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Preface 
June 2016 
The “Sino-German Comparison of Vertical Administrative Reforms” is an in-
ternational cooperation project initiated during the preparation period of 
China Society of Administrative Reform (CSOAR) from 2009 in cooperation 
with the German Research Institute of Public Administration and the German 
University of Administrative Sciences Speyer. It was supported by the Sino-
German Public Policy Dialogue Program of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für In-
ternationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). In 2010, the Sino-German cooperation 
project had officially launched and lasted for more than 3 years till its closure 
in October 2012.  
There are two reasons for choosing the topic of vertical administrative re-
forms for cooperation. On the one hand, the social and economic structures 
of China have been changing significantly after more than 31 years of reform 
and opening-up. Changing the dual structure of urban and rural areas, boost-
ing the strategy of urban-rural integration, accelerating the progress of in-
dustrialization and urbanization, expanding prefectural right of economic and 
social development, promoting counties directly under the management of 
provincial governments and achieving equivalence of public services etc. 
have a magnificent and profound impact on China's longitudinal administra-
tive levels, provincial, municipal and prefectural jurisdiction, public govern-
ance mode, finance and taxation, investment, and personnel management 
system. On the other hand, although Germany is a federal state, it has abun-
dant historical accumulation and practical exploration in terms of various ver-
tical levels of governments and administrations. It has accumulated plenty of 
experience especially in promoting urban-rural integration by functional and 
territorial reforms. There are many things that both parties can learn from 
each other, which deeply requires comparative studies.  
Both parties have hosted four major international academic conferences 
over more than three years: the first was the academic seminar of "Sino-Ger-
man Comparison of County Governance" hosted by the Chinese Academy of 
Governance in October 2010 followed by the "Territorial and Functional Re-
forms in China and Germany - A Comparison of Reforms of Sub-provincial / 
Sub-state Governance - " hosted by the German University of Administrative 
Sciences Speyer in September 2011. The third was the academic seminar of 
"County Public Finance Reform under Urban-Rural Integration" hosted in 
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Hangzhou, China, in March 2012; the fourth was the academic closure con-
ference "Administrative Reforms in China and Germany against the Back-
ground of the Financial Crisis" hosted by the Chinese Academy of Govern-
ance in October 2012. Among all those academic conferences, the partici-
pants not only include experts and scholars from both China and Germany as 
well as scholars from other European countries, but also a certain number of 
officials from actual government sectors. They conducted profound compar-
ison and discussion as well as provided a batch of papers with high academic 
level.  
During more than three years of cooperation, both parties have appointed 
experts, scholars and government officials to visit the other country for field 
study and academic communication many times. It gave them a better under-
standing of each other, enhanced their relationship, strengthened coopera-
tion, which is beneficial for both parties. The 31 papers collected in this book 
are the outstanding results of mutual cooperation.  
This book has a collection of 31 pieces of research results of Chinese and 
German experts, scholars and government officials. They are categorized into 
four sections:  
1. Introduction and analysis of the current situation of Sino-German admin-
istrative systems, such as experimental units of counties directly under
the management of provincial governments in the progress of China's ur-
banization, comparison of the Sino-German intergovernmental jurisdic-
tion division, history of the German administrative regions and local fi-
nance of Germany etc.;
2. Sino-German challenges faced by the administrative systems, such as
challenges of reform of counties directly under the management of pro-
vincial governments in China, urban-rural imbalance in the progress of
modernization of Germany and impacts of population change on local ad-
ministration management.;
3. Sino-German exploration and experience in administrative reform, such
as experience and inspiration of the administrative hierarchy reform of
Hainan, China, efficiency and expectation of strategies of “urban-rural in-
tegration” in Chengdu, China, inter-municipal cooperation in Germany –
design and limits of shared service, multilevel function reformation of
Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany;
4. Sino-German strategies of administrative reforms under the financial cri-
sis, such as influences of economic and financial crisis on German admin-
istration, strategies of China's urban-rural integration and optimization of
VII 
longitudinal administrative levels under financial crisis, promotion of 
equivalence of public services with fiscal balance. 
After publication of the Chinese conference papers “中德行政体制改革比较
研究”, the English version of the conference papers has suffered an unfortu-
nate delay due to problems of translation. The papers represent the differ-
ences in cultures of academic publication between both countries. As only 
very few information about the vertical administrative reform in China and 
corresponding reforms in Germany are available in English the publication 
will fill this knowledge gap. Both partners have agreed to continue common 
research on the implementation of the administrative reforms in China and 
Germany, their implementation and actual complementary issues of reform.  
It should be highlighted that without the sponsorship of GIZ, the "Sino-Ger-
man Public Policy Dialogue" Program would not be implemented success-
fully, and CSOAR as well as the two Speyer institutions have also provided us 
with great support. Moreover, GIZ covered the traveling costs of the German 
and European experts to and in China and those of the Chinese partners in 
Germany. Hereby, as the directors of this program, we would like to express 
our sincere gratitude to GIZ, CSOAR, Chinese Academy of Governance, Ger-
man University of Administrative Sciences Speyer, German Research Insti-
tute of Public Administration Speyer and all the experts, scholars, govern-
ment officials and related personnel who put efforts in the program and the 
book. We also thank Dominique Köppen, Stephanie Hengstwerth, Patricia 
Sander and Ursula Jungkind for all their efforts to prepare the proofs. 
Meanwhile, valuable opinions are welcome from readers and friends who 
are interested in this book! 
WANG Yukai Gisela FÄRBER 
Vice-chairman of CSOAR,  German University of 
Chinese Academy of Governance Administrative Sciences Speyer 
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1. THE CHINESE AND THE GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE
SYSTEM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
2 
3 
Research on Vertical Administrative Reform in China 
WANG Yukai 
China has conducted research and implemented reforms on administrative 
hierarchy during its 30 years of reform and opening up. As a whole, however, 
there are still many problems, among which the most serious one seen from 
vertical perspective is excessive administrative levels and costs, and imbal-
ance between responsibility and capacity of public services and the ability, 
impeding county economic development. Thus, how to deepen administra-
tive hierarchy management becomes an important task of administrative re-
form under current conditions.1  
1. We should reduce management levels
and empower local governments 
(1)  We should observe the policy of putting county directly under the control of 
provincial government in the implementation of urban-rural integration strategy. 
Since the Party put forward in the Third Plenary Session of the 16th CPC Cen-
tral Committee the strategic goal of basically achieving economic and social 
integration of urban and rural areas in 2020,2 issues regarding urban-rural 
integration again drew people’s attention. This paper believes that urban-ru-
ral integration cannot be interpreted as the urbanization of a rural area, nor 
as the general sense of urbanization. Actually, it means the process of inte-
gration of urban and rural areas in a state and society at a certain stage of 
economic and social development. This process will last long and the integra-
tion will not happen at once. Accordance to the experience of international 
community, the best period for urban-rural integration is when the urbaniza-
tion rate is about 50%.3 The rate of China at present has achieved 45.8%, an 
indication of the best time for the integration. 
1  Current administrative hierarchy of China including five levels: central, provincial, mu-
nicipal, county and township levels. 
2 The urban-rural integration strategy was put forward in Third Plenary Session of the 
16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in November, 2003. 
3  Accordance to the experience of international community, the best period for speed-
ing up urban-rural integration is when the urbanization rate is about 50%. 
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Seen from the perspective of system, urban-rural integration should in-
clude three basic elements.4 Firstly, it should systematically ensure that vari-
ous elements of urban and rural areas flow free and are not limited. Secondly, 
as the policy goal of the government, it should be a unified policy for both 
areas rather than two policies- one for urban area and the other for rural area. 
Thirdly, a unified institutional arrangement and design should be adopted in 
both areas. Based on the above institutional framework, urban-rural integra-
tion should conform with three goals. Firstly, in terms of politics, we should 
make traditional farmers and citizens have equal social status and common 
political rights. Secondly, in terms of economy, we should make productivity 
developed at the same level through promoting urban-rural integration, es-
pecially rural productivity. Thirdly, in terms of public service, we should make 
both urban and rural resident enjoy almost the same living standard and qual-
ity. In general, there are three ways to realize urban-rural integration.5 Firstly, 
we should break the system and policy restrictions on separated administra-
tion of urban and rural areas. Secondly, we should unify the planning, con-
struction and management of urban and rural areas. Thirdly, we should 
achieve the harmonious, coordinated and sustainable development of urban 
and rural economy and society.  
According to the above idea, this paper believes that an accurate judg-
ment of reality is undoubtedly the most important prerequisite and founda-
tion for implementing this strategy. It should be noted that China has made 
great achievements during its 30 years of reform and opening up and wit-
nessed the rapid industrialization and urbanization, but it has not achieved 
urban-rural integration. Instead, basically industrialization and urbanization 
develop in parallel. It should also be seen that three decades of reform and 
opening up has greatly improved living standards of Chinese people, includ-
ing that of farmers, and brought the number of impoverished people down 
from 250 million to 17 million, which can be one of world wonders. But it 
does not narrow the gap between urban and rural areas which even continues 
to expand with figures showing that the urban-rural income gap has changed 
from 2.22:1 in 1978 to 3.33:1 at present. Besides, historic changes that urban 
and rural areas have undergone have not shaken the foundation of separated 
administration of urban and rural areas and brought out excessive metropol-
itanization.  
4  “System” here refers to administrative hierarchy system. 
5  It refers to process and ways of urban-rural integration. 
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There are many reasons for the above issue, three of which can explain it 
from the perspective of system. Firstly, public policies formulated by the gov-
ernment has always been subject to separated administration of urban and 
rural areas. Thus, there is not a unified policy goal and arrangement. Secondly, 
China implemented the policy of “putting county under the control of munic-
ipal government” in 1982, which has facilitated the development of prefec-
ture-level cities. Based on the statistics, 275 out of 330 prefectures imple-
mented the aforementioned policy in 2002, covering one billion people. 
However, some municipal governments block capital projects, contain eco-
nomic development and occupy resources of counties. Such phenomena has 
to some extent intensified separated administration of urban and rural areas. 
Thirdly, township governance structure does not adapt to and to some extent 
have adversely affected the development process of urban-rural integration. 
All above indicate that it is necessary for us to make adjustment and imple-
ment reform on current administrative system.  
(2)  We should accelerate adjustment of vertical power structure of prefecture: 
the establishment of institutional framework of urban-rural integration. Accord-
ing to the central government, the adjustment of administrative hierarchy 
should be coupled with the strategy of empowering developed counties and 
strengthening their economy so as to reduce management levels and em-
power local governments. Accelerating the reform of putting counties di-
rectly under the control of provincial governments is a significant step in im-
plementing vertical management. There are two main models of this reform 
in China, Hainan Model6 and Zhejiang Model7. Hainan provincial government 
has never implemented the policy of putting county under the control of mu-
nicipal government from 1988, when Hainan province was just built. In 2008, 
it continued to streamline administration and delegate power, empowering 
municipal and county governments to deal with 100-plus matters. In 
Zhejiang Province, financial power is held by the provincial government while 
administrative power by municipal governments. Reforms like Zhejiang 
Model mainly aim to expand the power of county governments in economic 
management, which is different from the situation in social management and 
public services. This paper believes that Zhejiang Model is still the best choice 
6  Hainan Model refers to the policy Hainan provincial government has implemented to 
put county directly under the control of provincial government rather municipal gov-
ernment since 1988 when it was built. 
7  Zhejiang Model refers to the policy Zhejiang provincial government has implemented 
to put county administration directly under the control of municipal government and 
county finance of provincial government. 
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for other regions. But with the deepening of reform, it can be projected that 
more regions would choose Hainan Model during the Twelfth Five-year Plan 
period, not only financial power but also administrative power of county gov-
ernments are directly under the control of provincial government. Besides, 
the rapidly developing modernization, highway and E-government have pro-
vided guarantees for implementing the policy of putting county under the 
control of municipal government, increasing the number of entities directly 
governed by provincial government, and expanding management range.    
According to this paper, the administrative hierarchy should be based on 
local conditions and can coexist with other management structure. For in-
stance, after implementing the policy of putting counties directly under the 
control of provincial government, economically developed regions in the east 
can consider to cancel and integrate some township governments into agen-
cies so as to flatten management structure. In middle and western regions, 
township governments can be maintained with financial affairs of towns han-
dled by counties so as to avoid increasing burden on people because of their 
existence and to assume public services within their financial capacity. We 
can make effort from the following aspects. 
Firstly, we should make a bit of adjustment in the provincial and county 
administrative divisions, increasing the number of municipalities. But such 
adjustment may not lead to the increase of organizational system at the pro-
vincial level. Instead, only by setting cities like Dalian, Qingdao, Xiamen, 
Ningbo and Shenzhen as municipalities can we increase the number of pro-
vincial units. According to area and population of each region in China, this 
paper believes that we should at least have 40 provinces and municipalities8 
in total in the future.  
Secondly, we should further separate duties and powers of central, pro-
vincial, municipal and county governments. We should define responsibilities 
in social management and basic public services that governments at different 
levels shall take, and set up transfer payment systems respectively at central 
and provincial level. 
Thirdly, we should promote the transfer of power from provincial and mu-
nicipal governments to county governments.  Counties are important carriers 
for industrialization and urbanization, but much power is held by provincial 
8  Currently there are four municipalities directly under the central government, includ-
ing Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin and Chongqing, and the figure will be at least 40 if 
big cities like Dalian, Qingdao, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shenzhen are set as municipali-
ties. The number of provincial administrative units is small.    
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and municipal governments so that county governments do not have enough 
financial power to handle administrative affairs, social and public manage-
ment. We should promote provincial governments to empower county gov-
ernments by the reform of governing counties by provincial governments so 
as to balance financial power and authority.  
Fourthly, it is of vital importance for us to establish a standard provincial 
transfer payment system after county finance is included into provincial fi-
nance since each province has almost 100 counties with uneven develop-
ment. By doing so can we implement the policy of empowering developed 
counties and strengthening their economy which is fair to all counties rather 
than making developed one stronger while developing one weaker. 
Fifthly, it can be considered to upgrade administration of key counties on 
the basis of strict demonstration and scientific calculations, or to promote 
Party secretaries and governors at county level to prefecture level or sub-
prefecture level, and heads at township level to department level. By doing 
so can we stabilize grass-roots management teams and mobilize the initia-
tives of cadres. 
2.  We should push forward the equalization of basic public services  
and restructuring public service system 
To push forward the equalization of basic public services is a great strategic 
move put forward in the 17th CPC National Congress9 and a major goal for 
administrative system reform in the period of the twelfth Five-year Plan. It 
can be seen that the equalization of basic public services we have push for-
ward at present stage is at a lower level. That is to say, we should achieve the 
equalization for 21% of the world’s population with 6-7% of the world’s GDP, 
which is undoubtedly a great initiative. According to experts' estimates, we 
should invest at least six trillion yuan in order to achieve the equalization at 
lowest level and 45 trillion yuan at the average level of moderately developed 
countries.10 It is obvious that we still lack economic capacity to reach such a 
high level. Thus, we should start from a low level. 
                                               
9  It refers to the 17th CPC National Congress held in 2007. 
10 It is a research paper put forward by China Institute for Development and Reform. 
According to experts' estimates, we should invest at least six trillion yuan in order to 
achieve the equalization at lowest level and 45 trillion yuan, which is undoubtedly 
huge investment. 
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Since livelihood issues are prominent, to achieve equalization of basic 
public services will definitely be the focus of administrative system reform 
during period of the twelfth Five-year Plan. We should strive to push ahead 
our work from six aspects.  
(1)  We should set a goal for equalization of basic public services. Goals for real-
izing equalization of basic public services should include three aspects- the 
equalization between urban and rural areas, between regions, and between 
different social groups. We should do our work under the guidance of these 
goals.   
(2)  We should strengthen governmental responsibilities. It is inevitably for the 
government to play an important role and assume major responsibilities in 
the process of promoting equalization of basic public services. This paper be-
lieves that the governments should shoulder the following responsibilities in 
this process. Firstly, it should ensure the fairness and justice of the formulation 
and implementation of public policies, including choosing value orientation of 
public policy, preventing the change of governmental interests into depart-
mental interests, and making a coordinated strategic plan on equalization of 
basic public services. Secondly, it should reform and improve public fiscal sys-
tem. This move includes adjusting fiscal expenditure structure, allocating 
more fund to and keeping sustained growth of investment in public service 
sector, further deepening reform of fiscal administration system under pro-
vincial level to basically realize the equalization, and improving and regulat-
ing transfer payment system from the central government to local govern-
ments. Thirdly, it should promote governments’ capacity of public services with 
the focus on transform governmental duties and functions. The administrative 
system must meet the requirement of effectively performing public service 
functions. It should accelerate the pace of e-government and improve tech-
nical means and ways to supply basic public services and so on. Fourthly, it 
should establish a governmental performance evaluation system of basic public 
services. This includes working out basic standards and setting up a strict ac-
countability system of basic public services. 
(3)  We should establish a unified public service system. We should give empha-
sis on gradually establishing a unified public service system while advancing 
the equalization of basic public services. This is a arduous task for us. Accord-
ing to the current situation of China, the establishment of a unified public 
service system should mainly include the following aspects. Firstly, we should 
comprehensively promote rural compulsory education reform with the focus 
9 
on implementing the guarantee mechanism of educational appropriation, im-
plement the new rural cooperative medical care system and rural subsistence 
allowances system, and facilitate the reform of township fiscal administration 
system based on the principle of managing and utilizing township finance re-
spectively by county government and township government. Secondly, we 
should reasonably segregate duties of governments at all levels in basic pub-
lic services, like compulsory education, basic medical care, public health ser-
vice, public employment service, basic social security and other aspects. 
Thirdly, we should address the problem of inadequate basic public services 
for migrant workers. In other words, we should put forward nationwide policy 
to plan and solve this problem.11  
(4)  We should explore a mechanism of public service involving multiple roles. It 
can be seen that implementing the equalization of basic public services is a 
great cause, so it is impossible for the government to take on everything. The 
government, apart from fulfilling its responsibilities, should mobilize social 
and market forces, and explore a mechanism of public service involving mul-
tiple roles so as to speed up the equalization of basic public services. Rapid 
development of market reform and the growth of social organizations in the 
past have laid an important foundation for us to explore a mechanism of pub-
lic service involving multiple roles. 
3.  We should deepen the fiscal system reform and resolve the issue  
of relationship of financial resources and authority between central  
and local governments  
According to the report of the 17th CPC National Congress, we should push 
forward the equalization of basic public services and the construction of main 
functional regions and improve the public finance system.12 Therefore, we 
should accelerate the administrative system reform, effectively transform 
government functions, and facilitate the transformation of the government 
from a omnipotent one to a public service-oriented one, which will fully per-
form its duties in economic regulation, market supervision, social manage-
ment and public services. In this process, we should first gradually establish 
                                               
11  Basic public services for migrant workers mainly refer to the urbanization of those 
migrant workers who have left the rural area and entered into the town, which needs 
a large sum of input from the state to address their needs for most basic public service. 
12 It refers to a policy on improving public finance put forward in the 17th CPC National 
Congress held in 2007. 
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and improve the public finance system which is the basis for the government 
to fulfill its responsibility in public services.  
In recent years, with the rapid growth of fiscal revenue, the central govern-
ment focuses its spending on sectors like health, education and social secu-
rity in order to solve livelihood issues and promote economic and social de-
velopment in a comprehensive and coordinated way. The key point for con-
solidating financial results of livelihood is to improve systems, including fiscal 
system and transfer payments. As to the financial system, we should further 
clarify the authorities between governments at different levels in basic public 
services, including compulsory education, public health, social security, the 
environment and other aspects, and improve the fiscal system so as to keep 
balance in financial powers and authorities. As to the transfer payments sys-
tem, we should firstly improve the guiding ideology of transfer payments sys-
tem. That is to say, we should adopt general transfer payments completed 
with special transfer payments to enhance local governments’ capacities in 
public services with the basic goal of achieving the equalization of public ser-
vices across the country. Secondly, we should try to implement both vertical 
and horizontal transfer payments modes. Thirdly, we should phase out and 
include tax refund13 in general transfer payments. Fourthly, we should scien-
tifically define the standard of special transfer payments and control the ac-
cess to and the scale of them. Fifthly, we should improve the building of a 
legal system for transfer payments by defining the principle, content, form, 
budget and oversight in legal form. In addition, we should increase invest-
ment in basic public service sector. With economic development and the im-
provement of the market economic system, some quasi public products and 
services like infrastructures can be funded by private capitals so as to reduce 
government spending, which thus can be transferred to increased costs in 
basic public services like education, health care, welfare services and so on.  
                                               
13  Tax refund refers to a tax revenue returned from the central government to the local 
government based on the tax-sharing system and pursuant to relevant regulations. 
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4.  We should advance reform on the system of selection  
and appointment of leading cadres and improve public governance 
capacity of local governments 
The Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee has set the 
basic principle featuring democracy, openness, competitiveness and excel-
lence for the personnel system of cadres in the future.14 It can be envisaged 
that this principle not can only direct us to reform the personnel system of 
cadres, but also provide institutional guarantee for us to speed up the reform. 
It can be envisaged that this principle, not only for the next reform of person-
nel system we pointed out the direction, but also to accelerate the pace of 
reform of the cadre and personnel system during the second five, provide a 
guarantee. According to the spirit of the central government, we should ex-
pand the scope of directly elected grassroot leadership. At the meantime, this 
paper believes that we should pay attention to elections of Party and govern-
ment leadership both at township and county level. In view of the special ad-
ministrative status of counties, excellent performance in the election and ap-
pointment of county leadership will have significant influence on the overall 
public governance. Thus, this paper will provide several suggestions as fol-
lows.  
Firstly, we can consider to choose several pilot counties for the reform on 
personnel system of cadres and for the direct election of township Party and 
government leadership, which should implemented under teh direct control 
of the central government.  
Secondly, we can consider to make significant adjustments in township 
leadership. This paper suggests that Party secretary of the county should not 
serve as NPC director at the same time, otherwise the supervisory function 
of NPC cannot be realized.  
Thirdly, at county level, the posts of Party secretary and head of the 
county are suggested to be assumed by a person through direct election, who 
is supervised by both county people's congress and Commission for Disci-
pline Inspection (which is suggested to be managed by another one at higher 
level). In fact, these two bodies just need to oversee one person (who acts as 
Party secretary and head of the county). 
Fourthly, Party secretary and head of the county is suggested to be 
elected through the inner party election and the National People's Congress. 
                                               
14  It refers to principles for the reform of personnel system of cadres proposed in the 
Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee in April 2009.  
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Specific procedures are as follows. Firstly, several qualified candidates of 
Party secretary will be directly elected by Party members through inner elec-
tion. Secondly, head of the county will be selected from these candidates 
through the county National People’s Congress. Besides, candidates of head 
of the county can also be chosen from Party members by over ten represent-
atives of the county National People’s Congress. Thirdly, head of the county 
will be elected from the above candidates by all representatives of the county 
National People’s Congress. This person will also be Party secretary of the 
county. No matter in inner party election or in the National People's Con-
gress, multiple candidates should be given the right of expression so as to 
ensure the fairness and justice of elections. The above means of elections of 
county leadership will be a fundamental solution to strengthen responsibili-
ties of Party and government leadership for Party members and the masses, 
but also a good demonstration of democracy, openness, competitiveness and 
excellence. Historic changes will be found in county political ecology.   
 
13 
Public Administration going down to Rural Areas:  
Organizational Designs in History 
Stefan FISCH 
The "Peasants' War" against the lords and nobles, which occurred about 500 
years ago, was the most fundamental conflict of interests in pre-modern Eu-
ropean societies. The central question was how the products of agriculture 
should be shared between the peasants who produced them and the nobles 
who guaranteed in some way that the peasants could do so by giving them 
land and protecting them. In the year 1525, peasant protest in several Ger-
man regions culminated in their very unequal war against the nobles and their 
armies. In the end, about 100,000 peasants (out of 300,000 fighters) were 
killed, which was about 1 % of the total German population. 
About 350 years later Friedrich Engels reflected on this conflict in his 
book on the Peasants’ War in Germany, following Marxist lines of thought. 
He saw the war as a fundamental class struggle with revolutionary qualities 
and as a predecessor to the proletarian class war which he and Karl Marx ex-
pected in the near future. Stressing this aspect, Engels omitted the strong 
non-revolutionary elements in the peasants’ movement, a theme which has 
since been well researched. The peasants felt themselves treated in an unjust 
manner. Their conception of justice was based along the lines of a very tradi-
tional unwritten ‘good old law’ passed down from former times. For them, it 
was the nobles who had purposely broken this timeless and unchangeable 
law through changes that increased the charges and the obligatory labour 
which fell upon the peasants. 
Newer research focussed on the time of reconciliation after the Peasant’s 
War has examined whether the relations between the peasants in their hum-
ble dwellings and the lords in the castles changed afterwards? And was this 
change reflected in law, especially on the local level? This new research on 
this topic has been based on court records and decisions of that time which 
only became readily accessible to research in the 1960s at the earliest While 
conflicts of interests of course continued to exist, as a result of the Peasants’ 
War they were mitigated far more than before by the then emerging rule of 
law in many regions of Germany (not in all, however). This rule of law was a 
new thought, as it opened even to humble peasants a way access relatively 
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independent judges at a court. Conflicts between the two groups were in-
creasingly solved at law courts after 1525, up to the highest court of all, the 
famous ‘Imperial Chamber Court’. This Imperial Court was established in 
1495 and in 1527 it began to sit for more than 150 years in the Town Hall of 
Speyer, then a Free City in the Empire. The court ended its activity only in 
1806, when the Empire in its traditional form (‘Holy Roman Empire’) disap-
peared under Napoleon’s pressure. Not only were there many cases brought 
to the court by peasants against noblemen, but a substantial part of these 
cases were won by the common people. After 1525, these common people, 
mostly peasants, had organized themselves more and more through regular 
meetings and begun to decide commonly on their local affairs. The historians 
observe a certain juridification (Verrechtlichung) of power relations, instead 
of the use of brute force, and also local self-organization spreading over the 
countryside, not only in Germany. In 1789, in revolutionary France the com-
mon people in the 40,000 villages were quite familiar with the ways and 
means to defend their own interests. They even could write down their prop-
ositions for a better society and transfer them to their elected representa-
tives in the capital. 
However, the peasants’ world was not only determined by the local no-
bleman’s claims for charges and labor from the peasants. Within the scheme 
of different power layers in the early modern period there was also the supe-
rior authority of the monarchs who built their states and the supreme author-
ity of the Emperor in Vienna. In their search for regular income through gen-
eral taxation and for young men to serve as soldiers these monarchs began 
to more and more effectively penetrate the local communities. As early as 
about 1600 we find the first maps showing new administrative boundaries 
within a monarch’s territory which corresponded to the districts of newly 
nominated local office-holders of the central authority. With a steadily grow-
ing public administration (for taxation, recruitment, justice) its radius of ac-
tion grew, extending further and further away from the capital. Nonetheless, 
in the 17th and 18th century the new officials did not yet really penetrate the 
whole territory of a monarchy out to its most distant reaches. 
In the French Revolution, after 1789, a critical examination of the territo-
rial structures of public administration took place in France. What had grown 
up accidentally over two centuries or more was to be renewed as a rational 
organization of the country’s public administration. Nothing was more ra-
tional than geometry, and so a very interesting concept for the new adminis-
trative division of France was proposed. It was a standardized system based 
on the idea of equality (the fundamental value of the revolution) in the chain 
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of administrative hierarchy. In its radical version this project meant, that the 
new ‘departements’ of France should be as similar as possible to each other, 
that means in the shape of a square, and that their subdivisions should also. 
This was the break-through of a new rationality of administrative organiza-
tion. Each department should consist of equal parts, namely 9 (3 x 3) smaller 
parts, and each of them again of 9 smallest parts. For France as a whole, the 
about 80 departments would have been subdivided units (at least in this ge-
ometry-based rationality) to about 720 smaller units and further down to 
6,480 smallest ones, covering the about 40,000 villages.1 In reality, it was im-
possible for the legislator of 1790 to organize France by squares in squares 
in squares, as described. However, the establishment of ‘departements’ was 
a radically new organization. It served as a basis to destroy cultural and his-
torical traditions and, thereby, the identities of the former provinces, which 
were regarded as obsolete by the central authorities. 
In Germany, as the states began to distribute their agents in their rural 
areas, they had to cope with well-established traditions of local self-organi-
zation in many regions, which had been progressively strengthened, espe-
cially in the aftermath of 1525. Thus we find in Germany a variety of different 
models of administrative organization of the rural areas. This continued de-
spite the influence of the French Revolution, when German rulers sought to 
prevent a revolutionary movement by piecemeal reforms ‘from above’. The 
question of territorial organization was not approached in strictly rational 
manners and with total contempt of historical structures as it was in France. 
The two most important states in post-Napoleonic Germany were the King-
dom of Prussia (with its capital in Berlin) and the Kingdom of Bavaria (with its 
capital in Munich). If we look at them more closely we see that they shared 
(also with France) a hierarchical structure of new territorial administration, 
but they differed from each other in the extension of this structure. 
Prussia had by 1815, after a thorough reform of its institutions, five levels 
of administration and kept this structure up to 1933. Under the central min-
istries of the King there was a second layer of about a dozen (their number 
varied slightly over time) provinces under a ‘chief’-president (Oberpräsident) 
                                               
1  Designer of the project was Jacques-Guillaume Thouret, deputy for Rouen and presi-
dent of the National Assembly in 1789/90. In 1789 he added to the Declaration of 
Human Rights the central idea that "Nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden 
by law, and no one may be forced to do anything not provided for by law" (art. 5); in 
1794 he was no longer regarded as sufficiently radical and sentenced to death. The 
original map of 1789 in the French National Archives is online at: http://www.his-
toire-image.org/site/etude_comp/etude_comp_detail.php?i=280  
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who centralized the action of about two to six presidents of administrative 
districts (Regierungsbezirk), the third layer of administration, in his province. 
His title ‘chief’-president may sound rather odd, but it made clear that he, 
while being president of the district of his province's capital town, was in rank 
and influence above the presidents of the other districts in the province. On 
the third layer of Prussian public administration, that of districts (Regierungs-
bezirke), decisions were made by majority vote of five or so high state offi-
cials, one of whom acted as president of the Regierung (Regierungspräsi-
dent), who met regularly as a so-called (regional) ‘government’ (Regierung). 
Unlike the model of revolutionary France, the Prussian administrative struc-
ture was not shaped along strictly rational lines, but with great respect to 
historically rooted structures and different regional identities. When Marx 
and Engels grew up in the Kingdom of Prussia they were in a top-down orga-
nized system administrated on the levels of the state (King and the King's 
government), one of the 12 provinces (Province on the Rhine, with Koblenz 
as capital),2 and then one of about 40 administrative districts of the second 
layer (Marx by the ‘government’ of Trier, Engels by the ‘government’ of Düs-
seldorf).3 These greater units, provinces and ‘governments’, were again sub-
divided, in a fourth layer, into counties and (greater) autonomous cities which 
were treated like counties but not subdivided further. So Marx and Engels 
were each administrated on the level of one of about 400 counties in Prussia 
(city-county of Trier and county of Elberfeld, respectively). Engels grew up at 
Barmen which was one of the two municipalities (the other one being Elber-
feld) forming a county also called Elberfeld.4 Furthermore, under the county 
level there were about 50,000 local units in Prussia acting as the fifth and 
lowest administrative layer. These were mainly municipalities (Gemeinden) 
with a certain degree of autonomy, but up to the democratic Revolution of 
1918 Prussia also had more than 15,000 areas under the exclusive authority 
of their noble land-owner (Gutsbezirk), without any participation of their 
population of no less than 2 million Germans (= 4 % of the total population) 
in 1890. 
                                               
2  See a map (about 1900) at: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AProvinzen-
und-Regierungsbezirke-Preu%C3%9Fens.jpg  
3  See a map of 1905 at: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ARheinland_Regie-
rungsbezirke_1905.png 
4  See a map of 1817 at: http://www.solingen-internet.de/si-hgw/images/preussischer-
regierungsbezirk_duesseldorf.jpg; the municipalities of Barmen and Elberfeld joined 
in 1929 to form the city of Wuppertal, as it is known today. 
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So the general administration of the Kingdom of Prussia exhibited a cen-
tralized and hierarchical structure based on orders being given from the top 
and going down to the bottom. However, there was on the lower layers of the 
local level (especially in the bigger city-counties, but also in the small munic-
ipalities) a certain element of local participation by the common people. In 
some places this came from a change in institutional design after the Peas-
ants’ War, and for Prussian cities in general, it was implemented following a 
famous reform in favor of local autonomy in 1807 (Städteordnung). 
A highly important and interesting innovation in Prussia was to have a 
self-government element parallel to the general administration on the sec-
ond layer of public administration, that of the 12 provinces, as well. The high-
est state official in the province, the chief-president (Oberpräsident), had two 
very different functions at the same time: to obey to the orders from Berlin 
and to simultaneously act as the voice of his province to the same central 
authorities in the capital. The reason for this consultative role of the chief 
presidents was their quasi-automatic membership in the Prussian State 
Council (Staatsrat). Before the first freely elected parliament was established 
in 1848, the State Council was a highly influential quasi-parliament consist-
ing of the highest-ranking personalities (the Royal princes, the field-marshals, 
the King's ministers, and so on), and it continued in this function even later 
on. 
If we look a bit closer at the real tasks of an "Oberpräsident" in Prussia, we 
find that in addition to those resulting from the mainly hierarchical structure 
of public administration there were also very ‘modern’ elements such as ne-
gotiating and bargaining. It was he who was responsible within his province 
for those matters 'which were not mere administration' from above, but 
which needed negotiations: 
− between the state and religious authorities, 
− between the state and military authorities (who were a world apart up to 
the revolution of 1918), and 
− between the state and organizations within the civic society, especially 
the representatives of those privileged groups who participated actively 
in provincial self-government. The reason was that some structures of self-
government existed on the provincial level, especially with the provincial 
assembly, a quasi-parliament (without real legislative powers, and re-
stricted to the provincial affairs) of some relevant stake-holders, though 
not all (the various trade unions for instance were excluded, as usual at 
that time, and also national minorities like the Polish). 
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On the whole, we get the impression of a relatively responsive administrative 
structure on the lower levels of public administration, albeit particularly re-
sponsive to the ideas and proposals of rather privileged groups. Of course, 
this responsiveness depended to a high degree on the personal abilities of 
the holders of office and a certain ‘good will’ of the central government at 
Berlin. However, in general, there was some freedom of action to administer 
different provinces (as Rhineland and Westphalia in the industrialized West 
compared to Brandenburg and Pomerania in the agricultural East of the King-
dom) in different ways. 
Looking at the second kingdom in Germany, Bavaria, there were as in 
Prussia both elements present: a certain self-government and a strong gen-
eral state administration. However, due to the different size of the state the 
public administration was organized as a system of only four layers, with the 
King and his ministers, as in Prussia, on top. However, at the second layer in 
Bavaria there existed neither provinces nor the Prussian office of "Oberpräsi-
dent" to act as a transmitting actor between his province and the central 
state. Administratively, on the second layer Bavaria was divided into eight 
government districts, seven in the ‘mainland’ and the eighth one (the Palati-
nate, of which Speyer was the capital) about 200 km away on the left bank of 
the Rhine river. The third layer consisted of more than 150 counties and 
about 30 independent cities with their local authorities,5 and the fourth layer 
were the smaller municipalities in the countryside. 
So, the structures of public administration were similar in both cases. 
Apart from the top level of the King and his ministers, Bavaria and Prussia 
shared, if we look at it from the bottom, the municipalities, the counties and 
independent cities, and those administrative units grouping them together. 
The specific additional element in Prussia (with 64 % of total German terri-
tory and 60.6 % of the population as of 1890)6 that was lacking in Bavaria (14 
% of Germany and 11.3 % of Germans) were the provinces which grouped 
and coordinated the layer which was to supervise the counties and independ-
ent cities. If we compare merely the quantitative dimensions, the average 
                                               
5  See the government districts, called circles (Kreise), and counties in Bavaria in a 1862 
map (the Palatinate is not shown at its real geographic position) online at: 
http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerns.de/thumbnail/artikel/artikel_44535_bilder 
_value_1_regierungsbezirk1.jpg  
6  Hohorst, Gerd / Kocka, Jürgen / Ritter, Gerhard A.: Sozialgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch. 
Materialien zur Statistik des Kaiserreichs 1870 - 1914, München 1975, table 13, p. 47 
(in general, the book gives valuable data in the field historical statistics for Germany 
1871 to 1914). 
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Prussian province accounted for 5.4 % of German territory and 5.1 % of the 
German population, the same as half of Bavaria. Or the other way round: the 
Prussian province with the biggest territory, Silesia with its capital at Breslau 
(since 1945, Wroclaw in Poland) was 68 % the size of all Bavarian territory, 
and the Prussian province with the biggest population, the highly industrial-
ized Rhineland with its capital at Koblenz, had 84.1 % the total Bavarian pop-
ulation. 
Provinces as parts of the Prussian state were comparable to whole states 
in the German Empire of 1871. For Prussia this posed a problem of size and 
power in relation to the smaller states. After the collapse of Hitler’s ‘Great’-
German Empire in 1945 two German states arose, later to be reunified in 
1990. In the Federal Republic of Germany we still find Bavaria as a state while 
some Prussian provinces have become federal states either as they were 
(Schleswig-Holstein and Brandenburg), or with some additional territories 
(Niedersachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Hessen), or as an amalgamation of two for-
mer Prussian provinces (Northern Rhineland-Westphalia). In the latter case, 
the self-government structures of the two provinces survived under new 
names (Landschaftsverband). 
This development shows that the question of administrative layers is not 
only important in the organizational design of territorial administration. It is 
also of essential importance in the development of sustainable structures 
that allow for the participation of those who are administered and open a 
span of maneuvers for the leading administrators to take action for the public 
good. 
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Further English reading: 
Blickle, Peter: The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants' War from a New 
Perspective, Baltimore 1985 (standard title with fresh insights, trans-
lated in English). 
Clark, Christopher: Iron Kingdom. The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600 – 
1947, London 2006 (New comprehensive study from outside Ger-
many). 
Engels, Frederick: The Peasant War in Germany, in: Collected Works of Karl 
Marx and Frederick Engels, vol. 10: 1849-1851, New York 1978, p. 397-
482; see also online http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/ 
1850/peasant-war-germany/index.htm   
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The Pilot of Province Governing Counties Structural Reform and Its 
Implication for Policies in the Progress of Urbanization 
ZHANG Zhanbin 
Since the 16th CPC National Congress, the Party Central Committee (PCC) 
and the State Council take the province governing counties reform very seri-
ously. A few key areas and links achieved great progress, which have crucial 
impact and far-reaching significance in balancing urban and rural develop-
ment, expanding county economies, reducing administrative levels and en-
hancing administrative efficiency. Meanwhile, we need to notice that the 
province governing counties reform has an overall background, which China’s 
urbanization is entering an accelerating period. It involves the adjustment 
and coordination of multi-stakeholders. For further promotion of the prov-
ince governing counties structural reform, we need new institutional arrange-
ments in terms of economic and social administration authority of counties, 
fiscal management system, cadre management system, judicial management 
system, working system of NPC and CPPCC and other aspects according to 
the development requirements of new urbanization. In 2010, the State Com-
mission Office for Public Sector Reform (SCOPSR) confirmed to conduct pilot 
of province governing counties reform in 30 counties (cities) of 8 provinces: 
Anhui, Henan, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hebei, Yunnan and Ningxia. We 
planned to complete the pilot in about 3 years in order to accumulate expe-
rience for promoting province governing counties structural reform after the 
18th CPC National Congress. According to our tracking, observation and re-
search for many years, the article analyses – the new propulsion of province 
governing counties reform: carrying out counties specifically designated in 
the provincial plan or entirely administrated by provinces in pilot counties.  
I.  Propulsion methods of province governing counties reform 
in pilot provinces 
According to national progress of the province governing counties reform, 
SCOPSR and the pilot group actively explore new approaches and methods 
of province governing counties on the basis of implementing fiscal system of 
province governing counties and enlarging economic administration author-
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ity of counties (cities). In July 2010, SCOPSR published Notification with re-
gard to launching pilot of province governing counties structural reform, re-
questing pilot provinces achieving breakthroughs on key issues and touching 
underlying problems.  
First to extend seconomic and social administration authority of pilot coun-
ties. It requests extending decentralization efforts; researching and adjusting 
the relationship between vertical management, sending department and pi-
lot counties; the implementation of adjustment of administration authority 
needs to be conducted in the framework of laws and policies and carried out 
with necessary procedures; hurrying up to establish supervision and re-
striction system in compliance with the empowerment of governments of pi-
lot counties.  
Second, further implementation of fiscal system of province governing coun-
ties. We need to straighten out the expenditure liability and fiscal distribution 
relationship of provinces , prefecture-level cities and pilot counties on sur-
face, strengthen the fiscal system of provinces with matching finance and 
governance and study the financial administration authority of standard pilot 
counties. Provincial finance needs to increase support of pilot counties and 
encourage establishing award mechanism of prefecture-level cities helping 
pilot counties. For prefecture-level cites that increase support of pilot coun-
ties and achieve distinct results, provinces can give them certain awards of 
transfer payment.  
Third is adjusting judicial management system. From the local actual condi-
tions, we need to actively explore judicial management system suitable to 
province governing counties. As to the establishment of judicial organs, it 
does not only need to abide by regulations of organization laws of the Court 
and Procuratorate, facilitating people and ensuring normal and effective con-
duct of trials and legal supervision works, but also follow the principal of sim-
ple, united and effective without needless duplication. Moreover, it brings 
related requirements of cadre management system, administrative division, 
adjustment of work system of NPC and CPPCC.  
From Anhui, Henan, Heilongjiang, Ningxia, Jiangsu and other provinces, 
pilot counties have defined their own reform emphasis, which explore the 
path of thorough reform of national province governing counties. The follow-
ing are the propulsion methods of four province governing counties (cities) 
of representative provinces organized from related papers and materials.  
23 
i.  Pilot scheme of Anhui Province basically achieved province governing counties 
Pilot counties of Anhui Province: Guangde County, Xuancheng City and Su-
song County, Anqing City 
Expanding economic and social administration authority. We are giving pilot 
counties the same economic, social, cultural and other administration author-
ity as cities with districts. Apart from specific statements of  national laws 
and regulations, economic and social management affairs originally approved 
or managed by cities divided into districts shall be approved or managed by 
pilot counties themselves; anything that needs approval of cities with dis-
tricts and the province shall be directly approved by the province. As to items 
that need to be approved by cities with districts according to regulations of 
the State Council and other related departments, it shall be delegated by en-
trustment, authorization or other methods.  
Adjusting management system. Party committee and government of pilot 
counties are directly responsible for and report to provincial party committee 
and government; NPC Standing Committee of pilot counties directly report 
to and accept supervision of provincial NPC Standing Committee; CPPCC of 
pilot counties directly report to and accept direction of provincial CPPCC; the 
Commission for Discipline Inspection of pilot counties are directly responsi-
ble for and report to provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection; NGOs 
of pilot counties directly report to and accept business direction of provincial 
NGOs; according to laws, regulations and party constitution, party commit-
tee of pilot counties and all government departments accept direct business 
direction or leading of provincial party committee and government depart-
ments.  
Reforming organization and cadre management system. Party chiefs of pilot 
counties are under direct management of provincial party committee. Pro-
vincial party committee entrusts organization department of provincial party 
committee to manage other leading cadres above vice-county level (including 
Court, Procuratorate and other high cadres); organization department of pro-
vincial party committee approves and manages the transfer of cadres above 
vice-county level; leaders of environment, audit and other departments of pi-
lot counties are directly assisted to manage by provincial departments. Rep-
resentatives and commissioners who attend provincial party congress, NPC, 
CPPCC and other conferences on behalf of pilot counties are still elected in 
the cities with districts of pilot counties.  
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Straightening out relationships, which are for the purpose of completing gov-
ernment function of pilot counties and strengthening government capacity 
of regional economic and social development of pilot counties as a whole. 
Management institutions that Provincial Industry and Commerce, Local Tax, 
Quality Supervision and other departments set up in pilot counties change 
from vertical management under province to party committee and govern-
ment of pilot counties. It receives business direction from provincial depart-
ments. Cadres of Land and Resources department of pilot counties change to 
be managed by county party committee. Roads and other vertical manage-
ment institutions under municipal change to be managed by party committee 
and government of pilot counties and are directly guided by provincial de-
partments in business.  
Judicial management system. Judicial business management system with clear 
declaration of laws and regulations stay the same.  
ii.  Pilots in Henan Province mainly adopt economic and social counties 
specifically designated in the provincial plan  
Pilot counties (cities) of Henan Province: Gongyi City under the governance 
of Zhengzhou City; Lankao County, Kaifeng City; Ruzhou City under the gov-
ernance of Pingdingshan City; Hua County, Anyang City; Changyuan County, 
Xinxiang City; Dengzhou City under the governance of Nanyang City; Yong-
cheng City under the governance of Shangqiu City; Gushi County, Xinyang 
City; Luyi County, Zhoukou City; Xincai County, Zhumadian City, etc.  
Expanding economic and social administration authority. Provincial govern-
ment gives government of pilot counties (cities) municipal economic and so-
cial administration authority. Pilot counties are entitled with economic and 
social administration authority that provincial cities (including cities with dis-
tricts) are entitled with by laws, regulations and rules. Pilot counties report 
their statistics (including department statistics) directly to provincial coun-
terparts and copy to their provincial cities. The economic and social statistics 
of pilot counties are numbered into the total amount of their provincial cities. 
Pilot counties carry out the system of direct financial management of the 
province. All sorts of supporting funds of pilot counties (cities) undertaken 
by provincial cities are still undertaken by provincial cities; the provincial fi-
nance undertakes supporting funds that require provincial cities giving to pi-
lot counties in new national and provincial policies.  
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Adjusting management system. Government work of pilot counties is directly 
under the lead of provincial government. All government departments of pi-
lot counties are directly under the lead or receive business direction from 
provincial departments. Economic and social development affairs of province 
to pilot counties are separately managed. Items of pilot counties that need 
superior approval and examination are changed to direct approval and exam-
ination of province. Leading system of party committee, NPC and CPPCC, 
Court and Procuratorate system as well as cadre management and social sta-
bility, authority and responsibility of pilot counties stay the same. To facili-
tate the propulsion of pilot work, party secretaries and county magistrates of 
pilot counties upgrade to deputy departmental level. As to administration of 
other cadres, the basic guiding thought of the province is to upgrade by de-
velopment level of counties (cities), rather than upgrade by promotion. For 
those counties (cities) that develop very fast after governance of province, if 
their economic aggregate and prefectural population reaches to certain scale, 
cadres can be considered to manage by deputy departmental level. For those 
counties with continuous decrease of main indexes, adjustment of the post 
of main leaders can be made, or the pilot qualification can be cancelled.  
Straightening out relationships. Industry and Commerce, Local Tax, Quality Su-
pervision and other vertical management departments under provincial and 
Land and Resources department of pilot counties are directly guided by pro-
vincial departments. Opinions of party committee and government of pilot 
counties are important basis for provincial departments assessing and exam-
ining county departments work and appointing cadres.  
iii.  The pilot of Jiangsu Province adopts the method of provincial government 
directly leading pilot counties (cities) 
Pilot counties (cities) of Jiangsu Province: Kunshan City under the governance 
of Suzhou City; Taixing City under the governance of Taizhou City; Muyang 
County, Suqian City 
Adjusting administration system. In condition of remaining administrative di-
vision, statistical standards affiliation and cadre management system of pilot 
counties unchanged, provincial government directly leads government work 
of pilot counties (cities). According to laws, regulations and rules, all govern-
ment departments of pilot counties receive business guidance or lead of pro-
vincial departments.  
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Expanding administration authority. Emphasizing on transformation of func-
tions and enhancing efficiency, pilot counties (cities) are given the same ad-
ministration authority as cities with districts. Administration authority of pre-
fectural governments regulated by laws, regulations and rules shall be per-
formed by government of pilot counties (cities); administration authority of 
government and affiliated departments of cities with districts regulated by 
laws, regulations and rules shall be delegated to government of pilot counties 
(cities) and affiliated departments by legal authorization or entrustment; ad-
ministration authority of provincial government and affiliated departments 
regulated by laws, regulations and rules can authorize or entrust administra-
tion authority of government and affiliated departments of cities with dis-
tricts, or authorize or entrust government and affiliated departments of pilot 
counties (cities) to perform.  
Straightening out relationships. Local Tax Bureau of pilot counties change from 
vertical management under province to provincial Local Tax Bureau manage-
ment. Land and Resources Bureau and its cadres of pilot counties (cities) 
change to be managed by provincial Office of Land and Resources.  
iv.  The pilot of Ningxia Autonomous Region adopts entirely  
administrated by provinces 
Pilot counties of Ningxia: direct pilot management of autonomous region – 
Yanchi and Tongxin County of Wuzhong City 
Adjusting management system. Cancellation of administrative relationship of 
prefecture-level city and pilot counties. Party committee and government of 
pilot counties directly report to party committee and government of autono-
mous region. During the election of cities and counties, prefecture-level cities 
and pilot counties select their own representatives of NPC and commission-
ers of CPPCC to attend NPC and CPPCC conference of autonomous region 
separately. Main leaders of party and government of pilot counties are man-
aged by party committee of autonomous region. Other members are man-
aged by organization department of party committee. Party chiefs upgrade 
to deputy departmental level; deputy secretary and executive vice county 
magistrate upgrade to division level.  
Adjusting judicial system. Second instance cases of Court and Procuratorate of 
pilot counties and legal supervision directly connect with Supreme People's 
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Court of autonomous region and People's Procuratorate of autonomous re-
gion. To facilitate the masses and law enforcement, Supreme People's Court 
of autonomous region and People's Procuratorate of autonomous region ap-
point Intermediate People's Court and People's Procuratorate of Wuzhong 
City by law to take charge of the trials of first instance of important cases and 
second instance of Primary Court and Procuratorate as well as legal supervi-
sion.  
Expanding economic and social administration authority. Apart from specific 
statements of national laws and regulations, economic and social manage-
ment affairs originally approved or managed by prefecture-level cities shall 
be managed by pilot counties. Adjusting and completing vertical manage-
ment department system under autonomous region at the same time, central 
vertical management department and bank, power supply and other public 
service industry can make adjustment according to the need of structural re-
form of autonomous region governing counties.  
II.  Counties specifically designated in the provincial plan is the major 
mode of province governing counties reform of pilot counties (cities) 
Judging from the reform mode of 30 pilot counties (cities) of 8 provinces, 
most counties (cities) adopt the propulsion method of specific designation of 
provincial economic and social development. Specifically designated cities 
have a long history in our country. Connecting with province governing coun-
ties reform, its feature of streamlining administration and institutional de-
centralization show up.  
i.  Advantages of administrative system of specific designation  
Province governing counties reform emulates administrative system of spe-
cific designation, which makes sense theoretically, but whether national spe-
cific designation or provincial specific designation needs administrative 
power and development resources of a higher level. The basic idea of this ad-
ministrative reform is to close the relationship between provinces and coun-
ties, providing counties with more complete administrative power. There are 
at least a few reasons why counties specifically designated in the provincial 
plan are used to promote province governing counties reform:  
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First is the result of balancing interests of multiple parties. The reform task is 
very difficult and complicated nowadays. Every step of moving forward 
comes with huge obstruction, which are not due to external society but the 
inner system, and even some from the high level. On the one hand, people 
worry that province governing counties reform would affect the decision-
making and implementation of prefecture-level cities planning development 
space of counties (cities) under their governance. The natural connection be-
tween prefecture-level cities and counties (cities) are cut off, and industry 
accumulation and expansion among middle and small sized cities would be 
restricted. The function of central cities cannot be enhanced, and the devel-
opment of prefectural (municipal) towns would be separated. On the other 
hand, people realize that adjusting power relations of provinces, cities and 
counties and releasing the energy of economic and social development are 
the basic logic of systematic reform since the reform and opening-up of 
China. Both the formation and development of city governing counties sys-
tem and structural reform of province governing counties fit with this basic 
political logic. In order to giving attention to both sides, the reform mode of 
counties specifically designated in the provincial plan carried out naturally. 
By choosing this mode, it balances the interest demand of central govern-
ment, provinces, prefecture-level cities and counties (cities). It is a compro-
mising progress to achieve propulsion as well as taking care of interests of all 
parties.  
Second is helpless choice of supervision of counties (cities). The validity of 
supervision will be severely challenged after province governing counties re-
form. Due to the increase of span of management, provinces are undertaking 
huge guidance and supervision pressure because of the existence of numer-
ous supervision loopholes; prefecture-level cities would be in the dilemma of 
invalid supervision due to the change of their authority-responsibility rela-
tionship with counties (cities); counties (cities) would be facing the test of 
supervision level because of lack of supervision capacity, and even some op-
portunists try to avoid supervision. Choosing specific designation mode is to 
combine close supervision of prefecture-level cities to pilot counties with dis-
tant supervision of provinces to pilot counties.  
Third is looking for a good transition for the propulsion of province governing 
counties reform of counties under the governance of large provinces. Prov-
ince governing counties reform of counties under the governance of large 
provinces is the difficulty of reform. On the premise of administrative division 
not being reformed, the propulsion of province governing counties reform is 
limited. Developing counties specifically designated in the provincial plan in 
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the economic society, direct lead of provincial government to government of 
pilot counties, prefecture-level cities leading party committee, NPC and 
CPPCC of pilot counties, and efficient departmentalization of prefecture-
level cities can alleviate the provincial pressure to some extent, so that the 
scope of province governing counties reform can be expanded accordingly, 
which is the transition of promoting province governing counties reform 
without changing administrative division. Overall, the core content of this pi-
lot of structural reform of province governing counties for most provinces is 
to give government of pilot counties (cities) the economic and social admin-
istration authority of what provincial cities have. The economic and social de-
velopment affairs of pilot counties (cities) are managed by provinces on the 
mode of specific designation. The administration organization system and ad-
ministrative division of pilot counties (cities) stay the same, so as party com-
mittee, NPC and CPPCC system, judicial system, cadre management, social 
stability administration authority and responsibility.  
ii.  Difficulties faced by reform of counties specifically designated  
in the provincial plan 
Increase of difficulty of balancing interests of prefecture-level cities and pilot 
counties (cities). In the reform plan of some provinces, balancing interests of 
prefecture-level cities and pilot counties is all requested, which is extremely 
difficult in the actual propulsion. Before the pilot reform, prefecture-level cit-
ies spared no effort to support economic and social development of pilot 
counties (cities) because of highly relevant interests of economic and social 
development between prefecture-level cities and pilot counties (cities) under 
their governance. After specific designation of pilot counties (cities), they no 
longer have connections with prefecture-level cities in terms of revenue. Rev-
enue created by pilot counties are shared between province and pilot coun-
ties, while prefecture-level cities are just outsiders. Since the development of 
specifically designated counties (cities) only affects related economic indexes 
of prefecture-level cities, and prefecture-level cities can no longer acquire 
large amount of revenue, they certainly no longer put into resources. We felt 
that even if provincial government launches award mechanism to encourage 
prefecture-level cities helping pilot counties (cities), it will not so effective. 
Moreover, prefecture-level cities have limited authority in terms of the ap-
pointment and transfer of major cadres of specifically designated counties 
(cities), which increase the difficulty of communication and cooperation be-
tween specifically designated counties (cities) and prefecture-level cities.  
30 
 
Rough system. The relationship between most pilot counties and prefecture-
level cities is leading and being leaded as well as cooperation and competi-
tion. According to the requirements of counties specifically designated in the 
provincial plan, party committee of pilot counties report to prefecture-level 
cities, and NPC, CPPCC and the system stay unchanged. In this case, eco-
nomic and social development is managed by provinces while cadres and per-
sonnel are managed by cities, which inevitably leads to conflicts, putting both 
cities and counties into an embarrassing situation. From a few pilot counties 
(cities) we noticed that NPC and CPPCC system does not make adjustment 
accordingly, which affects normal performance of rights and implementation 
of duties of prefectural NPC representatives and CPPCC commissioners. It 
must have an influence on the economic and social development of pilot 
counties (cities) on the long run.  
Blocked communication of cadres. Under the system of city governing coun-
ties, the selection and adjustment of county cadres and cultivation and use 
of reserved cadres are carried out by prefecture-level cities. After counties 
specifically designated in the provincial plan, it is co-managed by province 
and prefecture-level cities generally. Since there is competitive relationship 
between pilot counties and prefecture-level cities, prefecture-level cities will 
not care as much as they used to be in terms of allocating cadres of pilot 
counties, which will gradually increase the burden of province. Currently, 
there are about 30 to 40 county cadres in a county (city), and they are allowed 
to re-allocate in the scope of prefecture-level city. After province governing 
counties, there is a link missing in the middle. County-level cadres moved 
from county to county, county to city and city to province, which resulted 
many problems of cadre transfer and management.  
III.  A few aspects that the pilot of in-depth province governing counties 
reform need to strengthen 
In view of province governing counties reform in the past, unilateral delega-
tion of power was hard to implement in real, and the problem of deficient 
vitality of counties (cities) development has not been solved fundamentality. 
The major problem was mismatching reform policies, and the key field and 
link achieved no breakthrough. Province governing counties is a large trend. 
Places with conditions need to shorten transitional period and finish pilot as 
soon as possible in order to accumulate experience for full-scale reform.  
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i.  Strengthening transformation of governmental function  
of pilot counties (cities) 
It must be pointed out that whether the structural reform of province gov-
erning counties is effective depends on whether governmental function can 
achieve actual transformation. We cannot simply consider prefectural eco-
nomic development issue as administrative division issue, let alone raising 
unrealistic expectation of the performance of province governing counties 
system. We need to be conscious to notice that governmental function trans-
formation is the political path of full-scale propulsion of the construction of 
well-off society, as well as the core of carrying out administrative reform of 
our country. As to pilot counties (cities) of province governing counties re-
form, further transformation of function is the premise and foundation of in-
stitutional innovation, systematic innovation, mechanical innovation and 
procedural innovation. Thus, we shall spare no efforts to promote the follow-
ing works in the pilot. First is highlighting management and service, strength-
ening social management and public services ability of pilot counties and 
constructing service-oriented government on the basis of governmental 
function transformation. Second is promoting in-depth institutional reform 
of villages and towns of pilot counties according to the requirements of bal-
ancing urban and rural development. We need to accelerate the propulsion 
of expanding power and strengthening town, extend part of administrative 
function and social administration authority to villages and towns by lawful 
exploration, and move the center of administrative enforcement of law down-
wards. Circling around the reform of management and operation mode of in-
stitutional organization of the village and town, we need to build up public 
service platform which aims at promoting economic and social development 
ability of village and town service.  
ii.  Strengthening the design of supervision and restriction system  
of pilot counties (cities) 
Province governing counties reform is a cutting-edge topic for prefectural su-
pervision. The reform enhances the power of counties. But in current pilot 
plans, the supervision and restriction of county power is obviously not 
enough. It not only lack of the restriction design from top to bottom, the re-
striction construction from bottom to top, but also the inter-restriction 
mechanism of power at the same level. If province governing counties 
strengthens the county power which lacks of restriction the most and not 
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providing effective restriction, it will lead to control loss of central govern-
ment and provinces to counties to some extent. According to the require-
ment of integration of power and responsibility, that is to say, power comes 
with responsibility; pilot counties (cities) shall undertake responsibility in ac-
cordance with administration authority when expanding their economic and 
social administration authority. Supervision and restriction of pilot counties 
needs to be innovative. It needs new design that in accordance with new ad-
ministrative system.  
• Firstly, provinces and cities shall supervise and urge counties (cities) to 
enhance administration by law and system construction. We shall insist 
on managing power, affairs and people by system, completing supervision 
mechanism and strengthening responsibility investigation. We shall com-
plete scientific and democratic decision-making system and increasing 
government's decision-making level continuously.  
• Secondly, we shall carry out in-depth mechanism reform of pilot counties 
according to the principal of simplifying unified performance and the re-
quirements of mutual restriction and coordination of decision-making 
power, execution power and supervision power.  
• Thirdly, we shall establish provincial supervision system. With regular su-
pervision, irregular spot check, e-government affairs linkage and other 
method, we can establish complete supervision and restriction system in 
compliance with government power expansion of pilot counties, stand-
ardize power operation and strengthen administrative accountability.  
• Fourthly, we shall strengthen the system of making government affairs 
public, unblock complaints channels reporting by the masses and consoli-
date social supervision by public opinion.  
iii.  Strengthening the establishment of cooperation mechanism  
of prefecture-level cities and pilot counties (cities) 
Province governing counties reform enables the change of affiliation of pilot 
counties and original provincial cities. But since they belong to the identical 
economic plate and their connection of history, culture and social lives, they 
need further cooperation for mutual development. We shall strengthen the 
coordination and cooperation of pilot counties and their provincial cities, es-
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pecially overall coordination of land utilization, urban-rural planning, indus-
trial distribution, infrastructure construction, public services etc., accelerate 
information construction, prevent repeat construction, promote reasonable 
configuration and natural flow of market factors, achieve new city-county re-
lationship of co-construction and sharing of major public infrastructure, com-
plimenting each other's advantages, co-development and mutual benefit and 
win-win result. Provincial departments need to strengthen innovation of re-
gional coordinative development mechanism and support industrial struc-
ture adjustment and fiscal and taxation system innovation that are suitable 
for administrative structural reform in order to create conditions for provin-
cial cities implementing duties of coordinating regional development.   
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Vertical Government Relationship in China and Germany:  
A Comparative Perspective 
REN Jin 
As one of the fundamental relationship within the national administrative 
structure, relationship between governments at all levels indicates the au-
thority division among governments. Government structure and administra-
tive system of Germany, a developed country in Europe, are perfect repre-
sentative and illuminating sample for our study on power and function allo-
cation between governments at all levels in Germany and China.   
I.  Significance, principle and method of power and function allocation 
between governments at all levels 
ⅰ.  Significance of power and function allocation between governments  
at all levels 
Relationship between governments at all levels indicates the authority divi-
sion among governments. Power and function allocation between govern-
ments at all levels means to divide the national power vertically, reflecting 
the state structure in legislative and administrative level. 
Comparing to unitary structure, the political mode, that is the power de-
centralization in federal system which distributes the state power throughout 
the country, will act as a whole in external, and takes a better consideration 
of the regional characteristics and diversity in a large extent. Power allocation 
among federal members could ensure the freedom of each other and protect 
the interest of each federal member. Meanwhile, power decentralization in 
federal system is conducive for citizens’ better involvement of politics, and 
strengthening democratic principle. Additionally, power decentralization in 
federal system is of great significance in extinguishing power abuse, and pro-
moting the competition between different federal members and different 
federations and their development. Federal members’ authorization to local 
government is also meaningful in promoting local democracy.    
Configuration optimization and rational allocation of unitary authority fa-
cilitate the formation of benign vertical interaction and positively influence 
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the governments at all levels under unitary authority. 150 years ago, Tocque-
ville said: “No matter how intelligent and capable a government might be, it 
cannot be perspective of the minutest detail in everything or of a great power 
on its own”1. A well-disposed inter-governmental relationship is based on a 
scientific power and function allocation between governments at all levels, 
which is also a normal feature of inter-governmental relationship between 
countries ruled by law. If power is excessively concentrated in central govern-
ment or national department, this may lead to power abuse and depress local 
government. But if the power of central or national government is too week, 
local government, which is entitled to great authority, may tend to secession. 
All these above will impair national power of China and might damage the 
stable political environment.    
ⅱ.  Principle and method adopted in power and function allocation  
between governments at all levels 
In a federal state, power and function allocation between governments at all 
levels covers two aspects below: power separation between federation and 
each federal member on one hand; power separation or authorization be-
tween federal members and local government on the other hand. In a unitary 
structure country, power separation between central and local government 
will dominate. 
In a federal system, generally, the power of federation and each federal 
members is specified by federal constitution. For example, Article 30 of the 
Basic Law of the federal government of Germany (referred as Basic Law here-
inafter) prescribes the general guideline of authorization allocation between 
federation and province, that is residual power shall be entitled to each pro-
vincial government, unless otherwise specified or authorized hereof, the ex-
ecution of national power and attainment of national omission shall be the 
obligation of each provincial government. Relative provisions in the Basic 
Law clearly define the authority of federal and provincial government, includ-
ing legislative authority, executive authority, judicial authority and financial 
authority.    
The relationship between central and local government in a unitary struc-
tured county, or the relationship between federal members and local govern-
ments in a federal country, differs from the relationship between federation 
                                               
1  Tocqueville: Democracy in America (Volume 1), Commercial Press 1997, page 100. 
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and each federal member within a federal country.  For the federation, each 
federal member has its intrinsic power and retain all right and power that not 
be waived or prohibited by the federal constitution. Each federal member ex-
ists as a sovereign political entity relatively. However, relationship between 
central and local government in a unitary structured country differs from the 
relationship between federation and federal member in a federal country. 
Power of local government is authorized by the central government as the 
local government is not a sovereign political entity itself. Local government 
is established by the Constitution, or under the approval of central govern-
ment on local’s requirement, and most of its right also comes from authori-
zation of the Constitution or legislation.  
Power and function allocation between governments at all levels under 
unitary system is carried out in two modes: first, divide by the Constitution, 
including detailed illustration and principled summarization; secondly, divide 
by power authorization to local government by law. 
Constitution of most country gives principled summarization of the local 
government’s power and function. For example, Article 28 of the Basic Law 
provides: we should ensure counties’ independent right to deal with local af-
fairs within the scope permitted by law. County is entitled to the autonomous 
administrative right within the legal scope.” State constitutions of some fed-
eral country set provisions on the power and function of state and local gov-
ernment.  
Constitution (1982) of China not only gives the principle to be observed in 
power and function allocation between central and local government, but 
also illustrates and summarize the duty and function of the National People’s 
Congress and its standing committee, the State Council, local people’s con-
gresses at all level and its standing committee, and specifies the state council 
is responsible for the detailed allocation of power and function between na-
tional administrative organization in central and provincial government, au-
tonomy zone, municipality directly under the central government.  
Local government in a unitary system acquires its power and duty by the 
authorization of the Constitution and law, such as the “Organization Law of 
Local Government”, “Legislative Law”, “Law of Regional Ethnic Autonomy”, 
“Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administration Region” and “Basic Law of Ma-
cao Special Administration Region” of China. 
Relevant international convention expressively defines the principles to 
be observed and method to be used in the power and duty allocation between 
central and local government and between federation and federal member in 
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a unitary system. For example, according to the European Charter of Local 
Autonomy: (1) basic power and duty of local government should be provided 
by the Constitution or law without prejudice to the nature of power or duty 
acquired by local government for specific purpose prescribed by law. (2) In 
legal scope, for the items which do not exclude the power and duty of local 
government thoroughly, or not exclusively belongs to the function of any 
other government, local government has sufficient decision-making right. (3) 
Organization located nearest shall have the priority in implementing the pub-
lic function of government. Allocation of governmental function and duty 
shall consider and balance factors such as the scope and nature of the work 
and the efficiency and economy. (4) Generally, power of local government is 
sufficient and exclusive, and immune from influence and restriction of any 
other organization of central or local government. (5) Local government shall 
be given the right to implementing the authorization from central or regional 
government considering the real situation the region.  
II.  Comparison of duty and function allocation between governments  
at all levels of Germany and China  
ⅰ.  Duty and function allocation between governments at all levels of Germany  
In Germany, duty and function allocation between federation and state 
means the allocation of legislative right. Items such as diplomacy and na-
tional security are under the exclusive legislation right of the federation. Each 
state has no legislative right unless authorized by any federal law expres-
sively.  
For the items the federation and the state share the legislative right, such 
as preservation of culture relics, social relief, agriculture, forest and fishing, 
land law, land regulation and so on, the conditions of the right execution in-
clude: state government could not address certain problem through legisla-
tion; solving some problems according to law of certain state may lead to the 
impairment of interest of other state or group; in order to achieving the uni-
fication of judiciary or economy, especially for the those to attain the unifi-
cation of living condition in an area related to several states. Each state has 
no legislative right for the items under parallel legislative right of the federa-
tion within legislation scope unless federation waives this right.  
For the items under the principle legislative right of federation, such as 
hunting, protection of natural landform and scenic point, land allocation, re-
gional planning and water management, application for residence and visa, 
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the federation should give principled provision, and detailed requirement 
should be given by each state.  
Secondly, allocation of administrative right. Few works are attained to the 
federation directly, while majority of works are assumed by each state inde-
pendently. According to the Basic Law, administrative work of the federation 
only covers fields as diplomacy, national security, federal finance, federal post 
and the customs. But the work of each state is relatively heavy and compli-
cated. Specifically, each state have to implement the work within the legisla-
tive scope of state, including culture, education, police, town management 
and regional planning, additionally, they are also charge of the enforcement 
of federal law, such as the Environment Protection Law and Management Law 
of Industry and Commerce and the Law for Construction and Planning en-
acted by the federal government. Each state would implement this work as 
the administrative work of its own.  
Thirdly, allocation of judiciary. In Germany, judicial power is executed by 
the Federal Constitutional Court, the Supreme federal Court and each federal 
court and state court. Judicial right of each state is relatively independent. In 
the federal judiciary system, judicial right is actually implemented by each 
state court firstly. The state court and local court takes charge of local trial 
and other cases in which no federation and other state get involved.  In each 
state, there are state constitutional courts charging for the trial of disputes 
relating to the state constitution. The federation court takes charge of any 
cases relating to federal law, relationship with foreign country, federal affairs, 
disputes between federation and state and disputes between different states. 
Last, allocation of finance. Federation and state make their budget respec-
tively and independently. Federation and each state shall assume their fees 
and expenditure arising from work implementation; and Federation shall bear 
state’s fees and expenditure arising from implementing the work delegated 
by the federation and the federation shall give finance support for major in-
vestment project to state and local government.   
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Fig. 4.1:  Federation, state and local government of Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data resource: Edited by the European Commission: Structure and Operation of Local and 
Regional Democracy (Germany) (France Strasbourg: European Commission Press 1999 Ger-
many Version, Page11) and adapted from the data from Federal Ministry of Interior of 
Germany in September, 2011. 
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Federal government of Germany and 16 states are attached to specific 
jurisdiction. Federal government located in Berlin governs the affairs such as 
diplomatic policy, European policy, national security, judiciary, employment, 
social affairs, tax and health; each federal state takes charge of issues as do-
mestic security, school, higher education, administrative management and 
local government. Duty of the federal government is focused on the legisla-
tion. Each federal state gives its influence on the legislation of the federation 
through their respective in the Upper House. On one hand, each state imple-
ments the federal law as well as the state law. Main reasons are: in the Ger-
many ethnic nation, several independent states emerged in 1871 through un-
ion of independent country, and this has made it unnecessary to establish a 
greater federal administrative system.2  
Local administrative function should be implemented by county and town 
government. According to the local autonomy principle of German, the local 
autonomous right is reflected by: (1) power and function of a town is entitled 
if the town assumes its obligation on the affairs within the administrative re-
gion; (2) county government functioned between the city and local govern-
ment, acting the supplementary and balanced role. The county should as-
sume all functions and duty out of the reach of town government within the 
region unless otherwise provided by law. County should take charge of all 
work relevant to the county region, resident in the county or the standard 
supply and assistances.  The states could require the county and town gov-
ernment to assume certain duty by enacting certain law, but the county and 
town government could execute these duties within their authority. The state 
could retain the right to issue certain supervising indication, and the limit of 
the right shall be specified by law. Some states transfer their authority to city 
and county government. In the North Rhine-Westphalia, state government 
do not have normal local office in local government, and state-level city as-
sumes the function and duty of state and city, and the power and function id 
divided between state and county observing to the illustrating principle. 3  
 
 
  
                                               
2  http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/political-system/main-content-
04/the-state-the-legal-system-and-the-citizens.html 
3   Edited by the European Commission: Structure and Operation of Local and Regional De-
mocracy—German France Strasbourg: European Commission Press 1999 Germany 
Version, Page 22. 
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Fig. 4.2:  Duty and Function Allocation between State and local govern-
ment of Germany 
Service Item Organizations Providing Services 
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ⅱ.  Power and function allocation between central  
and local government of China 
For the power and function allocation between central and local government, 
Constitution of China does not specify detailed items, but summarizes that: 
“power and function allocation between central and local government should 
give full play to the initiative and enthusiasm of local government and follow 
the unitary leadership of central government.” Constitution illustrates the 
power and function of the central governmental organization such as the Na-
tional People’s Congress and the State Council, and national power authority 
at all levels and national administrative organization. 
The Constitution and Legislative Law frame out the unit and multi-layer 
legislative system and basic structure of separation of legislative right be-
tween central and local government. The National People’s Congress and its 
standing committee are entitled to legislative right in the central govern-
ment. Specifically, National People’s Congress enjoys the exclusive right for 
the amendment of the Constitution, and the State Council, the highest na-
tional administrative organization has the right to enact regulations in ac-
cordance with the Constitution and laws. Legislative Law gives explicit illus-
tration of the items under the exclusive legislative right of central govern-
ment.  
Local legislative right could be divided into local legislative right and special 
local legislative right. Pursuant to the Constitution and Legislative Law, the 
National People’s Congress and its standing committee of each province, au-
tonomy zone, municipality directly under the central government, and some 
big city may enact local regulation and law considering the facts and actual 
necessity of the administrative region with no prejudice to the provision of 
Constitution, law and regulations.  
Except for the general legislative right above, three kinds of special re-
gions enjoy greater legislative right comparing to ordinary local government: 
first, ethnic autonomy zone is entitled to enacting autonomous regulation 
and specific regulation. Secondly, economic zone is entitled to enacting spe-
cific economic laws and regulations. Thirdly, special administrative zones 
have their legislative right.  
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Fig. 4.3: Power and function allocation between central and local gov-
ernment of China 
Item Organizations in charge or providing  
services 
 
central  
govern-
ment 
local Government 
 
local gov-
ernment 
higher than 
county 
town  
govern-
ment 
diplomacy ★   
national security ★   
• economic affairs ★ ★ ★ 
• urban and rural construction ★ ★ ★ 
• economic and social develop-
ment planning  ★ ★ ★ 
• budgeting ★ ★ ★ 
• finance ★ ★ ★ 
• resource and environment 
protection ★ ★ ★ 
• urban and rural construction ★ ★  
regulation and law ★   
Rules ★ 
★ provinces 
and larger  
cities） 
 
• education ★ ★ ★ 
• science ★ ★ ★ 
• culture ★ ★ ★ 
• hygiene ★ ★ ★ 
• physical education ★ ★ ★ 
• family planning ★ ★ ★ 
civil administration ★ ★ ★ 
police  ★ ★ ★ 
judicial administration ★ ★ ★ 
Supervision ★ ★  
ethnic affairs ★ ★  
declare a region of emergency ★   
Data resource: Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Organization Law of Local 
People’s Congresses at all levels and Local People’s Government at different levels of Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
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Administrative affairs in China are extremely complicated, but the Constitu-
tion only defines the function and duty of the State Council and local govern-
ment in principle. In China, most functions and duties of the state adminis-
trative organization in central and provincial government, autonomous re-
gion, and municipality directly under the central government are divided by 
the State Council. Few laws have given specific division of the certain duty 
and function that shall be assumed by central and local government organi-
zation and institution.4   
Factor that shall be taken into consideration for the State Council in the 
function and duty allocation of the state administrative organization in cen-
tral and provincial government, autonomous region, municipality directly un-
der the central government: 
1.  The geographic area relevant to the affairs leaded or conducted. Central 
government shall be responsible for the following affairs: national population 
census, national economy planning, construction and management of large 
railway and road and large power grid, planning and comprehensive improve-
ment of Yangzi River, Yellow River and other big rivers, coordination and set-
tlement of the environment pollution dispute involving several regions, coor-
dination and integration of pollution prevention and control of national key 
water basin.  
2.  Nature of affairs governed. Fields about the national sovereignty such as 
diplomacy and national security, affairs that are vital for national economy 
such as finance, customs, national tax, management of foreign exchange, 
should be controlled by central government directly. And central government 
could set up accredited agency or branch for management or authorization 
of local government; education, science, culture, hygiene and physic educa-
tion, environment and resource protection, urban and rural facility construc-
tion and finance, civil affairs, ethnic affairs, judicial administration, family 
planning, food security and other administrative affairs should be governed 
by both central and local government and their level-to-level management; 
tax and other authorization should combine the power division and overlap-
ping enforcement between central and local government; audit, administra-
tive supervision, statistics, public security should continue to be under dual 
                                               
4  For example, pursuant to the Article 4 of the Enterprises State-owned Assets Law, 
State Council should act as the sponsor for the large state-funded enterprises which 
is vital to the national economy and national security and the state-funded enterprises 
in the fields of key infrastructure or important nature resources; and the local govern-
ment should act as the sponsor on behalf of the state for other state-funded enter-
prises.  
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control of central and local government, and their business shall be guided 
dominantly by certain department of central government or local govern-
ment.    
3.  Working efficiency of administrative organization. Generally speaking, 
some affairs which could be addressed by local government efficiently shall 
be governed by local government; few affairs that is vital for the overall situ-
ation of economic or social development should be guided by the State Coun-
cil and other relevant departments.  
4.  Restrictive provision of law. Legislative right or administrative right of 
some items belongs to central government according to law. For example, 
law reserving matters prescribed by the Legislative Law could not be deter-
mined by the State Council, not to mention local government.  
III.  Scientific allocation and standardization of duty and  
power between governments at different levels 
ⅰ.  Firmly transform duty and function of government at all levels  
According to the Structure and Operation of Local Democracy and Regional 
Democracy in European Countries (Germany), duty of the state and local gov-
ernment is comprised of general administrative services, education, social 
welfare, public health, residence and urban planning, transportation, environ-
ment and public hygiene, culture, entertainment, physical education and eco-
nomic affairs. And some duties and functions are undergoing changes in the 
duty and function reform and local revolution of local government of Ger-
many.  
For a long time, authority boundary between central and local govern-
ment is vague in China. Thus, a scientific and rational duty allocation among 
governments in all levels shall focus on the government function transfor-
mation. We should continue to separate government administration from the 
management of enterprises, state assets, public institutions and market in-
termediary organization, and give full play to the fundamental role of market 
force in resource allocation.  
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ⅱ.  Scientifically allocate governmental function  
and duty among governments at different level 
All work in the central and local government in China are broke down and 
refined observing to the mechanism of “under unified leadership and level-
to-level management”. Generally, same office and organization are set up in 
government at all levels, and assume the same duty and function, leading to 
the duty dislocation, vague duty boundary, and duty absence in the upper and 
lower government. Therefore, there is an urgent demand to reorganization of 
the duty among central and local government.  
Subject to the requirement of promoting the reform on administrative 
system profoundly, governments at all levels should focus on the key points 
of management and service considering the actual situation and observing 
the requirement of promoting the governmental function transformation. Ex-
ecuting obligation allocation between central and local government may con-
sider the factors as provision of law, nature and scope of the work, efficiency 
and economic efficiency of management and fairness. Function and manage-
ment right belonged to central government shall be centralized to central 
government; functions aiming to local government shall be delegated to local 
government; for the common function shared by central and local govern-
ment, central government is entitled to the decision-making and supervising 
right while the local government to the management and executing right.    
Central government should reinforce the macro-management of eco-
nomic and social affairs, and continue to reduce and delegate detailed work 
to lower government; focus their energy on development of strategic plan-
ning, policy and regulations as well as standards and rules; local government 
should ensure the firm enforcement of policy, law and regulation of central 
government, and improve the coordination of local economic and social af-
fairs, the enforcement and supervision of enforcement and improve service 
and management for grass-root and the people.  
ⅲ.  Gradually realize the standardization of the relationship  
between central and local government 
Germany adopts the principle of the rule of law, which gives clear allocation 
and standardization of duty and function of federation, state and local gov-
ernment.  
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Take the adjustment of central and local government relationship since 
the reform and opening-up as an example. In 1987, 13th CPC National Con-
gress put forwards that: “Any problem that could be solved appropriately by 
lower governments shall be delegated to them for their decision and imple-
mentation and this should be taken as a general principle.” For the relation-
ship between central and local government, we should gradually specify the 
function boundary between central and local government under a unitary 
leadership, and ensure that local government shall takes full charge of local 
affairs respectively observing to the general policy and supervision put by 
central government. The principle above share some points with the “sup-
porting principle” put forwards by the “Local Autonomy Charter of Europe” 
in 1985, which indicated that organization located nearest shall have the pri-
ority in implementing the public function of government, and allocation of 
governmental function and duty shall consider and balance factors such as 
the scope and nature of the work and the efficiency and economy. However, 
the principle that any problem that could be solved appropriately by lower 
governments shall be delegated to them for their decision and implementa-
tion” have not be implement well in practice.   
The law establishment of relationship between central and local govern-
ment is the legal guarantee for a scientific, rational, and stable relationship 
between central and local government. A modern country ruled of law may 
be set up after the standardization and legalization of the relationship be-
tween central and local government. Then, we will achieve a balance and sta-
ble relationship between central and local government. At present, most of 
the policy, law and regulation of central government are implemented by lo-
cal government, the same as the authority of central government. However, 
the absence of standards and law on the power and duty allocation as well as 
the power execution, have promote the short-term behavior of local govern-
ment and foster the willful power and interest expansion. Therefore, achiev-
ing a clear power allocation between central and local government is one of 
the objects to be attain in the construction of government ruled of laws.  
ⅳ.  Adjust the relationship between governments at all levels  
adapting to situation changes.  
A study on the comparison between local government systems indicates that, 
relationship between governments at all levels in a unitary structured coun-
try or a federal country should be adjusted catering to the environment in 
change. In recent years, the administrative reform in Germany highlights the 
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power division and delegation to each state government to realize the power 
decentralization among states. Some federal state delegated certain function 
of state (reform of function) to local government, achieving a larger scale re-
form carried on wider region (reform of function). Some county-level cities 
have been put under administration of county and many state affairs have 
been delegated to the bigger county.   
Similarly, the promotion of administration reform of China is dispensable 
from the function adjustment of central and local government and we should 
give same space for difference function between central and local govern-
ment, and the management function and scope between governments at all 
levels.   
 
51 
Local Government in Germany: Key Features and Current Reforms 
Sabine KUHLMANN 
1.  Introduction 
The paper provides an overview on important key features of the German 
local government system and analyses current approaches of reform in the 
intergovernmental setting. After recalling the traditional local government 
system in Germany, a major approach of reform will be examined: the (verti-
cal) re-definition of local governments’ functions in relation to central/ State 
government, that is the devolution of state tasks to local authorities and 
changes of local governments’ position in the intergovernmental setting, will 
be considered.  
2.  Basic Features of the German Local Government System and 
State-Local-Relations 
Within the German federal and highly decentralized political system, the mu-
nicipalities (Gemeinden), the county-free cities (that is, standing outside 
county boundaries = kreisfreie Städte), and the counties (Kreise) enjoy a con-
stitutional guarantee as institutions of local government or, put in the tradi-
tional German parlance, “local self-administration” (kommunale Selbstverwal-
tung). This implies the right of the municipalities (and to a somewhat lesser 
degree of the counties - Kreise) “to attend all matters relevant to the local 
community in their own responsibility within the frame of the existing legis-
lation” (Art. 28, paragraph. 2 Basic Constitutional Law). This “general compe-
tence clause” amounting to an “all purpose” model (Allzuständigkeit) mirrors 
a historical path dependency that dates back to the early 19th century, when 
the municipalities were recognized and mandated as functionally strong, 
multi-purpose organizations. Until today, a peculiar feature of the German 
model can be perceived in the fact that both “delegated” state tasks and local 
self-administration functions are institutionally integrated at the local level 
(Wollmann 1999). With particularly the counties and the county-free cities 
(kreisfreie Städte) embodying and carrying out this “dual function” model, the 
counties in most Länder also serve, with regard to some of the “delegated” 
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functions, as bottom level State administration. With this functionally strong 
model of local self-administration/local government, the German system be-
longs, along with the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands, to the ‘North Middle European Group’ of local governments 
(Hesse/Sharpe 1991: 603-621; Heinelt/ Hlepas 2006: 21-42). 
The position of this two-tier local government system, that is, the munic-
ipalities and the counties, in Germany’s intergovernmental setting is marked 
by some ambivalent, if not contradictory features. Germany’s federal system 
consists, in constitutional terms, of two layers: the federal level (Federation, 
Bund) and the (16) Länder, while the municipalities and counties are, in terms 
of constitutional law, regarded as institutionally belonging to the organiza-
tional body of the Länder1. In practical and functional terms, however, the 
municipalities constitute a “third” layer and level by which the bulk of public 
tasks (including most of the pertinent legislation) is carried out. This primacy 
of the two-tier local government structure in its key role to implement and 
“deliver” public policies is also evidenced and supported by the fact that, un-
der the Federal Constitution of 1949, the federal level is not allowed, with 
only a few exceptions, to have field office of its on the Länder, regional or 
local levels. In a similar vein, the Länder have largely refrained from establish-
ing their own field offices on the sub-regional or local levels in leaving most 
public tasks to be carried out by the local authorities. In fact, in internation-
ally comparative terms, because of the combination of political and func-
tional strength to which, at least in most Länder with marked territorial re-
forms, the criterion of “territorial viability” may be added (see below), the 
German local government model can be counted among the strongest types 
of local government in Europe, besides the Scandinavian countries, particu-
larly Sweden. 
Yet, the autonomy of the local government units in carrying out their 
tasks has been restricted and constrained in crucial dimensions. First, Ger-
many’s local government level has been marked by a dense (and ever denser) 
array of regulations the layers and “cascades” of which are made up of federal 
legislation, Länder provisions and more recently European Union norms. Be-
sides Germany’s Rechtsstaat tradition, a main driver for the growth and per-
sistence of regulation comes from the peculiarity that, under the German 
Constitution, the federal level is not allowed to have regional or local field 
                                               
1 With the exception of the city states (“Stadtstaaten”) Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen 
which combine the status of municipalities with the constitutional status of Länder. 
 
53 
offices of its own to organizationally ensure the implementation of federal 
legislation and policies and, thus, resorts, too often detailed, if not over-de-
tailed legal regulation as a crucial resource to direct and control implementa-
tion. Another crucial instrument of centralized guidance over the local level 
operations is public finance and the status of local government finance within 
it. A third dimension crucially impinging on central government/local govern-
ment relations is the kind of supervision which the State, that is in the Ger-
man case first of all the Land authorities, exercise over the decisions and ac-
tivities pursued by the local authorities. With regard to their local self-gov-
ernment matters proper the local authorities are subject merely to the “legal-
ity control” which, however, becomes the more penetrating the more detailed 
the legal provisions are (which is particularly the case in self-government 
matters which the local authorities are legally mandated – as “mandatory” 
tasks – by the pertinent federal or Land legislation. Concerning “delegated” 
tasks of which the local authorities are put in charge to carry out the influence 
and guidance of the State authorities over the local level actors goes much 
further both in terms of instructions given how to implement the tasks and 
in terms of subsequent review. In fact the type of “delegated” tasks has the 
potential to “integrate” the local authorities into the State structure to the 
point of, as it were, “satellite” them, that is, of turning them into “local agents 
of the State”.  
3.  Particularities of the East German transformation process  
Due to the unprecedented transformation process in East Germany, local 
government development in the last decade has differed from West Ger-
many. In East German communes, public employment soared dramatically 
following reunification, in some large cities to as much as 5.000 or even 
10.000 employees. This primarily refers to the fact that the social and cultural 
facilities of the former GDR, which had been managed by state institutions 
or nationally owned enterprises, were now (re) transferred to the local au-
thorities (”recommunalized”). As a result, East German municipalities (and 
counties) had significantly more public personnel than their West German 
counterparts (Kuhlmann/Wollmann 1999). Thus, in 1991, the ”personnel 
density” of East Germany local authorities amounted to 42 public servants 
per 1.000 inhabitants and was, thus, double of that in West Germany (21). In 
the subsequent period, both West and East German public authorities were 
increasingly faced with budgetary problems and the need to cut back public 
spending and personnel. Their enormous efforts at cutback management can 
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be seen from the fact that in East Germany the density of local public person-
nel per 1.000 inhabitants was halved between 1991 and 2001. Notwithstand-
ing these enormous effects of cutback management, the “density” of local 
employment in East German municipalities, amounting to 21 employees per 
1.000 inhabitants, continues to be remarkably higher than in Western com-
munes (17).  
 
Tab. 5.1: Public Employment in German Local Authorities 1991-2001 
 
Year/ Change 
East Germany West Germany Germany* 
 Number  
in 1.000 
per 
1.000 
inh. 
Number 
in 1.000 
per 
1.000 
inh. 
Number 
in 1.000 
per 
1.000 
inh. 
1991 662 41,6 1334 20,8 1996 25,0 
1994 476 30,7 1330 20,2 1806 22,1 
2001 309 20,6 1161 17,2 1470 17,8 
Change 1991-
2001 in % 
-53,3  -13,0  -26,4  
* Note: differences due to rounding 
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt 1991-2001 
4.  Territorial Structure of the local level 
As was already pointed out, the German local government system is charac-
terized by a  two-tier structure within which cities and municipalities serve as 
the bottom (local) level of self-administration whereas the counties are the 
upper (supra-local) tier – with the county-free cities (kreisfreie Städte) com-
bining the municipal and the county functions. During the late 1960s and 
early 1970s the Länder to whose power it constitutionally falls to decide the 
territorial format of “their” municipalities and counties embarked upon terri-
torial reforms which, reflecting their individual responsibility, showed signif-
icant variance between the Länder. As a result of these reforms, the local gov-
ernment boundaries are quite heterogeneous today. Whereas some German 
Länder (for instance North Rhine Westphalia with 373 municipalities embrac-
ing 48,000 inhabitants on the average) belong to the North European Type 
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of local government structures, others (for instance Rhineland-Palatinate 
with 2,400 communes and 1,700 inhabitants on average) are closer to the 
South European model. This is mainly because the Länder governments in 
these parts of Germany refrained from coercive mergers of communes. In 
those Länder inter-municipal cooperative bodies (Verwaltungsgemeinschaf-
ten, Verbandsgemeinden) were created as an additional institutional layer be-
tween the counties and the municipalities, meant to serve as administrative 
“muscle” of their member municipalities.  
 
Tab. 5.2: Institutional layers of the German local government system 
(2002) 
level 
number of population 
abs. in 
1.000 
average 
population 
Counties 323 256.000 
County-free cities 117 n.a. 
Inter-municipal Cooperation-bodies* 1708 n.a. 
Municipalities 13299 6.000 
*  Without municipal special purpose associations  
Source: Deutscher Städtetag 2002; Statistisches Bundesamt 2004.  
 
By the end of the 1990s, further attempts at territorial reform have been un-
dertaken in East Germany. Those were meant to overcome the atomized 
structure of local government through amalgamations of municipalities. For 
example, in the course of the territorial reforms in Brandenburg, the number 
of municipalities has been reduced from 1,739 (including 1,169 municipali-
ties with less than 500 inhabitants) in 1990 to 419 in 2010 (cf. table 5.3). 
Similar steps have been pursued in Saxony where after the completion of a 
voluntary period legislations for redrawing local government boundaries 
have likewise came into force and the number of municipalities was reduced 
by 70%.  
At the county-level, too, significant reform steps have been undertaken, 
particularly in Eastern Germany, in order to adapt the fragmented territorial 
structure to the new competencies of the counties after re-unification. 
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Tab. 5.3: Territorial Structure and changes of the municipal level  
in Germany 
State 
No. Of Mu-
nici-palities 
Change 
1990-2010 Average 
no. of in-
habitants 
2010* 
No. of 
inter-
munici-
pal  
bodies 
(2010) 
% of  
municipa-
lities be-
longing to 
an inter-
municipal 
body in 
2010 
1990 2010 Abs. in % 
Brandenburg 1739 419 -1320 -76 6052 53 64,7 
Mecklenburg-Vorp. 1149 814 -335 -29 2064 78 95,0 
Sachsen 1626 485 -1141 -70 8701 99 51,7 
Sachsen-Anhalt 1270 345 -925 -73 6991 45 73,9 
Thüringen 1699 951 -748 -44 2407 121 87,1 
all East German Länder 7483 3014 -4469 -60 3517 424 81,5 
Baden-Württemberg  1102   9755 270 82,6 
Bayern  2056   6089 313 48,0 
Hessen  426   14256 - 0,0 
Niedersachsen  1024   7785 137 71,8 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  396   45447 - 0,0 
Rheinland-Pfalz  2306   1755 163 97,9 
Saarland  52   19942 - 0,0 
Schleswig-Holstein  1116   2542 87 92,6 
all West German Länder  8478   13446 970 49,1 
*  Inhabitants of the county-free cities included 
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt 2010 and own calculation 
5.  The responsibilities of local government 
Compared with other local government systems German local government is 
well-known for its multi-function model and an unusually broad range of du-
ties and responsibilities discharged by the cities, municipalities and counties. 
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Tab. 5. 4: Territorial Structure and changes of the county-level  
in Germany 
State 
no. of counties change average 
no. of in-
habitants 
after re-
forms  
(in 1,000)  
prior to 
the re-
forms* 
2010 abs.  % 
Brandenburg 38 14 -24 -63,2 143 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 31 12 -19 -61,3 103 
Sachsen 48 10 -38 -79,1 292 
Sachsen-Anhalt 37 11 -26 -70,2 166 
Thüringen 35 17 -18 -51,4 116 
East Germany in total 189 64 -125 -66,1 164 
Baden-Württemberg  35   250 
Bayern  71   126 
Hessen  21   222 
Niedersachsen  38   183 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  31   340 
Rheinland-Pfalz  24   125 
Saarland  6   172 
Schleswig-Holstein  11   202 
West Germany in total 409 237 -172 -42,0 203 
*  For East Germany: 1990, for West Germany: 1968 
Source: Wollmann 2004: 125; Büchner/Franzke 2001: 238; Statistisches Bundesamt 
2010; own calculation 
This reflects a main feature of the German constitutional and administrative 
tradition within which legislation is “centralized” at the federal level, whereas 
public administration and policy implementation, including the execution of 
federal laws and policies, falls to the Länder and particularly to the com-
munes. According to estimates, approximately 70 to 85 percent of federal 
and State laws (as well as most of EU legislation) is executed by local govern-
ments (cf. Schmidt-Eichstaedt 1999, 330). Local governments have been, 
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from the 1960s onwards, discharging a growing number of tasks, which pre-
viously fell to the Länder-administration. This applies particularly to public 
welfare and health policy, but also to public housing and environment pro-
tection. Today, the main function of local governments are to be seen in wel-
fare policy, especially in child and youth care, care of old, frail and disabled 
persons, in building and housing policy, urban planning and public transport 
(see table below). We must, however, take into account that a considerable 
part of local welfare services (e.g. kindergartens, care for the elderly, youth 
hostels) are not rendered by public agencies but – according to the ”subsidi-
arity principle” – by non-public organizations, thus limiting the municipal sec-
tor, in principle, to an ”enabling” (and funding) function. 
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Tab. 5.5: Local government function measured by sectors of employ-
ment (2001) 
Sector of  
Employment 
East Germany West Germany Germany** 
 Number 
in 1.000  
Share in 
% 
Number 
in 1.000  
Share in 
% 
Number 
in 1.000  
Share in 
% 
general administ-
ration 
52,3 16,94 183,8 15,83 236,1 16,06 
public security 26.0 8,41 88,2 7,60 114,2 7,77 
schools 22,4 7,26 96,5 8,31 118,9 8,09 
science, research, 
culture 
18,1 5,86 51,5 4,43 69,6 4,73 
social services/ 
Welfare 
58,8 19,05 193,8 16,69 252,6 17,19 
public health, 
sports, recreation 17,7 5,74 57,1 4,92 74,8 5,09 
housing and build-
ing policy, public 
transport 
25,0 8,09 95,5 8,23 120,5 8,20 
public facilities, 
economic promo-
tion 
20,6 6,67 83,5 7,19 104,0 7,08 
public enterprises 0,9 0,30 11,2 0,97 12,1 0,83 
special instituti-
ons* 
66,9 21,69 299,9 25,83 366,8 24,96 
Total** 308,6 100,00 1161,0 100,00 1469,7 100,00 
*  Hospitals and Public Enterprises with commercial double entry book-keeping 
** Note: differences due to rounding 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2001 
 
Traditionally, German municipalities offer a multitude of local public services 
in their own “régie” - the “Regie-Model” thus being the predominant model of 
public service delivery in Germany. This is especially true for the public utility 
sector (water, energy, waste management), whereas social services are 
mostly provided by non-profit actors whereas local governments are re-
stricted to an enabling and financing function (see further above). Public util-
ities are usually part of the multi-purpose local government model forming a 
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“protected market” within which the municipality acts as the sole supplier 
and enjoys a quasi-monopolistic status (Wollmann, 2002). Until the 1998 En-
ergy Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz), which was aimed at implementing the re-
spective EU-policy and thus substituting the law from 1935, more than 85% 
of the German population’s energy demand had been met by public suppliers 
most of which were a part of the “Stadtwerke” (see Bonde 2002, 234).  
This model of local government “self-production” was however witness-
ing dramatic incisions resulting from EU-liberalization, NPM-reforms and lo-
cal cutback policies. Privatization and outsourcing of local public services has 
particularly affected the public utility-sector in Germany (electricity, gas, wa-
ter supply, waste disposal, public transportation). Due to EU-liberalization 
and the respective Federal legislation, these protected markets in the utility 
sector have been opened to market competition. In the energy sector not 
only have nearly all local companies meanwhile been formally privatized (as 
Ltd. companies – GmbH - or incorporations - AG) but also the sale of shares 
to private companies (“materielle Teil-Privatisierung”) is particularly advanced 
in this policy area. According to a survey conducted by the German Institute 
of Urban Studies (Difu) only 30% of municipal energy companies are still en-
tirely the property of the cities whereas more than 70% have external share 
holders (for details see Libbe et al 2004, 75). Municipalities have minority 
holdings in roughly 20% of energy suppliers to big cities in Germany. Alt-
hough the time honored “Stadtwerke” have not yet completely disappeared 
from the local landscape, energy supply in Germany is increasingly deter-
mined by private companies, especially by four big groups acting as regional 
monopolies (E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall), whereas local governments 
have been partially displaced and lost their steering capacities. Private firms 
hold shares of nearly 40% of the cities’ companies and every tenth municipal 
company (11%) is, through a majority holding, the property of private firms 
(for details see Universität Potsdam/KGSt 2003, pp.22.). This conspicuously 
mirrors the increasing role of private actors in the local arena and local gov-
ernments’ loss in powers and influence.  
6.  Local Democracy 
In international comparisons, the German local government system is con-
sidered a ‘politically strong’ model (Wollmann 2008), which is inter alia re-
flected by the relatively high and stable turnout of local elections (60-70 per 
cent). A further indicator is the increasing importance of political parties in 
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the local councils amounting to what has been labelled as a ‘local parliamen-
tarism’, similar to the national level. Political strength in general arises from 
the important position the German local government occupies within the en-
tire democratic system and the political culture largely based on community 
identity and democratic participation at ‘grass roots level’. However, tradi-
tionally the German model is shaped by the concept of a representative de-
mocracy according to which the predominant mode of citizens’ participation 
is the right to vote the local council, whereas elements of direct democracy 
are weakly developed. The German municipal charters, which fall to the leg-
islative competence of the Länder, are – for historical reasons – in some Län-
der inspired by the model a local presidential system showing strong ele-
ments of executive leadership and, particularly in the small communes, of 
consensus democracy (South German Municipal Charter). In others, they re-
semble more the type of a local parliamentary system (North German Munic-
ipal Charter) marked, specifically in the bigger cities, by party competition 
and patterns of majoritarian democracy. Table 5.6 summarizes the major el-
ements of the ‘traditional’ German local government system  
7.  Further Decentralization of State Tasks 
The scope and plenty of tasks of the municipalities and counties point at and 
substantiate the strong functional standing which local government has in 
the intergovernmental setting. Territorial re-organizations as well as the 
more recent devolution of state tasks have contributed to further strength-
ening the traditional multi-purpose profile of local governments. After a first 
wave of so-called ‘functional reforms’ in the 1970s in West Germany, in the 
course of which major state (Länder) functions have been devolved from the 
Länder-governments to the local level, German reunification and recent de-
volutions projects of most of the German Länder have initiated further de-
centralization. The state of Bade-Württemberg has played a pioneering role 
(see Banner 2006, 125-144). On 25 March 2003, the Minister President of 
Baden-Württemberg, Erwin Teufel, presented plans for a major re-organiza-
tion and a complete re-distribution of tasks between state and local govern-
ment, prelude to a whole series of equivalent reform initiatives in other Ger-
man states. The core element in this so-called ‘Teufel Reform’ was the com-
plete dissolution of 350 of a total of 450 special-purpose state authorities, 
whose functions and personnel were transferred to the 35 counties and 9 
county-free cities (see Bogumil/ Ebinger 2005). According to first implemen-
tation studies, counties have meanwhile just about doubled their staff, which 
is to be regarded as a substantial upgrading of the county level in terms of 
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personnel and competencies. At the same time, the State government in 
Bade-Württemberg is being rolled back to ‘core functions’, and will maintain 
own de-concentrated single-purpose administrative units only in the fields of 
tax administration, police and justice. The reform package has thus resulted 
in a clearer institutional separation of State functions and local government 
tasks. It has notably contributed to simplify and streamline the sub-national 
institutional landscape in Germany.   
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Tab. 5.6: The traditional German Local Government System  
criterion of analysis properties 
territorial structure - 323 counties  
- 117 ‘county-free’ cities 
- 12,682 municipalities 
 - differences between the Länder 
(partly North/ partly South European 
model) 
- North Rhine-Westphalia: 373 munici-
palities with 48.000 inh. 
- Rhineland Palatinate: 2.400 munici-
palities with 1.700 inh. 
functional responsibilities/ 
state-local relations 
- communes as ‘multi-function’/  
‘all-purpose’ institutions 
- integration of state and local self-ad-
ministrative tasks 
- few single purpose state agencies 
- North Middle European Group of local 
governments 
model of service delivery - local self-production (‘Regie’) 
- exception: social services (non-profit-
actors) 
- ‘Municipal Utilities’ (Stadtwerke) com-
pletely owned by local governments 
(utility sector) 
administrative regime - rule of law (Roman Law tradition) 
- Weberian model; legalist culture 
- tradition of strong decentralized 
structures, subsidiarity principle 
local political system/  
democratic regime 
- representative democracy (only few 
exceptions) 
- partly presidential (South); partly par-
liamentary (North) 
- partly consensus-oriented (Southern/ 
small LGs); partly majoritarian (North-
ern/ bigger LGs) 
Compilation by the author 
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Nevertheless, the decentralization has proved limited in many respects. On 
the one hand, it is a ‘pseudo’ or ‘false’ decentralization in the sense that local 
councils are not granted any rights of political decision-making and control 
regards the new tasks transferred to them by State governments. Their ‘Ja-
nus-faced’ profile (see section 3), being de-concentrated State agencies on 
the one hand and local self-government institutions on the other, was rein-
forced, particularly with regard to the former one. Hence, the German coun-
ties mainly benefit from the devolution policies in their institutional role as 
the lower tier of state administration, whereas their local self-government 
profile and discretion are not affected. The reforms have insofar not contrib-
uted to enhance political accountability and democratic control, since State 
and local government tasks continue to be institutionally ‘fused’, to an even 
increasing degree.  
Furthermore, the intermediate or regional level of State administration 
located in the four administrative districts (Regierungspräsidien) has been 
maintained and even strengthened in Baden-Württemberg. Instead of 
streamlining these territorial offices of State-government and thus complet-
ing the decentralization process, their functional responsibilities and human 
resources have considerably been boosted by the reform. This can also be ex-
plained by the fact that the State government in Bade-Württemberg has re-
nounced any territorial reorganization in the direction of creating more viable 
regional-scale counties, as this is being envisaged, for instance, in the State 
of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (cf. Kuhlmann 2009). Accordingly, an in-
termediate level of State administration is still regarded necessary in order to 
guarantee effective State supervision and coordination. Finally, it should be 
added that developments in Bade-Württemberg also differ substantially from 
the reforms undertaken in other German States. For example, in Lower Sax-
ony the intermediate-level State authorities have been dismantled, which 
has, however, not resulted in streamlining the sub-national institutional sys-
tem but has brought about an increase in the number of special-purpose state 
authorities, greater fragmentation and sectoralisation of public administra-
tion (Bogumil/Kottmann 2006).  
Concerning efficiency and possible savings expected from the decentrali-
zation of State tasks there is on the one hand evidence for improvements. 
The transfer of state tasks in conjunction with a State-imposed so called ‘ef-
ficiency yield’ (Effizienzrendite) of no less than 20 per cent in Bade-Württem-
berg produces, as it were, automatically cost savings for the German Länder 
governments who get rid of costly personnel and functions. On the other 
hand, the local governments can only achieve these savings through severe 
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cutbacks of personnel and spending not least by privatizing or outsourcing 
local services or diminishing service quality. Moreover, German local govern-
ments have faced a severe financial crisis during the 1990s, which has also 
obliged them to reduce non-mandatory services and, in extreme cases, has 
limited them to discharging delegated State functions. Against this back-
ground, empirical findings provide evidence for a decreasing policy effective-
ness resulting from cutback-driven decentralization policies of the German 
Länder, but also from the reduced leverage single-purpose policy actors have 
within the multi-purpose local government system. Since local actors obvi-
ously give priority to attempts at reducing spending and relieving budgets, 
the quality and effectiveness of policy implementation in individual sectors 
of public activities (e.g. environmental protection, social integration etc.) is 
inadequate and even diminishing (see Bauer/Bogumil/Knill/Ebinger/ 
Krapf/Reißig 2007). 
8.  Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter, we address the question as to whether the insti-
tutional reforms scrutinized in this article resulted in a transformation of the 
German local government system or whether there is persistence and path-
dependence. The further decentralization of state tasks can be considered as 
significantly supporting and reinforcing the traditional model of territorial or-
ganization and self-administration. At least in some Länder, not only the sub-
national institutional landscape was significantly streamlined and the single 
purpose State administration rolled back, but also local governments’ man-
date of service provision and their multi function profile upgraded. Hence, 
there is evidence that the traditional principle of ‘territoriality’ within the 
German system was even strengthened. However, one could argue that these 
steps of a predominantly ‘administrative decentralization’ are still too limited 
to countervail the losses of local influence and functions. Therefore, it seems 
on the one hand necessary to enhance local governments’ room for manoeu-
vre in terms of resources and finance. On the other hand political powers and 
decision-making competencies should not only be granted to the directly 
elected mayors, but also to the local councils (Wollmann 2008), thus moving 
from an ’administrative’ to a real ‘political’ decentralization of State func-
tions.  
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Local Finance in Germany 
Gisela FÄRBER 
1.  Introduction  
Local finance in Germany is highly interconnected with the financing of the 
Federation and the Länder (states). The German financial constitution is char-
acterized not only by the centralization of legislation of the “normal laws” and 
the decentralization of the execution of federal laws, but also as a system of 
centralized tax laws and decentralized and shared tax revenues. Local gov-
ernments (county free cities, cities and villages within counties, counties, and 
other associations of communities) are – from the perspective of the Basic 
Law (constitution) - part of their states and their financial and budgetary com-
petences fall under the specific regulation and supervision of their respective 
states.  
Table 1 shows the expenditures and revenues of the Federation and the 
self-administered social insurances as well as of the states and local govern-
ments in 2012. Municipalities and counties spent almost 200 billion Euro, 
which makes up about 20% of total government expenditures. Their tax rev-
enues amounted to only 74 billion Euro, covering only 38% of local expendi-
tures. The grants received are amount to much more than the proper tax rev-
enues and cover about 60% of local expenditures. 
This chapter explains the rules of the German financial constitution re-
garding the distribution of taxes and the multi-level financial equalization 
schemes. The next section deals of the distribution of tax sources and tax 
revenues and the fiscal equalization among the states. Section 3 presents the 
patterns of local fiscal equalization within the Länder. The chapter closes with 
the actual discussion of problems and proposed reforms. 
2.  The German financial constitution: The revenue side 
The German financial constitution is a multi-level system of tax sharing and 
tax distribution under centralized tax legislation. The Federation has the right 
to legislate on almost all matters concerning tax bases and tax rates.  
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Tab. 6.1: Public sector expenditures and revenues in 2012 
expenditure/revenues 
millions of Euro 
Total 
Federa-
tion 
social  
insur-
ances 
Länder 
local  
govern-
ments 
personnel expenditures 235,949 42,725 18,075 122,454 52,695 
interest payments 69,709 42,566 174 22,544 4,426 
current transfers to public 
budgets 
514,462 169,730 203,813 93,127 47,793 
transfer payments to others 472,343 52,246 299,799 35,037 60,010 
investment expenditures 43,506 8,225 957 13,333 20,992 
transfers for investment 
exp.  
41,042 16,582 147 21,690 2,624 
Loans 10,810 3,080 3 6,319 1,408 
total expenditures 1,182,226 356,353 520,655 325,437 196,864 
tax revenues/social insu-
rance contributions 
1,022,016 285,626 419,954 215,692 74,361 
received current grants 537,928 29,680 313,044 84,104 112,234 
received capital grants 22,779 1,023 5 12,327 9,424 
total revenues 1,171,701 337,915 536,541 316,559 197,770 
financial balance -10,500 -18,394 15,836 -8,848 906 
net borrowing 20,962 23,891 0 -2,465 -465 
Source:  Federal Statistical Office: FS 14.2, 2012  
 
Exceptions exist only for the right of the states to determine the rate of the 
land acquisition tax and to regulate the local expenditure and consumption 
taxes (dog tax, beverage tax, tax on public amusements, second home tax, 
hotel tax and so on). Municipalities can decide about the tax rates of the lat-
ter and about the local multipliers on the federally uniform tax bases of the 
local business tax and local property taxes A (agricultural enterprises) and B 
(real assets). 
Tax revenue competences are distributed for several taxes as follows: 
• The Federation receives the revenues of the excise taxes (alcohol, mineral 
oil/energy, tobacco, coffee), the insurance tax, and since 2009 the motor 
vehicle tax, 
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• the Länder receives the inheritance and gift tax, the tax on gambling, the 
land acquisition tax, the beer tax, and – until 1996  - the wealth tax; 
• local governments receive the revenues of the property tax, the local busi-
ness tax (minus trade tax apportionment) and the local expenditure and 
consumption taxes. 
71% of the total tax revenues are collected as so-called ‘joint’ taxes: The Fed-
eration, the Länder and the municipalities share the revenues of the personal 
and the corporate income tax, and the turnover tax. according the share out-
lined in Table 6.2.   
 
Tab. 6.2: Percentages in shared taxes in Germany  
 Federation Länder 
local  
governments 
personal income tax 42.5% 42.5% 15% 
capital gains tax 44% 44% 12% 
corporate income tax 50% 50% - 
turnover tax* 48.41%** 49.39%** 2.2% 
* after 1%-point in favor of public pension scheme, flexible shares for Federation and 
Länder 
** plus fixed amounts in favor of the Federation at the burden of the states 
Source:  Federal Ministry of Finance  
 
The tax revenues collected by the states are equalized horizontally by the for-
mula-based state fiscal equalisation scheme and supplemented by vertical 
grants from the federal budget1. All told 64% of the local fiscal capacities are 
included into state fiscal capacity. In addition the Federation pays special 
supplementary grants in order to compensate for special burdens (costs of 
German division, special burdens of unemployment, above average costs for 
                                               
1  See Bundesministerium der Finanzen: The Federal Financial Equalisation System in 
Germany [http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/ 
The-men/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Foederale_Finanzbeziehungen/Laenderfinanzaus-
gleich/ The-Federal-Financial-Equalisation-System-in-Germany-.pdf?__blob=publica-
tionFile&v=2],  
72 
 
the political governance of small and underperforming states). Since 2010, 
special grants have been paid to those five states which are highly indebted 
in order to help them to achieve a balanced budget by 2020.  
In addition to tax legislation, distribution of tax revenues, and the basic 
rules of fiscal equalization the Basic Law also regulates the public debt of the 
Federation and Länder. In 2009, a new regulation for public debt was adopted 
requiring the Federation reduce its deficits to a maximum 0.35% of GDP from 
2016 and that the states balance their budgets from 2020. Exceptions are 
permitted for borrowings in times of crises and after natural disasters2. Local 
governments that have introduced a double book-keeping system are permit-
ted to borrow as long as the economic result is positive. Moreover, the new 
European fiscal compact limits the total public sector deficit in Germany to 
0.5% of GDP, effective as of 20143. 
3.  Local revenues and financial needs in detail  
Although local governments should first cover the costs of local public goods 
and services through fees and charges the amount of those are of minor im-
portance (except for water provision, sewage, garbage collection and local 
public transport) because of the typical characteristics of public goods and 
their distributional problems. State regulations require that the user fees 
must not exceed the production costs of the specific services delivered.  
The above described tax revenues are not sufficient to finance local ser-
vice production costs. Therefore the Basic Law foresees that the states must 
share their share of the revenues of the joint taxes (after state fiscal equali-
zation) with their local governments. This regulation is open to specific local 
fiscal equalization schemes dependent on the diverging degrees of decentral-
ization of local responsibilities among the states. The regulation centralizes 
revenues at the level of the Länder in order to establish horizontal equaliza-
tion measures through vertical grants (see below) because the collected tax 
                                               
2  See Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Compendium on the Federation’s Budget Rule 
as set out in Article 115 of the Basic Law [http://www.bundesfinanzministe-
rium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Schulden-
bremse/2012-06-14-kompendium-en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3] 
3  See Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Fiskalvertrag [http://www.bundesfinanzminis-
terium.de/ Web/DE/Themen/Europa/Stabilisierung_des_Euroraums/Neue_haus-
haltspolitische_Ueberwachung/Fiskalvertrag/fiskalvertrag.html] 
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revenues are not based on the financial needs of local governments but on 
federal tax policies. 
The constitutional rules for the distribution of tax revenues don’t foresee 
considerable taxes for the counties and other associations of local authori-
ties. Counties receive only the revenues from the tax on hunting and fishing, 
amounting to minor revenue of 12 million Euros in 2012. Counties do not 
have the right to levy a proper multiplier on local taxes. The expenditures of 
local authority associations that are not covered by fees and charges and 
grants from local fiscal equalization are financed by allocations based on the 
fiscal capacity of each individual member. Details concerning the base of the 
county allocations are regulated in the fiscal equalization laws of the states. 
The county allowance rates actually applied range from about 40 to 70 per 
cent. 
Borrowing is the instrument of last resort for financing local goods and 
services. The legal rules of the States applicable to local authorities only allow 
credit for investment expenditures and these have to be redeemed later. The 
volume of planned borrowing has to be approved - together with the whole 
local budget - by the local control administrations of the states4. Deficits cov-
ering current expenditures are generally forbidden and are only accepted 
temporarily in the event of a recession. Local governments with chronic cur-
rent deficits risk losing their budgetary independence and being placed under 
the administration of a state commissioner. 
The crucial question, however, is how to find out how much financial 
means a local authority needs, not only in absolute terms but also vertically 
in relation to the other tiers of the German multi-level state and horizontally 
compared with neighboring municipalities. As all local authorities dispose 
about the right to increase or decrease their revenues by changing fees and 
charges and tax rates, or – in case of the local government associations – the 
rate of the respective allocations, they can change the volume of their reve-
nues by making the appropriate decisions. Democratic elections on the one 
hand and controls by the court of audits on the other hand ensure the effi-
ciency of spending. Other regulations are intended to protect local authori-
ties from the financial burdens of new regulations passed by the upper tiers: 
• The Basic Law prohibits the Federation from directly implementing new 
responsibilities for local governments (Art. 84 I No. 7 BL).  
                                               
4  Organized by the county administrations for the villages and cities in their territory.  
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• All constitutions of the states contain the principle of “Konnexität”, stipu-
lating an equalization of additional costs incurred from the administration 
of new local tasks. 
However, these new regulations do not protect local authorities from need-
ing to carry the costs of federal and European legislation and from being bur-
dened with the increasing costs of already existing state regulations. As the 
transferred tasks requiring the localities administer the regulations of higher 
levels of government are “compulsory”, these tend to crowd out performing 
other, so-called voluntary, local tasks their proper responsibility, even alt-
hough the latter are protected in art. 28 BL. However, some recent rulings by 
some state Constitutional Courts require a more intense measurement of the 
necessary expenditures placed on local governments and require quantita-
tively fixed minimum local financial equipment. Political and academic dis-
cussions – with the involvement of the Constitutional Courts –about meth-
ods of measurement are ongoing. 
Horizontally, the theory and practice of local financial needs is still based 
on the size of the population, an approach rooted in Johannes Popitz’s (1932) 
‘canalized’ citizen in cities and agglomerations with higher public needs and 
Arnold Brecht’s (1932) idea of a “progressive parallelism between local ex-
penditures and the density of population”. Local financial needs vary with the 
number of citizens, increasing for bigger cities and agglomerations for a mul-
titude of reasons, among them inter-local and inter-regional externalities. 
These ideas still dominate the construction of local fiscal equalization5. 
4.  Basic types of local fiscal equalization  
Local authorities in Germany deliver a broad variety of local public goods and 
services – partly as compulsory tasks, partly according their own political re-
sponsibility for self-administration. Local fiscal equalization schemes should 
close the gap between the actual fiscal capacity and the foreseen financial 
needs, thereby providing more equal financial means to all local authorities. 
There are 13 different local fiscal equalization schemes, one in each of the 
‘spatial states’. Eleven are based on a so-called local tax sharing; two have 
recently been changed to a ‘need-based’ system. The two types differ only 
                                               
5   See Zimmermann, Horst: Kommunalfinanzen, 2nd. ed, Baden-Baden 2009. 
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with respect to their calculation of the total amount of grants. The latter re-
quire a calculation of total needs based on the average costs of production of 
local goods and services. 
All local fiscal equalization schemes have four elements in common: 
• the compulsory sharing of joint taxes and the definition of a local equali-
zation mass,  
• specific purpose grants within - and without - fiscal equalization, 
• general grants distributed on the basis of equalization formulas that take 
into account financial needs and fiscal capacities,  
• apportionments/allowances as instruments to cover for the deficient fis-
cal capacities of the counties and other local authority associations.  
Compulsory tax sharing of joint taxes and the definition of a local equalisation 
mass  
Art. 106 (5) of the Basic Law requires additional flexible tax sharing between 
states and their local governments in order to supplement increase the defi-
cient tax capacity of the latter. Tax sharing is compulsory for the personal and 
the corporate income tax as well as for the turnover tax revenues, plus the 
grants from or minus the transfer payments into the state fiscal equalization 
scheme; it is optional for all other state tax revenues.  
Table 6.3 shows the degrees of decentralization in 2012 measured as a share 
of local expenditures in relation to aggregated expenditures of states and 
communities. It also shows the diverging shares of local tax revenues com-
pared with the total tax revenues of states and municipalities. These param-
eters determine the general gaps to be covered by local fiscal equalization 
grants. The Länder, therefore, apply different formulas, with percentages 
ranging from 12.2% in Bavaria to 23% in North Rhine-Westphalia, in order to 
calculate the so-called tax combine, which then forms the amount of local 
fiscal equalization grants. The percentages are open to changes if local ex-
penditures and local and state tax revenues diverge over time. In some states, 
like Saxony, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and Brandenburg, the local fiscal 
equalization laws contain an explicit rule for the symmetrical development of 
state and local revenues. The states also apply the same or another percent-
age to their proper tax revenues. The combined total gives the total amount 
of grants and is called the “fiscal equalization mass”.  
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Specific purpose grants within (and without) fiscal equalization  
A special form of specific purpose grants, though one of minor quantita-
tive importance, is the so-called ‘need grants’ paid to help local authorities 
that are suffering from special and costly problems that call outside of what 
could be categorized as ‘normal’ financial needs. To illustrate, a need grant is 
currently helping in the reconstruction of the city of Stauffen in BW, which is 
suffering from geological uplift that is damaging many buildings.  
 
Tab. 6.3: Degree of decentralization and share of local tax revenues 
from state and local tax revenues after fiscal equalization 
2012 
Land degree of decentralization share of local taxes 
BW 50.1% 23.5% 
By 47.1% 24.9% 
He 49.5% 21.9% 
LS 46.6% 22.9% 
NW 49.2% 20.6% 
RPL 44.7% 19.4% 
Saar 38.3% 19.7% 
SH 46.6% 15.9% 
Bb 43.5% 13.9% 
MV 46.7% 16.0% 
Sn 43.3% 14.6% 
SAT 43.2% 15.2% 
Th 47.7% 21.9% 
spatial states 46.6% 15.9% 
Source:  Federal Statistical Office: FS 14.2; own calculations  
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Tab. 6.4: Percentages applied to state tax revenues after state fiscal 
equalization to calculate the local tax combine 2000 and 2012 
Land BW By He LS NW RP SL SH Bb MV Sn 
2000 23.0 11.54 22.9 17.59 23.0 20.25 20.0 19.0 26.1 27.36 26.365 
2012 23.0 12.2 23.0 15.5 23.0 21.0 20.555 17.74 20.0 23.81 21.910 
Source:  Deutscher Städtetag: Local Finance Reports 2000 and 2012 
 
Many other budgets of state ministries contain a broad variety of additional 
specific purpose grants. Many of them are constructed as matched grants, in 
which the local authorities have to cover a certain share of the total costs of 
the subsidized projects from their regular financial means. Some of these spe-
cific purpose grants originate from the federal budget (e.g. for local public 
transport or for urban development) or even from the EU budget (e.g. Euro-
pean Social Funds, European Agricultural Structure Funds) and are trans-
ferred and administered by the state administrations.  
General grants: equalization formulas including financial needs and financial 
capacity6  
The amount of the fiscal equalization mass remaining after specific purpose 
grants is the base for local fiscal equalization in the narrower sense. In some 
states (e.g. BW, RP, MV, Th) a special fiscal equalization apportionment is lev-
ied upon those entities with above average fiscal capacities, which are often 
those that do not receive any general grants because their financial capacity 
exceeds their financial needs. The revenues from such fiscal equalization ap-
portionments are added in total or in part (BW) to the remaining fiscal equal-
ization mass, after which it is called the ‘key mass’, as it is totally allocated to 
so-called ‘key grants’.  
Most states now start with the division of the ‘key mass’ into three or four 
parts, one each in favor of the county free cities, local authorities within coun-
ties, counties, and - if existing – of the higher local authority associations. 
Only Rhineland-Palatinate applies a common integrated formula for all types 
                                               
6  See Deutscher Städtetag: Gemeindefinanzbericht 2011; in: der städtetag 10/2011. 
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of local authorities. Key grants have – in different combinations and quanti-
ties among the states – three basic forms:  
• often a part of the key mass is given as lump sum grants – varying based 
on the types of local authorities – in order to cover the costs of compul-
sory local tasks;  
• some states (e.g. BW, RP) ensure a minimum fiscal capacity per inhabitant 
for municipalities by grants that fill up the average fiscal capacity to a cer-
tain percentage;  
• all fiscal equalization schemes contain key grants covering a certain share 
of the gap between financial needs and fiscal capacity for each local gov-
ernment 
The measurement of financial ‘needs’ is based on the size of the population 
(main approach) and other factors representing important cost factors (sec-
ondary approach). In most states the number of citizens is evaluated by a fac-
tor increasing with the size of the municipality. Only Rhineland-Palatinate 
and Schleswig-Holstein count the pure number of inhabitants. The variety of 
indicators for the secondary approach is broad and can include the number 
of pupils or standardized school costs per pupils, number of long-term unem-
ployed, number of employees, number of students, ‘central locations’ from 
regional planning categories, the size of the military population, mining com-
munities, spas, and so on and so forth. Based on these factors, each commu-
nity is given an indicator capturing their abstract financial needs without a 
particular monetary dimension attached to it. 
Fiscal capacity is counted as the real revenues from the local shares of the 
personal income tax and the turnover tax plus standardized revenues from 
the local property and the local business tax. Fees and charges as well as mi-
nor local taxes are not included into the fiscal capacity.  
The rate of equalization varies between 50% and 90% from state to state. 
The ‘neutral’ indicators of financial needs are multiplied by a ‘basic grant’, 
which is calculated to absorb exactly the whole key mass. Those local author-
ities where the monetized financial needs indicator exceeds the fiscal capac-
ity receive key grants. If the fiscal capacity exceeds the financial needs then 
no key grants are provided.   
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Allowances as an instrument to finance counties and other local authority 
associations 
Local authority associations, which do not possess own tax revenues, use al-
lowances as instrument for making up for deficient fiscal capacities. Corre-
spondingly, their fiscal capacity is calculated as the sum of fiscal capacities of 
their member communities weighted by an average allowance rate. The fi-
nancial needs are usually determined by the number of inhabitants. The 
equalization rate is the same rate as applied for municipalities. Counties usu-
ally receive lump sum grants and key grants.  
Allowances are additional instruments not only used to transfer local rev-
enues to higher levels of local government, but also to equalize fiscal capaci-
ties at the lowest - level of government. The base of the allowance is the sum 
of tax capacities plus the lump sum and key grants the member municipalities 
have received in the same year. In some states progressive rates for county 
allowances are levied upon communities with an above average fiscal capac-
ity. Municipalities with higher fiscal capacity and higher needs – which in 
most states are counted as financial needs only at the lowest level of local 
governments even though the respective tasks could be allocated to the 
county level – pay higher county allowances per inhabitant or, in the case of 
progressive allowance rates, an ever increasing amount per inhabitant with 
growing fiscal capacity. The burden of county and other allowances, there-
fore, also established incentives to increase local tax rates and local tax mul-
tipliers. After this very complex multi-level fiscal equalization scheme, local 
finance is in many aspects (fiscal capacities, local tax rates) much more har-
monized than before.  
5.  Problems of local finance in Germany  
The “beautiful very complicated world” of German local fiscal equalization 
has come under pressure in recent years because of a variety of legal changes 
and problems concerning local taxes and growing uncovered compulsory ex-
penditures. The tax base of local authorities, last adjusted in a fundamental 
way in 1970, is no longer appropriate for the financial needs of local author-
ities: 
• The property tax is based on values from 1964, or even - for the new Län-
der - 1935, and is no longer a suitable tax on the market values of real 
assets. 
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• The twice ‘castrated’ local business tax (abolition of the payroll tax in 1979 
and of the trade capital tax in 1998) provides uneven and heavily cyclical 
local revenues, as well as being paid only by a minority of local enterprises. 
• The share of tax revenues coming from taxes with no local autonomy re-
garding rates has, therefore, been decreasing for decades.  
• The distribution keys of the local shares of income tax and VAT are ‘artifi-
cial’ and provide nontransparent redistributions among the communities.  
Growing compulsory expenditures – particularly for social purposes – can no 
longer be covered by the static local tax capacities. In addition, tax sharing 
between the states and their local authorities and the hereby derived fiscal 
equalization schemes have suffered from several cut-backs in the last 20 
years, during which time the Länder needed to consolidate their budgets due 
to the burdens of German unification in the late 1990s and costly federal tax 
reforms in 2005. Since 1995 an additional trade tax allowance has been lev-
ied in Western Germany in favor of state budgets in order to include munici-
palities in covering the costs of German unification. 
In this context, many local authorities in some states (Saar, RP, NW, He, 
LS) suffer from chronic deficits in their current accounts. Although persisting 
deficits in current budgets are against the legal rules, the local control admin-
istrations of these states have tolerated the illegal situation too long. It is not 
astonishing that those Länder with high deficits in their proper budgets now 
have to fight harder to balance their budgets by 2020. The financial and eco-
nomic crisis in 2008 and 2009 hit local authorities during an ongoing yet un-
finished process of consolidation. Municipalities experienced the highest 
losses of tax revenues of all federal tiers, some 11.8%; total local tax revenues 
regained their pre-crisis 2007 level only in 20127.  
A Federal Commission for the Reform of Local Finance, which worked 
from 2010 to 2012, provided only marginal solutions, among them more 
transparency of the local burdens of federal laws. It did not abolish the local 
business tax, nor did it undertake to reform it. All attempts to introduce an 
autonomous local surcharge onto the personal income tax – instead of the 
local business tax or in addition to it – did not gain the necessary majority.   
So many unresolved problems remain, with some growing even worse. 
Although from 2014 the Federation will take over the costs for providing a 
minimum income to the elderly and those unable to work, social expenditures 
                                               
7  See the contribution of Färber about “Consequences of the Economic and Financial 
Crisis for Public Administrations in Germany”. 
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at the local level continue to increase, particularly for early childhood kinder-
gartens and support for the disabled. The first burdens the budgets of the 
lower level municipalities, the latter those of the counties. Counties, there-
fore, have for many years been increasing the rates of the county allowances, 
with the average amount in the Länder ranging from 30.46% in Saxony to 
60.04% in Saarland.8 Thus the financial means of the municipalities have 
been shrinking from both sides of the budget: increasing expenditures for 
child care and lower revenues after paying the county allowance. Meanwhile, 
in January 2013, the Federal Administrative Court judged this local finance 
situation as not conforming to legal rules and thereby implicitly required 
more transparent and financial minimum equipment of local governments.  
In this context of increasingly restricted tax autonomy and antiquated tax 
bases, particularly regarding local property taxes, the capability of the local 
authorities to meet their constitutional responsibilities is greatly reduced. 
The highest priority should be given to reforming local taxes. These should 
consist of at least a ‘triumvirate’ of taxes on local properties, local business 
and local personal income. In each the locality should have an autonomous 
right to determine the local tax rate or the local multiplier on the nationally 
uniform tax base. The ‘localization’ of the counties in recent years, which 
shifted them away from the old traditional construction, has made them the 
lowest level of state administration and at the same time an institution of 
local self-administration. Given this development, it is time to make them 
participate in the local rights of levying a proper tax rate on these tax bases. 
However, politicians at the federal and the state level seem to fear too much 
responsibility being given to local governments. Yet more tax autonomy - re-
sponsibility for the tax rates within their territory - could be the only way to 
stop the local cry for more state money.   
  
                                               
8  Deutscher Landkreistag: Kreisumlagehebesätze (arith. Mittel) im Ländervergleich 
2000–2012 (http://www.kreise.de/__cms1/images/stories/themen/Kreisfinanzen/ 
grafiken2012/abbildung_40.pdf) 
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Local Taxes in Germany – Problems and Reform Approaches 
Marco SALM, Stephanie HENGSTWERTH 
1.  Introduction 
Local government taxes made up 9 % of total tax revenues in 2012, from 
which a large portion was and generally is generated by the local trade tax1. 
Property tax and the trade tax constitute the largest component of local gov-
ernment own-source revenues, while several small local taxes, as well as 
charges and user fees make up most the remainder. Moreover, local govern-
ments directly receive a percentage of shared tax revenues.2   
 
Fig. 7.1: Structure of government and tax revenues 2011  
(after distribution of joint taxes) 
 
Source:  Authors; FSO 2013, Federal Ministry of Finance 2012 
                                               
1  Pure local tax revenue was 9% of total government revenue, while local level revenues 
including joint taxes came to about 13% of total revenues (see figure 1). 
2  All three levels of government are jointly entitled to the most important types of taxes 
(i.e., sales tax (VAT) and income tax), also known as “joint taxes”. Tax revenue is dis-
tributed using a fixed quota prescribed in the fiscal constitution. 
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Despite many reform efforts in the field of local taxes and intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, one can observe a subtle decline in local taxation autonomy 
over recent years. The purpose of this article is to profile the structure of local 
taxes, and the problems associated with them. Section two outlines the de-
velopment of the local tax system over time. The third section focuses on de-
scribing principles for a rational local tax system. The fourth section examines 
local taxes in detail, while the last section addresses current reform issues. 
2.  Development of Local Taxes and Revenues 
Municipalities carry out a wide range of tasks and responsibilities. Of all rev-
enue types the most important are “own-source” revenues (33 %) and grant 
financing from state governments (47 %), as shown in figure 2. Own-source 
revenues are generated by a municipality itself through the use of its power 
to tax and set fees and charges. Other revenues come from intergovernmen-
tal relationships. 
 
Fig. 7.2: Local government revenues 2012 
 
Source:  Authors; FSO 2012 
 
The current tax revenue mix of local governments  is summarized in table 7.1. 
 
  
Local taxes
33%
Charges and 
fees
8%
Grants
47%
Other
12%
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Tab. 7.1: Municipal tax revenues 
Type of tax Revenue share Assignment of revenue Legislation 
property tax  100 % Local 
Federal (rate fixed by 
municipality) 
trade tax 81,8 % 
Local, apportionment 
given to federal and 
state government 
Federal (rate fixed by 
municipality) 
personal in-
come tax 
15 % 
Federal/State  
(incl. municipalities’ 
share of 15 %) 
Federal 
withholding 
tax on capital 
12 % 
Federal/State  
(incl. municipalities’ 
share of 12 %) 
Federal 
value added 
tax (VAT) ca. 2.2 % 
Federal/State 
 (incl. municipalities’ 
share of 2.2 %) 
Federal 
local expendi-
ture and con-
sumption 
taxes 
100 % Local 
State/Local 
 
Source:  Authors 
 
Over time, the tax shares of federal, state, and local governments have 
shifted within the more lucrative taxes (income taxes, VAT). The shift from a 
strictly separate tax system to a system of tax revenue sharing entails ad-
vantages and disadvantages for municipalities. Within the local taxes, the sin-
gle largest revenue source of municipalities is the trade tax. The second larg-
est income comes from the local share of personal income tax.3 Property tax 
is split into two categories. Firstly, municipalities levy a tax on property that 
is being used for agricultural purposes (Property Tax A). More importantly, 
municipalities levy a tax on property and real estate assets (Property Tax B), 
which is relatively more profitable. 
 
                                               
3  Tax revenue sharing of personal income tax: federal government (42.5%), state gov-
ernments (42.5%), local governments (15%). 
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Fig. 7.4: Local tax revenues 2012 
 
Source:  Authors; FSO 2013 
 
Figure 7.5 illustrates the development of municipal taxes over time. Clearly, 
the cyclical nature of the trade tax strongly dominates developments in total 
local tax revenues. The trade tax exhibits the strongest growth rates relative 
to other local taxes. 
 
Fig. 7.5: Development of municipal tax revenues 1998-2011 
 
(Normalized series: 1998 = 100) Source:  Authors; FSO 2012 
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3.  Principles of Local Taxation 
Local authorities require tax revenues in order to provide public services to 
three groups within the municipality: citizens, land owners and businesses. 
These groups represent the potential users of public services as well as po-
tential tax payers. The following section outlines the required principles to 
set up a rational local tax system. 
The features of a reasonable local tax system are based on the decentral-
ization theorem, in particular fiscal equivalence. While every tax needs to fol-
low rational criteria, such as economic efficiency, ease and cost of administra-
tion, allocation, stability, and fairness (equity), local taxes must meet several 
additional criteria that only apply to the local level.  
- Visibility: Taxes are paid without receiving individual service in direct ex-
change. Yet, it is important for local citizens or businesses to be able to 
perceive a “visible” (rough) equivalence between taxes paid and services 
provided.  
- Local accountability: Local expenditures should be covered by own-source 
revenues via local taxes paid by local voter-citizens.   
- Balance of interest between user groups of local public services: Every user 
group needs to share in the financing of a municipality’s public goods. Cit-
izens, as well as businesses and land/home owners, have to be taxed by 
the municipality.  
- Resilience to cyclical trends: Local taxes should be designed to be relatively 
resilient to cyclical trends in order to maintain a steady income. This is 
especially important because fiscal policy with regard to business cycles is 
a primary task of the federal and not local government.     
- Proportional growth sensitivity: Municipal tax revenues should develop rel-
ative to economic growth (GDP), because local expenditures need to in-
crease with GDP. 
- Avoiding unnecessary migration: Technically, citizens and businesses can 
migrate to wherever they will benefit the most from local public services 
(Tiebout 1956). If citizens or businesses migrate to a different municipal-
ity, average costs for remaining citizens and businesses increase.  
- Flexibility: Depending on the amount or range of municipal public goods 
provision, tax rates in a given locality can be higher or lower than else-
where. This kind of taxation flexibility and resulting in a variation of tax 
rates can only be achieved by municipalities having partial tax compe-
tence (the autonomy to set rates). 
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In setting up a rational local tax system, municipalities should have access to 
several kinds of taxes that somehow fulfill the five general and seven local-
specific principles. Nonetheless, it is obvious that some of these principles 
for local taxes are not compatible with each other, or even contradict each 
other.  
4.  Local Taxes in Germany 
Local governments in Germany rely heavily on local taxation, but also finance 
local budgets through intergovernmental revenues (shared tax revenue, 
grants, etc.). Local own-source revenue derives from property taxes (A and 
B), local trade tax, and small local taxes. Intergovernmental revenues include 
shared tax revenue consisting of a local share of (personal) income tax and a 
local share of sales tax (VAT). Together own and shared revenue sum up the 
local tax system in Germany, while each also has different aspects and pro-
spects for reform.  
4.1  Own-source Revenue 
Property taxes constitute the third largest component of local government 
own-source revenue (12 Bn. Euro in 2012). Property tax A (agricultural prop-
erties) and property tax B (estate and housing) are linked to land/home own-
ers as a user group of municipal services. This is in line with the third principle 
(balance of interest) outlined above.  
According to Fischel (2001), municipal services are capitalized in a prop-
erty’s value. Increasing investments in infrastructure (e.g., connecting prop-
erty to a public transport system) raises the monetary value of properties. 
This “unearned” economic rent which land owners benefit from, called “get-
ting richer while sleeping” (Harriss 2001: 15), is re-captured through property 
tax. Property tax is therefore perceived as fair because the tax is offset by 
local government services and goods (visibility). Fiscal equivalence is also as-
sured by the principle of flexibility. Municipalities are able to set these tax 
rates themselves. As a result, different tax rates in different municipalities 
represent different supplies of public goods and services. This becomes evi-
dent when comparing differences in tax rates (multipliers) between urban 
and rural municipalities (490 % in Munich compared to 240-350 % in rural 
regions). Additionally, the entire property tax revenue goes directly to the 
municipalities (local accountability). 
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Yet property tax, a typical local tax meeting most of the established crite-
ria, nonetheless has several problems regarding its design. The property tax 
base is a so-called assessed value, which is based on historical data from 1964 
(1935 in former East Germany). This means the assessed values  are only a 
fraction of the current market value of a property. On average, assessed val-
ues from 1964 come to only 1/20th of the current value of properties.4 Using 
outdated land values is considered a violation of the principle of equality (Ar-
ticle 3 GG) of property and wealth (particularly capital assets). It results in 
different taxation of the two production factors: land and capital. By law, 
property values are supposed to be assessed every 6 years. Yet this has never 
been done due to the heavy administrative costs and burdens involved. 
The local trade tax constitutes the most important source of revenue for 
municipalities (35.2 Bn. Euro in 2012), accounting for 43 % of their tax reve-
nues. This tax is imposed on types of businesses clearly defined by law (§ 2 
Abs. 1 GewStG) and excludes a wide range of typical freelancer's professions 
(i.e., artists, physicians, lawyers), which automatically reduces the tax base. 
Just like property tax, it meets the criterion of flexibility. Municipalities are 
empowered to set the trade tax rates (multipliers) in order to adjust revenue 
to their fiscal needs. Furthermore, municipalities impose and collect the tax 
on businesses located within their own municipal boundaries (local account-
ability). 
Originally, the trade tax was designed a threefold tax base, rooted in the 
idea not only of businesses making profits, but that labor and capital contrib-
ute to the creation of value. Currently, the tax is based only on profits instead 
of including all three pillars, which were: 
- a tax on trade profits 
- a tax on trading capital (abolished in 1998, due to international tax com-
petition) 
- a tax on payroll (abolished in 1980, perceived as harmful toward employ-
ment). 
Removing trading capital and payroll from the tax base, which was associated 
with reforming taxation of profits, resulted in an excessive decline of the tax 
base and also reduced the potential number of businesses obliged to pay 
trade tax. In practice, only 30 % of all businesses currently have to pay trade 
tax (Geberth 2011: 151). The current design of the trade tax includes only 
                                               
4  Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2010): Reform der 
Grundsteuer, p. 1. 
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medium-sized and large companies (corporations and profitable partner-
ships). This leaves out a wide range of smaller businesses that also benefit 
from local public infrastructure but without having to pay for it, meaning the 
principles of visibility and balance of interest are only partially fulfilled. Thus, 
Zimmermann (2009: 171) refers to the ‘cannibalization’ of the trade tax, be-
cause its current design does not satisfy all the requirements of a good mu-
nicipal tax. Furthermore, profits are strongly related to the business cycle and 
general economic situation. Thus this tax has no resilience to cyclical effects, 
making budget management difficult for municipalities. 
In order to stabilize municipal revenues the financial reform of 1969 as-
signed a 14 %5 share of the national income tax to municipalities. This also 
balanced the fiscal capacities between different municipalities. Receiving a 
share of the income tax was intended to compensate for partially giving up 
the trade tax, resulting in a less cyclically sensitive tax base. Receiving a share 
of income tax also strengthened the local accountability of local revenues, 
since income tax is paid by citizens living in the respective municipality. 
In Germany, municipalities are entitled to levy taxes and set rates for local 
excise taxes (Article 106 GG), also called small local taxes. Based on the prin-
ciple of fiscal equivalence, municipalities can independently decide to intro-
duce a new tax. However, municipalities must take care that the design of the 
new tax is not similar to an existing federal or state tax and does not apply to 
the same tax base as these existing taxes. Additionally, certain laws and reg-
ulations of the state can restrict municipalities’ possibilities to levy specific 
small local taxes. Since the tax base of existing taxes is already fairly wide, 
there is only a little leeway for establishing new local taxes. Local excise taxes 
generally conform to the principles of good local taxation, yet they comprise 
a small percentage of municipal tax revenue (1.3 % in 2012). 
4.2  Shared taxes Revenue 
Municipalities have since 1969 been entitled to a share in (personal) income 
tax revenue.6 In 2012, the local share of income tax came to 29.1 Bn. Euro, 
accounting for 36 % of total local tax revenue (figure 4). The local income tax 
share is logically consistent with the postulated criteria in section 3, because 
                                               
5  The local VAT share was changed to 15 % in 1980. 
6  As mentioned above, a share in the income tax went along with giving up parts of the 
trade tax to state and federal government.  
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income tax makes local residents contribute to municipal services (balance of 
interest). One purpose of sharing income tax with municipalities is to provide 
steady revenue (resilience to cyclical effects) in order to mitigate differences in 
fiscal capacity among municipalities. The distribution procedure includes the 
following steps: 
- First, the withholding tax revenue is added to income tax revenue and is 
distributed with the same allocation formula. 
- Second, revenues of income and withholding tax (state plus local share) 
are assigned to the 16 states. 
- Third, each state distributes the total local share between its own munici-
palities using income statistics of single and married households to guide 
allocation. Single/married households up to a threshold of 35,000/70,000 
€ are taken into account. Households with higher incomes are not consid-
ered in the statistics, preventing outlying richer residents from raising a 
municipality’s share of income tax.7  
By law, municipalities are entitled to impose surcharges on income tax. Yet 
such surcharges have not yet been authorized by the federal government. 
Therefore, the local income tax share does not keep to the principle of flexi-
bility. Also, residents have no visibility of the relationship between taxes paid 
and local services, because the local share of 15 % is not pointed out in resi-
dents’ annual tax statements. 
Since 1998 municipalities have also been receiving a 2.2 % share of VAT 
revenue, totaling 3.9 Bn. Euro in 2012.8 In exchange, the former trade capital 
tax was abolished. Compensating for the loss by introducing a local VAT share 
had both advantages and disadvantages for municipalities. On the one hand, 
the local VAT share is a steady and reliable revenue source (resilience to cycli-
cal effects). On the other hand, municipalities have no right to set tax rates 
independently, thereby they lost flexibility. 
Clearly, VAT revenue cannot be allocated directly to each state due to 
consumers being concentrated in core regions, thus making it impossible to 
allocate VAT revenue to certain states or municipalities. Therefore, the local 
                                               
7  Cutting off income above 35,000/70,000 € intentionally aims to level the differences 
in fiscal capacity between municipalities. 
8  The federal government makes an annual decision about the specific amount of VAT 
that goes to the local share, but it usually come to approximately 2%. 
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VAT share is distributed between municipalities using three weighted statis-
tical indicators of a municipality’s economic activity (Federal Ministry of Fi-
nance 2013): 
- a municipality’s trade tax revenue accounts for 25 % 
- the number of employees within a municipality accounts for 50 % 
- employee remuneration subject to social security (total payroll) within a 
municipality accounts for 25 % 
Passing the local VAT share from the federal to state level and distributing it 
between municipalities makes it look more like a federal grant rather than a 
genuine local tax. The local VAT share does not fulfill any of the principles 
outlined in section 3.  
5.  Reform Proposals 
The above discussion of local tax revenue shows, given its current design and 
in light of the principles of local taxation that those particular local taxes 
which are directly linked to the three local user groups are in urgent need of 
reform, these being property tax (land/home owners), trade tax (local busi-
nesses), and the local income tax share (citizens). These three taxes represent 
at least 94% of total local tax revenue (figure 7.4).  
Regarding the problems of property tax mentioned above, there are a few 
proposals out there to revise the outdated assessment base. One complaint 
is that the current property tax favors single family houses and duplexes 
through applying lower base rates than for rental homes. The proposed re-
forms differ in terms of how to determine the value of real property assets: 
Pure area tax:  
- multiplying the area of a property by equivalence factors that depend on 
the usage of the area (residential, commercial) 
- no consideration of the actual market value 
Comparative value method:  
- requires a valuation of property assets (land and buildings) 
Pure land value tax:  
- only land is assessed (standard land values) 
- buildings are valued with their size and simple tax rates 
93 
From the perspective of what makes a good municipal tax, the comparative 
value method should be preferred for creating a feasible assessment base. This 
method adheres to the principle of proportional growth sensitivity, as it takes 
into account changes in value over time. Moreover, its near-market valuation 
of property finally brings an end to the unequal treatment of land and capital. 
The local trade tax derives its theoretical justification from the fiscal equiv-
alence principle, as municipalities provide the necessary infrastructure for 
the economic activities of businesses. In short, the local trade tax suffers from 
two main problems. Firstly, the tax base is too small, and secondly, the num-
ber of taxpayers could be much higher. Both problems result in generating 
lower tax revenue than is possible. Against this backdrop, there are two pos-
sible and widely discussed reform ideas. Both reform proposals aim at broad-
ening the tax base and increasing the number of commercial tax payers. 
Tax on net production value: Unlike the current system which taxes only 
trade revenue, the fundamental idea of a tax on net production value is to tax 
all elements that contribute to the creation of value: wages, rent, lease, profits, 
and interest.9 Technically, the tax comprises every type of income that arises 
in the local production. Furthermore, this reform model would allow for a 
broadening of the tax base by committing freelancers, all kinds of self-em-
ployed persons, the housing industry, farmers and foresters, as well as the 
public sector to pay trade tax. This reform proposal naturally includes the re-
moval of the trade tax in its current form. 
Revitalization of the trade tax: Other concepts for reform propose the revi-
talization of the current trade tax. The goal is to keep the trade tax as a local 
tax in order to maintain its positive aspects, but to eliminate its deficiencies 
by: 
- Expanding the number of tax payers to include freelancers, the self-em-
ployed, the housing industry, farmers and foresters, as well as the public 
sector. 
- Broadening of the tax assessment base by making taxable not only trade 
profit, but also interest income10, property rental, and leasing income. This 
would be accompanied with a decrease in the assessment rate (multiplier). 
- Re-introducing a tax on payroll (abolished in 1980). 
- Revoking many of the currently allowed deductions. 
                                               
9  It aims to avoid distorting relationship between the value of labor and capital by cap-
turing both in the tax base. 
10  This refers to re-introducing a tax on trading capital, which was abolished in 1998. 
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Both of the above outlined reform options contribute to a better balance of 
interest by encouraging lower tax rates. Thus, at this stage there is no lack of 
reform alternatives, but rather a mutual stalemate as municipal stakeholders 
on the one hand and businesses on the other hand blockade each other. 
In addition to reform proposals for property and trade tax, a third proposal 
seeks to reform the local share of income tax due to a lack of visibility for local 
citizens, along with the fact that municipalities cannot operate flexibly with 
regards to the desired tax revenue, as they are denied the right to impose 
surcharges on regular income tax. Only a citizen-centric revenue source that 
allows local variation of tax rates approaches the realization of the principle 
of fiscal equivalence. Importantly, total local income tax revenue depends on 
the number of income tax payers, the income structure of local citizens, and 
the overall economic situation (i.e., unemployment reduces the tax base). 
One reform proposal suggests taking advantage of the local right to im-
pose surcharges on the existing income tax. This option is not currently exer-
cised even though it is legally possible. According to the Basic Law, a federal 
law can allow municipalities to set a local rate on the local income tax share. 
Different local rates would allow municipalities to adjust to the local prefer-
ences of citizens and would, therefore, result in different supplies of services. 
Furthermore, it would strengthen local accountability. This type of local in-
come tax existed in Germany until 1920 (Sander 2001). It took the form of a 
percentage surcharge on the income tax of the respective state and was for-
merly the main revenue source of municipalities. A second proposal is to in-
troduce a municipal income tax, which would have a similar tax base as the 
current federal income tax but where municipalities independently decide on 
their desired tax rate. Instead of “just” a surcharge, they would be able to de-
cide their own tax rate completely.  
6.  Conclusions 
When examining current local taxes in Germany with reference to the princi-
ples of local taxation, we find that purposeful reforms are inevitable for many 
reasons. If own-source revenues continuously decline, municipalities have an 
insufficient incentive to finance their duties sustainably, as the transfers from 
the state increase. In addition, declining revenue changes their possibilities 
to finance optional tasks where they have full autonomy. Due to the transi-
tion from a separate tax system to a shared revenue system, possibilities to 
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generate own-source revenues have declined and local self-government con-
tracted, leading to a stronger dependency on state transfers. Local accounta-
bility declined drastically as a result. 
Local finances have been stabilized at the price of less local autonomy. 
The tax revenue sharing system between the three federal levels should focus 
more strongly on local tax autonomy. One possibility that exists is to re-af-
firm a local right to impose surcharges on personal income tax.  
State dominance due to high transfers needs to decline, as only 1/3rd of 
local income is based on local taxes. The current trade tax does not grow con-
tinuously and does not include all beneficiaries of municipal services. Prop-
erty taxes grow below average relative to economic growth and their revenue 
elasticity is smaller than one. This implies an unequal taxation of land and 
capital. Reforming property tax by using actual market values and broadening 
the trade tax base are essential reform issues. 
Again, the only three sources of local taxation are citizens, businesses, and 
land owners. Each group benefits from different types of local services. Yet, 
we showed above that the three corresponding taxes (income tax, trade tax, 
and property tax) are highly in need of reform. In conclusion, assessing local 
taxes seems to go along with the question of how much local fiscal autonomy 
a municipality desires, versus receiving transfers and shared tax revenues 
with correspondingly less autonomy. Nevertheless, municipalities need to be 
equipped with adequate taxation possibilities in order to fulfill their current 
and possibly future tasks and responsibilities. 
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Local authority Debt – Problems and Solutions 
Nadja BRAUN-BINDER, Joachim WIELAND 
I.  Preamble 
The extent of public debt and the resultant risks have become a topic of ever 
growing public interest in recent years. The financial and economic crisis ef-
fectively accelerated the trend of increasing public debt and enhanced the 
poor budgetary state of local authorities. The precarious budgetary situation 
has in some cases imposed massive limitations on the scope for decision-
making by local authorities. However, such scope is fundamental to ensuring 
that local authority autonomy can actually function in its capacity as a cor-
nerstone of government and society1. Thus, local authority debt affects a key 
aspect of the German federal state and a solution is essential.  
This essay outlines the fundamentals of how the functions of local author-
ities are financed (II) and the current state of debt (III) before the causes of 
local authority debt are examined in more detail (IV). Finally, potential 
approaches on how to solve the local authority debt problem will be pre-
sented (V). 
II.  Financing of local authority functions 
According to section 28 paragraph 2 Basic Law2 Municipalities as well as as-
sociations of municipalities must be guaranteed the right to regulate all local 
affairs on their own responsibility (“Selbstverwaltung”). The guarantee of 
self-government extends to the bases of financial autonomy. However, this 
does not include the authority of the municipalities to levy their own taxes.  
                                               
1  cf. Wieland, Der Anspruch der Kommunen auf eine angemessene Finanzaustattung, 
in: Schliesky/Ernst/Schulz (pub.), Die Freiheit des Menschen, Festschrift Schmidt-Jort-
zig, 2011, p. 221 et seqq. 
2  Basic Law (“Grundgesetz”) for the Federal Republic of Germany, as amended by the 
Act of 11 July 2012 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 1478). 
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Local authority functions are financed via four channels: through tax re-
ceipts (a), through levies (b), through compensation payments for the trans-
fer of specific functions by the Länder (c) and through general redistribution 
of federal state financial resources (d).  
(a)  While local authorities are generally unable to levy their own taxes, they 
do receive an apportioned share of income tax (section 106, paragraph 5 
Basic Law) and turnover tax (section 106, paragraph 5a Basic Law) as well as 
tax revenue from real property and trades taxation (section 106, paragraph 
6, sentence 1, clause 1 Basic Law). Municipalities (or associations of munici-
palities) are also granted tax revenues from local taxes on consumption and 
expenditures (section 106, paragraph 6, sentence 1, clause 2 Basic Law) and 
have the right to establish the rates (“Hebesatz”) at which taxes on real prop-
erty and trades are levied (section 106, paragraph 6, sentence 2 Basic Law).  
Although the Basic Law grants the Federation and the Länder an exclusive 
mandate to legislate on matters of taxation, there is one possibility for a local 
authority to levy municipal taxes: Section 105, paragraph 2a of the Basic Law 
assigns sole authority with respect to local excise taxes to the Länder. Con-
sequently, the municipalities are permitted to establish by-laws for the levy-
ing of municipal taxes, provided that they are granted the right to establish 
such by-laws by the respective constitution of their Land and by legislation 
governing municipal charges. The local authority then has absolute sover-
eignty over these taxes. However, in terms of the income of the local author-
ities, these municipal taxes are of no practical relevance. 
(b)  Contributions and fees are other sources of income for local authorities, 
although these do not usually give rise to any positive balance, because con-
tributions and fees are generally levied specifically for the purpose of recov-
ering expenses3. Moreover, sociopolitical factors dictate that the contribu-
tions and fees levied are often lower than those needed to actually cover ex-
penses. Investments in private companies, the disposal of assets and munic-
ipal borrowing are also governed by strict limits imposed by municipal codes 
and municipal budgetary law.  
(c)  For these reasons, local authorities are mostly reliant on financing from 
their respective Länder. They receive this financing when the Länder provide 
a mandate to the local authorities to perform certain functions, which in turn 
                                               
3  cf. Siegel, Einführung in das Kommunalabgabenrecht, JuS 2008, 1071. 
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obliges the Bundesland to bear the costs4. Such 'principles of relation' (Kon-
nexitätsprinzip) anchored in the constitutions of the Länder are aimed at pro-
tecting the autonomy of the local authorities.  
(d)  The fourth source of financing for local authorities is that of the redistri-
bution of federal state financial resources (“Finanzausgleich”; section 106, 
paragraph 7 Basic Law). Such redistribution of finances may either be man-
datory (sentence 1) or optional (sentence 2). Within the framework of man-
datory financial resource redistribution, local authorities are entitled to re-
ceive a certain percentage of the federal state's total revenue from federal 
and state taxes, specifically income tax, corporation tax and turnover tax; this 
percentage is set by the respective legislative body of the Land. The Länder 
may also decide whether and to which extent taxes levied on a federal state 
level are to be transferred to the local authorities.  
III.  Current debt 
As of the end of 2012, local authority debt totaled €135 billion5. €47 billion 
of this, representing 35 per cent of the debt, is attributable to municipal bor-
rowing (“Kassenkredite”)6. Municipal borrowing has grown massively in re-
cent years and shows the strain that local authority financing is under. These 
loans, which are actually only intended to cover short-term liquidity bottle-
necks, have since been used repeatedly to cover shortfalls in financing for 
long-term functions over a longer period of time. 
                                               
4  cf. by way of example, section 71 paragraph 3 of the Baden-Württemberg State 
Constitution.  
5  Please note that this debt situation does not concern all local authorities, nor does it 
affect all local authorities to the same extent. cf. Bertelsmann Foundation, Municipal 
Finance Report 2013, p. 60 et seqq.  (http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/ 
xbcr/SID-12603459-2027BC37/bst/xcms_bst_dms_38670_38671_2.pdf, document 
as present on 24 October 2013) 
6  cf. Overview by the Federal Statistical Office, Debts of Local Authorities and Local 
Authority Associations 31 December 2012; https://www.destatis.de/DE/Zahlen-
Fakten/GesellschaftStaat/OeffentlicheFinanzenSteuern/OeffentlicheFinanzen/Schu
lden/Tabellen/SchuldenGemeinden_311212.html;jsessionid=74700E4BF936D80A9
7FA6B8465DFD9B5.cae3 (document as present on 24 October 2013) 
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IV.  Causes 
The causes of local authority debt are complex and occur in towns, cities and 
communities in very specific combinations. Disregarding specific local cir-
cumstances relating to the generation of debt, there are certain common 
points of reference that can be identified as applying to all local authorities 
affected by the debt issue. These include not only the growth in the number 
of functions performed and the associated growth in expenditure (a) but also 
a certain element of responsibility on the part of local authority supervision 
(b) and certain counterproductive consequences arising from the debt ceiling 
(“Schuldenbremse”) (c). 
(a)  The range of devolved functions performed by the local authorities has 
grown continuously. This concerns functions where the state continues to as-
sume responsibility for their performance as well as those where the state 
transfers responsibility in full for the performance of these functions to the 
local authority, regardless of whether the state continues to play a supervi-
sory role in their performance. Despite this, the financial resources provided 
to the local authorities by their respective Länder for this larger range of func-
tions continues to decline7. Should the revenues needed to perform required 
functions not be sufficient, it becomes necessary to borrow the required 
money. 
This problem is particularly apparent with the constantly rising social se-
curity expenditure. The decision of the Federal Legislature prior to the Fed-
eralism Reform to transfer responsibility for the execution of social security 
legislation to local authorities has proven particularly catastrophic for these 
local authorities. The Federation and the Länder were very happy to transfer 
these functions to the local authorities, not least because it provided a way 
to create new social security benefits with no impact upon the state budget8. 
                                               
7  cf. Bertelsmann Foundation, Municipal Finance Report 2013 (http://www.bertels-
mann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-12603459-2027BC37/bst/xcms_bst_dms_ 
38670_38671_2.pdf) and also the earlier Bertelsmann Foundation, Municipal Finance 
and Debt Report Germany, 2008 (http://www.wegweiser-kommune.de/themen-
konzepte/finanzen/download/pdf/Finanzreport.pdf) – documents as present on 24 
October 2013. 
8  Schoch/Wieland, Finanzierungsverantwortung für gesetzgeberisch veranlasste 
kommunale Aufgaben, 1995; Wieland, Der Anspruch der Kommunen auf eine 
angemessene Finanzaustattung, in: Schliesky/Ernst/Schulz (pub.), Die Freiheit des 
Menschen, Festschrift Schmidt-Jortzig, 2011, p. 221 et seqq. 
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According to the principle of relations specified in section 104a, para-
graph 1 of the Basic Law, the Federation and Länder are responsible for bear-
ing the expenditure arising from the performance of their functions. As the 
Länder are generally responsible for the execution and enforcement of fed-
eral laws as per section 83 of the Basic Law, they must ordinarily also bear 
the costs for the provision of social security benefits, which are governed by 
federal legislation. The only exception – as per section 104a, paragraph 3 of 
the Basic Law – is when federal laws grant financial benefits to be partly or 
fully borne by the Federation under the wording of the law. This combination 
of the specified laws has enabled the Federal Legislature to create new social 
security benefits, with the local authorities being the duly commissioned 
agent for these functions.  
The consequence of the transfer of functions to local authorities under 
federal law was that the Federation did not need to give much consideration 
to the financial consequences of the continued expansion of the social wel-
fare system. Demands issued by local authorities to be financially compen-
sated for the additional functions and financial expenditure borne by them as 
a result of federal legislation have been easily fended off by the Federation 
on the basis that financial policy does not allow for direct financial relations 
between the Federation and local authorities. The Länder in turn have been 
able to argue that the principle of relations in their respective state constitu-
tions did not apply because the Federal Legislature was responsible for the 
transfer of functions, not the State Legislature.  
This unfortunate state of affairs was remedied in the form of a regulation 
prohibiting the transfer of functions from the Federation to local authorities 
introduced into the Federalism Reform in section 84, paragraph 1, sentence 
7 of the Basic Law. However, this does not change the fact that previous as-
signments of functions from the Federation to the local authorities continue 
to apply. Whenever benefits are increased in the relevant federal legislation, 
the local authorities will continue to bear the financial consequences. 
(b)  Local authority supervision plays a key role in municipal debt control. Su-
pervisory bodies are responsible for supervising all of the local authorities' 
actions (“Rechtsaufsicht”). This includes supervising compliance with the reg-
ulations in municipal ordinances governing redistribution of financial re-
sources9, which is a key element of municipal debt control. Approval by the 
                                               
9  The requirements imposed on budget management are codified in all local authority 
ordinances. Refer by way of example to section 93 of the Gemeindeordnung Rhein-
land-Pfalz. 
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supervisory authority concentrates on budgetary by-laws with the associated 
budgets. The aim is to ensure that local authorities are able to perform their 
functions with a balanced budget. If this is not the case, the local authority 
must present a budget recovery plan illustrating how it will return to a bal-
anced budget in the medium term. If the planned measures are not sufficient, 
the supervisory authority has the power in extreme circumstances to suspend 
the local authority's right of autonomy and appoint a commissioner to man-
age the local authority's business in place of the politically elected repre-
sentative until the budget is in order again. The local authorities affected are 
then in a state of provisional administration. 
The role that local authority supervision holds in the control of local au-
thority debt is ambiguous. While it does make an important contribution, the 
effectiveness of local authority supervision in ensuring fiscal discipline 
among the local authorities has noticeably declined. This is due in part to the 
political pressure exerted upon local authority supervisory authorities – de-
spite their being formally independent10. There are also purely practical rea-
sons to be considered. A supervisory authority can only function effectively 
if the process concentrates on a small number of manageable problem cases. 
As the number of unbalanced budgets has grown, the supervisory authority's 
personnel resources have become stretched11. Finally, the attitude of the mu-
nicipal supervisory bodies does account for part of the responsibility for the 
financial situation of the local authorities. On the other hand, some supervi-
sory bodies have simply been overly generous and on the other hand, some 
supervisory bodies have been enforcing dramatic extensions of the rates 
(“Hebesätze”) and thereby cutting the autonomy of the municipalities.12  
(c)  The structural deficiencies of the municipal budgetary management sys-
tem were further amplified by the 'debt ceiling' imposed by section 109, par-
agraph 3 of the Basic Law13. As a result of the ban on generating new debt in 
                                               
10  Junkernheinrich, Kommunalverschuldung: zur Transparenz und Rückführung 
kommunaler Schulden, in: Gernert/Konegen/Meyers (pub.), Nachhaltige 
Kommunalpolitik – ein Anforderungsprofil, 2010, 175 (194). 
11  Rehm/Tholen, Kommunalverschuldung – Befund, Probleme, Perspektiven, 2008, 67 
et seq. 
12   cf. Holtkamp, 20 Jahre Haushaltskonsolidierung unter Aufsicht, in: Bertelsmann Stif-
tung (pub.), Städte in Not, 2013, 40 et seq. 
13  The 'debt ceiling' in section 109, paragraph 3 of the Basic Law obligates the Federation 
and Länder to reduce their new debt starting from 2011. From 2020 onwards, the 
Länder are no longer permitted to incur debt. Some Länder (Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, 
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normal economic situations, the states are prevented from generating reve-
nue by means of borrowing to flexibly perform their financial functions. This 
gives rise to pressure to adapt the expenditure accordingly.14  
Local authorities may not explicitly be mentioned in the sovereign debt 
provisions in the Basic Law, but they are affected by them. The Länder are 
leaning towards passing on the debt ban to their local authorities, for exam-
ple by transferring high-cost functions to local authorities or by reducing fi-
nancing provided in the context of the redistribution of federal state re-
sources. Therefore, unless appropriate measures are taken to counter this, 
the budgetary situation in the local authorities will continue to worsen15. 
V.  Perspectives 
Since local authorities in Germany do not have the possibility of increasing 
taxes, they do not have many ways of addressing their poor budgetary situa-
tion. They can either increase the rates (“Hebesätze”) or refrain from per-
forming voluntary functions. Both of which is not acceptable from a demo-
cratic point of view and besides, it would not contribute substantially to the 
solution of the debt problem. 
Reacting to the growth in social security expenditure, the Federation has 
increased its financial commitment in this area, in particular by providing re-
lief in the provision of social assistance to old-age pensioners and persons 
with a reduced earning capacity, by increasing its commitment in the devel-
opment of child care for children below the age of three, and by means of a 
range of other measures. The Federation has thus demonstrated a willingness 
to contribute decisively and in the long term towards improving the financial 
situation of the local authorities. However, the rise in municipal expenditure 
will only be slowed by the financial commitment offered by the Federation.  
The dramatic rise in debt of the local authorities has made it necessary to 
seek other means of relief. Municipalities will only be capable of regulating 
all local affairs on their own responsibility when they have enough revenues 
                                               
Sachsen-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein) will be receiving consolidation support due 
to their particularly difficult budgetary situations.  
14  Cf. Groh, Schuldenbremse und kommunale Selbstverwaltungsgarantie, LKV 2010, 1.  
15  cf. Commerzbank, Auswirkungen der Schuldenbremse auf die kommunale Ebene, 
2012 
(https://www.firmenkunden.commerzbank.de/files/brochures/_de/studie_schulden
bremse.pdf, document as present on 24 October 2013). 
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at their disposal. Since their responsibility for deciding and organizing their 
own functions as well as their ways to increase revenues are limited, they de-
pend to a large extent on the Federal State and on the Länder and to their 
inclination of refraining from passing on their own charges. Furthermore, a 
direct financial relationship between the Federation and local authorities 
should be established for all functions that the Federal State has conveyed on 
the municipalities before the Federalism Reform.16    
 
 
 
                                               
16  Cf. Wieland, Neuordnung der Finanzverfassung nach Auslaufen des Solidarpakts II und 
Wirksamwerden der Schuldenbremse, 2012, 38 (http://www.wegweiser-
kommune.de/themenkonzepte/finanzen/download/pdf/Wieland_Finanzverfassung_
2012.pdf document as present on 24 October 2013) 
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Financing Counties in Germany -with specific Regards  
to the Situation in Rhineland-Palatinate- 
Gunnar SCHWARTING 
Counties are part of the local sector1 in Germany.2 Their institutional setting 
(not each single county) is guaranteed by the German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz, article 28, 2, 2), with each county consisting of several munic-
ipalities. There are counties in each Bundesland (except the city-states of Ber-
lin, Hamburg and Bremen), with the smallest number being the 6 counties in 
the Saarland, the highest number found in Bavaria (71). The populations of 
the counties vary widely – from 60,000 up to 600,000 inhabitants. The tasks 
of counties differ between the Länder, though this topic is beyond the scope 
of this section. In any case, basic public services (e.g. registration) are done 
by the municipalities; their town hall can be called a sort of “front desk for 
the citizen”, but they are still far from having developed into a “one-stop-gov-
ernment”. 
The counterpart of counties is the city (the so-called county-free city). 
Roughly speaking the (county-free) city has the same position as the county 
and its municipalities combined. Cities may have subdivisions, with different 
terms used in the different Länder. These form a kind of district, but often 
have very limited rights. In bigger cities they can act as a sort of decentralized 
administration (“district town hall”). 
Counties have the typical rights of local self-government: their own em-
ployees, own budgets, the right to issue by-laws and the right to determine 
the organization of the district administration, However, their spatial rights, 
a prominent right of local self-government, are limited. For example, zoning-
laws are determined by the municipalities. As in municipalities, the head of 
the county (Landrat) is directly elected by the population for a term of 8 years 
(Rhineland-Palatinate). Each county has its own assembly, which is also di-
                                               
1  In this paper the terms local entities, local sector or local level are used if all levels of 
local government (Cities, counties and municipalities) are included. 
2  As the sizes of the counties vary to a great extent between the Länder, their tasks and 
position in the system of local governments differ greatly. Thus this article can give 
only a very rough picture of the situation. 
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rectly elected (county council) but for a term of only 5 years (Rhineland-Pa-
latinate). The general county elections in a Land are held at the same time as 
those for municipalities. The rights and duties of the elected officials are the 
same for both institutions. So at first glance counties seem to be very similar 
to municipalities. 
However, there are some important differences. Counties have specific 
tasks but these are not established in the constitution (in contrast to the mu-
nicipalities, which are responsible for “all tasks of the local sphere”); instead 
the tasks of counties are defined by ordinary law. In addition, county tasks 
must be seen in the context of the tasks of the municipalities within the 
county. According to the principle of subsidiarity, tasks shall be fulfilled by 
the lowest level as possible.3 Naturally the same is true for county develop-
ment planning (schools, public transport, streets …), which has to respect the 
plans set by the municipalities. Therefore, counties are limited to some extent 
in their activities.  
The functions of counties in Germany are mainly described as the following 
(Henneke 2008a, p. 66): 
- to fulfil tasks which exceed the capabilities of municipalities but which 
must not be given to the state level (the counties as an intermediary level 
between the state and municipalities, see Henneke 2008b) 
- to assist the municipalities if they cannot fulfil their tasks on their own 
due to a lack of administrative or fiscal capacity  
- to ensure equivalent living conditions within the county (mainly by means 
of the contribution from the municipalities)  
Generally the budget of counties in Germany is financed from very similar 
sources as the budget of municipalities – but with one great exception: Coun-
ties do not levy their own taxes or take part in national tax sharing as do mu-
nicipalities.  Instead they are financed by contributions given by (the paying 
municipalities would rather say: taken from) the municipalities within the 
county. Thus this is a bottom-up system of financing. This is much the same 
for other regional entities we find in some Länder, as for instance the region 
of Palatina in Rhineland-Palatinate or specific Provinces in North Rhine-
Westphalia. 
                                               
3  This principle is also part of the Lisbon Treaty. The problem was the object of a judge-
ment by the High Court in 1988 concerning waste disposal. In its judgement the High 
Court clearly defined the conditions for state legislation in which a specific task shall 
not be given to the municipalities but to the district. See Henneke 2008a, p. 32 
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Figure 1 outlines the main sources of current county revenues, which are 
then further discussed below: 
 
Fig. 9.1: Composition of county current revenues in % 2011 
 
Eastern Länder 
 
Western Länder 
 
Source:  Wohltmann (2012a), p. 366 
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between the Länder). Generally these revenues cover the costs of the service 
so that it is not a burden on the county budget. This is possible because the 
county itself sets the rate of the charge (just high enough to cover the costs). 
A second quite important fee is levied for vehicle registration, another service 
done by counties. However, in contrast to user charges, this is an adminis-
tered price set by the national government. Whether these fees cover the 
costs of the service or not is determined by the number of newly registered 
cars and the efficiency of the service provision.  
Surpluses from local enterprises are more common on the municipal level. 
Most counties have only minor enterprises – however, in some regions coun-
ties are shareholders in regional energy suppliers, so in some cases the divi-
dends might be a substantial source of revenue for the county budget. All in 
all Taxes, Fees and Surpluses amount to 9% in western and 8% in the eastern 
Länder. The still remaining difference between the two parts of Germany can 
be seen in the proportion of grants and contributions resp.. 
Within every Land there are economic disparities; among the counties of 
Rhineland-Palatinate the GNP per capita ranges from € 13395 in a south-
western county to € 28140 to the county of Germersheim in the Rhine Val-
ley.4 Therefore, counties take part in a fiscal equalization scheme among the 
local entities.5 These payments amounted to 39% of total county revenues in 
2011. As is pointed out in other articles in this contribution, each Land has 
its own equalization scheme, but generally there are five decisions to make: 
- the proportion of the tax income of the Land that is given to the local sec-
tor (about 20% in Rhineland-Palatinate) 
- the division of this sum between general and specific grants (for many 
years this has been 60%:40% in Rhineland-Palatinate, but this is now 
changing slightly in favor of general non-specific grants, actually 
65%:35%) 
                                               
4  Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder: Bruttoinlandsprodukt, Brutto-
wertschöpfung in den kreisfreien Städten und Landkreisen der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 2008 bis 2010, Reihe 2 Bd. 1 Stuttgart 2013, Tabelle 6 
5  The Fiscal Equalization deals only with the budget (fiscal needs minus fiscal capacity, 
see the article by Gisela Färber); there are other instruments to close the gap between 
wealthier and poorer regions, such as development policy, the positioning of public 
institutions such as universities, and etc. 
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- the division of general grants between counties and municipalities (in 
Rhineland-Palatinate this is done within the equalization scheme – “sin-
gle-tier” – whereas in Hessen a specific “column” for the counties is de-
fined by the Land before equalization - “multiple-tier”) 
- the indicators used to determine the needs of the local entities. Aside 
from the number of inhabitants, the most important for the counties are 
(in Rhineland-Palatinate):  
- the costs of social aid and the number of pupils in secondary schools 
(as counties are responsible for these tasks)  
- the area - giving a higher weight the greater the area (this indicator 
shall reflect the costs of streets built and managed by the county) 
- the ratio of equalization between fiscal needs and fiscal capacity (50% in 
Rhineland-Palatinate) 
Generally the fiscal equalization scheme should be sufficient enough to ena-
ble local entities to meet minimum service requirements in relation to the 
average. The crucial point is the portion of tax income given to the equaliza-
tion scheme by the Land, which ranges from 11% in Bavaria to 23% in North 
Rhine Westphalia. However, in many cases this is not the whole story. A high 
portion does not necessarily indicate that a Land is very friendly to the local 
level and vice versa. Interestingly, short term loans to districts are very high 
in North Rhine Westphalia but very low in Bavaria (see Fig. 4). It may be that 
in Bavaria money is given to the local level outside the fiscal equalization 
scheme or that some tasks done in other Länder by the local level are situated 
at the state level in Bavaria. 
Another interesting question is: How are general grants divided between 
counties and municipalities within a single-tier equalization scheme as in 
Rhineland-Palatinate? The crucial determinant is the number of inhabitants. 
To avoid double counting inhabitants the population is divided between the 
two levels (70% for the county, 30% for the municipalities). The same is done 
for fiscal capacity. 
The contribution of funds to the county by the municipalities – the main 
revenue source for counties (Fig. 9.1) – is regulated by the fiscal equalization 
law. This shows the very close connection between the two systems. Contri-
bution funds are always general revenues. They are paid to finance current 
and capital expenditures of the county (Figure 9.2). The contribution is based 
upon the fiscal capacity of each municipality within the county. Of course the 
system works only if the municipalities have their own revenues which are 
sufficient enough to pay the contribution to the county. 
  
110 
 
Fig. 9.2:  Calculation of the contribution rate 
 
 
Municipalities are obliged to pay. They cannot hold back the money for any 
reason even if they disagree with the height of the contribution rate. Coun-
ties in two of thirteen Länder require approval for the rate of contribution if 
the rate exceeds a critical borderline, while in another four Länder approval 
is needed if the rate is to be raised. In Niedersachsen approval has to be given 
in any and every case (for more specific information see Wohltmann 2012b). 
Moreover in four Länder the municipalities have the explicit right to give their 
opinion on the county budget, especially on the rate of contribution. If they 
disagree with the rate their arguments must be discussed by the county coun-
cil. 
Fiscal capacity of the municipalities is determined in accordance to the fiscal 
equalization scheme. Generally speaking the municipal revenues consist of:  
- the local property tax  
- the local commercial tax 
- the local share of the national income tax  
- the local share of the national VAT 
- the general grants 
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Fig. 9.3: Rates of contribution by Länder in % of municipal fiscal  
capacity (average) 2011 
 
Source:   Wohltmann (2012b), p. 398 
 
These are the basis for defining fiscal capacity and thus determining the 
county contribution (occasionally with different rates between the Länder). 
The county determines a rate defined as a percentage of the total fiscal 
capacity of the municipality. This rate amounts to nearly 40% in Rhineland-
Palatinate, while there are even higher rates in, for instance, Hessen. Moreo-
ver, Rhineland-Palatinate allows a progressive setting of this rate. The contri-
bution of funds to the county sets a small-sized equalization scheme on the 
county level, very clearly seen if the rate is set in a progressive way.  
As is seen in Fig. 9.3 the contribution rate differs widely between the Län-
der. The lowest rate is found in Saxony, the highest in Hessen; the difference 
amounts to almost 30 percentage-points. Possible explanations for the dif-
ferences are: 
- a different division of tasks between counties and municipalities 
- a different position of counties in the fiscal equalization scheme 
- a different level of specific transfers from the Land outside the fiscal 
equalization scheme 
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- deficits on the county level which are not balanced by a rise in the con-
tribution rate (“holding deficits at the county level”) 
A unique aspect of the one-tier equalization scheme of Rhineland-Palatinate 
is the effect of the division of inhabitants between county and municipalities. 
The higher the rate in favor of the counties, the lower should be the contri-
bution rate demanded from the municipalities. This does not change the 
overall level of the budgets of the municipalities (less grants on the revenue 
side, less contribution on the expenditure side) – but it looks better! 
County capital expenditures are mainly funded by  
- surpluses in the current account or earnings from selling local assets 
- specific (matching) grants by the regional government 
- borrowing 
Nowadays surpluses are mostly small, and in many counties even negative. 
Thus this source is not really important. Earnings from the sale of assets are 
also of minor importance because counties do not have real estate that is not 
in use for public services. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier, in most cases 
counties do not have at their disposal public enterprises that could be privat-
ized. 
Specific grants are of course a means by which the state influences local 
preferences in order to further state policy aims. This happens also on the 
municipal as well as on the county level. Generally specific grants cover only 
part of the total investment, leaving the rest to local co-financing. Therefore 
it can be said that this amount on the local level is absorbed from other pro-
jects. The main objects of specific grants to counties are (secondary) schools, 
streets or – if run by the county – hospitals. Theoretically specific grants 
should follow a clear development strategy set by the Land but in many cases 
specific grants can be said to be a result of political negotiations. 
Counties as well as municipalities have the right to take out loans for in-
vestment purposes. They even can decide which financial institute shall pro-
vide the loan (according to the best effective interest rate), limited only in 
that local governments should avoid borrowing in foreign currencies. There 
is no need for specific guarantees for local borrowing. The right to collect 
taxes (or in the case of a county: contribution) is a sufficient collateral for the 
loan. Therefore, to date there has been no obligation for the financial sector 
to hold a specific ratio of equity in relation to loans to the local sector. De-
faults on loans to cities, municipalities or counties did not occur in the past. 
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Moreover, in Germany (in contrast to other nations, e.g. Switzerland) a rating 
procedure for local entities is not common or even necessary. 
Great attention should be paid to the burden of local borrowing. Because 
interest payments diminish the future fiscal capacity of the local entity, the-
oretically borrowing is permitted only if the excess of revenues over expend-
itures is high enough to cover additional interest payments (and, of course, 
the running costs of the investment project). Thus local entities need to get 
approval from the supervisory institution, which for municipalities is the 
county. Counties, therefore, are Janus-faced; as a supervisory institution they 
act in place of the state, but as a local entity counties themselves need the 
approval of a state institution, such as the Ministry of Interior or (in most 
cases) one of its subdivisions.  
Though not necessary for every single loan, such permission is needed for 
total borrowing planned for a given fiscal year. Permission should be denied 
if the budget of the local entity is not balanced. However, in reality this is 
often not the case. In order to ensure sufficient investment for fundamental 
services at least some debt financing will mostly likely be approved. This was 
a crucial condition for allowing the public investment (national investment 
program 2009/2010) needed to help overcome the difficulties caused by the 
financial and economic crisis of the last few years.  
Now, what are the main (fiscal) problems of counties? 
1. In many parts of western Germany the budgets of local entities – includ-
ing counties – are not balanced. The costs for local public services are 
insufficiently covered by revenues. The biggest part of the deficit, which 
nationwide is estimated at a level of about 15 billion Euros (160 Euros 
per capita) for the year of 2010, generally arises from the social aid sec-
tor. As social aid accounts for about 40% of county expenditures (Fig. 4) 
this problem is existential for them, even more so as these expenditures 
have risen extraordinarily in the past years.  
2. Counties face a variety of changes in legislation, especially in the field 
of social security. They have to adapt new or changed regulations for 
their services. As is the case for child care (children under 3 years old), 
more and more costly tasks are coming. Therefore counties and their re-
spective associations have to negotiate with the state ministries about 
compensation payments (principle of connectivity). 
3. On the other hand, rapid changes are occuring in the market for public 
services. This is for instance the case with hospitals. While traditionally 
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a typical task for the county, now an increasing number of private hos-
pitals are being establsihed. Sometimes counties even privatize their 
hospitals. 
 
Fig. 9.4: Share of Social Transfers in relation to current expenditures 
(in %) 1980 – 2009 
 
Source:  Wohltmann (2012a) 
 
4. A great part of the revenues of counties comes from the contribution by 
the municipalities. This affects the fiscal capacity of the municipalities. 
If – as in some cases such as Hessen – more than 50% of local tax reve-
nues and grants are absorbed by the county then conflict between the 
two levels is inevitable. 
5. A very real conflict is related to using the level of county costs as basis 
for setting the contribution rate (Fig. 9.2). In Germany the local sector 
will implement accrual accounting by 2016, meaning that depreciation 
has to be taken into account which was not the case before. Municipali-
ties claim that they will now be paying for depreciation of county infra-
structure that were once financed by them through earlier contribu-
tions. 
6. The implementation of accrual accounting is accompanied by the intro-
duction of more tools of new public management, such as governing by 
goals and numbers, benchmarking or (financial) risk management. 
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7. The members of the county council are often members of a council in a 
municipality within the county. Thus they face an inherent conflict re-
garding whether to support the county or the municipality. Conse-
quently, many counties do not raise the contribution rate to the level 
necessary to cover all expenditures. 
8. Therefore counties have to take out short-term loans to fill the gap be-
tween expenditures and revenues (Fig. 9.5). In the counties of Rhine-
land-Palatinate this debt amounts to about more than 400 Euros per 
capita (2008). This short-term debt adds to the long-term liabilities, 
which have risen in 2010 to nearly 350 Euros per capita. 
 
Fig. 9.5:  Short term loans by counties in Euro per capita 31.12. 2011 
  
Source:  Wohltmann (2012a), p. 338 
 
9. Hence the counties are demanding, through specific associations (Ger-
man County Association), their own taxes or a portion in tax-sharing – a 
system found in other countries such as France (communautés urbaines) 
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10. As the municipalities have to pay the contribution, they try to limit the 
activities of the county (Fig. 9.2) while districts are interested in getting 
more duties, e.g. by decentralizing former state duties.6  
11. The distribution of grants is another field of conflict (Fig. 9.2). As the 
sum of grants is limited, the division between the two levels is crucial. 
Some Länder try to solve the problem by dividing the grant total into a 
part for the counties and another one for the municipalities (multiple-
tier). However, this division itself can be a point of conflict and is open 
to political debates. 
12. The local sector overall (but with great regional differences) faces a sub-
stantial gap between investment needed and real investment expendi-
tures made. Most of this investment is not necessary for new infrastruc-
ture but for renovating and modernizing the existing one. This is true 
also for the counties. So unfortunately, many streets, schools and other 
parts of infrastructure are not in good condition. 
13. A challenge for the counties is the development of regions (somewhat 
higher level local entities). For example, the city of Hanover and the 
county of the same name now form the region of Hanover. Similarly, the 
city and the county of Aachen merged two years ago. Both regions were 
not initiated by the Land and the idea was instead born at the local level. 
They are thus a result of a bottom-up process. Furthermore, metropoli-
tan areas are becoming more and more important. A very old one is the 
Ruhr region in North Rhine-Westphalia, but more interesting is the 
Rhine Neckar region (Mannheim-Heidelberg-Ludwigshafen), whose lo-
cal entities belong to three different Länder.  
14. Are regions an answer to territorial reform through amalgamation of 
counties (and county-free cities)? Might regions in the long run become 
something like a “super county”? What happens to areas at the periph-
ery where no nucleus for forming a region exists? There are many ques-
tions about such issues but any prediction is nothing but speculation. 
 
                                               
6  A very creeping decentralization is found in street classification. The national level 
tries to shift the responsibility for national roads to the Länder as they try to shift the 
responsibility for their regional roads to the districts. 
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Local Fiscal sovereignty, Financial Supervision and  
Local Budgetary Rules 
Jochen DIECKMANN 
1.  Preliminary note: Municipal self-government 
The definition of the term “municipal self-government” is based on a set of 
rights (German: Hoheit). The German word Hoheit, which means “right” or 
“authority” is no longer generally used in German, but is still applied in this 
context.  
The following rights are conferred on German municipalities:  
• The right to adopt bylaws (Satzungshoheit); 
• The right to appoint personnel (Personalhoheit); 
• The right of the municipality to organize itself (Organisationshoheit); 
• Fiscal autonomy (Finanzhoheit) and 
• Planning authority (Planungshoheit). 
All of these elements are comprised by municipal self-government, which is 
guaranteed under the German constitution, the “Basic Law” (Grundgesetz).  
Article 28 of the Basic Law defines municipal self-government as “the 
right [of municipalities] to regulate all local affairs on their own responsibil-
ity, within the limits prescribed by the laws“.  
The scope of the following presentation is limited to only one, very vital, 
element of municipal self-government: fiscal autonomy.  
2.  What is “fiscal autonomy”? 
One element of “fiscal autonomy” is the right of the municipality to manage 
its revenue and expenditures autonomously. Once the budget has been 
drafted (and, where required, approved) no external influence or influence 
from “above” can be exerted.  
Furthermore, fiscal autonomy implies the right to autonomously impose, 
manage, and collect charges. Charges comprise the following:  
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• taxes, 
• duties and 
• contributions and 
• fees. 
A brief explanation of this terminology:  
Taxes are public-law charges that can be levied and used without having spec-
ified a binding purpose for their use. These are charges intended to cover 
general financial needs and have to be paid by anyone who meets the legal 
requirements. By contrast, real value for money is obtained in the case of du-
ties and contributions, as these are considered the quid pro quo required of 
citizens in return for the availability of municipal infrastructure (meaning the 
possibility to make use of rather than the actual use of this infrastructure!). 
Duties are continuously levied, contributions only in the case of initial or re-
sumed provision of infrastructure. As in private law, fees are payments for 
services provided by the municipality such as, for instance, general interest 
services, or rental of state-owned or municipal housing. Needless to say, fis-
cal autonomy also comprises the right to establish the municipal budget and 
decide on the use of funds. In principal, this is done on a yearly basis and prior 
to the budget year concerned.   
Some experts take the view that fiscal authority also implies an entitle-
ment of municipalities to the provision of adequate financial resources by the 
federal state (and the federal government?). This opinion is, however, contro-
versial. In any event, such an entitlement is not a core element of fiscal au-
tonomy.  
3.  Supervision of municipal authorities by the state 
Municipal self-government is not without limits. Article 28 Basic Law, which 
guarantees the freedom of decision of municipalities “within the limits pre-
scribed by the laws”, underscores this. 
3.1  Supervision of municipal authorities by the state 
With regard to the supervision of municipal authorities by the state we     may 
differentiate between:  
• repressive supervision and 
• preventive supervision. 
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In the case of repressive supervision, the supervisory authority takes action 
in the event of objections to decisions or measures of the municipal authori-
ties. This would be the case, for instance, if the head of municipal administra-
tion questioned whether a decision of the municipal parliament was legal.  
Preventive supervision means that in a number of cases federal state law 
stipulates that municipal authorities are obliged to notify the supervisory au-
thority of a planned decision or to seek the approval of the respective super-
visory authority.  
The latter also applies and, in fact, applies especially to the budget bylaws 
establishing a municipality’s annual budget. Depending on the laws of the re-
spective federal state (Land), this bylaw either needs to be notified or ap-
proved.  
Measures of the supervisory authority can be subjected to legal review by 
an administrative court if the municipality institutes legal proceedings. In this 
regard, municipalities have the same rights as any citizen. 
3.2  Competency for supervision of municipal authorities by the state  
The competent authority for state supervision of the municipal authorities of 
cities (i.e. communities that belong to an administrative district ((Land-) 
Kreis) is the district administration.   
With regard to the districts and – insofar as applicable – the cities admin-
istered as independent districts (kreisfreie Städte) the competent supervi-
sory authorities are generally the intermediate authorities of the federal state 
(Landesmittelbehoerde, e.g. Regional Government, Bezirksregierung).  
Where these do not exist, supervision generally falls to the competent Land 
ministry. As a rule this is the ministry of the interior. There is no supervision 
of municipal authorities by the federal government.  
3.3  Scope of supervision 
Supervision of municipal authorities by the state has the following two facets:  
• legal supervision and 
• technical supervision. 
Legal supervision concerns the procedural and substantive legality of deci-
sions or acts of municipal self-government. Unlike legal supervision, technical 
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supervision is not limited to the question of legality but also examines the 
expediency of municipal decisions or acts.  Technical supervision is, however, 
limited to tasks that have been delegated to the municipal authorities by the 
Land.  
3.4  Measures of supervision municipal authorities by the state   
It is difficult to make generally applicable statements with regard to measures 
that can be taken in the framework of supervision of municipal authorities by 
the state since both the measures and the terminology differ from Land to 
Land.  
The following are some common examples:   
• information of the lower level authority by the higher level authority  
• objection to and/or annulment of the measure concerned 
• measures carried out by the higher authority on behalf of the lower au-
thority without the need for a specific order on the part of the higher au-
thority 
• appointment of a State Commissioner (Staatskommissar), 
• dissolution of the municipal council/district council 
• premature termination of office of the mayor. 
In all of these cases, the principle of proportionality applies. It is enshrined in 
the German constitution (Article 2 Basic Law) and demands that initially the 
supervisory authority must apply the instrument or take the measure that 
least impinges upon the legal sphere of the regional or local authority. Only 
if this proves to be fruitless or without result may the supervisory authority 
resort to stronger measures.  
3.5  Some details of supervision 
The appointment of a “State Commissioner“ is the strongest measure of su-
pervision of municipal authorities by the state. Even if – in accordance with 
the principle of proportionality - mild measures are initially applied, a severe 
breach of obligations on the part of the municipal authority or the incapacity 
of municipal bodies may require the supervisory authority to replace the ac-
tions of the local authorities by an institution or an experienced person en-
dowed with plenary power and government authority. 
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Without exception, therefore, the municipal/district codes of the various 
Länder stipulate that in case of emergency the competent government au-
thority may appoint a representative to deal with all or some municipal af-
fairs. This representative is referred to as a State Commissioner (German: 
Staatskommissar).  
It should be emphasized again that this is the most drastic measure of 
state supervision. Temporally as well as figuratively speaking, this is the last 
resort. Only if no other measure produces results will the competent Land 
ministry take this step. Recent, more flexible legislation in North Rhine-West-
phalia, for instance, has led to the creation of a practical variant of the State 
Commissioner. So-called “Austerity Commissioners” (Sparkommissar) with 
consultative powers are appointed as a milder, preliminary measure. Some of 
these commissioners have already successfully completed their tasks. Strictly 
speaking, this is a case of external consulting for the municipal authorities on 
behalf of the state and at the expense of the municipality. 
4.  Municipal budgeting 
Municipalities are bound by the principles of budgetary law, which were pri-
marily developed for the federal and Land levels. The legal instrument used 
to transpose these principles into Land law is a budgetary regulation of the 
federal state concerned (Landeshaushaltsordung). 
The municipal budget is adopted in the form of a municipal statute and is 
part of local law. The requirements for its adoption and effectivity are laid 
down in local law. 
4.1  General budgetary principles 
Over the years, a catalog of general principles has developed in budgetary 
practice at the federal, Land and community levels. For the most part, these 
principles are reflected in specific regulations of the federal Budgetary Prin-
ciples Law (Haushaltsgrundsätze-Gesetz). Many of them enjoy constitutional 
status as they are reflected, mutatis mutandis, in the regulations of article 
110 Basic Law. 
Many of these principles are also applied in the private sector, where they 
are referred to as “principles of standard accounting”. 
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The following principles are particularly relevant:  
• principle of progressive and continuous fulfillment of tasks (Grundsatz der 
stetigen Aufgabenerfüllung):  
Budgeting needs to be carried out in such a way as to ensure progressive 
and continuous fulfillment of the respective public tasks  
• principle of budgeting in a way that is appropriate to the economic situa-
tion (Grundsatz der Konjunkturgerechtigkeit) 
• principle of economy and efficiency (Grundsatz der Sparsamkeit und 
Wirtschaftlichkeit):  
Municipalities should be economy and efficiency-minded not only in draft-
ing but also in implementing their budget 
• fundraising principle (Grundsatz der Finanzmittelbeschaffung), and 
• publicity principle (Grundsatz der Öffentlichkeit). 
The citizens should be able to see and understand how their representation 
makes use of the money it is entrusted with. 
4.2  Special budgetary principles 
Needless to say, in addition to the general budgetary principles there are also 
special budgetary principles.  
Specifically, this refers to the following principles: 
• principle of allocation (Prinzip der Veranschlagung):  
The full amounts of revenue and expenditures need to be allocated inde-
pendently of each other.  
• The principle of annuality (Biennial budget!) (Grundsatz der Jährlichkeit): 
The budget is adopted for one budgetary year at a time. A biennial budget 
therefore always consists of two one-year budgets.   
• The principle of priority (Grundsatz der Vorherigkeit):  
The allocated funds may only be used once the budget has been adopted. 
• principle of factual completeness (Grundsatz der sachlichen Vollständig-
keit), and 
• principle of unity (Grundsatz der sachlichen Einheit): 
These two principles mean that all revenue and expenditure related to one 
budget must be allocated in one single budge. 
• principle of budgetary accuracy and transparency (Grundsatz der 
Haushaltswahrheit und –klarheit):  
The estimated allocations need to closely relate to actual developments 
and the budget has to be clearly structured and transparent 
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• principle of budgetary equlibrium (Grundsatz des Haushaltsausgleichs): 
The budget needs to establish a balance between revenue and expendi-
ture. 
4.3  A recent development: budgetization 
Inspired by a number of communities in the USA, New Zealand and the Neth-
erlands that instituted reforms (Phoenix, Arizona, Christchurch, Tilburg) as 
well as by examples from Scandinavia, a reform of municipal administration 
has evolved. This reform is centered on decentralized distribution of re-
sources. In simple terms, this means a far-reaching delegation of authority 
for decision-making combined with a more stringent system of reporting ob-
ligations. 
In terms of budgeting, this means that the respective lower administrative 
units are given control over certain budget lines that they are allowed to dis-
pose of without formal allocation, as long as the total budget is not exceeded. 
This approach has met with general approval and, following its introduc-
tion in the municipalities, it is now also being pursued at the Land level. 
5.  Conclusion 
Fiscal autonomy is part of municipal self-government. The local authorities 
mostly are autonomous, but their fiscal policy has to respect their limits by 
the laws. As far as this is concerned there is a supervision of municipal au-
thorities by the state. 
Budgetary law is a rather “dry” subject matter, but it is an indispensable 
element in particular of local democracy. In Germany as in Europe, a dense 
regulatory regime has been established. These very detailed regulations are 
at risk of becoming an end in themselves. Gentle reforms and modernization 
measures are therefore required. Budgetization is a promising step in the 
right direction. 
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A Comparative Study of the Sino-German Public Financial Support 
Mechanism to the Vocational Education 
XU Zhengzhong, WANG Zhijie 
Advanced vocational education is the important engine of long-term stable 
development of German economy, while effective public financial support 
mechanism is the important support of German vocational education leading 
in the world. By comparing the public financial support mechanism of Chi-
nese and German vocational education, we can better collect funds, distrib-
ute, operate and manage the public financial expenditure in vocational edu-
cation; it has fundamental strategic significance of realizing the transfor-
mation across of China from big industrial country to industrial power, from 
big human resource country to human resource power. 
I.  It is an important function of public finance to support the 
development of vocational education 
The important requirement promotes the multiple and compound transfor-
mation of society. The contemporary China in the progress of modernization 
is facing the strategic opportunity period characterized by multiple and com-
pound social transformation, that is to say, the rural society is transforming 
to urban society, planned economy integrates with market economy, rural 
society leap to industrial and intellectual society, social structure changes 
from three-dimensional hierarchy to flattening network, social formation 
changes from closed inner volume to open outer expansion, industrial struc-
ture changes from industrial dependency to industrial innovation, develop-
ment pattern switches from linear economy to circular economy, culture 
changes from surviving type to developing type. While constructing the so-
cial universal service system is an effective method to avoid falling into “mod-
ernization trap” and successfully realize the multiple and compound transfor-
mation. As the integration of vocational education and general education, 
modern vocational education is closely involved in the social economic life, 
becoming an important part of the social universal service system. Therefore, 
public finance supporting the development of vocational education is the im-
portant contents of promoting the modernization construction and realizing 
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multiple and compound transformation by effectively using financial lever-
age.  
The important path remodels future China’s economic growth momen-
tum. In the current grand context of China’s economic development, promot-
ing the transformation of development mode and adjustment of economic 
structure, we should focus on the impetus to realize the economic increase, 
change the three troikas of investment, consumption and export to the three 
driving wheels of creativity, skills and high-tech. The advanced modern voca-
tional education can combine with the economic society with high speed, ab-
solutely becoming the catalyst of creativity, cradle of skills and the amplifier 
of high-tech. We can say that in the important stage of contemporary China 
taking the lead out of the economic downturn and breaking through the trap 
of middle income, vocational education has more closely combine together 
with regional strategic breakthrough, industrial high-end upgrading and eco-
nomic inclusive growth. Therefore, public financial supporting the develop-
ment of vocational education is an important path for the public finance to 
effectively stabilize the economic development and promote optimizing the 
allocation of resources.1  
The important channel promotes to solve the all-round development of 
human beings. In the final analysis, the problem of development is to solve 
people’s problem, the fundamental of planning to development and promot-
ing development should achieve the goal of all-round development of human 
beings. The vocational education in new period has carries three basic func-
tions, namely cultivating the innovative and entrepreneurship spirit, promot-
ing the match of people and industry, and promoting the social integration of 
marginalized groups. This determines that vocational education is not only 
the educational activity to cultivate vocational ability and entrepreneurship 
ability, becoming the booster of economic development, but also the educa-
tion service to improve the individual quality and promote social inclusion, 
becoming the supporting point of livelihood construction. 
                                               
1  Xie Xuren holds the view that public finance has the functions of stabilizing economy, 
resource allocation, income distribution and supervision and management, etc. it is 
the material base, system security, policy instruments, and supervision means. (“Peo-
ple’s Daily”, 10th edition in Feb 29, 2008) 
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II.  The practice of German public finance supporting  
vocational education 
For a long time, the German government actively responds to the change of 
development mode and improvement of development speed of vocational 
education, effectively adjust financial policy and collecting funds method, 
making great achievements in fully mobilizing the enthusiasm of the commu-
nity investing vocational education, guaranteeing the stable and clear funds 
source channel of vocational education and improving the utilization effi-
ciency of education funds. Especially in the face of the financial crisis and Eu-
ropean debt crisis, the high-quality “Made in Germany”, high level of voca-
tional education successfully boost Germany taking the lead in coming out of 
crisis shadow among the first starting countries. According to the statistics, 
in 2012 the EU’s youth (between 15 to 24 years old) unemployment rate was 
22.6%, while the German youth unemployment rate is only 7.9%2. 
1.  Actively give play to the leverage effect, and effectively guide the enter-
prises to invest. German vocational education is co-financed by public sector 
and private sector, the support of public finance to vocational education 
mainly reflected in the requirements of meeting infrastructure and basic ser-
vices, guiding the enterprises to actively carry out the vocational education, 
effectively give full play of leverage effect of public financial expenditure driv-
ing the investment of human resource and capital in the enterprises. The vo-
cational schools organized by the state cooperate with the enterprises run by 
private to carry out the “dual system” vocational education, forming the sub-
ject of German vocational education. Its biggest feature is that public finance 
is responsible for the schools’ operation funds, which are shared by state gov-
ernment and local government, while the enterprises undertake the training 
cost. In 2006, the total expenditure of German vocational education reached 
38.7 billion Euros, of which the Federal Labor Agency and vocational school 
each bears 15%, while the enterprise bear about 70% of the cost (see Table 
1). It is difficult for public finance to fully bear the full cost of vocational edu-
cation, however, as long as public finance plays a good guiding and support-
ing role in guaranteeing the vocational education development, it could open 
up the channel of strengthening vocational education and enhancing the hu-
man capital. For example, despite the high investments in vocational educa-
tion increasing the enterprise cost, the investment in vocational education 
                                               
2  https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2012/ 
08/PD12_296_132.html 
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and human capital is the investment of continued growth and better devel-
opment, becoming a basic consensus of German enterprise community. Data 
from German Federal Institute for Vocational Education shows that more and 
more enterprises are willing to provide learning opportunity and improving 
space for their employees through vocational education, in 2011, there were 
over 40000 enterprises participating in vocational education, an increase of 
46% on year-on-year basis.  
 
Tab. 11.1: Capital Source of Vocational Education in 2006 
Capital source 
Expenditures 
(100 million 
Euro) 
Enterprise 277 
Federal and State governemnt  
Part-time vocational school (dual system) 28 
Full-time school 24 
Other schools providing vocational education (for ex-
ample special grammar school and professional college) 
16 
Inter-enterprise vocational education center 0.3 
Training courses and projects 3.1 
Federal labor agency 39 
Source:  Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Berufsbildungsbericht 2007, 
p.146 
 
2.  Implement project promoting policy of limited durations and improve fi-
nancial support mechanism. German governments at all levels involving the 
departments of vocational education include federal education and research 
ministry, federal economic and technical department, federal labor and social 
affairs ministry, state labor, economy, education and culture affairs minis-
tries, etc. In order to avoid the unclear responsibility and unsmooth coordi-
nation of funds investment between competent departments of federal gov-
ernment and governments of each state, and balance each state’s vocational 
education gap resulting from the gap of economic level and financial capacity 
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gap and other problems, the federal government usually implements the pro-
ject promoting policy with limited duration, forms the joint forces by several 
departments, and improves the financial support mechanism to effectively 
support the development of vocational education. 
By analyzing the project promoting policy with limited durations, it is not 
difficult to find the main target location and value orientation of vocational 
project supported by German public finance. First, focus on promoting the 
balanced development of interregional vocational education. Supporting the 
development of latecomer regions by developing the vocational education is 
the proper meaning of public finance supporting vocational education pro-
jects. In 1996, the eastern apprentice post action plan implemented by fed-
eral government well promoted the problem-solving of high unemployment 
rate in East Germany since the unification of Germany. Second, focus on 
providing the training post and cultivating the vocational talents. From some 
projects acquired at present, clear capital support, post offers, and training 
objectives have constituted the basic characteristics of public financial pro-
ject of vocational education development supported by federal government. 
Third, focus on increasing the pertinence and effectiveness of training effect. 
A typical example is the vocational continuous education allowance plan im-
plemented in 2008. The plan is not simply releasing grant funds, the voca-
tional continuous education consulting of federal education and research 
ministry not only accepts the grant applications, but also provides the con-
sulting services on training objective, appropriate training course and appro-
priate training units, etc. Fourth, focus on the concern and support of special 
groups. The public property of public financial expenditure determines its im-
portant functions to rescue and support the socially vulnerable groups. For 
example, the expansion of “The Successors Agreement of German Training 
and Professional Talents” in 2010 brought the youth with immigrant back-
ground into the recipient range. At the same year, it started the plan of “Vo-
cational Education Chain” in April; an important program is to set 3200 “Vo-
cational Education Navigator” in Germany to help students with learning dif-
ficulties. 
3.  Be strict to appropriation budget and performance management, achiev-
ing the efficient allocation of capital. As to supporting vocational education 
development by public financial expenditure, German federal government 
has made active exploration on standardizing financial expenditure behavior 
and improving the using benefits of funds. First, establish the scientific and 
transparent budgetary system; the preparation, approval and execution all 
take place under the strict constraint mechanism. As to the public financial 
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expenditure used to support vocational education, the annual budget is pre-
pared from bottom to top according to the standards of government alloca-
tion, following the principle of budget classification and implementing that a 
fixed sum is for a fixed purpose. Second, make performance appraisal of fi-
nancial allocation and adjust allocation scheme in time. In general federal vo-
cational education and research institute and all the industry associations are 
responsible for the allocation of federal government funds. The allocation 
scheme is based on the common census reached by government and organi-
zations, the regulated quantity, quality quantitative indicators and mile-
stones effect as well as the approval achievements will directly affect the fu-
ture total allocation, which increases and decreases according to the rising 
and falling of the indicator. Third, regularly analyzing financial support plan 
and promptly resolve the problems of education development. Since 1975, 
on the basis of “Statistic Yearbook of National Education and Scientific Re-
search Funds Budget” issued by federal statistical office, the federal state 
commission (BLK) issued “The Analysis and Suggestion Report of Education 
and Finance”, which provides decision basis for improving and enhancing the 
education and scientific research funds support plan including the vocational 
education. 
4.  Give full play to the advantage of industry associations, and participate in 
the allocation and management of financial funds. Giving play to the ad-
vantages of industry associations is not the simple form of consulting, sug-
gesting and contacting, but clarify that it is the competent organization of 
industry vocational education institution, authorizing the industry associa-
tion to participate or even take charge of the allocation and management of 
some vocational education funds. According to the stipulation of German 
“Vocational Education Law”, as to the vocational education institutions in dif-
ferent sectors, its own industry association is the competent organization. 
Handicraft associations, business associations, agricultural associations, law-
yer associations, economic audit associations and the medical associations 
are the industry competent organization designated by “Vocational Educa-
tion Law”, other industries’ associations are assigned by each state. With the 
important link of participating in the allocation and management of financial 
funds, with the basic security of the competent organization’s determination 
of “Vocational Education Law”, the industry association achieves the partici-
pation of multi-channel and overall process in the support and supervision of 
vocational education development, for example, providing the education 
training institutions with professional service, the qualification authentica-
tion of vocational education and training institution, the management and 
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implementation of vocational training process, the teacher management of 
vocational education and so on. 
5.  Improve the construction of vocational education and research system, 
and support the continuous innovation and development. There is federal vo-
cational education research institute and national vocational research center 
network in Germany, making specialized research of the different areas and 
different stages of vocational education system. In Germany, there are about 
350 institutions engaging in vocational education research in all the univer-
sities, there are about 150 institutions engaging in vocational education re-
search outside the universities. The federal vocational education and re-
search institute directly subordinates to federal education and science min-
istry, is the biggest vocational education and research institution in the world, 
and is formed by representatives of federal government, representatives of 
state government, representative of enterprise group and employee repre-
sentatives; it is the mediation and bridge between government and voca-
tional education schools. The research institute not only undertakes the basic 
work of making research and planning of the vocational education, but also 
takes charge of the audit and assessment of the funding project of the federal 
related professional ministries, participates in the allocation and use of voca-
tional education funds. In addition, the “Vocational Education Conference of 
Colleges” holds intersect every four years, the “Professional Conference” of 
federal vocational education research institute and the community research 
forum of German vocational education research have become the most ac-
tive communication platform of vocational education research achievements 
in the world. 
III.  The main problems of Chinese public finance supporting  
vocational education 
Comparing the support of public finance in Chinese and German vocational 
education development, it’s not difficult to find that there are the following 
problems existing in Chinese public finance supporting vocational education. 
1.  Overly dependent on public finance. The national vocational education 
funds have increased from 114 billion yuan in 2006 to 241.9 billion yuan in 
2010. From the investment structure, increasing the financial funds invest-
ment the proportion of budget funds and education fees in the total amount 
has increased from 44.6% to 59.5%, accounting for more than half of the to-
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tal funds. On the other hand, as the major beneficiaries of vocational educa-
tion, the enterprises that make active investment on vocational colleges and 
vocational education still are minority, the participation method also remains 
at a low level of short-term loose cooperation, slow increase of school funds 
investment, the proportion in total investment funds also shrinks. The huge 
difference of Chinese and German public financial expenditures’ proportions 
on supporting vocational education development, fundamentally, is deter-
mined by the fundamental purpose of vocational education and the position-
ing difference of the basic beneficiary, and is determined by the difference of 
function definition and realization approach of vocational education devel-
oped by public financial development. 
2.  Project implementation mechanisms need to be improved. Whatever it is 
project design, supporting priority or the funding method, performance as-
sessment, the system, mechanism and method and means of German imple-
mentation of project promote policy with limited durations, are worth of our 
serious study and reference. For example, the plan of vocational education 
training base construction jointly implemented by Ministry of Education and 
Ministry of Finance, this is the first major project of vocational education sup-
ported on a large scale by central finance in Chinese history. By the end of 
2010, the central finance has invested 3.86 billion yuan to support 2356 pro-
jects of vocational education training based construction3. This not only re-
flects Chinese government’s determination to pay attention to vocational ed-
ucation, but also declares that Chinese vocational education project is still in 
the material level of base construction. Another example, the projects of Chi-
nese central finance mostly support the “mating” method, namely the local 
government matches the corresponding proportion funds. In consideration 
of some local governments are in urgent need of projecting supporting but 
lacking of mating ability, this method might intensify the unbalanced devel-
opment, coupled with the lack of strict financial discipline, there are noncom-
pliance mating and false mating phenomenon in some places. 
3.  Lack of effective performance management. Under the background of 
funds primarily relying on public finance and funds scale continuing to ex-
pand, as to Chinese public finance supporting vocational education develop-
ment, there exists a series of problems: neglecting funds allocation, neglect-
ing performance management, neglecting budget establishment, neglecting 
                                               
3  Zhang Jiahuan, Guo Yang, Chen Juan: The Comprehensive Analysis of Central Finance 
Supporting the Training Base Project Construction of Vocational Education Chinese 
Vocational and Technical Education, 2011 (30). 
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budget execution, treasuring plan setting and neglecting tracing and im-
provement, all these problems need to be paid high attention. The effective 
operation of German public finance supporting vocational education devel-
opment is the result of combined action of German modern education system 
and strict budget management. Of course, there are many conditions are not 
available for Chinese vocational education and budget management at cur-
rent phase, but it is extremely urgent to introduce and implement the effec-
tive measures of German strengthening budget management and perfor-
mance management. 
4.  Insufficient engagement of industry association. Due to the reason of lack-
ing restrictive institutional arrangement and own weak power and so on, the 
industry association’s participation in vocational education remains in a situ-
ation of narrow range and shallow hierarchy, let alone participation in the 
allocation and management of public financial funds used in vocational edu-
cation. For example, the management of vocation education is mainly 
grasped by education department, even the education instruction committee 
in some industries is founded by higher vocational college of vocational edu-
cation department in Ministry of Education, it is difficult to imagine an indus-
try association with weakening basic guiding effect to be able to participate 
in the fight, allocation and management of vocational education public funds 
aiming at this industry. 
5.  Inadequate vocational education research system. Chinese vocational ed-
ucation research system not only lack the leading institutions like federal vo-
cational education research institute, which has strong resources, extensive 
contacts and important responsibility, but also lack the vocational education 
research network with perfect functions, higher level and extensive coverage, 
the research of vocational education development, especially the research of 
public financial supporting vocational education development is still at the 
shallow phase. 
IV.  Summary and recommendation 
Based on the above analysis, compared with Germany, the system design and 
mechanism operation of Chinese public financial supporting vocational edu-
cation still has many gaps. As to German vocational education development, 
China should learn a lot from its experiences and methods: public financial 
supporting mechanism on guiding enterprise funds investment, optimizing 
major project design, improving budget performance management, giving 
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full play to the advantages of industry association and strengthening research 
system construction and so on. Combining with the practice of Chinese pub-
lic financial system and vocational education system, the following related 
recommendations are proposed: First, on the basis of effective implementa-
tion of vocational education training base construction plan, with the refer-
ence of German dual system vocational education mode, we actively promote 
Chinese vocational education system reform, innovate vocational education 
mode, with the mode of on-demand cultivation, order cultivation and com-
missioned cultivation and so on, we effectively integrate enterprises’ trend 
towards the profit and education’s public welfare, enrich and widen the chan-
nel of enterprise investing vocational education, with the expanding but rel-
atively limited public financial investment to drive the social capital with 
greater lever ratio, especially the continuous investment of enterprise capi-
tal.  
Second, gradually implement the public finance focusing on the implement 
of project with limited durations, especially the mechanism of central finance 
supporting vocational education development; optimize project value and 
the setting of project contests, paying more attention to regional coordina-
tion development and special groups, more highlighting the pertinence and 
effectiveness of project.  
Third, strengthen in an all-round way the public finance expenditure perfor-
mance assessment and management supporting the vocational education de-
velopment; in the field of vocational education, taking the lead in establishing 
and implementing the financial funds use system from the whole process of 
budget demonstration, performance assessment, performance management 
and follow-up feedback, providing a good demonstration for the security and 
efficient delivery of enterprise and vocational education investment.  
Fourth, highlight the regional and industry feature, improve the construction 
of vocational education research network system, break the major control of 
education system to vocational education, effectively introducing labor and 
social security department as well as industry association to become the ma-
jor competent department of vocational education, not only achieving 
providing decisions for the scientific and innovative development of voca-
tional education, but also promoting to realize the reasonable allocation and 
efficient use of public financial funds supporting vocational education devel-
opment in a more professional way. 
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Rural-Urban Inequalities, Modernization, and Reforms  
in Public Administration since 1789.  
Experiences from German History 
Stefan FISCH 
The year 1789 was a water-shed in European history. 1789 stands as a symbol 
for the French Revolution. It was, first, a political revolution with many totally 
‘new’ events. In 1789 there was a free discussion on all the country’s griev-
ances in all the 40,000 villages and towns of the kingdom, and relatively free 
general elections followed. The new representatives of the people passed the 
famous Declaration of Human Rights of 1789 and, in 1791, a constitution 
which became a model for Europe. In 1792 the political revolution became 
far more radical. France became a Republic without a monarch, the former 
King of France was sentenced to death in 1793, and the ‘export’ of the revo-
lutionary achievements to other European countries through expansionist 
wars began. In 1794 the Revolution ended up as a terrorist regime (ironically 
named the ‘committee for the general welfare’) which murdered thousands 
for the sake of a better world in the future. For contemporaries of the time all 
these were previously unthinkable events, an unprecedented upheaval and 
turnover of all the former political structures … and of even more, because 
the French Revolution was, second, a social revolution. Its double character 
as a political and a social revolution was exemplified by the famous slogan of 
1789 “Liberty, equality, fraternity (brotherhood)”. The revolution put an end 
to many social, economic, and fiscal privileges within the former system, and 
thereby fundamentally changed the structure of French society. 
German contemporaries of the Revolution observed the French events, of 
course. They detested revolutionary turmoil and feared their loss of power, 
their expropriation and, in the event, exile or execution. They were thus led 
to seek "reforms instead of revolution". The German reaction to 1789 was 
characterized by gradual action in favor of an inevitable slow change. This 
action was led by the monarch's administration rather than by the people 
since there were not yet parliamentary representatives. The gradual change 
in rural – urban inequalities was a significant element within the broader re-
form strategy. 
In 1789 most Germans still lived in the countryside. Their rural world was 
as it had been for generations. There were shared property rights to the land. 
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The peasants who worked on the land had to share the harvest with the local 
nobleman who held the lordship of their land, and they had to deliver com-
pulsory labor to him. A fundamental interest of the nobles was to keep the 
labor force where it was, in the villages of the countryside. This resulted in 
restricted personal freedom. A peasant was not allowed to leave for the town 
(and when he did, it was illegal) and in many regions he was not even free to 
marry without the consent of his nobleman, who earned an additional income 
through granting such authorizations. In the peasants’ world the family and 
the wider household (including unmarried sons and daughters) were the basic 
unit of their society, not the individual person as it would later become. Thus 
it was the families who acted, in a sense, as a 'social security' institution for 
their elderly members. 
However, in around 1789 a small proportion of the Germans did already 
live in the urban world. German towns at that time were economically based 
on petty crafts in small local markets rather than on big trade (with the ex-
ception of harbor cities like Hamburg and Bremen and mercantile centers like 
Leipzig, Frankfurt, and Nuremberg. The craftsmen were organized in guilds, 
which defended the monopoly of their members. No one outside the guild 
was allowed to exercise the craft and the guild acted as a ‘closed shop’, pre-
venting newcomers from entering through its control of the examinations 
leading to mastership. Again, the master’s family and wider household (in-
cluding the apprentices and the journeymen) were the basic unit of society, 
not the individual person, and they had the function of providing 'social se-
curity' for the elderly. 
The Germany of 1789 was characterized by a general immobility in town 
and country. It was not yet a country of real and important change and inno-
vation in economy and society. Germany’s economic base still lay in the rural 
world, as it had in the centuries before, and it kept its traditional social struc-
tures. People remained heavily restricted in their choices and in their per-
sonal prospects for the future. Moreover, any change was popularly con-
nected with deterioration and a traditionalist, positive view of a static world 
prevailed: "What is old, has proved to be good". 
Special disadvantages experienced by those living in the rural areas in-
cluded having a lower standard of living, very restricted territorial mobility, 
lack of education and therefore intellectual mobility, and very few choices 
regarding their occupation and therefore low inter-generational social mobil-
ity. With “1789” being a catalyzing event, a ‘modernization’ process started 
in that year, touching on many aspects of German society, economy, and po-
litical-administrative system. The three fundamental social and economic 
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changes were the demographic ‘revolution’, industrialization, and urbaniza-
tion. The general response within the German political system was to pro-
mote reform to prevent revolution, a path that led eventually to the well-
known German model for the welfare state. 
This process of modernization began in the late 18th and continued into 
the 19th century as a massive demographic revolution. The population living 
in a given country in a given year is the result of three independent (!) factors 
acting in that year: the birth rates (usually per 1,000 inhabitants), the death 
rates (usually per 1,000 inhabitants), and the balance of emigration and im-
migration. In Germany, the high pre-modern era birth rates remained rela-
tively high through the 19th century, whereas the death rates had begun to 
fall significantly already in the late 18th century, especially the mortality rate 
for new-born children up to their first year. As a result, people began to live a 
longer life, on average. As a result of the new combination of unchanged high 
birth rates and lower death-rates, the German population as a whole grew 
year by year to an unforeseen extent. Some side effects came in with the re-
sults of the migration movements, for instance the politically motivated em-
igration after the 1848 events and emigration for economic reasons in the 
last European hunger year 1847 and during the general crisis of 1873. Histo-
rians explain the sinking death rates mainly with reference to better nutrition 
(potatoes with their high caloric content became the new food for the 
masses, for instance) and better health care (Dr. Jenner’s discovery of the 
small-pox vaccination and the beginnings of the public hygiene movement, 
for instance). On the other hand, the continuity in the high birth-rates was 
the result of the ongoing belief in the advantages of having many children in 
a family-based traditional economy - these traditional ideas lived on for some 
generations despite all the changes in the socio-economic context of their 
lives. 
In Europe this process of demographic revolution was a characteristic of 
the 19th century and came to an end in the 20th century, whereas in China 
this is still an ongoing transition, as tables 1 and 2 demonstrate. Table 1 
shows a clear peak in the population growth rate from the 1870s to the 
1920s, a period of intensive industrialization marked by an excess of births 
over deaths. Comparing table 2 on China with the peak and its decrease in 
Germany in table 1, one can easily see that in China the process of demo-
graphic revolution and population growth is still at its peak and not yet de-
creasing. 
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Tab. 12.1:  Population (in millions) living on the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany before 1989, 1816 – 1989 
 
 
(own diagram according to the data of Sensch, Jürgen as histat-Datenkompilation online: 
Geschichte der deutschen Bevölkerung seit 1815, see http://www.gesis.org/histat/de/) 
 
Demographic Revolution and Industrialization were two aspects of the more 
general modernization process in the economy and society. These aspects 
were mutually triggered and re-enforcing: Population growth and higher ef-
ficiency in agriculture led to a growing labor force which was a precondition 
for industrialization. Local mobility of this labor force was a condition for the 
growth of industries since their placement was dependent on the location of 
raw materials. The transformation, within only a few years, of the Ruhr Dis-
trict from a quiet agricultural region to the center of Germany’s coal mines 
and steel works, continuously active at day and at night, illustrates this pat-
tern perfectly. 
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Tab. 12.2:  Population (in millions) living in China, 2 C.E. – 2000, 
 
(source:  Smil, Vaclav: China’s environmental crisis, 1993, for the graphic see: 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_population.htm)  
 
The rapid change of the Ruhr District also gives an impression of the urbani-
zation process. The new industrial sites attracted workers from the country-
side and became new urban centers. The new factory work was totally differ-
ent from traditional peasants’ work. No longer were the weather conditions 
important and the change of seasons, and no longer did the work directly 
guarantee the family’s subsistence. Instead, workers became part of the ma-
chine and they had to adapt to its uniform rhythm. They lost much of their 
self-sufficiency in this new daily urban life. Money became a new medium 
which transformed the results of their labor into foodstuffs. The industrial 
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workers produced for a market within a national economy (and with growing 
exports beyond this market). This new market was based on abstract money; 
the elements of traditional barter and subsistence society disappeared. Tra-
ditions of life as expressed in family values or in craftsmen’s and guilds’ stand-
ards of product quality disappeared. Socially and economically, the growing 
working class had become dependent in new forms, on new institutions, ac-
tors, and ideas within a society and economy which was no longer local-based 
but national-oriented. It was this situation in the 1850s and 1860s which led 
Karl Marx to his original reflection about the workers’ conditions and how 
dramatically they had changed. 
Whereas the French Revolution was a revolution in the strict sense (of a 
rapid and thoroughgoing change), the modernization of economy and society 
was a relatively slow process. Nonetheless, the outcome of demographic rev-
olution, industrialization (or: industrial revolution), and urbanization was as 
pervasive and fundamental as that of a ‘real’ revolution of the 1789 ideal-
type. Yet of these two types of fundamental change, modernization gives 
more time to the ruling powers to adapt their action to the realities. Put oth-
erwise, the lack of revolutionary events and organized mass action in the de-
mographic revolution allowed the option for a strategy of reform from the 
top. 
These reforms were based on the conviction of the high value of the indi-
vidual. This conception found its earliest roots in the religious tradition of 
monotheism, especially of Christianity in its different variations, which estab-
lished a kind of ‘personal relation’ of every faithful to his God. In day-to-day 
life an important origin of this individualistic conception can be found in the 
Roman Law (of contracts, for instance) of ancient times which was renewed 
in codified legislation. Public administration acted (or at least tried to act) 
uniformly for all those subordinate to their authority on the whole of its ter-
ritory, be it a (still) rural or an (already) urban population. Their reaction to 
these accelerating changes was characterized by placing their trust in rules. 
The reforms should first establish and then guarantee reliable rules for all. 
This is a value-based individualistic approach; every sane adult is perceived 
as able to decide and to act for him- or herself and, moreover, to conclude 
binding contracts. At the same time rational considerations led to the strong 
conviction that general rules are very useful since they spare lengthy individ-
ual bargaining – provided that they are generally accepted. Nonetheless, 
rules may need interpretation and sometimes even sanctions; thus the need 
for independent courts. 
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The specific German way of political-administrative reform is, therefore, 
distinguished by a special importance for the rule of law, which laid an essen-
tial base for mutual trust in the burgeoning multi-relational market society. 
For the effective rule of law the active presence of the state and its public 
administration down to the local level became highly important. Thus new 
institutional structures were constructed which for the first time covered not 
only the country’s key centers but its whole territory. In their organizational 
culture the new generations of public administrators tried to ensure the del-
icate balance between orders from above and free initiative from below. Cen-
tral in that respect was the municipal reform of 19 November 1808 in Prussia 
(in Northern Germany), which entrusted the representatives of the cities’ cit-
izens (being at that time those only with significant property) with making 
free and autonomous decisions for their local community, and made them 
accountable for the results. Everyone knew that the same rules were applica-
ble to all his fellow citizens and courts would provide effective sanctions 
against anyone breaching the rules. Trust proved to be an important non-ma-
terial factor in the success of reform: more than any rigid control from above, 
trust favored and furthered a new spirit of initiative within the citizenry. 
A unique result of the German structural reforms was to shape a relatively 
open-minded and independently thinking bureaucracy. Thoughtful emperors 
and kings always faced a very difficult structural problem: how to ensure the 
quality (in terms of the general interest) and the independence (mere endear-
ing the monarch is not really helpful) of their closest staff? Thus in 1796, in a 
master-plan for the coming King of Bavaria (in Southern Germany), a ‘revolu-
tionary’ idea was developed. A counterweight should be set-up against min-
isterial power through establishing the principle of guaranteed life-long em-
ployment for the public administrators subordinated to the ministers. The ar-
gument was as follows: these administrators would never hinder the ‘good’ 
actions of a minister, but they would resist collectively any unlawful action 
initiated by him if they were protected against his arbitrariness. In fact, public 
administrators in Germany became open-minded partners in free discussions 
with each other and with the heads of their departments. This fostered a 
greater diversity of new ideas and uncommon solutions. The public adminis-
trators knew that their possible political dissent against the minister’s opin-
ion would not harm them personally, e.g. by depriving them of their income. 
At the same time, a regular and adequate income proved to be an efficient 
barrier to corruption, which was previously pervasive. 
Perhaps the most important reform for economy and society was the 
overthrow of the old traditions of rural life that had restricted geographic 
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mobility. For the peasant population their social and economic relationship 
to the nobles constituted not only life-long dependency, but was even hered-
itary. Reforms in the early 19th century made them ‘free’ persons who could 
move freely and without the consent of an authority within the whole terri-
tory. The old servitude having been abolished, a new kind of dependency 
arose, however. In case of old age, illness, disability or so on people became 
by new laws dependent on organized help by the municipality of their birth-
place and had, therefore, to return there, even after extended absence. This 
was an important impediment to real nation-wide geographical mobility. It 
was solved in the late 19th century by the implementation of a general, na-
tion-wide scheme for social security. These reforms were, together with the 
spread of compulsory and free schooling for all, a first-class investment in 
human capital: People enjoyed greater mobility in space from the changes in 
the legal-administrative framework. And they got a chance to experience new 
and creative ideas, broaden their intellectual abilities, and perhaps in-turn de-
velop new ideas themselves. Thus both labor mobility and ability grew stead-
ily, as is so essential for a market society and its sustained growth. On the 
whole, a greater diversity in many aspects of life and on many different levels 
helped people to cope with new changes occurring on a scale that had never 
been experienced before – and this is today, more than ever, the challenge of 
our modern world. 
 
Further English reading: 
Nipperdey, Thomas: Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 1800-1866. Prince-
ton 1996 (especially rich in perspectives, covering all aspects of history; 
only this first of three volumes (up to 1918) in German is translated into 
English). 
Retallack, James (ed.): Imperial Germany, 1871-1918, Oxford 2008 (new col-
lected volume). 
Sheehan, James: German History, 1770 – 1866. Oxford 1989 (deals in depth 
with the new liberal ideas). 
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich: German Empire 1871 -1918. Leamington Spa 1985 (crit-
ical approach, highly controversial; five newer, very rich volumes on the 
19th and 20th century in German are not at all translated into English). 
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Progress, Challenges and Prospects of the Administrative Reform 
of the Central and Local China 
FAN Jida, ZHANG Zhanbin 
Reform of administrative system the crucial point of deepening economic 
structural reform, social system reform and promotion of political reform and 
plays a global and driving role in further improvement of socialist market 
economy system as well as establishment of public service-oriented govern-
ment. At the new historical starting point, facing the new condition and new 
mission, we must comprehensively analysis problems and reasons existed in 
our administrative system reform, and promote the administrative system re-
form actively and prudently. 
I.  Major problems and reasons existed in our administrative system: 
seeing from perspective of the relationship between central  
and local government 
Generally, China’s reform of central and local administrative system has 
made significant progress and some achievement. However, with China’s 
rapid economic and social development, some deep-seated contradictions 
and new problems have emerged. 
Chinese Constitution only gives some extensive and principled provisions 
about the authority of central and local government, which mainly aims to 
the volume segmentation and do not give clear division of central and local 
authority from detailed tasks. Additionally, the absent of supporting laws and 
regulations made it hard to fractionize the whole work especially in various 
“fuzzy regions”. The legislative hysteresis restricts the separation of central 
and local government’s authority.  For example, pursuant to the Constitution 
Article 3, Authority division of central and local governmental institutions 
shall be under the unified leadership of central government and give full play 
to the enthusiasm and initiative of local government. It gives no clear speci-
fication about how to divide the authority further.  Even though, Legislative 
Law stipulates the legislative authority of central and local government, but 
it is too extensive and local government has little voice comparing to central 
government. 
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Functional transformation of government has not been completed, and 
central and local government’s public expenditure on social management and 
public service is gravely insufficient. Although the “over-stepping”, “absence” 
and “dislocation” of government authority is a old problem, they are still ex-
isting after year of revolution. Governments at all level tend to value eco-
nomic management and look down upon market supervision, social manage-
ment and public services. Governments still prefer economic development 
and interfere too much in micro-economy. The restless governments inter-
fere in many affairs out of their duty and beyond their capability. Some su-
perfluous administrative approval or disguised administrative approvals still 
work in the fields within which they shall quit the stage. In some place or 
department, governments still play leading role in resource allocation. Poli-
tics has not been separated from affairs and society thoroughly. Social organ-
izations are not valued and classification reform of governmental institution 
is left behind. Governments are used to undertaking social affairs and public 
service. Affected by existed financial and taxation system, development goals 
and evaluation mechanism, central and local government’s public expendi-
ture on social management and public service is gravely insufficient. 
Chinese Constitution, Organization Law, Budget Law and other laws and 
regulations only gives some extensive and principled provisions about segre-
gation of public service duty among governments from all levels. Except for 
the exclusive duties such as national defense and diplomacy, other public ser-
vices are classified as common duty shared by governments at all levels, 
working differences between whom lie in the size of jurisdiction, and that is 
the highly consistent of organization structure, function and duty among cen-
tral government and local government at all levels. Authority of governments 
at all level always crosses with each other and fuzzy work boundary, frequent 
change, buck-passing and similar actions happen frequently in the public ser-
vice. For example, pursuant to the Compulsory Education Law, operating ex-
pense and capital construction investment shall be financed and guaranteed 
by State Council and local governments at all levels. This provision only indi-
cate that implementation of compulsory education is the common duty of 
governments at all levels, but not specify detailed duty of government at each 
level. Additionally, problems such as ambiguous authority-responsibility re-
lationship between governments at different level, excessive organization 
setup and duty overlapping still exist to some degree. For instance, the State 
Council only set the National Development and Reform Commission, but 21 
provincial and local governments set up the Development and Reform Com-
mission and the Economy Commission whose duty overlap with each other.   
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Dislocation of right and duty between central and local government, and 
authority of local government do not match to their finance resources. Some 
public service duty, such as compulsory education, medical treatment and 
public health, and social insurance, which shall be assumed by government at 
a higher level are actually assumed by government at lower level, and central 
government's expenditure on those is relatively low. Some affairs in the fields 
such as national defense, diplomacy and national security, which is classified 
as central government’s duty are carried out and financed partly by local gov-
ernment. Authorities of central or local government do not match to their 
finance resources respectively. Finance resources go upwards while the pub-
lic service duties go downwards. At the same time, some duties belonged to 
local governments, such as upgrading of some county hospital, construction 
of cultural venues and waste water treatment are shared by central govern-
ment. Some project invested by central government are directed to some cer-
tain city, and fundamental facilities constructed by some local government 
servicing for people in certain area also strives for financial support from cen-
tral government. These actions enhance interference from central govern-
ment objectively. 
Vertical management impairs authority of local government to some de-
gree and will restrict local government’s enthusiasm. Actually, vertical man-
agement is a double-edged sword and series of new problems and new con-
tradictory gradually emerged following the status development. Local gov-
ernments deem that central government sets up vertical managing depart-
ment because they have no confidence on local governments, resulting in 
that each department acts on their own way instead of cooperation and bad 
relationship between governments at all levels. Concentrating the manage-
ment of troublesome fields to central government leads to continuous expan-
sion of vertical managing departments, shrink duty, impaired function of local 
government which actually give local government some ground for their fail-
ure. Furthermore, internal management of staff, finance and materials within 
vertical managing department makes it hard for implementation of supervi-
sion from local National People’s Congress, making vertical managing depart-
ment a vacuum space of supervision from local National People’s Congress, 
further breeding to following phenomenon: such as possession of govern-
mental authority by the local vertical department, or governmental authority 
processed by one department become their right or interest, and what’s 
more, those right may be become statutory.  
Excessive administrative levels form a lengthy administrative chain, which 
features of poor work efficiency but high administrative cost. Public services 
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provided by central government have to go through layers of administrative 
governments before its implementation, resulting in low efficiency. For the 
economic regulation, as majority of projects are controlled by central govern-
ment and the construction of grass-roots projects have to acquire approval 
of National Development and Reform Commission, many local governments 
spare no efforts in acquiring of administrative approval from central govern-
ment so far as to the establishment of Beijing Liaison office of Economy or 
Beijing Liaison Office of Culture. This may result in waste of human and ma-
terial resources and high administrative cost or breed to corruption. A pow-
erful interest group has taken shape within the vertical managing department 
taking charge of market supervision. They enjoy the “super priority”. Local 
governments also give various subsidies to vertical managing department 
openly or covertly and bribe the leaders, damaging the justice of grass-root 
enforcement. Supporting policy establishment lags behind the downwards 
trends of social management duty. Staffing and funds in local governments, 
who assume major social managing duties do not match to the social man-
agement duty born by them. Many local governments could not carry out 
their work effectively with the poor staffing and funds. 
II.  Strategic path of administrative system upgrade,  
seeing from perspective of central and local governments 
Administrative system upgrade in central and local government shall arouse 
the enthusiasm of both central and local government, be beneficial for the 
settlement of prominent problems emerged in current social and economic 
development, be beneficial for addressing the urgent needs put forwards by 
the mass practically. It shall highlight solutions of following problems: 
1. Draw up the “Relationship Law between Central and Local Government”, 
achieving thorough transformation of government management, gradually 
realizing legislation of authority division between governments at all levels. 
Looking from long term, thorough transform and the realization of standard-
ization and institutionalization of central and local administrative system are 
dispensable from the amendment of Constitution and Organization Law as 
well as the establishment of the “Relationship Law between Central and Local 
Government”, which will specify authority division between central and local 
government expressively and list out detailed administrative affairs under 
central or local governments control only or either of them. Legislation of 
authority allocation among government at all levels, relationship between 
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different powers and the execution of power will make the administrative en-
forcement of government at all levels much scientific, rigorous and fair. We 
must ensure that there are laws to abide by, laws are strictly observed and 
enforced and violations of the law must be investigated and dealt with. The 
“Relationship Law between Central and Local Government” shall cover fol-
lowing aspects: legislative intent and application range, fundamental princi-
ple observed in disposing of relationship between central and local govern-
ment,  power division between central and local government, details and pro-
cedures of adjustment, monitoring mechanism of central government to local 
government, legal settlement mechanism of power conflict between central 
and local government. Doubtless, it needs to emphasize that the amendment 
of the Constitution and the legislative process of laws used for regulation or 
adjustment of relationship between central and local government shall ob-
serve to the democratic procedure specified by the Constitution and laws. We 
will establish and improve the appealing and balancing mechanism of local 
benefits as well as reciprocal and cooperating relationship between central 
and local government. 
2. Specify the authority of economic adjustment, market monitoring, social 
management and public service among governments of all level. Firstly, Eco-
nomic regulation (macro-economy regulation) shall be guided by central gov-
ernment. Economic regulation, which plays a global role, shall be unified 
throughout China by the central government without power separation, sup-
ported by the provincial government on the issues such as regional planning 
and financial policy.  Secondly, central and provincial governments shall play 
a leading role in the market monitoring. Central government shall draw up 
the market supervision law and regulation, market competition rule and rel-
ative standards. Provincial government shall take charge of the coordination 
of major market supervision activity while the municipal and township gov-
ernment is responsible for the organization of supervision activity, regulation 
of market behavior and market order. Thirdly, the establishment and supervi-
sion of social management policy is under the control of central government 
while the specific implementation and execution of social management is al-
located to local government. Fourthly, the public service duty shall be as-
signed to central government or local government or both of them according 
to its classification.   
3. Improve vertical management structural reform, gradually adjust or re-
move some vertical managing department or organization. Along with the 
situation development, some new problems emerged in the vertical manage-
ment, which could be improved by reform. Firstly, we need specify the duty 
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and authority of the vertical managing department. Duty and authority be-
tween organizations in each level within vertical managing department shall 
be defined and specified by law, avoiding authority absence, over-stepping 
and displacement among organizations from different level and the forming 
of special benefits community within the vertical managing department. Sec-
ondly, clarify the authority-responsibility relationship between managing de-
partment and local government, establishing and improving the supporting 
mechanism and exploring the integrating point of vertical management and 
level-to-level management. Thirdly, existed vertical managing departments 
are also facing reform, so additional new vertical managing department is not 
needed. We should gradually adjust the structural configuration or remove 
some vertical managing departments established in the times during which 
the market economy remains to be improved according to the status of our 
market economy, especially for the vertical managing department or organi-
zation such as Administrative Authority of Industry and Commerce, Quality 
and Technical Supervision, Food and Drug Administration which might be 
delegated to local government. Therefore, local government could coordinate 
and integral their regulating resources and achieve more effective manage-
ment, coordination and disposing over local government and play greater 
roles in local management. 
4. We improve deliberative democracy to settle duty confliction in adminis-
trative execution, and establish legal coordination mechanism between cen-
tral and local government. China has entered a critical stage when golden op-
portunity coexists with conflicts. Driving by benefits and interests, contradic-
tions and disputes accumulated between central and local government or 
among governments at all levels incur many conflicts events. To deepen the 
administrative system reform between central and local government, we 
must establish channels for negotiation and equal communication, delibera-
tive democratic resolution to solve administrative conflict and a benign ap-
pealing and coordinating mechanism between central and local government 
basing on recognition of rationality of public interest, national interest as well 
as local interest. We shall restraint the action such as black case work and 
buck-passing. 
5. Enhance authority and independence of supervising institution of central 
government and improve supervisory mechanism of central government to 
local government. Supervision from central government includes inspecting 
and regulating activity, ensuring local government’s behavior is legal and 
compliant with stated goals. In order to strengthen central government’s su-
pervision, firstly, we shall increase authority and independence of supervising 
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institution in central government, enabling them to carry out their work in-
dependently and ensuring a valid supervision. Secondly, we must transform 
from traditional supervising mode which concentrating on administrative su-
pervising, to a new supervising mode that combining legal supervision, judi-
cial supervision, administrative supervision and social supervision together. 
We must ensure that local governments act within the scope prescribed by 
law. Thirdly, we shall build up and improve supervision procedure, achieving 
the routine, standard and systematic supervision of central government. 
III.  Several problems waiting for settlement  
Administrative reform is a systematic project, which requires the attainment 
of many supporting condition. Reform of administrative system in central and 
local government depends on addressing of following problems: 
Promote reform of public finance system profoundly. Firstly, we will in-
crease governmental expenditure on public service area， especially for 
basic public service such as social insurance, compulsory education and med-
ical care and public health, ensuring public service area is entitled to most 
public finance of government. Better public services create a much favorable 
external atmosphere for the market and enable common people to share de-
velopment achievement and realize their all-round development. Secondly, 
we will keep promoting tax reform. We should give a clear and reasonable 
dividing line between tax of central government and local government, and 
according to their actual needs, entitle local government to collect some 
taxes matching to their economic development without making influence on 
macro-economy function and financial income of central government, enrich-
ing their financial resources and improve their public service capability and 
level. Reform on resource tax will be carried out to fit for the actual situation 
of economy development. Resource tax allocation rte between vertical sys-
tems within local government will be adjusted and the consumption tax and 
individual income tax shall be improved. Thirdly, we will improve the transfer 
payment system. We will raise the proportion of general transfer payment, 
and reduce and control special transfer payments;   regulate the “Beijing liai-
son office of local government” stringently; restrain the unfair competition 
between local governments who actively endeavor to acquire approval of  
each ministry; narrow the financial resource gap between different regions 
and enhance economic power of less-develop area.      
Accelerate reform in investment management system. We will straighten 
out the relationship between central and local government. In order to speed 
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up reform in investment management system, we need to implement follow-
ing urgent work: one, we will establish and improve coordination system and 
mechanism of investment management system, innovating new exertion 
mode for government investing project. We will clearly specify duties of dif-
ferent government departments and making information and supporting 
management policy of investment shared among different governmental de-
partments, between central and local governments as well as different enter-
prises. Two, we shall allocate authority and managing scope about the invest-
ment rationally between central and local government, and take effective 
measures to arouse investment management enthusiasm of local govern-
ment. Give clear division line of investment managing scope and authority 
between central and local government; specify relationships clearly and com-
bine the power, duty and interest together. Three, we should effectively re-
duce the financial pressure of local government and implement different sup-
porting funding policy for local government. Four, we should reinforce the 
supervision on project invested by government and establish the post-project 
evaluation system and accountability system for projects invested by govern-
ment. We will set up a unified authoritative supervising institution and the 
post-project evaluation system; formulate and issue the Post Project Evalua-
tion Method for National Medium and Large Scale Project. Five, we should 
pay close attention on the legislation about investment, and improve the ap-
proval and filling system construction of investment project in enterprises. 
We will improve the basic system construction about governmental invest-
ment, and pay close attention on the establishment of the “Regulation for 
Governmental Investment” and consider the formulation of the “Law for Gov-
ernmental Investment”. 
We will move faster to implement system reform of counties directly man-
aged by provincial government. In terms of reform schedule, it could be car-
ried out in three steps: firstly, financial system will be managed directly by 
provincial government except some ethnic minority area from now to the 
middle of the 12th Five Year, and we will keep exploring and promoting fi-
nancial affairs of township be managed by county government. In developed 
regions like Zhejiang province and areas where serous contradiction exists, 
we consider to transform some county whose finance is directly managed by 
provincial government into a county whose administration is directly man-
aged by provincial government and in some cases, the county might upgrades 
to a municipal city.  Secondly, we will condense the existing financial institu-
tions at provincial, municipal, county and township level into three levels: 
provincial, municipal (county), township level until the end of the 12th Five 
Year (2015). Some regions in East China, Middle China and Northeast China, 
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where condition permitted, will realize the transformation of some county 
whose finance is directly managed by provincial government into a county 
whose administration is directly managed by provincial government. Some 
township government shall be transformed into local office of county gov-
ernment. In west areas, we will also realize the county’s financial system be 
managed directly by provincial government while township government 
could remain unchanged. Thirdly, we will further condense the financial insti-
tutions at provincial, municipal (county) and township level into two levels: 
provincial, municipal (county) level until the end of the 13th Five Year (2020). 
Transformation of some county whose finance is directly managed by provin-
cial government into a county whose administration is directly managed by 
provincial government will be taking shape. In west areas, some counties will 
have realized the county’s administrative system be managed directly by pro-
vincial government and some countries will have realized the county’s finan-
cial system be managed directly by provincial government, and some town-
ship government will have be transformed into local office of county govern-
ment. General direction is: municipal city never governs township which will 
be under direct management of provincial government. And the municipal 
city and township would become same level administrative institution under 
direct management of provincial government. After reform, municipal city 
shall focus on promoting city’s development and strengthen city manage-
ment while township will spare no effort to promoting county economy and 
servicing for agriculture, farmer and rural area. Economic cooperation be-
tween municipal city and township shall be drove by the market mainly, sup-
plemented by governmental coordination and establish a regional economic 
development community. Regional coordination shall be transformed into 
complex administration. 
We will give overall consideration for the adjustment of provincial admin-
istrative division. China’s existing administrative division took shape in 
planned economy times with some adjustment within small area after reform 
and opening up. For now, along with the development of market economy, 
especially the regional economy, regional cooperation and horizontal coop-
eration are increasing day by day. Economy of some big city develops quickly 
and elements aggregation is speeding up. The position of regional hub city is 
very obvious, putting forwards the urgent demand of uplifting the city’s po-
litical and economy strategic position .Problems and conflictions caused by 
the hysteretic administrative division managing system reform increases 
gradually, which has put forwards a higher and more urgent demands for ad-
ministrative division managing system reform. Facing to new circumstance, 
new task and new development outlook, we shall make new coordination and 
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arrangement of administrative division managing system. There are many 
problems within China’s government such as excessive management level, 
complex administering system, wide administrating scope, serious adminis-
trative partition, high administrative cost, mainly due to the lagging reform 
of middle level and oversized management span and management scale left 
unsolved for years. Some provincial governments in China which still keep 
their oversized management span and management scale that could not 
adapt to social and economic development, are facing much more problems 
and difficulties. The idea of decentralizing local power by setting more ad-
ministrative division, keeping balance and preventing localism, put forwards 
by Jia Yi, a famous ideologist in Han dynasty, in his work “Zhi’an Ce” shall be 
attached importance. To maintain China’s long-term stability and security 
and promote overall development of economy and society, the smaller a 
province region is, the better.  Considering various aspects reform involves 
in, we should implement step by step, and attain the goal gradually. We will 
increase number of provincial governments, by setting up new directly-con-
trolled city, splitting or reorganizing existed department, and reduce the 
management range and scale of each provincial government and decrease 
the management layer. There should be 20 to 30 more provincial govern-
ments could be set up. The method: setting up new directly-controlled city is 
relatively appropriate and practical. Its advantages include: firstly, we could 
refer to experiences of Chongqing city, avoiding making detours; secondly, 
this method has less impact on the status which is advantageous for reducing 
opposite force; thirdly, it complies with development of urbanization and will 
act as role mode.  
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The Problems and Measures of Province Directly Governing  
County Reform 
XU Ke 
Since 1992, with the support of the central government, some provinces in 
China successively implemented the reform pilot with the main content of 
“strong country expanding power”, “province directly governing county”, “di-
vide and conquer county and city” on finance and so on, thereby opening the 
prelude of province directly governing county reform. Since the century, ac-
ademia constantly summarize the experience of reform pilot, making a re-
search wave of reform of city governing county, and promoting province gov-
erning county reform, forming a roughly identical systematic understanding 
of the background, feasibility, pilot situation, step, form, mode and other 
parts of the province directly governing county reform, also gaining the re-
sponse and support of the central government. In June 2005, Premier Wen 
Jiabao pointed out at the reference of national rural tax reform pilot work: to 
reform the management style of the county and town’s finance, the place 
where conditions permit can promote the financial system of province di-
rectly governing county1.  
The fifth plenary session of the 16th CPC Central Committee put forward that 
in order to optimize organizational structure and reduce the administrative 
level, the place where conditions permitted could implement the financial 
system of province governing county. “The National Eleventh Five Year Plan 
for Economic and Social Development” proposes that in order to straighten 
out the financial government system below the province level, the place 
where conditions permitted could implement the management system of 
province directly governing county.2 In 2006, the central number one file pro-
posed that the place where condition permitted could accelerate to promote 
the reform of province directly governing county’s financial and management 
system. In 2009, the central number one file proposed that encouraging the 
                                               
1  Tang Shuquan: “Province Governing County” Reform: Redistribution of Local Rights 
[N], People’s Network, 11/6/2007 
2  National Eleventh Five-Year Economic and Social Development Planning [N], People’s 
Daily, 17/3/2006. 
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province where condition permitted to explore the system of province di-
rectly managing county (city) according to the law.3 In July, the Ministry of 
Finance issued “The Opinions on Promoting the Reform of Province Directly 
Managing County’s Finance”4. In 2010, the central number one file empha-
sized again to continue to promote the reform of province directly governing 
county’s finance and management system, and promote the reform pilot of 
power expansion strengthening county.5 In October, the fifth plenary session 
of the 17th CPC Central Committee passed “The CPC Central Committee’s 
Suggestion on Formulating the 12th Five Year Planning of National Economic 
and Social Development”, in which it proposed that the place where condi-
tion permitted could explore the system of province directly governing 
county (city).6 All these measures point out the forward direction of promot-
ing province directly governing county reform for our country. 
As we all know, “city governing county” is the historical tradition of an-
cient China formed over a long period of time. Soon after the establishment 
of new China, the “city governing county” system established in our country 
played the center cities’ gathering effect and radiation role in the construc-
tion of economic society. However, the second clause of article 30 in our 
“Constitution” clearly stipulate that the municipality and larger cities can be 
divided into district and county, suggesting that the regional or prefecture-
level city has the legitimacy of existence, but also is the undetermined level 
of organizational system. And with the rapid development of China’s eco-
nomic society, over the years, city governing county increasingly exposes its 
weakness, and seriously affects the efficient operation of administrative 
management and the development of the county economy, unbalancing the 
urban-rural and regional economic development, and making it difficult to 
                                               
3  CPC Central Committee and the State Council’s Opinion on Promoting the Stable De-
velopment of Agriculture and Continuous Income of Farmers in 2009 [N], People’s 
Daily, 3/2/2009. 
4  The Opinion on Promoting the Reform of Province Directly Governing County’s Fi-
nance [N], People’s Daily, 10/7/2009. 
5  CPC Central Committee and the State Council’s Several Opinions on Strengthening 
the Efforts of Overall Urban and Rural Development and Further Laying a Solid Foun-
dation of the Development of Agriculture and Rural Areas [N], People’s Daily, 
1/2/2010. 
6  CPC Central Committee’s Suggested Tutorial Reading on Formulating the Twelfth 
Five-Year Planning of National Economy and Social Development [C], Beijing: People’s 
Publishing House, 2010. 
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solve the problem of “three agriculture”. Since the recent change of govern-
ment functions, it radically reduces the workload of all levels of government, 
the technical progress and the improvement of infrastructure create the con-
ditions of tools, public management innovation requires the flattening re-
form of the government; meanwhile, based on solving the problems appeared 
since the city governing county, our country gradually implement the meas-
ure of province directly governing county reform, which has become the ma-
jor strategy and future direction of our national administrative system re-
form. However, province directly governing county reform involves many is-
sues of province first-level government, including the management range, 
benefit distribution of prefecture-level government, the adjustment of ad-
ministrative division, institutional reform, and personnel reassignment and 
so on. It is long-term and complicated system engineering, whether achieving 
the desired effect or not requires our continuous research on the theory and 
constant exploration in practice. 
I.  The main problems existing in the province directly governing county 
reform in China 
Although the province directly governing county reform has achieved some 
success in the pilot, the central government also support to continue widely 
promote it in the provinces where conditions permit, also it is widely recog-
nized that this measure can bring many positive effects, however, whether 
those people, who help intensify making the province directly governing 
county reform to become topic of administrative system reform and maybe 
not take charge of this, still clearly recognize that there are also many prob-
lems to be solved and a long way to go in the province directly governing 
county reform. These are things most worth thinking deeply, most expect to 
be explored and researched, and most in need of support and responsibility 
in our reform. 
(1)  The problems of management organization and personnel. Province di-
rectly governing county reform does not cancel the prefecture-level city; the 
province should establish the corresponding organizations to govern the 
county, the county will be able to add departments after expanding power, 
there will be a big momentum for reform in the organization, personnel and 
position configurations. But there are over 300 prefecture-level cities in the 
national province directly governing county reform, each prefecture-level 
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city reform also involves tens of thousands of cadres7, with so many cadres 
emplacements and disposes of organizations and positions, one can imagine 
the impact of it and can never overlook it. The maximum expectation of cen-
tral government and the masses is that jumping out of the vicious cycle of 
“simplifying the organization-expanding-further simplify-expanding again” 
reform, overcoming the phenomenon of bloated organization and personnel, 
implementing downsizing to improve the efficiency, achieving the purpose of 
improving the administrative efficiency of civil servant and reducing the fi-
nancial burden of the masses. The province directly governing county reform 
not only retains most organizations and personnel of the prefecture-level 
city, but also adds province-level management organization, personnel and 
position, and expands the county-level power, therefore providing a breeding 
ground for the bloated organizations and personnel as well as the increase of 
financial burdens of the masses. 
(2)  The problem of management range. After the reform of province directly 
governing county, for example, there are only over 40 counties and districts 
managed by Zhejiang Province8, the provincial government generally has bet-
ter control, but many provinces like Hebei, Henan, Sichuan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Shandong, Fujian and so on, changing from governing over a dozen 
of prefecture-level cities to directly governing dozens of counties or even 
over 100 counties, therefore it’s difficult for the provincial government to 
have corresponding actual control ability. In addition, the provinces with vast 
areas like Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, whose management radius is difficult 
to cover every corner. In order to ensure the actual control ability, can we 
diminish the province and district proposed by some experts?9 If not, then 
how to achieve this goal; if so, then how to divide it to maximize the effi-
ciency? 
(3)  The problem of management authority. Namely to what extent is it sci-
entific and rational for the province directly governing county? That is to say, 
to what extent should the province-level management authority transfer? 
What power does the county level possess? How does the central govern-
ment balance the power relationship between the two? In general, the size of 
                                               
7  Zhou Tianyong, Zhang Zhanbin: Canceling the Prefecture-Level City Comes into View, 
[N], Jinan Times, 16/9/2005. 
8  Wang Yi, Xu Juan: On the Development of Province Directly Governing County Sys-
tem in Contemporary China [J], Office Business, 2009, (5). 
9  Shi Jiangmin: Scholars’ Suggestion to Diminish Province and District in China, [N], 
China News Network, 13/1/2005. 
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management power matches with the development degree of the economic 
society, if the management power is too small, it may be a waste; if it is too 
big, it may be abused. If the county lacks the ability of economic and social 
development, the relation between the county and town is like “small horse 
draws the big cart”. In this case, who can guarantee that after eliminating 
“city extorting county” and “city suppressing county”, the situation of “prov-
ince extorting county” and “county extorting town” does not appear? By then, 
should we still implement “province directly governing town”? Thus, to what 
extent does the management power transfer can neither be wasted nor be 
abused? 
(4)  The problem of transverse cooperation. In the short term, as the prefec-
ture-level city formed in the process of city governing county has the relation 
of leading and being led, consultation cooperation and competition develop-
ment with the county for a long time. In the early days of province directly 
governing county reform, there are still some phenomena that project should 
first pass the city standard then be submitted to a higher level for approval, 
some city authority having been transferred to the county, but the funds al-
location and other powers still operate according to the original procedure. 
In the long term, as city governing county has a long historical tradition in 
China, gradually forming the certain geography, customs, ethnic and other 
areas, and since the establishment of our nation, China’s long-term imple-
ment of city governing county makes some places to establish specific eco-
nomic, industry and other structures. From the current practical situation, if 
we implement the province directly governing county, some places like Su-
zhou will be destroyed its original good regional economic structures, and 
places like Changde in Hunan and other places will be destroyed its original 
agricultural and industrial structure.10 In addition, it may also destroy con-
struction structure of the city and town and other things in the originally ma-
ture provinces and districts.11 Therefore, from the reform of province directly 
governing county, we should think how to strengthen the problem of trans-
verse cooperation between county and prefecture-level city and between 
each county. 
(5)  The problem of reform standards. From the current pilot situation, we ba-
sically use the condition of economic development as the standard to decide 
                                               
10  Moving Towards Agricultural Strong City from Agricultural Big City, [N], Changde 
Daily, 26/12/2008. 
11  Xiong Wenzhao, Cao Xudong: The Calm Thinking of “Province Directly Governing 
County”, [J], Administrative Forum, 2008, (5). 
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whether implement the reform of province directly governing county or not. 
In this standard, there are the following problems: the current reform is a top-
down administrative order with big arbitrariness, ignoring to give full play of 
the local economy, especially the enthusiasm and creativity of social devel-
opment; some counties’ economic and social development is relatively back-
ward constrained by the geography, conception and other reasons, it is diffi-
cult to achieve goal of economic development by expanding power; our coun-
try has vast territory, and each country’s economic development is out of bal-
ance, and the reform of province directly governing county maybe intensify 
the imbalance; in the reform of province directly governing county, the dif-
ferent counties within the same province may compare with each other, re-
sulting the increase of image project and false data, even evoking more con-
flict; the reform of province directly governing county may make the admin-
istrative level of county-level government rise semi-lattice, but gaining more 
powers is not the fundamental reason to promote the county’s economic de-
velopment12; after the reform of province directly governing county, there are 
also problems of establishing a sound administrative accountability and per-
formance evaluation and so on. 
In addition, with the deepening of the reform of province directly govern-
ing county, it will inevitably involve the problem of resetting the functions 
and powers of central ministries and township. How to adapt to the require-
ments of province directly governing county reform, scientifically and ration-
ally set the functions and powers of central ministries and township; the cen-
tral ministries how to implement the super-ministry system, the township is 
set as city or the office of county, and so on. 
II.  The main measures of province directly governing county reform  
in China 
In fact, there are many factors to restrict the success of the province directly 
governing county reform, if we set aside the effect of institutional mecha-
nism, external environment, the concept of civil servants and other factors, 
thinking and solving the above problems will undoubtedly become the key to 
province directly governing county reform. 
                                               
12  Liu Dasheng, On the Status of Our Cities in the Current Constitution, [J], The Truth, 
2004, (11). 
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(1)  “Downsizing”. The reason why downsizing is so important is that it con-
cerns with the fundamental interests of the masses and the issues of China’s 
long term stability. With retaining prefecture-level city’s establishment and 
expanding power from county level as the starting point, province directly 
governing county reform begins to take shape by expanding organizations, 
increasing the establishment and adding staff. However, reform is after all 
not the secular opportunity to win promotion and get rich for someone; it is 
fundamentally full of ideal colors. If we can make the province directly gov-
erning county reform with lofty mission avoid becoming the farce of wining 
promotion and getting rich, contending for power and profit, even eliminat-
ing the dissidents, but self-consciously start downsizing, we are bound to face 
enormous difficulties and pains. In this case, those who believe in public or in 
private that the more civil servants are, the better beneficial to the stability 
of our country only hold a false conception, which is experiential, perceptual, 
indulgent and even adding fuel to the fire.  
Advocating downsizing, we should have scientific and rational attitude, start 
from the overall situation of the county, and truly make it consistent of or-
ganization, establish, number of people with the local economic and social 
development level as well as management range and precision. Select some 
cadres who should have the concept of overall situation of the country, ob-
serve the sufferings of people, and be good at balancing all the rights and 
interests, and make them directly participate in the province directly govern-
ing county reform. On the premise that trying not to increase the establish-
ment and number of people, focusing on train and use the existing talents, 
especially when we strengthen the county-level management organization 
and township reform, promote the cadres with rich practical experience on 
the economic and social development in the county and grassroots. Combine 
the province directly governing county reform and transforming the govern-
ment function, make moderate adjustment of the organizations and staffs in 
administrative and public institutions, and change the phenomenon of too 
many talents and very few grassroots talents, guaranteeing the governments 
at all levels to fully perform their functions. Shunt the extra cadres after being 
compiled, or send them to the Party School and administrative Institute to 
reserve and study, or encourage them to actively engage in the wave of mar-
ket economy to promote the local economic and social development. It is 
worth mentioning that, regardless of whether diminishing the province and 
district through the argument in the future, we should all take such measures 
as premise. 
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(2)  Rationally divide the functions and powers at all levels. By scientifically 
dividing the range and size of the functions and powers at all levels, it is ben-
eficial to realize the stable and orderly stratified management or regulations 
with integration of power and responsibility and division of labor with indi-
vidual responsibility from central to local government. The division of func-
tions and powers at all levels of province directly governing county is still in 
control of reform pilot; based on the summary of practical experience, 
strengthen the practical research and first achieve the reasonable boundary 
of jurisprudence. Based on the principle of further macro-control of prefec-
ture-level city and county level, according to the requirements of promoting 
the social and economic development, the province level should decentralize 
some personnel powers and financial powers relating to local economic and 
social development, especially giving greater autonomy to the county level 
to stimulate the vitality of its economic and social development. Based on the 
principle of accelerating their economic and social development, the county 
level makes rational division of the powers, corresponding adjust the limit of 
personnel power and financial power, achieve high performance in the field 
of resource application and decision-making, seeking self-development. After 
the determination of the inherent power between province level and prefec-
ture-level city and county level, we will accordingly solve the problems of ex-
cess province-level power, insufficient power of prefecture-level city and 
county level as well as power abusiveness, etc. Combine safeguarding na-
tional interests with protecting individual interests, and correctly handle the 
interaction between them. Legalize the power relations of province level, pre-
fecture-level city and county level, and institutionalize the achievements, 
then transform them into practical legal rules, and internalize into the com-
mon concept of cadres and masses. Based on the problems that diminishing 
province and district would directly result in the expansion of province-level 
size and probably weaken the control force of central government, we should 
be calm, rational and prudent on whether implementing the reform of dimin-
ishing the province and district, only conduct it when all the conditions per-
mit, avoiding the huge losses of reform brought by the imperfection and sway 
of policy. 
(3)  Establish a sound mechanism of transverse cooperation. According to the 
integrality and unity requirements of regional economic and industrial devel-
opment, urban and town construction and other works, establishing a sound 
mechanism of transverse cooperation is to establish the unified working op-
eration mechanism of transverse cooperation between the county levels, and 
between prefecture-level city and county level, so as to ensure the scientific 
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development of local economy and society. Since the reform and opening up, 
especially in recent years, all kinds of regional economic and industrial groups 
at all levels in China have a large increase in the number, scale and range, 
becoming an important force in the development of local economy. For a long 
time, the transverse cooperation at all levels in China has a weak coordinating 
and control capacity, being difficult to form an effective constraint. After the 
reform of province directly governing county, it not only probably further ex-
pand the problem, but also may destroy the original transverse cooperation 
relations between the county levels, and between the prefecture-level city 
and county level. For this reason, we should break the situation of adminis-
trative barrier and the each administer in his own way in system, determining 
to eliminate the institutional roots between the free flow of factors in admin-
istrative regions. In order to establish a sound transverse cooperation organ-
ization between the county levels, and between prefecture-level city and 
county level, we should clarify rights and responsibilities, increase efforts in 
support of funds, personnel, management and so on. We should actively es-
tablish comprehensive experimental zone of transverse cooperation develop-
ment, forming a good patter of interactive development, complementary ad-
vantage and common development between experimental zone and radia-
tion zone. With the use of legal, economic and other means, we promote the 
complementary development of regional economy and industrial structure, 
guiding the reasonable flow of capital, human resources and technical re-
sources, strictly avoiding the short-term behavior of competing for resources, 
repeated configuration and construction of resources as well as blind and dis-
order competition. 
(4)  Establish and improve the reform supervision system. Strengthening the 
administrative supervision and performance monitor of province directly 
governing county reform, it is an important method to solve the supervision, 
evaluate how well the province directly governing county reform has done 
and ensure achieving results. In accordance with the requirements of scien-
tific development concept, pay close attention to study and formulate the 
assessment indicator of province directly governing county reform and spe-
cific rewarding and punishment measures violating the stipulation, seriously 
sum up the experiences on the basis of trial implementation, continuing to 
improve and implement it so as to make it scientific, institutionalized and 
standardized. According to the local economic and social development prac-
tice, we should adjust measures to local conditions and determine whether 
to implement province directly governing county reform or not, avoiding 
rigid uniformity, and also resolutely putting an end to the use of “avoiding 
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rigid uniformity” conduct. Adopt workable leadership responsibility, accord-
ing to the requirements of province directly governing county reform stand-
ards, determined the cadres’ promotion and demotion, reward and punish-
ment with their performance, change the administrative order means of 
county-level rising semi-lattice promoted by the reform from the top to  
down. Realize the diversification of supervision subject of province directly 
governing county reform; strengthen the reform information in public, make 
three-dimensional supervision of the reform from all direction and multi lev-
els.13 
In addition, we should steadily carry out super-ministry system reform, 
province division’s reform and township reform, providing supporting 
measures to further implement the province directly governing reform; 
standardize the work procedure of province directly governing county re-
form, prevent the phenomenon of omission, offside, dislocation and not in 
place of administrative organs at all levels; straighten out the relations be-
tween vertical and transverse organization, properly solving the contradic-
tions appearing in the province directly governing county reform; strengthen 
the education of cadres’ ideal and faith,14 carry out the explaining and advo-
cating work of province directly governing county reform, so as to make the 
reform measures be scientifically used by cadres at all level and be accepted 
and supported by the broad masses, etc. 
 
 
                                               
13  Xu Ke, Governmental Executive Ability [M]. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2007. 
14  Xu Ke, The Textbook about Strengthening Governmental Executive Ability and Cred-
ibility [M], Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009. 
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Local Administrations under Demographic Change  
– Challenges and New Patterns of Administrative Organization and 
Cooperation? 
Gisela FÄRBER 
1.  Introduction 
Demographic change is a huge and long-term challenge for every country in 
the world. While the problems of and solution for pension schemes have been 
intensely debated, the consequences of such change for local governments 
have become of interest to academic research and political discussion only in 
recent years. Municipalities have a crucial role to play in overcoming the var-
ious problems demographic change will create for them. Municipalities are 
or soon will be confronted by growing or shrinking, and in any case aging, 
populations. As the locations where people live and where the economy pro-
duces goods, services and economic values, the local communities and their 
capacities to manage demographic change will determine the living condi-
tions of the future populations. 
The paper presents, firstly, the patterns of demographic change currently 
underway in China and in Germany. It shows the diverging pattern experi-
enced by different German Länder before considering some theoretical as-
pects about the consequences of shrinking populations. As the problems aris-
ing from change are bigger for regions with shrinking populations the follow-
ing section presents four strategies which are now under discussion in Ger-
many for the regions facing such a situation. Section four emphasizes the im-
portance of fiscal equalization for the successful regional and local manage-
ment of demographic change. The paper closes with a short wrap-up and of-
fers some perspectives on the political decisions to be made. 
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2.  Demographic change in China and Germany and the economics of 
public service provision 
2.1  Demographic change in China and Germany 
China has a still growing population, while Germany’s is already shrinking 
slightly. The Chinese population is expected to grow from 1.34 billion people 
to 1.45 billion by 2030, but afterward will start shrinking, returning to its cur-
rent level by 2060. Germany attained its maximum size of 82.5 million people 
in 2003, with the census of 2011 counting only 80.3 million. The population 
is expected to have shrunk to 64 – 70 million in 2060, depending on devel-
opment in birth rates, life expectancy and (im)migration1.  
Both countries are ‘aging’: China’s one-child policy will not only lead to a 
shrinking population from 2030 when – provided the birth rates remain as 
low as today - the cases of death exceed the number of births, but also en-
sures the average age of the population will continuously grow as average life 
expectancy increases further in line with current expectations. Germany has 
had a birth rate of 1.3 - 1.4 children per woman since the middle of the 1970’s 
in Western Germany, followed by a slightly higher but then sharply shrinking 
birth rate after German re-unification. The birth rates are now more or less 
the same all over Germany, which has a rather stable net rate of reproduction 
of 0.66 – 0.7. Germany is also experiencing a continuously growing life ex-
pectance of about 40 days each year. Germany is an immigration country: 
Except during the years of economic crisis there is a net immigration of 150 
– 250,000 people per year.  
In both countries considerable internal migration is occurring. In China 
migrant workers emigrate from rural areas, especially in the Western parts of 
the country, to cities and metropolitan agglomerations primarily in the East. 
The number of migrant workers is actually estimated to include some 300 
million people. In Germany the migration from East to West Germany, which 
started even during the time of the former GDR and became stronger after 
German unification in 1990, is continuing. The migrations from the East to 
the West is, however, expected to decline or to be balanced by migration in 
the other directions after demographic change reduces the extremely high 
                                               
1  See Statistisches Bundesamt: Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, Vorläufige Ergeb-
nisse der Bevölkerungsfortschreibung auf Grundlage des Zensus 2011, Wiesbaden 
2013 and Bevölkerung Deutschlands bis 2060, 12. Koordinierte Bevölkerungsvoraus-
berechnung, Wiesbaden 2009.  
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unemployment rates in Eastern Germany, a legacy from the transformation 
of the economy of the former GDR.  
Both countries also exhibit a gender bias in their demographic pattern. In 
China, many more male babies than female are born because many parents 
prefer a son due to tradition, regardless of the fact that preselecting of gen-
der creates an imbalance that impacts marriages a generation later. Further-
more, female migrant workers often have to return home after the birth of a 
child because the ‘hukou’-system only provides social and educational ser-
vices for the children in the municipality where their parents are registered. 
In 2012 a program was started to improve the integration of migrant workers 
into their working locations2. In Germany the gender bias is also connected 
with migration. Specifically, well-educated and/or trained young women have 
been emigrating from Eastern Germany to regions in the West and the South 
where can more easily find appropriate jobs. If they then start families in their 
region of employment they never come back. Thus there is a considerable 
gender imbalance in Eastern Germany. For example, in the county of Bautzen 
in Saxony there are 125 men that are 20 to 30 years of age for every 100 
women of the same age3.  
These demographic developments have led to a polarization of the popu-
lation in both countries.  
- The population is growing or at least stable in agglomerations, including 
in the surrounding smaller cities and counties. In Germany these sur-
rounding areas are called “Speckgürtel” (‘pork barrel’) communities be-
cause they profit from the infrastructure of the core cities without having 
to levy the high taxes usually necessary to cover the costs.  
- In China as well as in Germany the population in peripheral regions and 
rural areas has been shrinking for many years. This trend is a result of ur-
banization, which started in Germany in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury and in China during the economic reform period in the 1980’s.   
- The imbalance between genders is higher in shrinking regions. Among the 
younger people there are more men than women. The sex ratio reverses 
in the group of those 50 years and older. Here the higher life expectancy 
                                               
2  Wang, Wenfei Winnie; Fan, C. Cindy: Migrant Workers’ Integration in Urban China: 
Experiences in Employment, Social Adaptation, and Self-Identity; in: Eurasian Geo-
graphy and Economics, 2012, 53, No. 6, pp. 731–749. 
3  See Statisches Landesamt Sachsen: Bevölkerungsstand des Freistaates Sachsen nach 
Alter und Geschlecht 2011, Meißen 2012. 
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of women leads to an overhang of women, which increases further among 
the population over 80 years of age. 
- In both countries, enterprises realize the advantages agglomerations offer 
for their production (short distances to a higher number of consumers, 
higher degree of education in the labor force, existence of creative ‘mi-
lieus’, better and less expensive local public infrastructure) and prefer to 
locate there. Therefore most regions in the periphery are experiencing 
economic decline and job loss while agglomerations are the winners in 
economic development and demographic change.  
 
Fig. 15.1:  Size of population in selected Länder 1990 – 2060 (2020 – 
2060 according to the 9th forecast of population of the Fed-
eral Statistical Office) 
 
Source: Statistsches Bundesamt: Bevölkerung Deutschlands bis 2060, Wiesbaden 2009 
 
All these developments contribute to a diverging decline in the population 
depending on a location’s existing economic und geographical structure and 
the future regional demographic parameters. Figure 15.1 sets the size of the 
population in 1990 as 100%. By 2010 the number of inhabitants in Saxony-
Anhalt (SAT) had declined by almost 20%. By 2060 it will have shrunken to 
less than the half of its size in 1990. The best development is observed for 
the city-state Hamburg, which has seen an increase in its population by 8% 
since 1990 and will grow continue until 2030, after which it will slowly start 
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to decline; but its 2060 population will still be bigger than in 1990. Overall, 
Germany will again reach the level of its 1990 population in 2020 and then 
continue to shrink to 84% of that size by 2060. States with a good economic 
development – like for example Bavaria - will shrink less, those with sectors 
and enterprises undergoing economic structural change, like Bremen (HB) 
and Saarland (Saar), will shrink by more than the average. 
The diverging developments in the size of different region’s population will 
have effects on its density, which is an important indicator for the costs of 
providing public goods and services because agglomerations can realize 
economies of scale while thinly settled territories, particularly those with less 
than 40 inhabitants per square kilometer, suffer from increasing costs of pro-
vision. Actually, the population density of the German Länder ranges from 
506 people per square kilometer in North Rhine-Westphalia to only 83 in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. In 2060, North Rhine-Westphalia will still be the 
most densely populated state, but the number of inhabitants per square kilo-
meter will decline to only 417, while in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern only 46 
people on average will liv in the same size area.  
  
Fig. 15.2: Population density of Germany 2010 and 2060 
 
Source: Statistsches Bundesamt: ibid.; proper calculations 
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2.2  Effects of demographic change on public service provision 
With regard to the production of public goods two types of public services 
can be distinguished: 
• Public (infrastructure) goods and services like education, public health and 
hospitals, streets, trains, local public transport, water supply and sewage. 
Their cost functions are highly dependent on the number of users (i.e. size 
of population) because they are based on a high endowment of capital 
goods invariant from consumer. As these capital goods remain in use for 
a long period and are not changeable, the average costs for infrastructure 
services increase sharply if the number of consumers decreases. Many of 
these public services are essentials for the basic living conditions of the 
population.  
• The second type are administrative services ‘producing’ permits, licenses, 
controls of environmental standards or work safety procedures on the one 
hand, and financial transfers like public pensions, family allowances, and 
housing allowances on the other hand. These public services deal with tra-
ditional ‘paper work’. They require a high level of specialized knowledge 
and, therefore, qualified personnel; the recipients - enterprises and citi-
zens - carry corresponding costs for delivering information and covering 
the distance to the administration. Small municipalities cannot afford the 
specialized personnel. However, the centralization of these responsibili-
ties, e.g. to a county level administration, would increase the distance for 
the citizens to apply for such transfers and services. A shrinking number 
of citizens, particularly if it falls under a certain threshold, limits the pos-
sibility of guaranteeing a professional local administration.  
A shrinking population leads to increases in costs, lowers the efficiency of 
local public administrations, and increases the citizens’ costs for the con-
sumption of local services. On the revenue side of local budgets the tax ca-
pacities decline with the number of inhabitants and the migration of enter-
prises to the bigger locations. An aging population also decreases tax reve-
nues because old, retired people typically earn lower incomes from pensions 
and capital investments than they do during their active working lives. They 
may even need financial help if their pensions are under the minimum sub-
sistence-level income or in the event that they need nursing services the 
costs of which exceed their net income.  
Demographic change means a broad variety of adaptations and changes 
must be made under the special and difficult conditions of a shrinking and 
ageing population which therefore ages with double speed and becomes 
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more and more costly due to increasing salaries during the life-time contracts 
and even more growing costs for – mostly unfunded - civil servants’ pensions. 
A declining number of kindergarten places contrasts with a growing number 
of nursing places. Strategies of change are needed and need to be imple-
mented soon because demographic change is already happening and yet local 
authorities need time for strategies of change. 
3.  Strategies for securing public services in areas outside 
agglomerations and with shrinking population  
Among all the good ideas discussed, and occasionally in part already started, 
to reforms local governments to meet the challenges of demographic change 
there are four main issues which are considered to be crucial:  
• What is the required minimum level of local public goods and services? 
• What is the minimum size of local jurisdictions? 
• Can e-government be a tool to more efficiently organize certain local ser-
vices? 
• Which new types of organization and cooperation are available for a more 
efficient local government? 
3.1  Political decisions about a minimum provision of public services 
In Germany, “equivalence of living conditions” is mentioned in the Basic Law 
(Art. 72 (3) and 106 (4)) as a goal for public sector and public goods’ provi-
sion. The discussion of the effects of demographic change, however, leads to 
the question of whether in the future public services should be available all 
across the country or whether only agglomeration should offer the full range 
of public services and peripheral, thinly populated areas should only provide 
a minimum supply. In the latter case the question needs to be answered as to 
which public services would constitute a ‘minimum provision’. 
This ‘basic provision of local services’ would be a basket of decentralized, 
guaranteed goods and public services which each citizen has a right to access 
within an established maximum distance from his or her home. The basket 
should certainly contain inter alia pre-school and school education, several 
health services (hospitals for the treatment of ‘typical’ illnesses, access to 
general ambulatory medical services, public rescue services), supply of water 
and sewage, and waste removal services. The majority of these ‘minimum’ 
services could be guaranteed by federal or state regulation. However, local 
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authorities should decide more than the currently do about how they would 
organize the guaranteed services and how they could do so efficiently.  
Political decisions are necessary not only about which goods and services 
should constitute a minimum provision, but also about their volume and the 
quality of service. The decision about the “organization” of service provision, 
e.g. public or private suppliers, can happen in a more decentralized manner. 
Also crucial are the decisions about the prices of the goods and services: are 
they for free, or should they be financed totally or partly by fees? High fees 
and charges would likely exclude the poorer population from the consump-
tion of these ‘fundamental’ public services. Too much centralized regulation 
regarding the details of production and financing could endanger the effi-
ciency of the local provision public services, particularly in the smaller and 
rapidly shrinking communities. The more intense and detailed the regulation 
by higher levels of government, the more urgent is the need for sufficient 
compensation through local fiscal equalization.   
In Germany, art. 72(3) GG has for many years set the condition of ‘equiv-
alence of living conditions’ as criterion for the centralization of legislation. 
This means that the Bundestag and Bundesrat can centralize certain compe-
tences in order to create more equivalent living conditions throughout the 
country. Art. 106(2) is the corresponding rule for intergovernmental financial 
relations, allowing for a vertical shift of VAT revenues in favor of the Federa-
tion if it is necessary for the ‘uniformity of living conditions’ within the federal 
territory.  
The German “Sozialstaat” has developed a variety of tools and institutions 
in order to prevent poverty and to guarantee many public and social services 
throughout Germany. The so-called ‘social budget’ accounts for 767 billion 
Euro (29.9% of GDP) of total public expenditures and tax exemptions in 
20124. The majority of the social budget consists of transfer payments (such 
as pensions, unemployment benefits, continuing salaries in the case of dis-
ease, family allowances, etc.). These monetary transfers make the production 
of services more flexible and more efficient compared with direct local gov-
ernment services. They, therefore, help guarantee an important portion of 
the basic provision of local goods and services and at the same time organize 
an effective transfer of resources from economically strong regions, rich in 
tax revenues and social insurance contributions, to poorer regions with low 
tax revenues and low social insurance contributions. Lower level govern-
                                               
4  See Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung: Sozialbudget, Berlin 2013. 
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ments are then responsible for the regional provision of infrastructure equip-
ment (planning and provision), but don’t need to organize all aspects of every 
social services in detail.  
3.2  Amalgamations of municipalities and counties 
Demographic change also induces shrinking local budgets, as all fiscal equal-
ization schemes in Germany depend on the size of the population. Each in-
habitant is worth about 2,300 Euro for the spatial states and about 3,000 
Euro for city-states in the state fiscal equalization scheme. In the respective 
local fiscal equalizations ‘local citizens’ are worth 500 – 700 Euro, in some 
Länder even more. The consequences of a shrinking population for local 
budgets are aggravating. The governments lose personnel which they can no 
longer pay for and thereby lose also their specific knowledge. Additionally, 
the cost of infrastructure goods and services increase due to cost resistance.  
Therefore, many state governments are discussing and reaching decisions 
about an amalgamation of cities, villages and counties in order to secure a 
minimum population within a local authority and thereby re-capture the cost 
advantages created by having a higher number of citizens5. However, the 
other side of the coin is that in such amalgamations the distance to local in-
stitutions increases for the citizens. In general, the increasing costs incurred 
by longer distances to government locations could lead to a loss of demo-
cratic participation. Additionally, amalgamations are politically ‘expensive’ 
because municipalities do not want to lose their independence and to be 
combined with neighboring communities. What’s more, to date there is no 
proof that amalgamations have ever led to the expected savings through 
lower production costs. In the end, if the decline in population continues, the 
newly established bigger entities again lose the advantages of their bigger 
size. Therefore, more fundamental reforms of local service provision are 
needed.  
3.3  New approaches of e-government 
One of these new approaches is connected with electronic government. The 
basic idea is that the citizens do not need to go to their administrations; the 
                                               
5  See the contributions of Jan Ziekow, Gunnar Schwarting and Dirk Zeitz. 
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administrations can come to the citizens. The simplest solution, which is al-
ready functioning in many regions of Eastern Germany, is a bus delivering 
public services to the villages (e.g. a rolling library, advisory services, local 
health services, etc.). An aging population with decreasing individual mobility 
can thereby access the provision of many local public goods and services and 
at the same time deliver social contacts and meeting occasions in the villages 
of thinly populated areas.  
For many other local services, electronic procedures form the solutions 
for the future. In particular, all applications for transfer payments, licenses, 
permits, documents and so on can easily be prepared at home and communi-
cated to the far away local administration provided the right programs, elec-
tronic security, technical equipment and knowledge are available. In Ger-
many, many laws specifying the necessary documents and other conditions 
for a given application need to be changed to accommodate non-paper elec-
tronic procedures, which allow for different ways of documentation and dif-
ferent types of proof that are in most cases less burdensome for applicants 
as well as for local administrations. Problems of data protection  should  be 
solved by new technical arrangements.  
Another problem of e-government is unequal access for some citizens and 
– usually very small – enterprises because of their lack of technical equipment 
or knowledge. Older persons in particular are often not educated in the basic 
use of electronic media. Here, local authorities should have staff who can give 
support such citizens. But novel solutions also exist: for example, mail deliv-
ery staff could carry laptops among their professional equipment from which 
administrative programs and other support could be electronically accessed.  
Higher technical requirements for administrative procedures create also 
the possibility of a new administrative labor division between front-offices in 
each village and back-offices in centrally located administrations. Here, eco-
nomics of scale in the processing of electronic applications could be realized, 
but also fundamental changes in internal administrative procedures could be 
implemented, including fully electronic records with all the corresponding ad-
vantages. To date, all these opportunities for new efficiencies have not yet 
been fully realized. Therefore, further change in local public administration 
can be expected. 
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3.4  Reorganization and cooperation of local governments  
Small communities need cooperation partners to mitigate the costs of local 
public services. The decline of their populations induces a reduction in their 
responsibilities, about which they can decide independently.. Electronic gov-
ernment is a solution only for certain standardized local administrative ser-
vices. Services which are centered on the human element - like education, 
health and nursing services - don’t offer themselves to electronic rationaliza-
tion. 
In these fields, however, a new labor division among communities is avail-
able, with the allocation of different responsibilities to the centers and pe-
ripheries. For example, schools in a village could supply sports for children 
regardless of school type, while schools in the centers could provide the more 
detailed, individual and specialized knowledge transfers of the class levels. 
Hospitals in the periphery could provide more care-based and less specialized 
services, while hospitals in the center could cover the more complicated ill-
nesses and injuries. The service provides in the peripheral regions are then 
more efficient f they are not organized independently, but rather as part of a 
local enterprise network which ‘belongs’ to all communities in the network. 
The concept of front- and back-offices can be applied not only within a 
local authority but also among several communities. Why should each county 
have a separate administration for housing allowances or motor vehicle per-
mits? Why should the back-office not be organized across several counties as 
a new centralized level of local administration under the responsibility of the 
counties, making it clearly different from the former state or provincial ad-
ministrations prior to the decentralization of tasks? The locations of the 
above-county administrative offices could be distributed more or less equally 
among the cities of the member counties.  
4.  The importance of fiscal equalization for the equivalence  
of living conditions and national stability under the conditions  
of a shrinking population 
A system of fiscal equalization is necessary to guarantee a basic level of pro-
vision of public goods across a country. Fiscal equalization transfers not only 
compensate inter-regional economic effects of supply and demand for public 
expenditures and tax revenues, but also redistributes tax revenues from rich 
states/provinces and/or agglomerations to poor regions and municipalities. 
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Demographic change necessitates that difficult political decisions be 
made about the volume and quality of local public services, about the extent 
to which these will and can diverge in central versus peripheral regions and 
the necessary minimum provision throughout the country. These decisions 
require corresponding changes in the tools of local authorities, in tax bases 
and tax competences on the one hand and the corresponding fiscal equaliza-
tion formulas on the other hand. The vertical distribution of tax sources re-
sults in indirect fiscal equalization. Meeting the financial needs of local au-
thorities in the future would be best attained by placing more emphasis on 
the vertical suitable assignment of taxes among the levels of government. 
Taxes with a significant above average revenue in economically strong juris-
dictions should be contributed to the central state/federal level; this would 
replace explicit fiscal equalization and is the best approach for the effective 
redistribution of wealth among economically divergent regions. 
Experiences in Germany have shown that fiscal equalization schemes 
should not be so redistributive that they prevent decentralized governments 
from pursuing ‘good financial policies’ with regard to public debt and the ef-
ficiency of local service provision. Furthermore, efficiency and effectiveness 
could be improved by a systematic benchmarking, such as the Australians do 
for public services at the state level. The Commonwealth Productivity Com-
mission publishes a very comprehensive annual report that not only sets 
benchmarks for the states but that also brings the public into the discussion 
about the performance of state service delivery. Further financial grants 
could even be connected with good performance in the sense of a high level 
of problem solving by public services. 
5.  Summary and conclusions 
Demographic change generates specific problems, especially for peripheral 
regions with shrinking populations. A strong decline in population and a re-
sulting low density leads to increasing costs per inhabitant for public goods 
and services. The political actor responsible (governments) then needs to de-
cide which services should be provided in the ‘periphery’ and which should be 
concentrated in agglomerations, or even whether they prefer people migrate 
to the centers and leave the periphery even less populated. 
Far-reaching reforms of local administrations will lead to strong changes. 
New technical solution, particularly through electronic government, and far 
reaching organizational reforms creating horizontal and vertical cooperation 
among local authorities are the most important areas.  
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Growing importance for the stability of income and demand out of the 
agglomerations will come from the big public ‘national’ transfer systems and 
other expenditures of central government with regional effects. A multi-level 
fiscal equalization system which includes the appropriate assignment of tax-
ation powers is decisive for the future social cohesion and equivalence of liv-
ing conditions for all people in a nation-state. Therefore, the construction of 
fiscal equalization systems will be a good indicator for the future ‘solidarity’ 
(Germany) and ‘harmony’ (China) of the societies in both countries.  
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The Meaning of County Administration and the Essence and Goal of 
the County Administrative Reform 
CHEN Guoquan, LI Yuanlin 
Since the Qin Dynasty began implementation of “the system of prefectures 
and counties (a system of local administration)”, the county-administration 
has always been an important foundation for maintaining the political unifi-
cation and social stability. An ancient precept sums up the experience: “Coun-
ties govern well, the whole country is stable”, which sufficiently recognizes 
the importance of the county-administration. Facts prove again and again 
that the disorder and void of county-level governance have been the main 
roots of political disputes and social upheaval. An ancient precept “imperial 
power takes county-administration as the bottom” reflects that the central 
government had the political awareness of rehabilitating the people in ar-
rangement of political system, and that the central government faced a help-
less situation “Heaven is high and the emperor is far” in the game with the 
local governments. A 2000-year history of county-administration is also a his-
tory of activity of “anti-county-administration theory”.  
After New China was established, we continued to implement the system 
of county-administration, which is also the common experience of material-
izing effective governance in the countries all over the world. I have to point 
out that there is major difference between the county-administration in 
China and that in Europe and America: in China, there is an additional admin-
istrative level above county level – prefecture-level municipalities (although 
the system of prefecture-level municipality was actually adopted from the 
1980s), and below county-level, there is a country-level administration. Such 
a system was somewhat reasonable under the situation of “Planned Econ-
omy” when the productivity was low, and such a system actually exerted its 
historic function. However, with the free expansion of market order and the 
formation of the modern market economy system, the existing multi-level lo-
cal administration system did not withdraw simultaneously with the extermi-
nation of the system of “Planned Economy”, and such situation causes the 
“anti-county-administration theory” to emerge further under the new historic 
conditions.  
The “anti-county-administration theory” looms large increasingly, which 
not only puts forward demand for overall reform of county-administration, 
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but also raises new challenge to the reform of county-administration: while 
carrying out overall reform of county-administration, it is necessary to make 
efforts to increase and upgrade the development capacity of municipalities 
and counties respectively and to materialize the harmonious development of 
municipalities and counties. Although a sweeping consensus has come into 
being about the necessity and urgency of the reform of county-administra-
tion, a series of fundamental theoretical matters related to the reform of 
county-administration have not met sufficient response, such as margin or 
connotation of county-administration, essence of county-administration, and 
the target of the reform of county-administration. Such matters are funda-
mental theoretic matters in the research into county-administration reform, 
but also the key theoretic problems as to whether the reform of county-ad-
ministration reform can be successful.  
I.  Quadruple Connotation of County-administration  
The demand for the reform of county-administration is based on such a logi-
cal precondition: such a reform is to take the county-administration as the 
theme and subject as well. It is very important to probe into the connotation 
of county-administration. If the margin of county-administration could not 
be defined clearly, then the reform thereof will lose target and will finally de-
viate from correct orientation of development. If no common consensus is 
reached on the essence of county-administration, then a general consensus 
on substance, target or methods of the reform of county-administration 
could hardly be reached. Therefore, a theoretic definition of the margin of 
county-administration is the logical start of research into the matters of 
county-administration.  
The concept of county-administration refers to the county-level political 
power. The county-level political power is the natural extension of central re-
gime, and the will of the central regime is to be carried out through county-
level political power, the interests of the central regime are to be materialized 
by utilizing the county-level authorities as platform, and the public resources 
of the central regime are to be distributed through county-level authorities 
as channels. In this sense, the functions of county-level authorities are within 
the scope of political function. In the periods of “taking class struggle as guid-
ing principle”, the county-level authorities exerted their political functions to 
an extreme extent. With the passing of times, China has completed the trans-
formation from “taking class struggle as guiding principle” to “making eco-
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nomic development our central task”, and the country is oriented itself to-
wards social construction. Under such a general background, the political 
functions of county-level political power have been played down when com-
pared with the past times, which does not necessarily mean the political func-
tions of county-level political power has become weak, nor mean the political 
function of county-level political power withdraws completely. Even it can be 
said that the fading of political function of county-level authorities is based 
on such a general judgement: the central regime’s governing capacity is suf-
ficiently strong, or at least its governing base will not shake, or such fading of 
political function of county-level authorities is not materialized at the cost of 
the governing interests.  
In terms of organizational state, county-administration refers to all the 
governments of counties. The terms “political power” is an abstract concept, 
and it needs government as organizational entity to carry out its activities. 
Government is the embodiment of political power, and the political power is 
the root of the legality of government politics. As indicated in the current 
actual classification of administration, China’s county-level government is 
the third-class agency of the central government in essence, and the provin-
cial government and prefectural government play the roles of I-class agency 
and II-class agency respectively. To some extent, the county-level govern-
ment is actually the micro-organization of the central government. Except the 
special departments of national defense and foreign affairs, the county-level 
governments have the counterparts of all the ministries of the central gov-
ernment.  
However, the primary connotation of county-administration is county-
level public administration. For county-administration, the primary public ad-
ministration function is to provide and ensure the public services. As we 
know, China is a country with a large population. As reported by the National 
Bureau of Statistics in 2007 statistics gazette, China’s population exceeds 
1.32 billion, about 70% of which live in county-level society. The urban resi-
dents take up a low proportion of the total population, which is one of the 
basic national situations China must face. This condition causes such a state: 
the public services provided by municipal governments can hardly cover 
county-level society effectively. Then, who can provide and ensure public ser-
vices within counties and then finally ensure the basic fairness? Or we may 
ask: who is the most desirable and feasible carrier of public services within 
counties? The answer is obvious: the county-administration is the most de-
sirable undertaker of public services, because only county-administration has 
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obtained the most knowledge of the characters of the demand for public ser-
vices, and what’s more, the county-administration has sound and complete 
functions with relatively independent free hand in finance. Therefore, county-
administration necessarily has the qualification and capacity for providing 
and ensuring public services in county-level society. If the county-level public 
service is provided by the lower authorities, the provision of public service 
will be in shortage, because township governments have not complete func-
tions, and they have no independent financial right. If the task of providing 
public services within counties is assigned to township governments with ad-
ministrative order, they will probably fail finally even after making full efforts, 
which may be obviously evidenced by a fact that the township governments 
failed in the 9-year compulsory education. Therefore, county-administration 
must act as the basic subject of providing and ensuring public services, and 
provide quality public services for residents living within the county societies, 
so as to maintain and promote social fairness and ensure and boost harmoni-
ous development within the county societies.  
In addition, the county-administration is an open county-level political 
and economic ecosystem. Whether this ecosystem can be kept in a balance 
depends on whether it is sufficiently open. The county-administration politi-
cal and economic ecosystem is composed of four sub-systems including pol-
itics, economy, society and culture, and therefore it is a great system with 
rich contents and it does not refer to only the political and economic system 
of the county-administration. In short, the political sub-system constitutes 
the core of the large county-administration system, the economic sub-system 
is the main body of the large county-administration system, and the social 
sub-system has the dominant influence and position in the county-admin-
istration system.  
II.  PAGES Model of County-administration Reform  
The reform of county-administration is a comprehensive, overall reform, and 
a great systematic project. In detail, the county-administration reform in-
volves reforms in politics, administration, governance, economy and society, 
etc. Therefore, we can judge that the reform is a very arduous task, which 
cannot be finished in only a step. The rash advance plan of “achieving full 
success in only a fight” is very defective in theory and very harmful in practice. 
The county-administration reform is a comprehensive reform, but it does not 
necessarily mean that the reform in politics, administration, governance, 
economy and society must be all carried out simultaneously, or mean that all 
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reform items must be carried out simultaneously. To the contrary, the value 
and risk of all the specific measures of county-administration must be esti-
mated in advance, and on the basis of such estimation, the importance and 
urgency of every reform measure are to be ranked in terms of priority; and 
then all the detailed plans and affiliated measures in every reform measure 
are to be ranked in terms of priority, so as to ensure that the county-admin-
istration reform can be carried out steadily in full swing.        
In essence, the reform of county-administration is a political reform. The 
reform of county-administration includes political reform; the reform of 
county-administration includes the readjustment and restructuring of major 
interests of county-administration. As we know, the larger interest the re-
form involves, the more ultimate and overall the reform will be, and the more 
opinion the reform needs; and the reform has to be carried out step by step 
after weighing all the advantages and disadvantage comprehensively. The po-
litical reform of county-administration must be carried out with a view to es-
tablishment of a system arrangement, which can, in a long term, ensure that 
the readjustment and restructuring of major interests of county-administra-
tion can be materialized in a scientific, fair and rational way. If the major in-
terest in the political reform of the county-administration is materialized 
through a system with long-term efficiency, then the political condition for 
initiating the other important reform items of the county-administration 
have been obtained. It can be said that, whether the political reform can suc-
ceed will have a direct impact upon whether the whole reform of county-ad-
ministration can succeed. At present, however, the theoretical fruits of re-
search into the reform of county-administration by the academic world from 
a political point view are very rare, and such a situation cannot keep pace with 
the importance of the political reform in the county-administration reform. 
One of the authors of this article1 wrote an article in cooperation with others. 
In this article, we put forward a strategy of administration reform of county-
administration, in which organization, function and politics interacts. Alt-
hough the above-mentioned article deals with administration of county-ad-
ministration from the political point of view in some parts, but it did not 
probe into the whole reform of county-administration at a political high be-
cause of the limitation in topic. Besides research into fundamental matters of 
the county-administration reform and provision of countermeasures for the 
reform, this article aims to cause the academic world to research into the 
county-administration reform at a political high.       
                                               
1  Chen Guoquan; Mao Ruifu; Xu Luhui: On Administration Reform of County-level Gov-
ernment and Strategy Choice; in: Journal of Public Management in April 2006. 
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The political nature of the reform of county-administration ultimately de-
termines the long-term of the reform progress, complexity of the nature of 
reform and the enormity of the reform task, because the political reform in-
volves the vital interests of all respects of the county-administration and the 
reform itself will carry out major readjustment and restructuring of vital in-
terests. When talking about common interests, Hamilton said sharply: “Noth-
ing could be easier than payment in making people disagree.”2 With common 
interest, people have difficulty in reaching tacit agreement smoothly; of 
course it will be more difficult to reach sweeping consensus on ultimate in-
terests. Therefore, if people have reached wide consensus or at least the basic 
agreement on ultimate interests of the political reform, the reform of county-
administration will be carried out in full swing more favorably and more 
steadily.  
The reform of county-administration is also a constant administrative re-
form. The administrative reform is the embodiment of political reform, and 
therefore, the administrative reform of county-administration is the logical 
extension of political reform of county-administration. In terms of the rela-
tion between them, the political reform sets the orientation and target of the 
reform of administration, and the reform of administration provides organi-
zational guarantee and the mechanism of driving force. The county-level re-
form of administration is to be carried out in the following respects: 
The first is the administration system reform of county-administration, 
which is typically represented by the transformation from “county directly 
administered by municipality” to “county directly administered by province”. 
There are very rich research fruits in this respect. As early as in the mid-
1990s, Wang Tinghuai and Bian Weiqing3 carried out overall research into the 
advantages and disadvantages of the system of “county directly administered 
by municipality”, and they made the theoretic deduction of the feasibility of 
the system of “county directly administered by province” by using the admin-
istration degree formula. In the same year (1995), on the basis of reviewing 
the history of prefecture-level government, Mao Shoulong predicted that the 
prefecture-level governments in the system of “county directly administered 
by municipality” would fade because of “separate governance of urban and 
                                               
2  Hamilton, Alexander; Madison, James; Jay, John: The Federalist Paper [USA] translated 
by Cheng Fengru, Zai Han, Shu Xun, published by The Commercial Press in 2004 p 33. 
3  Wang Tinghuai; Bian Weiqing: Analysis of System of Municipality and County Admin-
istration and Ideas for Reform; in: Journal of Nanjing Normal University (Social Sci-
ence Edition) in 1995 (4). 
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rural areas”, “self-governance system in urban communities” and “self-gov-
ernance system in rural communities”4. Before this, under the background 
that the system of “county directly administered by municipality” was imple-
mented in full swing, Zhou Zhenghe (1990) advocated the implementation 
of the system of “province-county (county-level city)” on his own, and he con-
sidered that such a system could apply to both regional administration area 
and urban administration area, and what’s more, when a county of the re-
gional type was to become municipality, it could be materialized automati-
cally without causing change of classification of administration level.5 In the 
year of 2000, Gong Guizhi put forward a reform idea “separating county from 
municipality completely in one step, revoking the system of prefecture-level 
administration and directly administering counties by provinces (autono-
mous regions)”6. In 2004, Sun Xueyu wrote articles twice, dealing with the 
necessity and feasibility of the reform of the system “county directly admin-
istered by municipality” and implementation of the system “county directly 
administered by province”7. In 2006, Sun Xueyu emphasized the necessity of 
the reform of the system “county directly administered by municipality”, and 
he considered that the expansion of powers of strong counties should be 
taken as the breakthrough of the reform of the system “county directly ad-
ministered by municipality”, and such measure would be the necessary prep-
aration for the system “county directly administered by province”. We con-
sider that, we should not have only one way for the administration reform, 
and if we can make only one choice in the existing system “county directly 
administered by municipality” or the system “county directly administered by 
province”, then the result could not be very satisfactory. What’s more, if we 
implement the system “county directly administered by province” strictly 
                                               
4  Mao Shoulong: The Past and Future of China’s Prefecture-level Government; in: Jour-
nal of Anhui Institute of Education in 1995 (2). 
5  Zhou Zhenhe: Theory of Governing Capital and Countryside, Hongkong 1990, p306. 
6  Gong Guizhi: China’s Current Administrative Division System and Ideas for Reform; 
in: Cass Journal of Political Science 2003 (2).  
7  Sun Xueyu; Wu Kaichang: Establishment of Government System in which Counties 
Directly Administered by Province - A Research on Reform of the System in which 
Counties Directly Administered by Municipalities; in: Cass Journal of Political Science 
2004 (1) 
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while the other affiliated measures are not carried out completely, to the con-
trary, the result will likely be institutional shock8.  
The second is the reform of administration organs of county-administra-
tion, which is typically represented by the campaign of “losing weight for fit-
ness” of county-administration. In 2003, Xu Yong considered that the way of 
the county-administration reform is “condensing county administration”, and 
he pointed out that “condensing county administration” meant not only “re-
ducing and condensing organs”, but also “establishing a responsible govern-
ment, preventing harsh government and building fine government.9 ”The re-
duction and optimization of administration organs will not only reduce the 
administration costs and expenses, but also conduce administration effi-
ciency and upgrade the quality of public services. Therefore, the success of 
the reform of administration organs will constitute a strong stimulus to the 
administrative reform of county-administration.  
The last is the reform of personnel system of county-administration. This 
reform aims to cultivate and establish a quality staff required for develop-
ment of county-administration. The personnel system reform should never 
be reduced to the reform of appointment or dismissal of officials or public 
servants, and should not be regarded as reduction of the administration per-
sonnel of county-administration. The personnel system reform should be car-
ried out with a view to long-term development of county-administration, in 
order to establish a stable and quality staff for the county-administration. In 
2008, Yu Jianrong and Cai Yong Fei discussed the four salient problems of the 
county-regional economic development in a centralized way: lack of money, 
lack of power, lack of talent, and lack of land10. The lack of talent mentioned 
above means lack of quality talents necessary for the development of county-
administration, and it does not mean lack of population.  
The reform of county-administration is also a reform of governance. The 
county-administration is a geographical concept. Every specific county has 
close relation with the surrounding counties and neighboring cities as well. 
                                               
8  Sun Xueyu: Analysis of the Necessity of Expansion of Strong Counties’ Power and Re-
form of the System in which Counties Directly Administered by Municipalities; in: Chi-
nese Public Administration, 2006 (5). 
9  Trend of Reform of Countryside Governance – Strengthening Rural Areas, Simplifying 
Country-level Administration and Reduction of County-administration [J] by Xu Yong 
published on Strategy and Management 2003(4) 
10  Yu Jianrong; Cai Yongfei: Country-administration Reform is the Breakthrough of 
China’s Reform; in: Southeast Academic Research 2008(1).   
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With the social development, the public services and public crisis across 
counties or municipalities will become more and more, which needs joint gov-
ernance together with municipalities and county-administration. The original 
status of being fragmented has to be changed under the new social condition.  
The reform of county-administration is also an economic reform. The eco-
nomic reform of county-administration is a “gas station” for the development 
of county-administration. The economic development and prosperity consti-
tutes the material basis for the overall development of county-administra-
tion, and is also an important criteria of measuring the overall development 
of county-administration. The economic development and prosperity of 
county-administration depends on stimulus from economic reform. If the 
economic reform succeeds, then it will become a constant stimulus to the 
long-term economic development and prosperity, and further strengthen the 
economic foundation for the overall reform of county-administration.  
In addition, the reform of county-administration must be a social reform. 
Since the early period of Qin Dynasty implemented the system of prefectures 
and counties, the county-administration has always been a barrier for social 
stability. There must be sufficient preconditions for the county-administra-
tion to exert the active function of barrier: the social contradictions, social 
conflicts and social problems were completely exterminated, or at least alle-
viated well, in their seminal state or early periods. With the intensification of 
social reform of county-administration, it will make favorable social condi-
tions and social support for political reform, administrative reform, govern-
ance reform and economic reform that are related to social reform. If the re-
form of county-administration wins popular social support, then it’s complete 
success will not be something very difficult.  
Political reform, administrative reform, governance reform, economic re-
form and social reform jointly constitute the basic contents of the reform of 
county-administration. No single reform can be carried out in disconnection 
from the other reform items. If we carry out one item of reform in isolation, 
the final result will probably not be ideal. In other words, the five items of 
reforms constitute a reform system in which they support one another. On 
the basis of such conclusion, we put forward the PAGES model of the reform 
of county-administration as follows:  
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III.  County-administration Reform and Harmonious Development 
between Municipalities and Counties  
Harmonious development between municipalities and counties is both the 
target and the requirement of county-administration reform. There are a total 
of more than 2,000 county-level administration zones in China, and the de-
velopment differs very much. As we know, China’s economy is uneven, and 
this is represented by the fact that the difference in development of every 
county is very obvious; and even in the same area, the difference between the 
development of counties and cities is also salient. If we let such a situation 
continues automatically, the result will be very serious: it will affect not only 
the health of the whole national economy, but also the social stability and 
finally political stability. Therefore, the reform of county-administration must 
take harmonious development between municipalities and counties as its 
constant pursuit, so as to maintain and materialize social fairness, and boost 
the building-up of the harmonious socialist society.      
County-
administration 
reform
political 
reform
governancing 
reform
social 
reform
economic 
reform
administrative 
reform
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The harmonious development between municipalities and counties 
means that the high development of cities must be based on the development 
of counties. The development of cities may not be materialized at the cost of 
the interest of economic development of counties, and may not be material-
ized by depriving or plundering the resources of county development on the 
strength of administrative force. In fact, if the counties within a municipality 
are all poor and underdeveloped, then even if the city among them is very 
developed, the superior status of the city can hardly continue; the high de-
velopment under such background is nothing but seeming prosperity, if we 
cannot describe it as false prosperity.  
The harmonious development between municipalities and counties re-
quires that high development of cities must be based on its own capacity for 
development. If a city’s development is materialized only by depending on 
administrative force or other political resources, then such a result will be 
caused finally: once administration force becomes ineffective, or the supply 
of such political resources is cut, the city will fade easily. A city’s development 
must be based on the increase and upgrade of its own capacity for develop-
ment, so that the high development of a city will be ensured ultimately.    
The harmonious development between municipalities and counties re-
quires cities to exert its basic functions wholly, which means that cities must 
take great improvement and upgrade of social efficiency as its own task. In 
those developed countries, the urban economy generally takes up a relatively 
high proportion (generally 80%) in the national economy, which is the best 
evidence of “city representing efficiency”. China’s urban economic volume is 
relatively small and has not reached the extent of representing the social ef-
ficiency. If the city efficiency is not upgraded generally, the result would prob-
ably be “harmonious stagnation” of municipalities and counties, which had 
ever been evidenced in the period of China’s “Planned Economy” system.  
The harmonious development between municipalities and counties could 
not be realized without the normal operation of basic functions of county-
administration, namely, the basic function of maintaining and boosting social 
fairness. If such a basic function is vacant in county-administration, then the 
social unfairness will be intensified; when the social unfairness reaches a 
breakthrough point, serious social contradiction or even violent social unrest 
will likely be induced. With a capacious coverage, county-administration con-
tains the most majority of China’s population; if the county-administration 
cannot efficiently exert its basic function of maintaining and boosting social 
fairness, then social contradiction or social unrest will not be a complete 
alarmist talk.  
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The harmonious development between municipalities and counties nec-
essary requires county-administration to take urbanization as its mission and 
take integration of urban and rural areas as final target. With a view to the 
harmonious development between municipalities and counties, county-ad-
ministration has to transcend its limits continuously, so as to materialize ur-
banization and to realize urban and rural integration finally. In this sense, city 
is the final target of the development of county-administration. In fact, now-
adays cities had ever been counties, and nowadays counties will be future 
cities.  
 
 
195 
The Utility Analysis of the Province-County Direct  
Governance Strategic Reform Promote  
the Urban-Rural Integration Development 
LI Shaohui  
The key of development of urban and rural integration is to step up the de-
velopment of the rural economy with county-level economy, so as to materi-
alize legal equality between rural and urban areas. On July 9, 2009, the Min-
istry of Finance of the PRC publicized Proposal on Enhancing the Reform of 
“County-level Finance Directly Administered by Province”, which states “be-
fore the end of 2012, we are to strive to boost the reform of county-level 
finance directly administered by province in full swing in the country except 
national autonomous regions”. So, it is obvious that the reform “county di-
rectly administered by province” represents the general trend. The practice 
of “county directly administered by province” has proved that it can boost 
county regional economy and upgrade the status of counties, and therefore, 
the strategic reform “county directly administered by province” may advance 
the urban and rural integration by boosting county regional economy. On the 
basis of the fact that the local administration system restricts the develop-
ment of urban and rural integration, this article points out that county-level 
governments constitute the important platform and carrier for China’s devel-
opment in urban and rural integration, and in addition, this article analyzes 
the expected effect of the strategic reform “county directly administered by 
province” on the development of urban and rural integration.  
I.  Local Administration System Restricts Development  
of Urban and Rural Integration 
With the development of the socialist market economy, especially the devel-
opment of regional economy, and the change of administration environment 
and means, the various irrationalities brought out by the system of “county 
directly administered by municipality” have emerged. The emergence and in-
tensification of such irrationalities widen the difference between urban and 
rural areas, and county regional economy is therefore prevented and the ad-
ministration efficiency is further lowered. The governments of rural areas 
gradually become the dependency of city’s governments while the power of 
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city’s governments is strengthened. This inequality in legal status between 
rural and urban areas causes the increasing difference between them, which 
seriously refrains the urban and rural integration.  
1.  Consideration could not be given to both rural and urban development  
The original intention of arrangement of the system of “county directly ad-
ministered by municipality” was to enable the favorable resources and status 
of cities to drive the economy of the countryside areas within the administra-
tion of cities. In fact, however, except those provincial capitals and mid-de-
veloped cities, the cities with weak industrial base or the cities just upgraded 
from county level to prefecture level can hardly exert such a function. Such 
cities have many difficulties even in their own development, and of course 
they are unable to help the counties and countryside areas within their ad-
ministration in development. What’s more, in the practice of operating the 
system of “county directly administered by municipality”, some municipali-
ties will favor urban areas more than rural areas: large amounts of funds are 
invested in urban development and the development of rural areas are ig-
nored, and sometimes even the funds originally planned for rural areas are 
diverted into urban areas. Obviously, the countryside economy with much 
difficulty can not rely upon the central cities that are not powerful in eco-
nomic strength.  
2.  Industrial separation between rural and urban areas still exists     
In the era of the planned economy, the industrial separation between rural 
and urban areas was typically represented by weak relation between urban 
and rural industries. The core of urban industries was modern industries and 
service industry, and meanwhile, in the rural areas, there were only plantation 
and simple processing. Such industrial structure lacked interaction and the 
joint development could hardly be realized. The system of “county directly 
administered by municipality” did not ultimately change the condition in 
which the rural and urban economy differed too much and there was few re-
lation between them. The trend of market economy did not boost the rural 
and urban development under a whole plan, and what’s more, it intensified 
the separation between urban and rural areas.  
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3.  Serious “Bubbles” in Urbanization  
With the implementation of the system “counties directly administered by 
municipalities”, some county-level cities that are not qualified for being up-
graded as municipality and county towns are striving to be upgraded as mu-
nicipalities with a view to benefit, which causes the system “counties directly 
administered by municipalities” to mutate in its progress. At present, many 
“municipalities” do not have the nature of municipal administrative zone any 
longer, and they have become regional administrative zones with countryside 
as main body. Even many “municipalities” rely mainly upon agriculture for 
their economic development, just like super “county” of agricultural function 
or semi-agricultural function; and there are great differences between them 
and real cities, which caused “Bubbles” in urbanization.  
II.  The Role of County-level Governments  
in Boosting Urban and Rural Integration 
Establishment of Socialist New Countryside and enhancement of urban and 
rural integration have been China’s important development strategy. If we 
can say the important role of county-level regions in China’s socialist econ-
omy development determines that the county-level regions become the most 
important platform for materialization of urban and rural integration, then 
the special roles of county-level governments in the state’s governing system 
determine that the county-level governments constitute the most important 
organizer and implementer in the progress of urban and rural integration.  
Firstly, the relative stability in governance of counties determines that 
county-level governments are the most suitable for the role of organizers and 
planners of the Project of New Countryside. 
Currently, there are a total of 2861 county-level administrative regions in 
China (except Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Macao Special Ad-
ministrative Region and Taiwan province), covering a 90% of the whole area 
of the country and accounting for more than 60% of the country’s total pop-
ulation. Therefore, in the sense of administrative division, counties are the 
most suitable administrative regions for implementing the overall planning 
project for urban and rural economic and social development. The relative 
cultural and geographic independence in counties determine that the overall 
planning within counties is always the optimum choice for materializing the 
scale effect of local public resource supply.  
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Secondly, counties connect urban and rural areas, and this character deter-
mines that county-level governments are the most suitable administration 
for undertaking the responsibility for planning urban and rural development 
as a whole.  
Counties are connection between modern industries and traditional agri-
culture, and between modern urban culture and traditional rural culture. 
County-level governments must develop modern industries and protect and 
boost traditional agricultural economy concurrently; county-level govern-
ments must actively boost urbanization and maintain social order in rural ar-
eas concurrently; county-level governments must spread modern civilization 
so as to enable rural and urban residents to enjoy the modern civilization 
fruits, and county-level governments must protect beneficial cultural and 
ecological resources in rural areas. The function of county-level governments 
is highly comprehensive, and they are the most suitable for exerting the 
structural function of “industry supporting agriculture” and “urban areas 
stimulating rural areas”.  
Thirdly, the relatively complete function, power and organizational structure 
of county-level governments determine that they have relatively strong free-
dom for action and they are suitable for undertaking the role of planning as a 
whole urban and rural economic and social development in harmony.  
In sense of administration classification, county-level governments are 
the undertakers of transforming macro policy into micro policy. Compared 
with provincial and municipal governments, the functions of county-level 
government are relatively micro and county-level governments are perform-
ers of the state’s policy and guiding lines. Compared with country-level gov-
ernments, county-level governments own relatively complete functions, ad-
ministration power and sound organization structure, integrating administra-
tion, service, coordination and supervision. It can be said that county-level 
governments are both enforcement organization for the guiding principles 
and policies of the CPC and the country, and the organs leading the politics, 
economy, culture and social affairs in specific areas; and county-level govern-
ments are more suitable for organizing whole-planned development in urban 
and rural areas than provincial, municipal and township governments.  
Fourthly, county-level governments’ role in integrating resources from region 
and sectors and in coordinating contradictions enable them to have special 
advantages in planning urban and rural development as a whole.  
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County-level governments have relatively complete function, power and 
organizational structure, and they have the capacity to carry out unified ar-
rangement of and coordination for the public affairs in specific region; the 
county-level governments have relative independence in region. On the 
other hand, county-level governments are also final execution organ of affairs 
in specific sectors and the final organizer of resources from every sector. The 
functional departments in the vertical administration system will have to rely 
upon county-level governments in implementing their respective administra-
tion targets, and such departments will distribute the resources within their 
administration scope to county-level governments for final distribution. Such 
a system constitutes a great challenge to county-level governments in per-
forming functions, puts the county-level governments at the focus of the in-
ternal contradiction of such system, and meanwhile, such system enables 
county-level governments to have great freedom in materializing their rela-
tively independent administration targets. County-level governments may 
make the most use of such a role, integrate the resources from region and 
sectors and arrange the rural and urban economic and social development 
under a whole plan1.  
III.  Effect of Strategy of Counties Directly Administered by Province  
on Advancement of Urban-rural Integration  
The strategy of counties directly administered by province can boost the ur-
ban and rural integration because of the root reason that the expansion of 
power of counties directly administered by province in finance and affairs can 
stimulate county-level governments to more enthusiasm for economic devel-
opment and administering social affairs, and can enable county-level govern-
ments to make unified plan with a view to long-term development within 
county, and because of the root reason that the strategy can conduce various 
elements to flow in a rational way, conduce county regional industrial struc-
ture to be upgraded and optimized, enhance the improvement of urban and 
rural infrastructure so as to form rational urban living system, and carry out 
innovation in system continuously.      
                                               
1  He Xianming: Economic and Social Development Effect of Reform “Counties Directly 
Administered by Provinces” by– Analysis on the basis of individual case from Zhejiang 
province; in: Journal of The Party School of CPC Hangzhou Municipal Committee  
2009 (2). 
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(1)  The system “counties directly administered by provinces” can stimulate 
all departments under county-level governments to more enthusiasm and re-
sponsibility for work  
Under the traditional administrative system, the county-level govern-
ments have little autonomy with weak financial capacity, and under most cir-
cumstances, they are only relying upon the instructions and financial sup-
ports from the upper-level governments; the county-level governments can 
only act according to the plans made by the upper-level governments, and 
they neither have power nor undertake responsibility, which leads to a situa-
tion that the departments under the county-level governments have not 
enough enthusiasm or responsibility for work.  
The strategy reform “counties directly administered by provinces” aims to 
materialize the direct administration of county-level finance by province, re-
duce the financial loss in the intermediate links, and avoid the financial with-
holding by municipalities, so that all the subsidies, supporting funds and spe-
cial funds from provinces to counties will be strengthened and efficiency will 
be increased. Thus the administration costs will be decreased, the provincial 
control is strengthened, and the fund use efficiency and administration effi-
ciency are increased. In addition, the increase in the county-administration 
power in financial affairs and examination and approval enables county-level 
governments to have financial power to carry out overall planning for rural 
and urban development with all its strength. Under the condition that 
county-level regional economy is underdeveloped, the reform “counties di-
rectly administered by provinces” is undoubtedly beneficial to county-level 
regional economy and countryside economy as well.  
(2)  The reform “counties directly administered by provinces” boosts optimi-
zation and upgrade of county-level industrial structure  
According to New classical economics and industry economy, the flow of 
resource elements, funds and labor among sectors will observe the principle 
of profit tendency. With the economic growth, the flow of production ele-
ments among sectors causes the industrial structure to experience the evo-
lution: “1st, 2nd, 3rd industry”, “2nd, 3rd, 1st industry”, and then “3rd, 2nd, 
1st industry”. In consideration of the evolution of industrial structure in set 
order, and on the premise of optimization and upgrade of industrial structure, 
the urban and rural integration is flow of resource elements in the space of 
the three industries.  
In essence, the reform “counties directly administered by provinces” is a 
new distribution of public administration power and social resources, and it 
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will ultimately boost the county-level regional economy. The core of the re-
form is to “retain benefit for counties”, to clearly divide the main taxes and 
share proportion of them by province, municipality and county, to increase 
the base of quota of subsidy from province to county accordingly, to verify 
the amounts of the refund of “two taxes” budgeted for central fiscal revenues, 
the income tax refund, export rebate for county-level, and to distribute the 
special appropriate funds, funds allocated for special purpose, and the trans-
fer payment subsidy to county-level. All such measures will provide powerful 
support for county-level regional economy, clean out those system and 
mechanism obstacles existing in the development of county-level regional 
economy, so as to enable counties to develop all sectors with all their finan-
cial capacity and to realize fast development.  
In the respect of development of township enterprises, the tax right read-
justment is concerned in nearly all practice of the strategy “counties directly 
administered by provinces”. The counties directly administered by province 
have the same examining and approving power in reducing taxes as the mu-
nicipalities that have districts under administration, and such system is con-
ducive to retaining of benefit for enterprises and expanding of enterprise ac-
cumulation, and the system can encourage enterprises to re-invest in expan-
sion of production, and stimulate enterprises to expand size and develop 
faster. While the strategy “counties directly administered by provinces” 
boosts township enterprises and further boosts fast development of county-
level regional industries, it boosts the development of county-level regional 
tertiary industry, so that the county-level industrial structure becomes more 
rational.  
(3)  The strategy “counties directly administered by provinces” stimulates 
county-level governments to strengthen innovation in system  
According to the opinion of institutional economic school represented by 
Douglass C. North, the economic growth is closely related to system, the so-
cial technical structure determines the upper limit of social economic activi-
ties, the favorable system can stimulate economic activity to its upper limit, 
and the unfavorable system will cause economic activities to take on declin-
ing tendency. As a strategy selected for boosting social economy and coordi-
nating contradictions between rural and urban areas, whether the urban and 
rural integration can stimulate economic growth effectively is contingent 
upon whether it can render effective policy system. The strategy “counties 
directly administered by provinces” stimulates county-level governments to 
more enthusiasm for providing policy system and probing into innovation of 
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system. Such policy and system innovation will play a coordination role in 
rural and urban integration in the following respects:  
1).  Drive for Urban and Rural Integration 
By effectively boosting system innovation in agriculture, the strategy can 
stimulate agricultural production efficiency and output, so as to enable agri-
cultural sector to provide surplus of agricultural products and resources while 
maintaining reproduction of itself, to provide labor force and products for 
non-agricultural sectors and to create demand for agricultural machines and 
related industrial products, technology and information. By effectively boost-
ing system arrangement for industries and non-agricultural sectors, and un-
der policy support in related enterprise system and investment and financing 
system, the strategy can boost non-agriculturalization and industrialization 
of national economy, so as to create driving force for absorbing surplus labor 
from agriculture and provide supply drive to agricultural development. 
Through effective system innovation in economic element flow, the strategy 
can help the recourse elements of industries and agriculture to flow and in-
tegrate one another, so as to materialize rational allocation and new combi-
nation of industrial and agricultural elements and redistribution of benefits, 
to boost agriculture industrialization in rural areas and industrialization and 
urbanization in rural areas, and to finally realize urban and rural integration.  
2).  Performance in Space of Urban and Rural Integration  
Through effective policy in urban development and planning policy for urban 
and rural areas, the strategic innovation can enable towns and villages in all 
grades, sizes and functions to be distributed in order, in rational division of 
function, and in harmonious landscaping, so as to satisfy the requirement for 
harmonious economic development in rural and urban areas and further 
strengthen the economic relation between urban and rural areas. The con-
venient and high-efficiency infrastructure constitutes the fundamental con-
ditions for existence and high-efficiency operation of the economy in urban 
and rural areas, and constitutes the guarantee for internal and external inter-
action of urban and rural areas. By boosting the system arrangement for ur-
ban and rural development effectively, the strategic innovation can enhance 
the network use in and modernization of infrastructure in urban and rural ar-
eas, so as to satisfy the requirement of flow of elements between urban and 
rural areas, and further boost optimization of urban system, harmonization 
and modernization of urban and rural landscaping and materialize spatial in-
tegration of urban and rural areas.  
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(4)  Expansion of Power Enables Counties to Select Better Economic Layout 
Model  
Economic layout is influence and intervention in spatial composition of 
economy elements by the subject, so as to make economy develop in favor of 
the subject. The influence of economic layout upon urban and rural spatial 
structure differs from one economic layout to another as follows:  
1. Economic layout determines the state of labor division and cooperation 
among cities, towns and rural areas; and the close cooperation in work 
among cities, towns and rural areas can boost urban and rural integration.  
2. Economic layout affects the distribution of property and fortune, as eco-
nomic development differs in areas and causes income differ. 
3. Different Economic layout causes different distribution of resources. Re-
source distribution is very important to the development any department 
and any industry, and especially to the development of agriculture and ru-
ral areas.2  
With influence from the elements such as natural environment, historic con-
dition, economic basis and location, economic layout differs from a county to 
another very much. For example, those backward areas take the layout of 
“growth area” as the main model, underdeveloped areas take the layout of 
“point-axis” as the main model, and those developed areas take the layout of 
network model. Different layout models require counties to select the model 
suitable and corresponding to respective conditions so as to boost the urban 
and rural integration. After implementation of the strategy of “counties di-
rectly administered by province”, counties may select the layout model favor-
able to respective development on the basis of their respective natural and 
historic conditions, economic base and location advantages.  
(5)  The strategy “counties directly administered by provinces” is conducive 
to improvement of urban and rural infrastructure  
The infrastructure is the fundamental element for supporting and ensur-
ing social and economic activities, including transportation, post and tele-
communications, water supply and drainage, electric power supply and other 
production facilities, and commercial and technology education, sanitation, 
culture, finance, insurance and other social public facilities and public service 
facilities. The urban and rural infrastructure is the carrier for urban and rural 
integration and constitutes the precondition for interaction and cooperation 
                                               
2  Shi Xiao Hong: Research into Power Expansion of Strong Counties and Mechanism 
and Effect of Urban and Rural Integration, 2009. 
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between urban and rural areas. The development of infrastructure is of great 
significance to urban and rural integration, and the strategy “counties directly 
administered by provinces” can boost development of counties’ infrastruc-
ture because of the following reasons:  
Firstly, the strategy “counties directly administered by provinces” enables 
county-level governments to have financial power in investing in infrastruc-
ture development  
The infrastructure is public facilities, which are mainly supplied by gov-
ernment bodies; and the financial revenues constitute the basic guarantee 
for infrastructure development. Under the system “counties directly admin-
istered by municipalities”, the prefecture-level cities are absorber of county-
level financial revenues and take great amounts of county-level financial 
funds, and thus county-level governments have no funds in investing in infra-
structure development. After the strategic reform “counties directly admin-
istered by provinces”, the provinces are to strengthen direct financial admin-
istration of counties and transfer payment, so as to ensure that county-level 
governments have sufficient funds to invest in infrastructure development.  
Secondly, the strategy “counties directly administered by provinces” enables 
county-level governments to have power to invest in infrastructure develop-
ment 
Under the system “counties directly administered by municipalities”, the 
prefecture-level cities’ governments adopt policy in favor of cities. They not 
only tend to use the fiscal revenues collected the counties within their ad-
ministration in urban infrastructure development, but also tend to distribute 
the projects of infrastructure development in the urban areas, which makes 
counties have neither funds nor power to invest in infrastructure within coun-
ties. After the strategy “counties directly administered by provinces” is im-
plemented, according to the policy of direct application for examination and 
approval of the relevant items in the development projects, the policy in favor 
of cities may be avoided and the infrastructure may be developed on the basis 
of the actual demand of the areas within the county-administration.  
IV.  Conclusion  
Administrative system reform is a systematic project involving politics, econ-
omy, geography, culture and many other elements, and it must be treated 
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seriously and operated in a scientific way. At present, the practise of the strat-
egy “counties directly administered by provinces” are always carried out with 
a financial view, and the real administrative reform for “counties directly ad-
ministered by provinces” are in pilot period. Therefore, in order to develop 
county regional economy, implement regional integration and joint develop-
ment, to materialize free flow of production elements among counties under 
the principle of combination and share of power3, and to finally materialize 
the situation of rural and urban integration in which coordination and inter-
action is carried out between province and counties, we have to carry out 
deep and complete research and investigation, make whole planning in sci-
entific manner, sum up experience, so as to find a reform method suitable for 
economic and social development while maintaining relative stability.  
 
  
                                               
3  Liu Yapin: System Reform “Counties Directly Administered by Provinces” and Re-
gional Economic Development; in: Cooperative Economy and Technology 2009 (6). 
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3.  RECENT REFORMS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE  
IN CHINA AND GERMANY  
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The Experience and Enlightenment of Hainan’s Administrative 
Level Reform in China 
PENG Jingyi, BI Puyun  
I.  The formation of city governing county system since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
After the establishment of People’s Republic of China, the formation of city 
governing county system has gone through five stages.  
(1) At the beginning of the founding of our country, in order to guarantee the 
vegetables and subsidiary food supply in the city, it implement the city 
governing county system in Wuxi City, Xuzhou City, Lanzhou City and 
other places, generally one city only governs one county.  
(2) In the late 1950s, “in order to adapt to the rapid development of Chinese 
socialist construction, especially the great leap of industrial and agricul-
tural production and rural people’s commune since last year, it closely 
combined city with the village so as to stimulate the mutual support of 
industry and agriculture and facilitate the deployment of labor”, the NPC 
Standing Committee passed “The Decision of Municipalities and Larger 
Cities Being Able to Lead the County and Autonomous County”, affirming 
the city leading county system in legal form. At the end of 1960s, there 
were 48 cities leading 234 counties and autonomous counties, and gov-
erning 6 county-level cities throughout the country.  
(3) In the early 1960s, due to the economic difficulty and the short supply, 
the central government decided to adjust the organizational system of 
the city and town, and narrow the suburb, stopping the implementation 
of city governing county. At the end of 1965, there remained only 25 cit-
ies that leaded 78 counties and one autonomous county1.  
                                               
1  The Ministry of Civil Affairs in People’s Republic of China: The Reform of Administra-
tive Regions’ Division above the County Level in People’s Republic of China（1949～
1983), Beijing: Surveying and Mapping Press, 1988. 
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(4) In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in order to stimulate the common de-
velopment of urban and rural areas, the “city governing county” system 
was put on the agenda again. The central government decided to combine 
the prefecture and city and let the city lead the county, since then, city 
governing county system has become the basic division mode.  
(5) In 1999, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued “The 
Opinions on the Reform of Local Government Organization”, said: “the 
districts coexisted with prefecture-level city should combine with the pre-
fecture-level city; the districts coexisted with county-level city, and its city 
(county) has reached the standard of establishing prefecture-level city, we 
remove the organizational system of the district, establish the prefecture-
level city and implement the city leading county system.” Since then, city 
governing county system has been further strengthened, and China has 
become one of the few countries with multi-level system. 
 
Tab. 18.1:  The formation process of city governing county system after 
the founding of our country 
Time Aim Characteristic 
in 1949 
guarantee the subsidiary 
food supply in the city 
generally one city only 
governs one county 
in 1959 
adapt to the great leap 
and rural people’s com-
mune 
affirm the city governing 
county system in legal 
form 
in the early 1960s 
severe shortage of food 
supply in times of eco-
nomic difficulty 
stop city governing 
county 
in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s 
city driving the town 
occupy the land and ex-
pand the city 
in 1999 
adjust the organizational 
system in the district 
remove to build the city 
Source:  according to “The Reform of Administrative Division above the County Level of 
People’s Republic of China (1949-1983)” 
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City governing county system has produced its due positive role, for example, 
many regional center cities have got better development and so on. However, 
from a global point of view, it has failed to achieve the goals of urban-rural 
balanced development originally set. According to the statistics, in 2009 the 
counties’ gross population in China reached 931 million, accounting for 
70.1% of the national gross population; the counties’ local GDP reached 
15.05 trillion yuan, accounting for 50.05% of the national GDP; the national 
counties’ local fiscal general budget revenue reached 659.2 billion yuan, ac-
counting for 23.01% of the national local fiscal general budget revenue, that 
is to say, with the 50.01% of the national GDP, and 23.01% of the fiscal scale, 
the counties’ economy holds the public affairs accounting for 70.1% of the 
national population. 
 
Tab. 18.2:  The Statistics of China County’s Economic Conditions  
in 2009 
 total  
population 
total GDP 
fiscal  
revenue 
absolute number 931 million 15.05 trillion 659.2 billion 
share of the counties of the 
national total  
70.1% 50.05% 23.01% 
Source:  “Chinese County-Level Economy Yearbook” 
 
There are large differences between the scales of county economy: the aver-
age value of the top 100 counties’ average per capital gross national produc-
tion is more than 15 times of that of the low 100 counties2. The gap between 
the income of urban and rural residents does not shrink but expand instead: 
in 2010, the per capita net income of rural residents was 5919 yuan, while 
the per capita disposable income of urban residents was 19109 yuan, the ra-
tio of urban and rural residents’ is 3.23: 1. The rural Engel coefficient was 
41.1%, and urban 35.7%. According to the prediction of “2011 Rural Econ-
omy Green Book” issued by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the ratio of 
disposable income of urban residents and the per capita net income of rural 
residents is 3.26: 1 in 2011, expanding 0.03 compared with that of 2010. 
                                               
2  The Editorial Board of Chinese County Economy Yearbook. “Chinese County Economy 
Yearbook”, Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 2010. 
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It is in this context that China began the pilot of province governing 
county. In 2008, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council issued 
“The Opinion on the Reform of Local Government Organization”, and pro-
posed to promote the fiscal system reform of province directly governing 
county (city), places where conditions permitted could explore the system of 
province directly governing county (city) according to the law, expanding the 
social management and economic management power of county-level gov-
ernment. In 2009, the CPC Central Committee Document No. 1 issued to 
“promote the fiscal system reform of province directly governing county 
(city).”3 The State Council issued “The Notice on the Key Work Opinions of 
Deepening Economic System Reform”, proposing that the places where con-
ditions permitted could begin the reform pilot of “province directly governing 
county (city)”, expanding the economic and social management power of 
county-level government, and actively exploring the ways and means of prov-
ince directly governing county (city). Until 2011, China has implemented fi-
nancial management reform of “province directly governing county” in 970 
counties of 27 provinces, it is clear that the reform has a strong meaning to 
“return”. 
II.  The experience of province governing county system  
in Hainan Province 
In 1988, Hainan Province was established; it also conducted the special eco-
nomic zones, whose main task was to explore to establish the socialist market 
economic system. According to the requirements of central government, Hai-
nan Province stated to establish the local administrative system of province 
directly leading city and county from the very beginning, implementing the 
administrative structure and management mode of “city and county are di-
vided and conquered”:  
 
                                               
3  Meng Yuanxin: The Observation of Financial Management System Reform of “Prov-
ince Directly Governing County in China; in: Background and Analysis 2009 (201) 
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The system has the following characteristics: the provincial government is 
the senior government, whose main function is to formulate plans, policies 
and guide and supervise the lower-level government. City and county gov-
ernments are mid-level government, whose main function is to implement 
laws and policies, stimulating the social and economic development. Alt-
hough there is a difference of level between the city government and county 
government, they are not subordinate to each other. Town government is the 
grassroots government, whose main function is the social management and 
public service. Therefore, compared with the other province in China, Hainan 
Province successfully reduces a level of government. 
If only seen from the outside, the above systems only reduce a level of 
government, but seen from the inside, they have three advancements.  
(1) Significantly reduce the administrative intervention. From 1999 to 2006, 
Hainan provincial government in six batches has cleaned up 945 and can-
celed 293 administrative approval items, canceled and adjusted 15 an-
nual audit and annual inspection items, reduced and adjusted hundreds 
of administrative approval rights. According to “The Administrative Per-
mission Law of People’s Republic of China”, in 2004 it cleaned up again 
thousands of administrative permission items, canceled more than 200 
administrative permission items, and also successively decentralized 65 
administrative approval items and 43 administrative permission items to 
the city and county. The reform of administrative approval system and the 
cancel of many administrative permission items enable the government 
to change from almighty government to limited government, reinforcing 
the institutional foundation to promote the province governing county.  
Hainan 
Province
Prefecture-
level City
Municipal 
District
County-level 
City
Town
Autonomous 
County
Town
County
Town
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(2) Significantly decentralize the administrative authority. From 2000 to 
2006, the provincial government has successively decentralized 62 ad-
ministrative approval items and 43 administrative permission items to 
the county (city). In 2007, the provincial party committee proposed to 
gradually decentralize the administrative management authority of the 
provincial city to the county (city). In 2008, the provincial government 
officially decentralized 197 economic and social management authori-
ties, of which there were 166 economic management authorities, ac-
counting for 84.2% of the total number of decentralized powers; 31 social 
management authorities, accounting for 15.8% of the total number of de-
centralized powers. A series of approval items involving economic and so-
cial development will be decentralized to city and county, including: the 
approval of reduction or exemption of enterprise income tax, the first re-
view of enterprise value-added tax rebates, the business registration of 
foreign investment enterprises, the project approval of investment below 
100 million, the overall planning approval of towns’ land utilization and 
so on. The reform not only decentralizes all the administrative approval 
rights, which can be exercised by the city and county according to na-
tional regulation, to the city and county, but also realizes the direct joint 
of province to county on personnel and finances, therefore realizing prov-
ince directly governing city and county in the real sense.  
(3) Solidify the reform achievements by the legislations of the special zones. 
In April 2009, the Standing Committee of Hainan Province passed “The 
Decision on Further Improving the Management System of Province Di-
rectly Governing City and County”, determining the reform content in the 
form of local legislation. In order to solve the legal questions in the pro-
cess of decentralizing power, Hainan started the legislative authority of 
the special zones to guarantee the smooth implementation of the reform. 
III.  The enlightenment of province governing county system  
in Hainan Province 
The successful practice of province governing county system in Hainan Prov-
ince gives people a wide range of useful enlightenment, mainly including: 
(1)  It is the need of improving the market economic system. Over 30 years 
of reform and opening up development, China has become the largest devel-
oping country, the world’s second largest economy, the largest exporter and 
the second importer, possessing 5.5 trillion dollar GDP and 2 trillion dollar 
foreign reserves. During the world financial crisis in 2008, according to the 
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statistics of World Bank, China’s contribution to world economic growth was 
more than 50%. At present, China is playing a pivotal role in the world econ-
omy and political situation. While all this is benefited from the establishment 
of socialist market economic system. There are two basic requirements of the 
market economy, one is the diversification of the market subject, and the 
other is the service of government functions. It is clear that decreasing the 
administrative level, reducing administrative costs and stimulating govern-
ment transformation are the necessary elements of improving market econ-
omy system. The current implementation of “city governing county” is estab-
lished under the economic thought of “planned commodity economy” and 
“planned economy supplemented by market regulation”. The core of “city 
governing county” system is how the city strengthen the leadership of the 
rural areas, while the market is in a subordinated position. In other words, it 
emphasizes the effect of that “visible hand”. Today, it requires more the mar-
ket subject to play a role in improving socialist market economic system, 
while the government returns to macroeconomic regulation, market supervi-
sion, social management and public service. In other words, it emphasizes the 
effect of that “invisible hand”. 
(2)  It is the need of promoting the balanced development of urban and rural 
areas. China is still a developing country, and is still in the primary stage of 
socialism; the dual economic structure---the situation of coexistence of agri-
cultural economy and industrial economy, rural economy and urban economy 
will exist in the long-term. System of tax allocation reform in 1994 reduced 
the proportion of local government revenue, especially fiscal revenue of the 
county and town government declining sharply, the proportion of county and 
town finance declined to less than 20%, the minimum self-sufficiency coeffi-
cient of the county-level finance was less than 0.5, the financing gap reached 
more than half. The weak county and town financial situation made it hard 
for the county economy to change the rural public service. Under the system 
of financial division, the prefecture-level city maintained its political power 
to operate by depriving the financial resources of some counties and county-
level cities. The current system of the superior inspecting and appointing sub-
ordinate cadres and the system of financial division of the superior and sub-
ordinate make the prefecture-level finance share a part of the paying tax of 
the county-level. According to the statistics, 60%-70% of the financial reve-
nues in some counties are turned over to the central government, province 
and the prefecture-level city, and 80%-90% of the rest are payroll finance, 
10%-20% of the rest funds are used as the economic development and con-
struction funds, playing little role in the development of the county economy. 
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In a sense, the prefecture-level city is actually a “pump”. The experience of 
province directly governing county in Hainan indicates: through reasonable 
division of the income scope of province, city and county, transferring pay-
ment, tax returns, income tax returns and others are directly verified by the 
province and then are subsidized to the city (county), effectively alleviate the 
financial difficulty of the county and town. A batch of poor cities and coun-
ties, whose previous local financial revenues used to wander between 10 mil-
lion to 30 million yuan all the year round, now most of them have entered the 
“100 million yuan club”. 
 
Tab. 18.3:  The Statistics of China Local Administrative Level from  
Qin Dynasty to the Republican Period 
Level 
two-level 
system 
virtual 
three-level 
system 
three-level 
system 
coexist-
ence of 
three-level 
and four-
level 
multi-level 
system 
existing 
number of 
years 
290 610 600 276 350 
the propor-
tion of his-
tory 
13.60% 28.70% 28.20% 13% 16.50% 
 
(3)  It is the need of integrating with international standards and respecting 
the history. From the point of view of international level, among the nearly 
200 countries and regions in the world, whose local administrative level are 
two-level and three-level, accounting for about 67%; only 21 countries have 
more than three levels, accounting for 11%; India’s local administrative level 
implements three-level system of state-county-district; Germany’s local ad-
ministrative level has three-level of state, county city and town; France’s local 
administrative level has three-level of district, province and city; Britain’s lo-
cal administrative level also only has three-level; Japan’s local administrative 
level has two-level of capital, sect, prefecture, county and city, ting and vil-
lage; America also implements the coexistence system of two-level system of 
state-city and three-level system of state-county-town. Viewed from the in-
ternational experience, the countries with a mature market economy have 
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adopted flattening two-level and three-level local administrative system. 
Viewed from the Chinese history, in the more than 2100 years from Qin Shi 
Huang unified China to the end of Republican Period, the local administrative 
level is two-level system for 290 years, accounting for 13.6%; virtual three-
level system for 610 years, accounting for 28.7%; real three-level system for 
600 years, accounting for 28.2%; coexistence system of three-level and four-
level for 276 years, accounting for 13.0%; multi-level system for 350 years, 
accounting for 16.5%. Therefore, from the Chinese history, three-level and 
the below levels are normal. In this sense, reducing administrative level not 
only means integrating with the international standard, but also means re-
specting history. 
IV.  Conclusion 
China has large population, vast territory and extremely complex situation, 
the practice of province governing county in Hainan Province doesn’t and 
can’t provide a mode of “one size fits all” for the nationwide administrative 
level reform. However, the successful practice of Hainan Province can pro-
vide beneficial reference for the nationwide administrative level reform. That 
is to say, the experience of Hainan cannot be applicable everywhere, but also 
being like the coconut trees that only bear fruit in Hainan. Focusing on it in-
stead of ignoring it, paying attention to it instead of despising it, that’s the 
right attitude. 
It is a fact that the provinces of China are too big, unable to govern so 
many counties. This problem is actually not difficult to solve. One way is to 
properly diminish the provincial administrative regions. There are as much as 
tens of millions of population in the provincial-level administrative regions in 
China, the populations of some provincial administrative regions are even 
close to 100 million or more, this kind of situation really needs to change. The 
second way is to establish a “virtual level” between the province and county, 
namely establishing provincial government agency, which representatives 
the provincial government to implement the basic social management and 
public service on several counties. It neither requires tedious structure of the 
first level government, nor the accompanied “four sets of leading group”. The 
third way is to combine the above two together, namely on one side properly 
diminish the provincial administrative regions, and on the other side establish 
a “virtual level” between the province and the county, maybe this is a more 
effective way. In fact, these methods “have existed since ancient”, basically 
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consistent with the ubiquitous national psychology, and entirely feasible in 
practice. 
It is a fact that there are too many cities’ first-level personnel to emplace. 
This issue is also not difficult to resolve. It is in need of people to diminish the 
province, to make the city “virtual” and to strengthen the county. In this 
sense, on the contrary, the reform provides new opportunity for us to reason-
ably emplace personnel and let everybody fully display his talents and uses. 
Most importantly, the market needs people, and especially the professional 
people. One of the important tasks in the structural reform is to encourage a 
lot of people, especially the professional people to go to the market, becom-
ing the owner of finding resource, integrate resources, creating wealth and 
accumulate wealth. 
Is it possible just to reducing one level of government if the proposition 
of this article is too simple? Good question, we like to consider the problem 
more simple. In fact, in many areas of the reform, our problem is not lacking 
in design and conception, but having excessive design and conception; not 
grasping the common sense, state and convention, but being far away from 
the common sense, state and convention. Today, we particularly need to sim-
plify the seemingly “complex” questions, and return to the common sense, 
state and convention. At present, “lie, boast and empty verbiage” prevails; 
“entering from the shallow and coming from the deep” is in the fashion, we 
really need to “ruthlessly eliminate the encumbrance”. 
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From “Empowering Township from Power Expansion” to “Strong 
Township Expanding Power” - The Achievements and Prospects of 
“Urban-Rural Integration” Strategy in Chengdu 
SHAO Yu, WANG Qiyou  
I.  The origin of “power expansion strengthening strong town”:  
priority development of “key town” 
At the beginning of the 21st century, Chengdu took the lead to implement 
the development strategy of “urban-rural integration”. This strategy is imple-
mented mainly through two paths: first, Chengdu is divided into three eco-
nomic spheres according to the distance from the central city, concentrating 
on the gradient construction and development of various spheres; second, as 
to the district (city) and county in the second and third spheres far away from 
the central city, the towns with some better conditions are established as 
“key town”, making them obtain policy, funding and resource for priority de-
velopment, and becoming as soon as possible the “fulcrum” levering the fast 
development of the underdevelopment areas, eventually achieving the goal 
of joint development and prosperity in “global Chengdu”. 
For this reason, Chengdu issued “The Opinion on Accelerating the Con-
struction of the Key Town” in September, 2004, identifying 30 “key towns”; 
it also issued “The Opinion on Accelerating the Construction of the Priority 
Development Key Town” in 2005, identifying 14 “priority development key 
towns”. By issuing the two “opinions”, we aim at concentrating the limited 
resources, making the “key towns” become regional center town with scien-
tific planning, complete functions, prosperous economy, flourishing social 
undertakings, beautiful environment, unique style and strong capacity of ra-
diation and promotion; making the “priority development key towns” become 
a small city with fast economic growth, excellent living environment and 
strong function of radiation and promotion; the two will work together to 
achieve the goal of “urban-rural integration”. 
According to the “opinion”, Chengdu seeks to “let go the work, support 
the policy and strengthen the equipment of cadres” for the key towns and 
priority development key towns. In the series of special policies, financial spe-
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cial care is the core, its basic spirit including: increasing the funding invest-
ment of city and district (city) and county the two-level finance on key towns; 
the related fees of involved construction with the town, such as urban con-
struction matching fee, water resource fee and so on, in addition to the de-
livering parts according to national regulations, the rest will be all left in the 
key towns; land transfer benefit and related fees, in addition to the delivering 
parts according to national regulations, the rest will be all left in the key 
towns. Therefore, through empowering the key towns, Chengdu opens its big 
screen to stimulate the priority development and rapid growth of the town-
ship economy. 
II.  Specific measures and development achievements 
Since the implementation of priority development strategy of key towns, all 
the key towns, especially the priority development key towns, through im-
proving town planning, fostering leading industry and innovating institu-
tional mechanism, they greatly improve the urbanization level, enhance the 
economic strength and also accumulate the valuable experience in urban and 
rural overall development. At present, these towns are striding forward to a 
town with positive industrial advantage, high population concentration, ex-
cellent living environment and prominent style and feature, initially pos-
sessing the potential to lead off their areas where their experience should be 
summarized. 
First, initially undertake the transfer of central city’s industries, and lay a 
solid foundation for the booming of industries. For example, Huaikou Town 
in Jintang County relies on the basic advantage of Jintang power plant, 
Jiulongtan power plant, Baiguo hydropower station and so on, undertakes the 
heat-engine plant transferred from central city, and constructed the Huaikou 
Town into the electricity energy base of Chengdu. Meanwhile, Huaikou Town 
seizes the chance of shoemaking industry transfer from the central city, and 
plans a shoemaking industrial park with seven square kilometers, striving to 
build a capital of women shoes in China. An electrical energy base and a shoe-
making industrial park will completely change the industrial pattern and de-
velopment foundation in Huaikou Town, which has gradually become a high-
land in the third circle economic development. 
Second, explore to establish town-level urban management system and 
innovate the management style of grassroots planning and construction. The 
planning, construction, road administration, environment, city appearance, 
environmental sanitation and other management work of the key towns 
221 
should follow the urban standards. Some key towns establish the urban man-
agement enforcement team as the agency of Urban Administration Bureau 
in the district (city) and county; the functional departments in the district 
(city) and county can also accredit personnel to the key towns, expanding the 
government’s public management functions to towns, villages (communities) 
and farmers concentrated residential areas. Explore the “grid” planning and 
construction management style, with the village (community) as the basic 
unit, strengthening the village (community) principals’ construction and su-
pervision responsibility to the areas; integrate the neighboring two or more 
villages (communities) into a district, divide the whole town into several plan-
ning and construction enforcement areas, and the village-town construction 
office of the town government will be responsible for the inspection and en-
forcement in the district. 
Third, make appropriate adjustments of township organization and oper-
ation system so as to make the organization settings meet the operational 
needs. According to the principle of “simplification, efficiency and practica-
bility”, under the premise of not exceeding the size of existing organization 
establishment, we specially establish the urban and rural overall development 
as well as urban management department as the internal organization being 
responsible for the urban planning, construction and municipal management 
in the town as well as the reform of rural property right system, industrial and 
agricultural industrialization development and other urban-rural integration 
work. Each key town has established government affairs services hall, each 
village (community) has established government affairs service center or con-
venience service station; establish the career management service center in 
the key town, undertaking the social labor guarantee, intellectual resource, 
cultural, sports, radio and other public services as well as the guidance of the 
town. 
III.  The existing problems 
After implementing “power expansion strengthening town”, Chengdu has 
made remarkable achievements, showing the overall effect by “expanding 
power” realizing “strong town”. However, with the deepening implementa-
tion of these policy measures, some new problems have gradually taken 
shape. 
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(1)  There are some differences in policy implementation of the key towns 
As key towns have different basic conditions, development stages, local eco-
nomic development level and original financial forms of distribution, all the 
key towns’ constructions generally have the following three types of specific 
modes. 
First, it is a relatively independent operational model. Its characteristics are 
that within the scope of the town, the state-owned land transfer benefit, in 
addition to the part delivering to the central and provincial finance according 
to the rules, the rest remains in the local place. The key is that the construc-
tion funding and various expenses of the key towns are mainly resolved by 
the town itself. Therefore, the township government has actually become a 
relatively independent financial body, correspondingly also become the main 
body of construction and development. Although this can furthest mobilize 
the enthusiasm and initiative of the town level, the premise is that the town-
ship revenue and financing capacity can support a lot of money needed for 
the construction. Once this mode can operate effectively, it is easy to gener-
ate a virtuous cycle effect, and this kind of town often has a better develop-
ment. 
Second, it is an operational model supported with emphasis. Its characteris-
tics are that it continues to retain the original finance share system of the 
town, district (city) and county, the construction funds of the key towns are 
comprehensively resolved by the district (city) and county; the financial rev-
enue of the town mainly guarantee the daily operation, and the construction 
funds are mainly invested by district (city) and county. Under this mode, dis-
trict (city) and county become the main body of the key towns’ construction, 
while town government become its executive and partner with weaker inde-
pendence, departing from the original intention of “power expansion 
strengthening town”. Moreover, it relies on the high-growth and high-invest-
ment of the county finance, therefore it has greater uncertainty. 
Third, it is a semi-autonomous and semi-independent operational mode. The 
revenue and expenditure pattern of the district (city), county and township 
remain unchanged; according to the principle of priority to the basic expendi-
ture, county finance pays the key towns the public funds of the minimum 
standard; the construction funds of the town can apply for the county finance 
according to the needs of the project and paid by the project. In brief, the 
town is the main body of construction and development with relatively inde-
pendence; but the town’s finance is not yet independent, the required con-
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struction funds are comprehensively resolved by the county’s finance. There-
fore, it is a semi-autonomous and semi-independent operational mode. In 
this case, it determines that its growth rate is relatively slow, but it’s benefit-
ing to cultivate the independent ability of the township. 
(2)  The township urban management function  
and management capacity need to be strengthened 
According to the principle of “local management”, all the key town govern-
ments should undertake a large amount of economic development tasks, and 
also undertake a lot of work---shouldn’t be managed, not managed in place 
and not managed well within the existing framework, distributing the energy 
of urban construction management. For example, according to the current 
management system, the urban management and enforcement authority of 
planning, construction, road administration, environmental protection and 
other areas are in the county department, but in practice, limited by the num-
ber of personnel and geographical conditions and many other restrictions, 
these functional departments cannot send enough personnel to take uninter-
rupted inspections and enforcements on the key towns, the government still 
undertakes a lot of management work, forming an embarrassing situation of 
“small horse drawing big cart” and “big foot wearing small shoe”. 
(3)  The organizational structure and establishment need to be improved 
Although the internal agencies of the township government have made some 
adjustments, but limited by the establishment and management system, es-
pecially due to insufficient “power expansion”, in general this adjustment is 
still repaired and mended. At present, the internal agency of the township 
government cannot meet the needs for further development, and the func-
tion of town government still focus on the economy development, not giving 
enough considerations to public service and social management; it is incom-
patible with the growing urban management and social service of the key 
towns. In order to eliminate the situation, we need to fully authorize the 
township government, allow some “breaking tradition” attempts of the town-
ship administration management, and explore the management model more 
suitable for the development of key towns. 
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IV.  The countermeasure, outlook and thinking of “strong town 
expanding power” 
The key towns acquiring priority development under the framework of 
“global Chengdu” are facing the serious constraint of management power; 
“township system, county level workload and municipal requirement” are the 
true portrayal of the current township management operation. “Strong town 
expanding power” is the inevitable choice to solve this dilemma, that is to 
say, continue to untie the “strong town” having been developed, and also 
eliminate the institutional drawback restraining its further development. 
(1)  Recent action suggestion 
First, accelerate the reform and innovation of administration management 
system in the key towns. Some key towns have become small towns with fast 
economic development and strong population absorbing ability, with urgent 
need to be authorized with corresponding administration management limi-
tation. At present, the key is to strengthen the decision-making scope and 
enforcement authority of the township government, and change the seri-
ously unequal situation of township property right, power and staffing with 
complex social management and public service. In addition to continue to in-
crease financial support, as long as development and reform, economy and 
trade, construction, planning, environmental protection, housing, urban man-
agement enforcement, homeland, family planning, public security, price, for-
estry and other departments involve in the limitation of urban management, 
project approval, household management, social management, etc, we 
should fully authorize the key towns’ government to directly executive the 
rights; the cadres below the section level can be uniformly distributed and 
utilized by the town party committee, some professional and technical per-
sonnel on planning, management, finance, banking and other fields should 
also be transferred from the upper department to enrich the key towns. 
However, the “empowerment” for the strong towns should also be con-
trolled to prevent changing “power expansion” into power games. “Power ex-
pansion” is not a reward, the unprincipled expansion of power will create 
problems, and empowerment should serve the needs of real management 
functions. Accordingly, the assessment of the township government after ex-
panding power should focus on public construction, public service and other 
urban elements closely relating with people’s livelihood, but not emphasis 
too much on the economic indicators. 
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Second, further improve the leadership ability of the key towns’ leading 
groups. The kind of leading groups determines what kind of development ef-
forts and development speed is. The key town is the key to the development 
strategy of “global Chengdu”, relating to the overall situation of “urban-rural 
integration” development strategy, therefore, whether it is the standard of 
selecting and using personnel or in the self-consciousness of the leading ca-
dres, we must free our mind, update our ideas and dilute the traditional ad-
ministrative level. The leading cadres in the key towns should have the mind, 
vision and courage of “global Chengdu”, the ambition of finding a foothold, 
overlooking the world and making friends all around the world, and possess 
the coping capacity and executive capacity adapting to fast development and 
profound changes. 
Third, pay attention to the quality of the population absorbed. Population 
quality is the basis and guarantee of the development condition and speed of 
a region. Population quality is a strategic problem, in the natural state, im-
proving the population quality of a region requires long-term effort. But for 
the keys towns of priority development, with big industrial structure changes, 
and dramatically improved entrepreneurial environment and living environ-
ment, they have the better condition to implement the talent strategy and 
build the talent depressions, completely being able to optimize the popula-
tion structure with lesser cost in a shorter time. For example, Huaikou Town 
in Jintang County now has a population of only 82000, with town built areas 
of 6.5 square kilometers, but its development goal is to build a medium-sized 
city being able to accommodate 200000 people with the built areas of 12 
square kilometers. This means that there will be more than 100000 people 
are migrants. The external population attracted will directly affect the devel-
opment speed and development level of Huaikou Town. 
(2)  Long-term development prospects 
From “power expansion strengthening town” to “strong town expanding 
power”, its important is that it will affect the basic patter of China’s urbani-
zation in the future, and will also directly affect whether China’s urbanization 
and industrialization being able to combine together or not, as well as the real 
realization of “urban-rural integration” strategy. In the long run, China has 
more than 2000 counties and more than 40000 towns, if the defects of the 
two levels could be compensated on the infrastructure construction, high-
quality educational resources, excellent medical resources and other public 
services could be fully extended to the town level, they will have great impact 
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on the development of our future economic society. It is one of the real es-
sential conditions to open the vast rural consumer market, while opening the 
rural consumer market is precisely the main driver of future economic growth 
in China. 
(3)  Some thoughts on “strong town” and “power expansion” 
At last, it is appropriate to think about such a problem, whether it is “power 
expansion strengthening town” or “strong town expanding power”, why do 
“power expansion” and “strong town” always link together? “Expanding 
power—strong town—expanding power again” shows the development logic 
of “expanding means strong, being strong then expands, expand again to be 
stronger, being stronger then expands again”. The other side of strong power 
matching the strong town implies that reality of “no expansion, no strong”, 
and the trend of resources keeping concentrate on the dominant end. But in 
deep meaning, we can’t exclude power worship and the over-expansion of 
government’s self-consciousness. In fact, after “power expansion strengthen-
ing town” or “strong town expanding power”, some places still haven’t funda-
mentally resolved the original problems, which are only dispersed or hidden 
by levels’ conduction. Therefore, township administration management get-
ting rid of “small power and weak function” is just taking the first step, how 
to implement the “the equal rights and responsibilities” is the key to “power 
expansion.”  
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Rural Public Governance and Public Service in Chengdu:  
Practice and Thoughts 
MAO Zhixiong  
The third Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee has passed “The 
Resolution of CPC Central Committee on Rural Reform and Development and 
Several Major Issues", which formally sets forth the objective of rural reform 
and development by 2020: realizing "significantly advance of equalization of 
basic public service in urban and rural areas", "the effective protection of 
farmers' democratic rights" and "further improvement of rural social manage-
ment system". It points out the direction for our local government to further 
promote rural public governance and public service. To achieve above objec-
tives suggested by the central government, we need to thoroughly imple-
ment the scientific concept of development, adhere to building a new social-
ist countryside as a strategic task, and follow the path of agricultural modern-
ization with Chinese characteristics as the basic direction, with the funda-
mental requirement of speeding up the integration of urban and rural eco-
nomic and social development to form a new pattern. Then we will further 
accelerate the development of rural public utilities; expand the coverage 
scope of public finance in rural areas, guaranteeing the rural masses' educa-
tion, labor income, medical service, a sense of security and housing, thereby 
promoting the comprehensive progress in rural society. We will further im-
prove the democratic management system in rural areas, with the emphasis 
of expanding the orderly participation, promoting information disclosure, 
making a sound consultation procedure and enhancing power supervision. 
Focusing on strengthening the grassroots political power, we will develop the 
democracy at the grassroots level, guarantee farmers with more democratic 
rights, as well as promote rural economic society with a good and fast devel-
opment. 
Chengdu is the capital of Sichuan Province, the science and technology, 
trade and financial center, transportation and communication hub in south-
west China determined by the State council, with a total area of 12,100 
square kilometers, household population of 11,733,000, of which agricultural 
population of 4,566,000. Since 2003, especially 2007 it was approved the 
national overall urban and rural comprehensive coordinated reform pilot 
area, Chengdu municipal party committee and municipal government made 
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in-depth implementation of the overall strategy for the overall scientific de-
velopment of urban and rural and adhered to regard the public governance 
and public service in rural areas as an important task. Focusing on the village 
level, it is critical to establish an urban-rural unified public service system. It 
should focus on establishing the requirements fitting for the changes of farm-
ers’ production, living and residential patterns, the basic public service of ur-
ban and rural overall development and the social management standard sys-
tem, focus on improving and ensuring the powerful public financial invest-
ment security system meeting the operating requirements, focus on improv-
ing the public service management mechanism of democratic appraisal, dem-
ocratic decision-making and democratic supervision, focus on building rural 
public service and society management team with perfect cooperation, or-
derly management and effective service. The city’s rural public service and 
social management level have been improved significantly, strongly promot-
ing the development and prosperity of urban and rural economic society. We 
mainly work as the following aspects. 
I.  Improving the governance mechanism at a new village level 
Improving the governance mechanism of the rural grassroots is the basis and 
condition for the development of grassroots democracy. To establish the gov-
ernance mechanism of the rural grassroots meeting the requirement of the 
new era, it is critical to combine the actual situation of China and the reality, 
accelerating to establish the democratic self-governance mechanism at the 
village level to ensure both the Party’s leadership and villagers’ self-govern-
ance rights. Combine the need to uphold the Party’s leadership and to ensure 
that the people are the masters of the country with the need to rule the coun-
try by law, and implement it to the rural grassroots, making it the institutional 
basis of dealing with the relations in rural areas, therefore further consolidat-
ing the Party’s leadership and governing capacity in the countryside.  
We focus on the following three aspects:  
(1) First, strengthening the village-level Party organization leadership. Ad-
here to focus on the construction of leading bodies, guarantee to estab-
lish the Party organization, and improve the way of leadership, we effec-
tively strengthen the leadership of village-level Party organization to vil-
lager committee, collective economic organization, the communist youth 
league, conference of women representative and other organizations, cul-
tivating social organizations with service, public welfare and mutual aid. 
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Under the leadership of village-level Party organization, we will establish 
the governance mechanism at a new village level focusing on villagers’ 
self-governance and the wide participation of social organization, effec-
tively promoting the village-level Party organization leadership way to 
change from the direct management to guiding the villagers self-govern-
ance according to laws.  
(2) Second, establish the villager council system. Actively promote the vil-
lager self-governance mechanism of regarding villager meeting as the 
highest decision-making agency, and the villager (villager group) council 
as the permanent council decision-making agency and villager committee 
as the executive agency. Villager council is responsible for the villager 
meeting, reporting the work and being subject to their supervision. The 
villager committee is the executive agency of the villager council, being 
responsible for implementing all the decisions of the council. Practice has 
proved that through the establishment of the villager council, it fully mo-
bilize the enthusiasm of the farmers, effectively resolves many problems 
arising from the government representing the farmer. In the post-disaster 
reconstruction, the important matters during reconstruction and all kinds 
of difficult issues will be resolved during the council by the villager self-
governance in the rural disaster areas.  
(3) Third, straighten out the relationship of village self-governance organiza-
tion. Focus on “Three Clarity”, that is to say, clarify border between gov-
ernment and village self-governance organization function, standardize 
government and village self-governance organization social management 
and public service content, strengthen the government at all levels 
providing the basic public service responsibility for the countryside; clar-
ify the relationship between village self-governance organization and col-
lective economic organization, promoting the separation of collective 
economic assets’ management function with villager self-governance 
function, strengthen the principal status of collective economic organiza-
tion in the market; clarify the relationship between the village self-gov-
ernance organization and the other organizations at the village level, sup-
port the communist youth league, conference of women representative 
and other group organizations to work under the leadership of the village-
level Party organization. For example, in the Xindu area of our city, the 
Sanhe street applies the grassroots governance model of “two commit-
tees, three conferences, one center and economic organization”, promot-
ing the change of traditional single community management system to 
multiple subjects collaborative governance system. 
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II.  Advance the construction of grassroots democracy 
Advance the construction of grassroots democracy is not only the major re-
ality problem concerning the rural reform and development, but also the key 
to construct the socialist democracy. To advance the construction of grass-
roots democracy, we should focus on taking the law to protect farmer’s right 
to know, to participate, to express and to supervise, thoroughly carry out the 
democracy election practice with the basic requirements of direct election 
and being fair and orderly, and the democracy management practice with the 
purpose of self-education, self-management and self-service, as well as the 
democracy supervision practice with the main content of open village affairs, 
finance supervision and the masses discussion, constantly promoting the in-
stitutionalization, standardization and routinization of the grassroots democ-
racy.  
We focus on the following work:  
(1) First, introduce the system of direct election. In 2003, the first implemen-
tation of “direct election” of township party secretary in China, with 
“mass democratic recommendation and direct election of party mem-
bers” as the main content, and then the scope of direction election ex-
pands to the key enterprise, school, and hospital and so on. From the 
2003 pilot to now, there are 198 township party secretary elected by di-
rect election in the city, in the village (community) general election in 
2007, there were 3331 secretaries of village and community party organ-
ization all elected by direct election, effectively stimulating the enthusi-
asm of the rural masses to be interested in politics and participate in the 
reform.  
(2) Second, improve the democratic appraisal system. Establish and improve 
the evaluation index system that meeting the requirements of reflecting 
scientific concept of development and correct view of achievements, 
meeting the actual requirements and being popular and easy to under-
stand, constantly explore telephone appraisal, network appraisal, the 
third-party surveys and other appraisal methods. Actively promote the 
appraisal methods like “one household, one vote”, adhere to implement 
the annual appraisal system of township party secretary and secretary of 
village (community) party organization, initially in the whole city forming 
the social evaluation mechanism of area (city) county, department and 
township (street) leaders, village (community) cadres, ordinary party 
members “four social evaluation network” and “superior evaluates the 
231 
subordinate, public evaluate the officer, grassroots evaluate the agen-
cies”. For example, each year, in the democratic appraisal of the township 
party secretary, the number of participated party members and mass rep-
resentatives are nearly 100000, with ten thousands of suggestions. Third, 
enrich the grassroots democratic practice. Actively innovate the realizing 
form of grassroots democracy, widen the participation channel of grass-
roots democracy, and comprehensively promote the permanent system 
of congress of party representatives and the tenure system of party rep-
resentatives, comprehensively carry out the openness of “three will-be”, 
fully implement the openness of party affairs, government affairs and vil-
lage affairs. So far, the city has held more than 1200 party committee at 
all levels, the NPC standing committee, and government standing com-
mittee, more than 100000 people attending the meetings; more than 
1100 party committee members, 6500 party representatives, and 74000 
party members participating in the “three contacts” activity, contacting 
with 32000 party member and 230000 masses. All the administrative vil-
lages in the city implement the openness of village affairs, the public 
openness reaching 100%. 
III.  Straighten out the authority power and financial power  
of the township government 
The biggest drawback of the original township management system is that 
the authority power does not match the financial power, to some extent lead-
ing to the unclear distinction between the function of the two rural commit-
tees and the phenomenon of holding all the power. Therefore, in order to 
strengthen the rural public governance and public service, we should further 
straighten out the authority power of the township and strengthen the finan-
cial power of it, consolidate the management function of the township soci-
ety, and promote the change of “money raising people” to “money resolving 
issues”, creating a favorable external environment for the villager self-gov-
ernance.  
We focus on the following three tasks:  
(1) First, change the function of the township government. Adhere to the 
breakthrough of changing functions, focus on the efficiency building, and 
further clarify the authority power and responsibility of the township gov-
ernment, weaken the economic development function of the township 
government, and strengthen the social management and public service 
232 
 
function of the township government. In China, we first carry out the rural 
administrative management system reform with the main content of ad-
justing the township government administrative area and rural team 
management system reform, and explore to establish the township ad-
ministrative management system adapting to the construction of func-
tional area. In recent years, the city has removed and merged 30% town-
ship and 46% village, the development space of center town and center 
village has been further expanded; the system of “two-level government 
and three-level service” has been basically established in the county and 
town.  
(2) Second, simplify the township government agency. According to the prin-
ciple of “simplification, efficiency and unification”, we fully make adjust-
ment of the township agency setting and administrative establishment, 
standardize the public institution setting and simplify the township 
(town) staff. In recent years, the township and village level in the city has 
reduced 1028 administrative establishments, 1133 party leadership post, 
1945 township public institutions, and 10994 public establishments. For 
example, through the reform, Pi County removes 154 township public in-
stitutions, recovers more than 1500 establishments, and shunts more 
than 4000 staffs; the average expenditure has been saved more than 100 
million yuan per capita for the finance each year.  
(3) Third, improve the township financial system. According to the require-
ment of public finance system and the target of equalization of urban and 
rural basic public service, we give the corresponding financial resources 
of the authority power for the township to dominate autonomy, and es-
tablish the township financial management system corresponding with 
the overall urban and rural development. At the same time, each year 
gradually increase the financial investment to the rural public service. 
Since 2003, Chengdu finance has invested more than 50 billion yuan to 
the “three rural”, with unprecedented amount of investment effort, cov-
erage scope and benefiting masses. Only in 2009, the municipal financial 
investment to rural education, medical treatment and health reached 
4.11 times, 3.88 times and 4.13 times of that of five years ago. Especially 
in 2009, our city brought the annual public service funding of 300000 
yuan of each village and community into the budget, therefore the annual 
financial investment reached over 700 million yuan, and the financing 
could reach 5 billion yuan in 2 or three years at most, investing all these 
into the construction of rural public service facility. 
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IV.  Establish a sound rural public service mechanism 
Rural public service supply does not adapt to the requirement of public ser-
vice, but leads to the supply contradiction of rural public service. To 
strengthen the rural public service, it is essential to establish rural public ser-
vice supplying mechanism with classified supply, while the government 
should do well in the basic public welfare service; rural self-governance or-
ganization relies on the market to develop the rural public service in the form 
of marketization.  
We focus on the following three service supplies:  
(1) First, strengthen the supply of government’s responsible project. The 
basic pattern of this project is: unified standard and moderate advance-
ment; unified planning and reasonable layout; unified design and opti-
mized function; unified financing, the city gives the money while the 
county invests the land; unified implementation and professional man-
agement. This pattern reflects the equalization and fairness concept of 
urban and rural public service. For example, in terms of the standardiza-
tion construction of rural primary and secondary school, in 2004 the city 
authorized a state-owned company as financing platform and construc-
tion owner, the city finance invested 300 million yuan project capital 
fund, and loaned 700 million yuan, the county (city) matched and utilized 
the land, launched in 2004, in 2005, we built 410 modern schools. For 
another example, in terms of the standardization construction of town-
ship public hospitals, the government invested 400 million yuan in 2006, 
unifying planning, standards, style, logo and device configuration, carry-
ing out the separation of administration and governance, medical service 
and medicine, income and expenses, accounting and appointing, formu-
late the establishment, post and salary, constructing a standardized pub-
lic hospital in each township.  
(2) Second, focus our efforts on the supply of government’s dominant pro-
ject. The basic pattern of this project is: unified standard, unified station-
ing, unified deployment, city subsides and full coverage construction. For 
example, since 2008, the city applied the operation pattern of the city 
giving money to construct plants, the county giving money to lay pipe and 
outsourced service, focus on the township sewage treatment plant and 
associated pipeline network, and the concentrated residential areas’ sew-
age treatment facility construction in the villages with more than 50 
households, overall constructing urban rural sewage treatment facility 
system with large, medium, small and micro-combined, multi-form, multi-
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level and multi-technology, realizing the goal of township sewage treat-
ment plant full coverage by the end of 2010. For another example, we 
apply the pattern of the city subsidizing, the county investing, standard-
ized charging and society leading, each constructing a standardized cen-
ter kindergarten in 224 towns (streets) in the whole city.  
(3) Third, achieve the supply of the government’s guiding project. The basic 
pattern of the project is: unified standard, stationing and subsidy, boosted 
by the city and implemented by the county. For example, the city adopts 
the pattern of unified standard and distribution, and quality management 
construction, realizing the goal of full coverage of village-level pharmacy, 
shop and agricultural store in 2006. Another example, according to the 
requirements of gathering globalization, treatment standardization, facil-
ity landscape and sustainable operation, we adopt the pattern of “house-
hold gathering, village receiving, town transporting and county handling”, 
and realize centralizing treatment of the rural garbage. At present, the 
rural life garbage collection system in the city has covered nearly 3000 
villages, benefiting 5.48 million people in rural areas. 
V.  Deepen the rural comprehensive reform 
To strengthen rural public governance and public service, we must further 
promote rural reform and institutional innovation, give full play to the basic 
role of market in the allocating resources, and constantly improve the vitality 
of rural economic and social development.  
We focus on three reforms.  
(1) First, it is the reform of rural property system. Centering on “returning 
rights and enabling function”, we verify the rights, register and certificate 
the rural collective land ownership, collective construction land use 
rights, land contract and management rights, forest rights and house 
ownership, founding city, county, and town three-level rural property ex-
change center. Establish the farmland protection system, every year the 
city and county two levels finances are arranged 2.6 billion yuan to farm-
land protection fund (the subsidy standards of basic farmland is 400 yuan 
per mu each year, that of general farmland is 300 yuan per mu each year), 
in order to improve the production capacity of farmland and the pension 
insurance subsidy of farmers, who are responsible for the farmland pro-
tection. Up to the end of 2011, the city has been basically completed the 
verifying the right and certification, a total of 4.076 billion yuan farming 
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fund has been granted, benefiting 1702000 households; a circulation of 
26345 rural property, the amount of 11.558 billion yuan.  
(2) Second, it is the reform of land management system. With the land con-
solidation and the increase and decrease of urban rural construction land 
as the carrier, according to the “four” principles---new rural construction 
industry development, architectural style and morphological diversity, 
environment integration and infrastructure sharing, we effectively inte-
grate special funds of land remediation and transform funds of medium 
and low production land, construction funds of irrigation and water con-
servancy, funds of “six small projects”, rural roads construction funds and 
other agriculture-related funds, strengthen strongly rural land compre-
hensive improvement, and make efforts to radically change the rural face 
and farmer’s production and living style. By the end of 2011, the city com-
pleted 731 rural land comprehensive remediation projects, investing 
more than 41 billion yuan, newly increasing 300000 mu of farmland; im-
plement 140 projects about the increase and decrease urban and rural 
construction land, investing nearly 20 billion yuan, especially in post-dis-
aster reconstruction, with the use of pilot policy of the increase and de-
crease urban and rural construction land, raising 8.4 billion yuan of funds 
for the rural reconstruction.  
(3) Third, it is the reform of rural financial system. Organize rural commercial 
bank, local corporate insurance company and consumer finance company, 
and actively encourage the found of social capital to participate in village 
bank, rural fund mutual cooperative and microfinance company, establish 
the interaction financing mechanism of bank and insurance combining 
with the rural credit financing and agricultural insurance, advance rural 
property mortgage financing, expand the scope of rural effective collat-
eral, stimulate the marketization, capitalization and fairness of rural prop-
erty resource value, and solve the problem of “where money come from” 
in the agricultural and rural development. At present, the Rural Property 
Transfer Guarantee Company in the city guarantees loan of 1.592 billion 
yuan for the rural collective or household. Especially in the post-disaster 
reconstruction, through rural property security guarantees, we raise 724 
million yuan of reconstruction funds for the masses. 
Strengthening village-level public governance and public service not only 
promotes the city’s agricultural and rural work, but also stimulates the 
healthy development of economic society. In 2012, the city’s gross regional 
production was 813.89 billion yuan, with year-on-year growth of 13%, the 
volume and growing rate respectively ranked the third and first place in the 
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sub-provincial cities; the local public finance income reached 78.1 billion 
yuan, an increase of 18.9%; fixed assets investment reached 589.01 billion 
yuan, an increase of 17.7%; social total retail sales of consumer goods 
reached 331.77 billion, an increase of 16%; urban residents disposable in-
come per capita reached 27194 yuan, an increase of 13.6% than that of last 
year; rural per capita net income reached 11501 yuan, an increase of 14.2%; 
urban and rural income gap narrowed from 2.66: 1 in 2002 to 2.36: 1 today. 
While compared with the requirements of CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council, provincial party committee and provincial government, com-
pared with the expectations of the masses, our work still has a big gap. Next, 
we will further promote rural public governance and public services, and in-
novate institutional mechanism, guarantee the rights and interests of farm-
ers, stimulate the rural harmony and promote a sound and rapid economic 
and social development in rural areas. 
First, there is a more prominent marketization direction. Deepen the reform of 
rural property right system; actively carry out verifying the rights of rural pri-
vate plot, rural unused land, public facilities and collective enterprise occu-
pied land and other land used rights, and steadily push forward the rights to 
contracted management over the long term. Accelerate the construction of 
rural property factors transfer market, strive to foster the trading market for 
collective construction land use rights, basically establish the system of col-
lective construction land benchmark price. Coordinate the implementation 
planning of regional land comprehensive remediation, fully respect the 
wishes of farmers, follow the market rules, and link together to promote the 
land comprehensive remediation. According to the requirements of national 
modern agricultural demonstration zone, we continuously improve the land 
output rate, resource utilization rate and labor production rate, and stimulate 
the agricultural standardization, scale and intensive production. Expand rural 
effective range of collateral, explore to establish agricultural re-insurance 
system and catastrophe risk diversification mechanism, encourage the rural 
areas to develop mutual cooperative insurance and commercial insurance 
business, comprehensively use entrusted loans, secured loans, interest sub-
sidies and rural property mortgages and other means to guide financial capi-
tal and social capital orderly in larger scale into agriculture and rural areas. 
Second, there is a more prominent democratic orientation. Adhere to “independ-
ent, voluntary and self-government” principle of the masses, standardize the 
democratic procedures, improve the procedure rules, focus on straighten out 
the relations of village-level party organization, villager self-governance or-
ganization and collective economic organization, establish a sound scientific, 
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standardized and institutionalized democratic decision, democratic supervi-
sion and democratic discussion mechanism. Adhere to return the rights to 
people and villager self-governance combine with the village-level organiza-
tion general election, determine the authorization relations of villager meet-
ing to villager council, standardize the election procedure of council mem-
bers, forming a sound operation rule for the villager council. Strongly develop 
service-oriented, nonprofit and mutual social organization, play their active 
role in village-level grassroots governance. Adhere to the principle of fully 
respecting the wishes of the masses and going deep among the masses 
throughout the work, strengthen and perfect the working mechanism of lis-
tening to the voice of the people, observing people, do work for people, ex-
clude people’s concerns and solve people’s problems. During the policy for-
mulation and work advancement, we fully respect, listen carefully and exten-
sively absorb the opinions of the masses, eliminate “on behalf of people” and 
coercion, fully realizing the transfer of “government rights standard” to “citi-
zen rights standard”. 
Third, there is a more prominent fairness orientation. Improve agricultural and 
rural investment guarantee mechanism, improve the transfer interest of gov-
ernment land and the ratio of farmland occupation tax new income with ag-
riculture, strongly implement farmland protection and quality improvement 
project, and increase the input of rural public welfare construction project. 
Strengthen the rural infrastructure construction, grasp the flood control pro-
ject and flood control system, accelerate the transformation and upgrading 
of rural power grids, improve the rural road network encryption level. 
Strengthen the construction of rural ecological environment, carry out the 
activities of beautiful environment town, ecological village and ecological 
home creation, and implement the urban and rural environmental compre-
hensive management. Promote the development of rural culture and educa-
tion and health service, improve the rural three-level medical and health ser-
vice network, and promote radio and television entering into every house-
hold, town theater construction, and cultural information resources sharing 
and other cultural projects. Improve the rural social insurance level, acceler-
ate to improve urban and rural residents’ basic medical insurance and cata-
strophic health care mutual complement insurance system, guide the rural 
residents of the right age to participate in the urban residents’ endowment 
insurance, realizing the integration of urban and rural residents medical in-
surance. Deepen the reform of urban and rural household registration man-
agement, and guide the rich people in rural areas to transfer to the urban 
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areas; they also enjoy the same public service and social security benefit with 
the urban residents.  
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The Practice Exploration of Fuyang`s County Administrative 
Reform: Improve the Operation Mechanism of the Public Power 
and Built the Modern Service-Oriented Government 
Fuyang Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection,  
Fuyang Police Research Office,  
Fuyang Party School 
At present, China is still in the course of social transformation from tradi-
tional society to modern society. The structure of government public power 
is transforming from the traditional mandatory power to the modern public 
power, which emphasizes the contractual and service nature of government. 
However, as China is in the specific transforming course, the contractual and 
service nature of public power has just emerged but not been put into effect 
completely. Many structural and operational mechanism defects, such as 
loose resource configuration, transparency’s absence in decision-making, 
slack power and difficult implementation in each department, the lack of re-
striction power and insufficient authority of supervision, still exist in the pub-
lic power.  
To address these problems, since 2007, Fuyang municipal committee and 
municipal government have undertaken bold exploration and practice on the 
operating mechanism of public power in accordance with the requirement of 
integration of enhancing the strategic guiding capability of Party committee, 
coordinating and integrating ability of government as well as implementation 
and creativity of departments of all levels. After several years of efforts, a new 
operating mechanism of decision-making, implementation and supervision, 
which combine multiple constraints and inter-coordination together, has ef-
fectively promoted the sound and fast development of Fuyang city. And spe-
cifically, 15 special committees have been established for the classification 
and inclusion of similar function departments into one system. And this sys-
tem is directed by one leader and its routine businesses is coordinated by 
each responsible department that assuming this function with the assistance 
of other departments thus to clarify everybody’s responsibility and supervise 
its execution, avoiding the confusing accountability, and realize the function 
integration and smooth operation with minimum cost and without organiza-
tional downsizing and staff augment.  
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I.  For decision-making, transforming the decentralized decision-making into 
integrated and coordinated decision-making through the function of “special 
committee”, and enhancing rationality of their decision-making  
Despite of personnel decision-making, government performs importantly 
in the project arrangement, allocation of funds to maximizing resource ben-
efit and public interest. Therefore, we will give full play to the integrating and 
coordinating capability of “special committee” and carry out a integrated, ra-
tional and feasible decision-making via integral planning and financial sys-
tem. 
The project planning and financial arrangement shall perform in accord-
ance with the following procedures. Firstly, according to the principle of 
“town and township government coordinate and package and each depart-
ment direct and supervise”, township government and department submit 
projects to each special committee as needed; second step, each special com-
mittee make choice between the submissions of township government and 
each department, then report the result to the Planning and Coordinating 
Committee and the Managing and Operating Committee of Public Asset after 
their primary coordination;  third step, according to the principal of “keeping 
planning scientifically and rationally , focusing on the key points, and inte-
grating and coordinating to optimize performance”, the Planning and Coor-
dinating Committee and the Managing and Operating Committee of Public 
Asset shall put forwards the project budget of the whole city in a coordinated 
way basing on the financial status of the city as well as the projects priorities; 
fourth step,  the governmental project budget shall be released at the end of 
this year and then go through four deliberation steps: research of the govern-
ment, deliberation of municipal People’s Congress, consultation of the  
CPPCC municipal committee and decision-making of municipal party com-
mittee. And the detailed budget will be issued by the people’s Congress and 
make sure that basis, scope, and amount of the government funds allocation 
is accessible and transparent on the beginning of the year; fifth step, subject 
to the decision-making results of the four procedures above, the Planning and 
Coordinating Committee and the Managing and Operating Committee of 
Public Asset shall issue the project budget of the whole city to each special 
committee, department and township. 
We have strict requirements for the steps above: investigation shall be 
carried out carefully and profoundly while underreporting and falsifying re-
port are prohibited in declaration in the research and declaration steps. And 
the discussion of each special committee shall fully coordinate and integrate 
241 
all projects within their duty scopes, the Planning and Coordinating Commit-
tee will check and audit the project strictly out of the cage of original depart-
ment, and make overall arrangement considering the project priorities. 
Therefore, with checks and coordination made in all levels, we have achieved 
good results in the following three aspects: 
1.  Obtain more rational projects. We have finished the transformation from 
decision-making at department level to the city level. And we have set prior-
ities for the projects and ensured the direct funds allocation by each project 
to achieve a more rational project arrangement, a more reasonable financial 
investment and made best use of the limited government financial resources. 
Thus we have improved our work efficiency and the once existed phenome-
non that the departments taking charge of the project instead of the govern-
ment and loose supervision of the projects as well as its funds have disap-
peared completely. 
2.  More rational funds allocation. Funds arrangement shall be carried out ac-
cording to the principals that two-way check of incomes and expenditures 
and unified control of income and expenditure. Once going through “four de-
cision-making procedures”, the funds for this project would be guaranteed 
sufficiently and paid on time no matter how complicated and fickle the situ-
ation may be. Therefore, we avoided that many departments competed to 
obtain and begin one project before it become financially secured, preventing 
the “uncompleted project” and enabling us to pool resources to solve major 
problems.  
3.  More transparent decision-making process. Through these repeated check 
and review of the project, and centralizing the decision-making right of de-
partment to “special committee” and codetermination of the four teams of 
municipal government, all income and expenditure of the government was 
close supervised by the four teams of municipal government. Previously, even 
the leader in charge did not exactly know or have access to the annual dis-
posable funds of one certain government department. Now, with this “four 
decision-making procedures”, this number is accessible to many people and 
the decision-making process become open and public.   
Additionally, a decision-making process regulation have been established 
within the municipal Party committee, municipal government, villages and 
town (sub-district) office as well as governmental departments since 2009, 
realizing a standard decision-making process.  
242 
 
II.  With the improvement of a series of supporting mechanism, changing 
from passive to active and raising the validity of implementation  
Establishing the execution mechanism that “the project will be overall 
controlled by the department, leaded by the leader, guided by the perfor-
mance evaluation and promoted by the supervision”, making all works’ co-
gent implementation. 
1.  Department is responsible for the execution. Special committee system 
realized the systematic management of departments bearing similar duties.  
Work is emphasized while the concept of department faded and different de-
partment is coordinated and integrated instead of just taking charge of dif-
ferent division. Integral planning and financial system carried out the man-
agement of project and funds of the whole city in a holistic way, making de-
partment into actually executing department, clarifying duties of each de-
partment and gaining a more powerful execution. Meanwhile, the integral 
planning and financial system emphasized on the annual early planning. The 
annual plan and budget is transparent and accessible to everyone and all pro-
jects are financially guaranteed. Thus township government sections will not 
waste much effort on the problems such as how to make money, how to gain 
profit and how to get funding. The saved effort could be put into develop-
ment, project, management and service optimization.   
2.  Leaders guide the execution. The work shall be assigned to certain person 
whose performance be evaluated and be carried out in an overall way. The 
municipal leader shall take charge of certain line and point, setting a example 
and guide the work in the field, acting as a line commander as well as a com-
batant. Each municipal leader assumed some work until it is completed. The 
municipal leader plays the role of the CPC party chief of a certain township 
(sub-district) team. 
3.  The result of performance evaluation guides the execution direction. Ac-
cording to the requirement raised by central government, we create a new 
and scientific evaluation system with which we stimulate the work passion 
and entrepreneurial zeal. One, we classify the performance evaluation of dif-
ferent township government sections. Firstly, highlighting classification. Sub-
ject to the construction of a main functional region, considering actual status 
such as the transportation condition, resources and environment, economic 
foundation and developing potential, we classify all 25 towns (sub-district) 
into three classes: comprehensive development region, industrial-oriented 
region and agriculture-oriented region. Similarly, for the governmental organ 
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at municipal level, we divide these organs into window service, internal ser-
vice and the other unit. We draw up different developing goal and working 
task for different type of organs. Every year, we evaluate their performance 
separately which is similar to avoid running and swimming athlete compete 
together. Enhance the working enthusiasm of the vast cadres. Secondly, high-
lighting the key point, especially for the evaluation of special project. Special 
project is the key point of the overall task of the city. Every year, special pro-
ject is put forward considering to the central task of this year, and new key 
point, requirement as well as goal will be set.  Through the performance eval-
uation of special project, we want to make government and department at all 
levels concentrate their effort on the special project, on developing their 
competitive industries, on concentrating on implementation of central task 
of municipal party committee and municipal government, ensuring that all 
work of this city concentrate on the same goal. Thirdly, rewards and penalties. 
We give rewards to the goods and fine the bad instead of only no punishment 
to de bad. Two, we evaluated a leader comprehensively. We use the assess-
ment methods for municipal leaders established to reinforce the comprehen-
sive evaluation of municipal leaders. We not only sort all leaders within one 
team, but also rank all leaders taking charge of the work in the same category 
horizontally.   Leaders with low-ranking will not be classed as reserved cadres. 
And those who rank last and the second worst and fail to reach the expected 
standards in two consecutive years will have to face the investigation of the 
organization department who will take the measures such as having a talk, 
persuasion or admonition, occupation adjustment or demotion or removing 
them from their position as the case maybe. Three, evaluating the service of 
general cadres. We carried the “evaluation and problem-addressing action” 
throughout the city, including following aspects: on one side the project eval-
uation and renovation of work style of governmental organs in order to im-
prove the execution of cadres, and on the other side, the service evaluation 
and renovation of bureaucracy in order to upgrade environmental soft power  
themed by strengthening coordination and integration, accelerating execu-
tion process, taking a tight watch on the work style and improving service 
level.   We evaluate the service of all institution personnel of all township 
(sub-district) government, each unit of municipal institution, each project 
headquarters and other public institutions on the review meeting.  A rank of 
all personnel would be released during the meeting and the last two persons 
at the rank list would declare their stands and altitudes. The evaluation result 
will be published on the media and linked up with the performance evaluation 
of the department and persons in charge, enhancing the overall conscious-
ness, sense of duty and performance consciousness.   
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4.  Supervision and examination will promote the execution. We establish a 
supervision office, a bureau-level institution, in the municipal party commit-
tee and municipal government, coordinating and making overall plan for the 
supervision throughout of the city. A supervision network comprising of peo-
ple from five different levels and fields as municipal leaders, four offices, Dis-
cipline Inspection Committee(Supervision Bureau), Party representatives, 
members of National People’s Congress and the members of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Committee, experts,  non-governmental per-
sons is established, having sufficient power, integrating the resources and 
forming an overall supervision. The supervision office will refine the work into 
practical program and explicit working task, goal, requirement, deadline and 
department and leader in charge of each task by the form of Letters of Re-
sponsibility, forming the target duty system. Normally, we strengthened the 
supervision and check of the progress and completion status of everyday 
work through the six systems: daily-report system, commitment approach 
system, regular meeting system, statements and reports system, supervising 
and examining system and informing system, ensuring each task is finished 
as planned.  
With the establishment and improvement of series of supporting mecha-
nism such as “target, duty, supervision and evaluation”, we made sure the 
implementation of following items: clear and definite time schedule, inverted 
working plan, process monitoring, object management, and explicating duty 
division, binding responsibility, checking and acceptance of the result and re-
wards and punishment in the light of performance evaluation. Therefore, we 
enforced the procedure of task assignment at the beginning of the year, su-
pervising and urging in the middle of the year and achievement evaluation at 
the end of the year, preventing from leader’s relax and laziness, improving 
the implementation level and creativity of leaders and ensuring the progress 
of major project and key work of the city.  
III.  Transforming from multiple supervision to integral supervision with the 
great supervision system, enhancing the authority of supervision. 
We established the Administration Committee of Great supervision, inte-
grating and coordinating various kinds of supervision resources such as su-
pervision within the Party, supervision of the National People’s Congress and 
specialized governmental institution, juridical supervision, democratic super-
vision from the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee as well as 
the social supervision including public opinion supervision, establishing the 
three-dimensional great supervision mechanism with the internal supervi-
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sion, supervision within the system and out of the system. The Administra-
tion Committee of Great Supervision’s source control measures, and the 
overall organization and coordination of Discipline Investigation Committee 
have increased the power of the Discipline Investigation Committee and en-
hanced the authority of supervision. 
1.  Strengthen the control over the use right of funds.  We have reinforced 
the measures in the following three aspects: firstly, the separation of deci-
sion-making and management. With the implementation of the overall plan 
and overall financing, we unified the budget and the project confirmation and 
determine a project according to the plan, coordinating the decision-making 
process by “four steps” above. Thus, each department could focus efforts on 
the project management, avoiding to acting as the decision maker and regu-
lator at the same time, preventing the black box operation, power-rent seek-
ing, black hole of funds and unit-owned exchequer. Secondly, separation of 
operating funds and project funds. Functional budget, special budget and 
construction budget would be made respectively. Each department could 
kept the daily spending supporting their normal function while special funds 
and construction funds would be allocated to certain project through the na-
tional treasury centralized payment or centralized funds allocation for fiscal 
revenue instead of going through any department. Now, we have realized the 
separation of functional fund and project fund at village-level to avoid the 
retention or diversion of any agriculture-related funds. Thirdly, we have rein-
forced the supervision and regulation of some governmental investment pro-
ject. A supervision center of governmental investment projects framed by 
“one database, three centers, one platform and four subjects” (Government-
investing Project Database, Review Center for Government-investing Pro-
ject, Public Resources Exchange Center, Supervising Center of Government-
investing Project), reinforcing the prevention and control as well as supervi-
sion of 10 links in the engineering construction field such as design, bid and 
tender, supervision, quality control, security, schedule, site, funds, alterna-
tion and contract management. We held the execution and supervision 
strictly and managed the government funds well and ensuring the overall su-
pervision of the government-investing project before, during and after the 
event.  
2.  Strengthen the supervision of administrative examining and approving au-
thority. We made solid progress in the revolution of “Two Focus and Two Im-
plementation”, fully implement the mode of administrative approval. In ac-
cordance with the “separating the approve and regulation right”, 36 depart-
ments enjoying the administrative approving right were merged by their 
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function, and establish the Administrative Licensing Office whom was regu-
lated by other relevant administrative offices, building up the internal super-
vision system. All issues and personnel of administrative approval functional 
department throughout the city were merged into the Administrative Service 
Center, which had acquired sufficient authority and set up the service win-
dow. We actively promoted electronic approval, building up the “Online Ad-
ministrative Service Center” and real-time supervision system of administra-
tive authority and video monitoring system in the Administrative Approval 
Center and so on. Thus, we have achieved the online service, real-time service 
and real-time supervision of all administrative procedures， ensuring effi-
cient approval and  sound supervision and realizing the transforming from 
managing people by people, by rules to by technology. 
3.  Reinforcing the supervision of administrative enforcement right.  In order 
to regulating the administrative enforcement, after the clear up and solidifi-
cation of administrative power, we have built up the online administrative 
penalty system supported by the construction of the sunshine power infor-
mation platform and unified the supervision. The managing scope of the ad-
ministrative penalty system covers all administrative enforcing departments 
to achieving overall control, registration and monitoring.  Meanwhile, we reg-
ulated the discretion right of administrative penalty in a unified way and es-
tablished the standard database of administrative penalty measurement and 
applied it into operational process of administrative penalty, realizing the no 
self-discretion right in administrative enforcement and a just and fair admin-
istrative penalty. Additionally, our management was carried out by incomes 
and outcomes separately to avoiding the enforcement officer’s illegal en-
forcement to get money.  
IV.  The development of public power operating system is a systematic pro-
ject and is still under research and exploration. Our experiences and gains are 
below:  
1.  It must be guided by strategic planning. Strategic planning needs not only 
strategic wisdom but also the most comprehensive, systematic and extensive 
public power. The long-term development of one place depends on whether 
they have a clear direction firstly. Strategic planning, goal and idea, planning 
scheme and policy measures must go ahead of the rest. On the basis of ex-
tensive discussion, national-wide argumentation, and the participation of ex-
perts, we have drawn up and implement the Development strategic planning 
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of Fuyang city, which have established the developing goal by 2030, develop-
ment orientation, development layout and development path and laid the 
foundation, premise and direction for the function of public power. 
2.  It must be focused on coordination and integration. The efficient function 
of public power depends on the smooth and unhindered function and perfor-
mance instead of the number or the size of the institution. In order to meet 
the requirement, we should focus on the construction of the coordination 
idea, the integration of resource factors and power of each department, and 
the improvement of governmental regulation capability and leading force. 
The “special committee mechanism” established broke through the barriers 
among the divisions of planning, project, funds, budget, township and depart-
ment, “special committee” and the four teams within the municipal govern-
ment, coordinating and integrating the regulative resources and explicating 
duties and function boundaries of different department, confirming govern-
ment’s public service duty. Thus, decision-making, execution and supervision 
power is divided, achieving a more scientific and rational decision-making re-
sult, much smooth the implementation and more effective supervision, and 
sketching out the primary profile of a modern public service-oriented govern-
ment. 
3.  It must be based on the function transformation. A good execution of pub-
lic power is root in function transformation of government from regulation-
orientation to service-orientation, and the role of government shall be trans-
formed from local magistrate to public servant. Governmental department’s 
function of our city is undergoing deep transformation with series measures. 
For instance, Supervision department’s function has changed from case in-
vestigation to problem control and prevention in advance; department of de-
velopment and revolution focusing on preliminary work seriously instead of 
approval acquirement, giving full play to the coordinating effect of develop-
ment and revolution department; financial department broke up benefit of 
each department and enhanced their public awareness by implementing the 
great finance system which features in centralization of financial power, co-
ordination of funds, unified budget, project negotiation, supervision and per-
formance evaluation. Function of finance department changed from manage-
ment of financial affairs to operation of financial affair while the department 
finance has changed into public finance; Department of audit changed from 
post-auditing mainly into overall auditing throughout the whole course of the 
event, preventing the waste, illegal action and corruption during the project 
construction from the source. 
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4.  It must follow the principle of transparency and publicity. Transparency of 
public power could prevent corruption significantly. Transparent procedure 
of decision-making, policy inquiry, policy-making and result accessing had 
guaranteed public’s right to know, supervising, judging and participating. 
Firstly, public decision-making. Adhere to the principal of investigating, ne-
gotiating, arguing and group discussion ahead, then making decision, espe-
cially for the decision-making of project funds. We have strictly enforce the 
“four steps for decision-making”, achieving more transparent public power. 
Secondly, open policy inquiry. Ask cadres and the mass actively on the major 
issues and collect opinions in all direction. Make sure that ask for opinions of 
the mass during development strategy planning, the masses participate in 
the development and share the development achievement. Thirdly, public 
policy.  Any administrative decision-making items, standard documents, work 
process and service standards closely related to the masses or social manage-
ment function of government shall be published on the government affairs 
network and ensure the public’s right to know and supervising. Fourthly, ac-
tively public the decision-making status, project schedule, personnel place-
ment, supervision and other items concerned by the masses to the society for 
their awareness.  
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Territorial and Functional Reforms on the local Level – Current 
Developments and Challenges in Germany 
Jan ZIEKOW, Axel PIESKER 
1.  Introduction 
Territorial and functional reforms of the local level have a long tradition in 
Germany. Although they can be understood as a permanent task for any in-
novative administrative policy, they occur only periodically, but when they 
do, such reforms generate broad effects that have impacts beyond the bor-
ders of a regional state. Because they face pressures to adjust to changing 
demographic, economic, and technical circumstances, state and local admin-
istrative structures cannot be static and must constantly be adjusted to fit 
the changing environment. (Lorig 2010: 497; Mecking/Oebecke 2009: 1; 
Wallerath 2009: 191). 
Examining the approaches to reform implementation in the last fifty years 
in Germany we can distinguish a temporal dimension that has led some con-
tributors to identify different reform waves, or phases, as well as different 
reform objectives and intensities within these waves. Following these obser-
vations, in the section below this article briefly outlines the structure of the 
German state. Next, the specific challenges and developments at the local 
level will be discussed. Afterwards, the different reform approaches and 
waves in Germany will be introduced. Subsequently, current reform activities 
in three regional states are presented in detail in order to demonstrate how 
this topic has increased in importance over the past years. Finally, the last 
section draws some important conclusions from the developments observed 
over time.  
2.  Challenges and developments on the local level  
Bull (2008) stated that the object of discussion regarding territorial and func-
tional reforms has not really changed since the 1960s. The primary question 
remains whether the fragmented organisation should be maintained in order 
to preserve the ideational value of the existing communes (e.g. integrative 
power and the provision of identity) or if bigger administrative units should 
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be built so as to improve the performance of the local level (Bull 2008: 286-
287). 
The conditions for the first large territorial reform after the Second World 
War in the 1960s were characterized by the combination of different devel-
opments that created a reform-friendly climate. Due to changes in agricul-
tural production the number of people working in agriculture had decreased 
considerably while a new wave of urbanization was under way. At the same 
time post-war era economic growth had slowed and faith in the scientific 
planning of politics and administration had increased (Wallerath 2009: 201-
202). In this context, Mecking and Oebbecke (2009) refer to the use of new 
methods of “modern administrative science” and political planning as instru-
ments for analyzing complex situations and finding forward-looking solu-
tions. The far-reaching reform approaches of the 1960s were intended to se-
cure for the population habitation, employment, technical infrastructure (wa-
ter, energy, waste disposal), education, transportation and conditions for lei-
sure time activities as well as to improve these conditions for future genera-
tions. By establishing a new hierarchical network of different central points 
distributed across the country the reformers attempted to equalize living 
conditions throughout Germany (Mecking/Oebbeck 2009: 6). 
With German reunification came the need to adjust the local socialist 
structures in the east to the standards of the West German state structure. 
Because of the multitude of new tasks given to the counties and county-free 
towns, the first reform steps were focused on this level. Out of respect for 
the role played by local civic groups during the peaceful 1989 revolution, 
post-communist East German politicians chose to not fully integrate the mu-
nicipal level in the reform approaches carried out during the first years of the 
transformation process (Wollmann 2010: 256-259).   
Since the middle of 1990s, when reformers realized that the performance 
of the inter-communal bodies established parallel to the county reform were 
insufficient, the municipal level has increasingly become the target of re-
forms. The political decision-makers decided they could now pursue a 
sounder reform strategy because, first, they had completed the initial territo-
rial county reforms and second, they had given up their protective position 
that excluded the municipalities from reforms. Thus, the East German re-
gional states extended their previous approaches by carrying out a more 
forceful local territorial and organizational reform (Kuhlmann 2009: 116-
117).  
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In the last few years, the dramatic demographic changes in German soci-
ety have developed into one of the most pressing new challenges facing pub-
lic infrastructure, as they are leading to an aging society and a population 
drain from rural and structurally weak areas to the suburban areas of bigger 
and medium-sized cities. In addition, a loss of trust in the state’s capability to 
solve problems has led reformers to consider the creation of bigger units. 
They argue that the devolution of state tasks is inhibited by the current frag-
mented territorial structures of the local level. Hence, they demand an ad-
justment through the establishment of bigger administrative units; otherwise 
the local authorities are seen as overburdened by the devolved tasks. While 
this argument is not new, it has gained new relevance due to the increasing 
burden of debt the public authorities have to face. In response to this devel-
opment, reformers have promoted the integration of single purpose state au-
thorities into concentrated administrative units, the devolution of further 
state tasks to the local level and the establishment of bigger administrative 
units. These developments clearly show that there is a withdrawal of the 
state, with such reforms and reorganizations reducing its physical presence 
(Wallerath 2009: 202-203).  
Additionally, the current reform approaches are still based on the belief 
that the existing organizations are the reason for the sub-standard perfor-
mance, functional loss and insufficient planning. A new challenge that the 
counties, county-free towns and municipalities have had to face since the 
1990s is increasing financial constraints and fiscal emergencies, which are 
likely caused by the fragmented territorial structure of the local level (Bull 
2008: 287).  
The above discussed developments show one thing: That the main objec-
tive behind local territorial reforms is always to improve the performance of 
the administrative units. However, the specifics of the reform phases are 
highly influenced by the actual basic conditions within which the approaches 
are developed and implemented.  
Alongside territorial reforms, the local level can also be the target of func-
tional reforms. In the past, the main motive for carrying out a functional re-
form was a permanent migration of tasks to higher levels of administration. 
This migration process was pursued even after territorial reform, often seen 
as a prerequisite for meaningful functional reform, was carried out. This 
raised occasional questions of why bigger administrative units had to be es-
tablished in the first place. In the end, functional reform was connected to 
the objective of attaining a durable and balanced assignment of tasks, and to 
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guarantee that no further migration of tasks to a higher administration level 
occurred (Püttner 2007: 49-50).  
In the context of current reform approaches to devolve tasks, three cen-
tral problems can be identified that represent challenges for the local level. 
First, despite the positive reform effects, the administration, as well as busi-
ness representatives and the central associations of the communes, report 
that new coordination problems (e.g. additional expenses, assignment and 
coordination problems) have been caused by the integration of the devolved 
tasks into the administrative procedures of local authorities. In addition, the 
integration of employees from one level into a new level has led to tensions 
and conflicts in the new administration. Second, an important precondition 
for efficient and effective task fulfilment is the attainment of optimal econo-
mies of scale. This requires highly-specialized, highly-educated and experi-
enced employees, as well as specific technical equipment. However, local au-
thorities can only make efficient use of these when the utilization ratio is high 
enough. In some policy fields every individual local authority does not have 
enough individual cases (of specific administrative procedures) and thus can 
experience difficulties in fulfilling the requirements of efficient implementa-
tion. It is difficult to preserve the expertise previously located in the special-
purpose authorities when their highly specialized staff members are redis-
tributed to each local authority.  
In this context, local level administrations have reported facing problems 
such as task fragmentation, deficient expertise, longer handling times be-
cause of undersupplied standard operating procedures, and growing unpre-
dictability in administrative performance. To these difficulties we can add 
also mid- and long-term problems. By extending their employees’ scope of 
responsibility, requirements for the further education of staff raise consider-
ably. However, because the administration keeps changing, by the time the 
staff is re-trained in new specializations the organization has evolved even 
further, thus requiring yet another round of staff re-training. At the same 
time, the requirement to reduce expenses related to every reform forces 
most local authorities to stop hiring and advancing employees, a practice that 
could lead to an ageing and unmotivated staff. Finally, a problem in the con-
text of task devolution is that when local authorities are fully in charge of a 
task (decision making, financing and consequences of their action) they face 
huge challenges resisting political and economic pressures, as well as meet-
ing functional necessities.  
Ebinger (2010) emphasized that the long-term consequences of the cur-
rent trend of devolving tasks to the local level are: uninhibited reduction of 
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tasks (e.g. service provision), that administrative performance and circum-
stances are becoming more heterogeneous, and the worsening of the local 
business environment vis-à-vis competitors. (Ebinger 2010: 54-61).   
3.  Territorial and functional reform waves (waves and types) 
We can distinguish two sub-types of territorial reforms, classified according 
to the level at which they are carried out. First, given the two-tier structure 
of the local level in Germany, there are territorial county reforms whose pur-
pose is to rearrange the territories of the counties into larger units. The en-
largement of administrative units serves to reduce the total number of coun-
ties in a regional state. Second, below the county level, the municipal level is 
also an object of reform efforts focused on enlarging and rearranging the ter-
ritorial structure of municipalities (Hennecke 2009: 213-214; Kuhlmann 
2009: 114). 
As already mentioned above, territorial and functional reforms on the lo-
cal level are not new phenomena in Germany. This topic appears periodically 
on the political agenda of the regional states’ governments. For the post-war 
era Kuhlmann (2009) identified two waves of territorial reforms on the local 
level in Germany. These will be presented in the following sections.  
3.1.  Territorial reforms on the municipal and county level 
The first wave of reforms occurred in the 1960s and 1970s and drastically 
reduced the number of municipalities and counties in the West German re-
gional states. About two-thirds of the then existing municipalities disap-
peared from the map, while the number of counties was reduced from 425 to 
235. At the county level, authorities generally selected minimum sizes be-
tween 100,000 and 150,000 inhabitants. In addition, the ratio of the number 
of municipalities in each county was set to be between 1:10 and 1:12. The 
biggest municipality of a county was not supposed to contain more than one-
third of the county’s inhabitants. Despite these rules of thumb, we still find 
significant differences between the regional states in terms of how county 
and municipal level reforms were carried out. While North Rhine-Westphalia 
and Hessen considerably reduced the number of municipalities in their terri-
tory, regional states like Rhineland-Palatinate or Schleswig-Holstein chose 
not to implement radical territorial reform. These two states established a 
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new administrative level between the counties and the municipalities to en-
hance the efficiency of administration on the local level without sacrificing 
the independence of the small-sized municipalities that became part of these 
newly created inter-communal bodies (Kuhlmann 2009: 113, Wallerath 2009: 
200-201, Wollmann 2008: 50). 
A second wave of reforms was initiated in the East German regional states 
immediately following German reunification. In all five East German regional 
states, territorial county reform was implemented in the early 1990s, starting 
with Brandenburg in 1993 and followed by the rest in 1994. Although the 
implementation of the reform concepts turned out differently in each re-
gional state due to different strategies and constellation of actors, the overall 
reform effort can be seen as a success. Overall, the number of counties was 
reduced from 189 (1993) to 87 (1994) in a very short time. However, alt-
hough it was necessary, the East German regional states decided not to carry 
out territorial reform on the municipal level at the same time, as it was seen 
as too conflict-laden. At first they focused only on voluntary mergers and co-
operation between municipalities (so-called Verwaltungsgemeinschaften, 
Ämter) instead of legally forced amalgamations. Although this “soft version” 
of territorial reform was seen as a viable alternative to amalgamations, new 
ideas for carrying out municipal reorganization and territorial reforms sur-
faced in the middle of the 1990s. Additionally, further steps were taken to 
optimize the existing inter-communal bodies by raising their minimum size. 
The policy makers intensified their efforts by integrating proposals for terri-
torial reform on the local level into their political agenda. Thus, legally forced 
amalgamations were no longer a taboo topic.  
In East Germany, we can distinguish two strategies by which the regional 
states reformed the territorial structure on the municipal level. First, a rather 
restrained-conservative strategy, characterized by the expansion of inter-
communal bodies while still preserving the independence of each municipal-
ity, was chosen by some regional states. The second strategy was sounder 
and was characterized by a transition from municipal reorganization to terri-
torial reform through amalgamations, by force if necessary. The policy mak-
ers choosing the second strategy also essentially maintained the inter-com-
munal bodies and continued optimizing these structures. However, by form-
ing unitary municipalities (Einheitsgemeinden) they set new priorities for 
their reform agenda. Despite these efforts to reform the territorial structure 
within the five East German regional states, it is quite remarkable that more 
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than 80 percent of the East German municipalities are still part of inter-com-
munal bodies. This number can be interpreted as indicating some inefficiency 
in the structure of the municipalities remains (Kuhlmann 2009: 114-119).  
3.2.  Functional and administration structural reforms  
Several authors (e.g. Mehde 2008: 51, Püttner 2007: 49) point out that there 
is also a close connection between territorial and functional reforms. Territo-
rial reforms are partly seen as a prerequisite for carrying out functional re-
forms (reforms of competences), whose goal it is to rearrange state tasks and 
competences between the existing levels of local and state administration. 
These differ from ‘administration structural reforms’, which are reform ap-
proaches focusing on a rearrangement of the administrative levels them-
selves, e.g. by dissolving one of those levels (Hennecke 2009: 213).  
Functional reforms are considered a permanent task of German admin-
istration policy. However, there is no comprehensive decentralization legis-
lation in Germany that can be applied to all municipalities, as for example in 
France. Because the regional states hold the competences for municipal leg-
islation we find different variations of task devolution to the local level. In 
Germany, based on the German Basic Law and ‘administrative federalism’, 
task devolution flows from regional states to municipal and county admin-
istrations. Direct devolution of tasks from the Federation to the local level is 
not possible because, according to German Basic Law, the federal level has 
no direct access to the local level. A widespread version of functional reforms 
is “administrative decentralization”, in which the local level gets new compe-
tences without having a say in the local parliament about what these tasks 
will be (“cropped devolution of tasks”) (Kuhlmann 2009: 119). The following 
section gives a brief overview of the different types of task devolution to the 
local level.  
3.2.1. Devolution of tasks to the local level as an element of functional 
reforms  
Ebinger (2010) states that the recent efforts to devolve tasks to the local level 
are a by-product of the functional reforms currently being implemented. But 
task devolution—as one form of task fulfilment—competes with other alter-
natives, such as privatization, devolution to third parties and (de-)concentra-
tion within the state administration. Since 2005, when the comprehensive 
administration structural reforms were implemented (e.g. in Lower Saxony), 
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the devolution of tasks has been carried out with varying intensities and in 
various legal forms (Ebinger 2010: 48). 
But what does the devolution of tasks to the local level actually mean? 
Looking at the legal literature, you discover that there is no examination of 
the topic. Therefore, Burgi (2010) developed a definition for this term in or-
der to clarify what we are actually talking about. He understands devolution 
of tasks to the local level as a transfer of tasks from the regional state admin-
istration to local authorities (municipalities and counties). In this context, 
transfer means more than just a withdrawal of the state because the regional 
state still wants to see the devolved functions exercised and not abandoned. 
That is why the government possesses responsibilities to ensure task fulfil-
ment. Hence, task devolution to the local level is not part of territorial reform 
but is a functional reform. According to article 84 Paragraph 1 set 1 of the 
German Basic Law, it is not possible for these tasks to be passed from the 
regional states to the Federation. The devolution to the local level means that 
there is an assignment of state tasks from the direct to the indirect state ad-
ministration, as local authorities are legally responsible administrative units 
and not just public authorities (Burgi 2010: 23-24).  
According to Burgi (2010), there are two main types of task devolution to 
the local level. First, a “false” devolution of tasks is characterized by devolving 
tasks that do not become a part of local self-government, that is, delegation 
to the local level without the local level having input into the issue. The sec-
ond main type – so called “real devolution of tasks to the local level” – is char-
acterised by the fact that the devolved tasks are supposed to have the char-
acter of self-government issues (Burgi 2010: 29-31).  
3.2.2.   Waves of functional reforms  
Kuhlman (2009) identifies three clear strands in the decentralization debates 
since the Second World War. While Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW) took their first steps for delegating tasks to the local level 
right after the second world war, the main push for a comprehensive decen-
tralization debate in all West German regional states came with the territorial 
reforms of the local level starting at the end of the 1960s. In order to adapt 
the structure of tasks on the local level to the new territorial structure, func-
tional reforms were focused on devolving tasks that had been exercised by 
the immediate authorities of a regional state (mostly special authorities on 
the lower implementation level) to counties, county-free towns and munici-
palities. However, task devolution varied in scope in the different regional 
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states. For instance, comparatively NRW pursued the most far-reaching steps 
for devolving tasks from the regional government administration to the local 
level and could be seen a forerunner in task devolution, especially regarding 
implementation and permission tasks. In comparison, the activities in Baden-
Württemberg were characterized by decentralization of a more limited scope. 
Thus the subsequent reforms in this regional state could be understood as 
being an attempt at “catch up modernization”. 
Another important step in the decentralization debate was the reintro-
duction of local self-government in East Germany after the coming into force 
of the GDR´s local constitution on May 17th 1990. The transformation pro-
cess in East Germany was characterized by the comprehensive decentraliza-
tion of political and administrative competences. The task portfolio of the 
newly established administrations at the local level increased tremendously. 
A multitude of public tasks, especially within the healthcare, social and cul-
tural sector, that were previously exercised mainly by the state were devolved 
to the local level. Already within the first local election period measures were 
undertaken to devolve state tasks to the communes. This was done because 
two-tier structured regional states tend to create a sort of intermediate level 
of administration by installing single-purpose state authorities that pro-
moted a “sectoral pillarization” of regional government authority. The density 
of single-purpose state authorities in the regional states was even higher in 
the East than in West Germany, which was criticized early-on by the associa-
tion of local authorities. The functional reform in the Eastern regional states 
can also be seen as a complement to the territorial county reform, much as 
they were in West Germany. The main purpose was to adjust the task struc-
ture of the counties to their new territorial structure in order to correct the 
top-heaviness of the administration through devolving first-instance admin-
istrative competences to the county-free cities and counties (Kuhlmann 
2009: 119-121). 
The third decentralization wave started at the beginning of 21st century, 
with three distinct paths being recognizable: 
1. Decentralization and Re-Concentration (Baden-Württemberg) 
2. De-Concentration (Lower Saxony) 
3. Regionalization (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) 
Baden-Württemberg is a textbook example of comprehensive decentraliza-
tion of single-purpose state authorities, while at the same time the general 
state administration at the intermediate level was functionally upgraded and 
strengthened. The comprehensive administration structural reform (the so 
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called “Teufel-Reform”, named after the minister president at that time) came 
into effect on January 1st 2005. This reform was necessary because of the 
limited success of the functional reforms of the 1970s. Over time, in many 
policy fields a parallel structure of general state administration and a variety 
of mono-functional special-purpose state authorities (450) had developed. 
The core element of the new reform was the complete dissolution of 350 of 
these units. The tasks and personnel of the higher federal state and special-
purpose state authorities were to be integrated into the four German Re-
gional Councils, while the lower special-purpose state authorities were to be 
integrated into the 35 existing administrative district offices and the nine 
mayor’s offices of the county-free towns. However, territorial reform (e.g. on 
the county level) was not part of the reform package, which made it easier for 
the counties to accept it (Kuhlmann 2009: 121-122).  
To date, you can find the second reform approach only in Lower Saxony. 
Compared to Baden-Württemberg, it is less focused on devolving state tasks 
to the local level than on carrying out an administration structural reform by 
dissolving the district governments and transforming the regional govern-
ment authority from a three-tier to a two-tier structure. Although there is a 
high decentralization potential related to this reform option – most of the 
state tasks exercised by the district governments could be devolved to the 
local level – a very low percentage of these tasks were actually devolved to 
the counties and county-free towns. Kuhlmann (2009) states that the decen-
tralization effect remained minimal because just 10 percent of the state’s 
tasks were eventually devolved to the local level after the dissolution of the 
district governments. On the one hand, in the course of the reform 121 fed-
eral state authorities were dissolved. However, on the other hand, since 21 
special-purpose authorities have since been founded and most of the state 
tasks have not been devolved to the local level but to these special-purpose 
authorities or departmental administration, representing a considerable up-
grading of the sectorally organized state administration.  
The third decentralization option is characterized by regionalization. For 
a long time this “alternative” was seen as a theoretical model or the typical 
objective of the political opposition for reforming the district governments in 
three-tier structured regional states. Nevertheless, Mecklenburg-Vor-
pommern has taken concrete first steps towards legislative implementation 
of regionalization. The core idea behind regionalization is the devolution of 
state tasks, including the bundling and coordination functions, to independ-
ent (regional) administrative units that exercise these as mandated tasks 
(Auftragsangelegenheiten). A more detailed analysis of this decentralization 
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option follows in the next section where three current reform examples from 
a potential fourth reform wave are presented.  
4.  Conclusions 
Territorial and functional reforms are an important and necessary instrument 
for policy makers to respond to present and future challenges such as demo-
graphic change and economic and financial developments. Although they can 
be understood as a permanent task of administrative policy, they occur in re-
form waves because they are connected to drastic changes in the local envi-
ronment and are, therefore, highly conflict-laden. One reason why these re-
forms are conflict-laden can be found in the goals which underlie them. On 
the one hand, they are intended to better the performance of the local au-
thorities, while on the other hand their democratic and political viability must 
be ensured. To carry out a territorial reform successfully, several aspects have 
to be considered. First, the goals of a reform project have to be well-balanced. 
A single-minded orientation towards efficiency aspects will lead to problems 
with constitutional courts, as the most far-reaching approach to date in 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern shows. Second, to change territorial structures it 
is necessary to overcome the bureaucratic inertia of the affected local author-
ities. Therefore, reforms require a carrot and stick approach that offers, on 
the one hand, incentives (e.g. a debt relief, governmental support during the 
process, freedom of choice for the fusion partner) for a given period of time 
during which the local authorities can actively shape the process. On the 
other hand, it is also important to use the “stick” – in this case the announce-
ment that legally forced fusions will be carried out – if the affected local au-
thorities are not able to initiate the fusion process within the specified time 
period. Third, to increase the acceptance of the reform measures it is helpful 
to clearly communicate the advantages of the reform project. This can be 
done by offering debt relief that would improve the financial situation of 
newly created administrative units. A possibly more convincing argument 
might be a comprehensive functional reform combined with any territorial 
reform. This dual approach would promise to strengthen the local level by 
devolving more tasks to the enlarged local authorities. 
It is clear that probably the most important goal for carrying out territorial 
reforms, considering current problems such as demographic change and the 
financial situation of many local authorities, is to improve the performance 
of public administration at the local level. However, other instruments can 
also contribute to reaching this goal. For example, the technical possibilities 
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and potential of E-Government to make administrative procedures easier and 
more efficient have not yet been fully tapped. E-Government also could help 
to compensate for the problems caused by the enlargement of local authori-
ties (e.g. longer distances for the citizens to the local administration). Beyond 
this, inter-communal cooperation also offers an option to enhance efficiency 
while initially retaining the independence of the participating local authori-
ties. This approach helps smaller local authorities to jointly provide a range 
of services with a level of quality that would not be possible for each of them 
alone. Such cooperation can also be seen as a first step towards eventual fu-
sion because it can build trust, which is an important prerequisite for an even-
tual fusion process. 
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Territorial Reforms - An Approach to ensure effective and efficient 
Administration in times of Demographic Change? 
Dirk ZEITZ 
The contribution briefly describes territorial reforms in Germany during the 
last years. It explores the main drivers of reform – demographics and financial 
issues – which represent major challenges for Länder and their municipalities. 
Moreover, two examples for recently implemented and discussed territorial 
reforms in two German Länder are investigated.  
1.  Demographic and financial background 
There is some good news as regards the demographic development in Ger-
many. Germany’s population does not decrease in numbers anymore. The 
year 2011 was the first year since 2002 without a further decline in popula-
tion. Currently the population is around 81,8 million.1 The increase in 2011 
and also in 2012 cannot be attributed to a raising number of births, but is 
more the consequence of an inflow of migrants from other European coun-
tries, in particular from Southern European countries, moving to Germany 
because of better economic prospects and a robust labor market. The recent 
years are exceptions however from the overall trend of a declining popula-
tion. The fertility rate of 1,4 newborns per woman over the last 40 years is 
below the required rate to maintain a constant population. Considering this 
rate one can expect that population is to decrease in future. In 2011 there 
were 190.000 more deaths than there were newborns. Taking into account 
the official assumptions taken in the 12th coordinated population projec-
tions of the Federal Statistical Offices and the uncertainties in the projection, 
the population in 2060 will be in an interval from 62,0 million to 77,7 million.2 
Whereas these numbers give a picture on the developments on the aggre-
gate level, one should also have a look on the regional developments of the 
                                               
1  Federal Statistical Office, Press release 255 / 2012-07-25.  
2  Federal Statistical Office (2009): Germany’s Population by 2060. Results of the 12th 
coordinated population projection; Zeitz. D. (2010): Assessing uncertainties in popu-
lation projections. A test based on the 12th coordinated population projection for 
Germany.  
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population. One can observe a high heterogeneous development since the 
year of German reunification in 1990. While total population increased by 
roughly 2 percent, four out of six Eastern German Länder, Brandenburg and 
Berlin being exempted, have been losing more than 10 percent of their pop-
ulation. Following reunification a strong migration from eastern to western 
Länder took place, which accounted for around 1.5 million inhabitants or 10 
percent of German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) total population. In partic-
ular the well-skilled labor force and the younger persons left their hometowns 
in the east for better perspectives in the west, whereas less skilled people 
often remained. After a first large wave of migration within the first years of 
reunification, in the meantime the degree of east-west migration has scaled 
down significantly. Nowadays we rather find migration patterns from rural 
areas to cities and from less prosperous regions to more prosperous that to-
day can also be found in some larger metropolitan areas in Eastern Länder 
(such as Berlin, Dresden or Leipzig).  
Because of the fact that migration occurred foremost in Eastern Länder 
those show a net loss in substantial human capital. Particularly they suffer 
from the younger that moved who are not available as parents. If at all, then 
their kids are born in other Länder. This causes that these Länder are ageing 
at a much higher pace.  
But it does not remain the only problem how to maintain an adequate 
level of public goods and administration in increasingly sparsely populated 
areas. The challenge is, to achieve this with smaller amounts of financial re-
sources. The Länder in the eastern part of Germany will lose transfers that 
have been made available to them for developing of infrastructures after re-
unification. The federal supplementary grants of the Solidarity Pact II (7 bil-
lion euros in 2012) are gradually phasing out until the year 2020. Moreover, 
also the financial means provided from European structural and cohesion 
funds will also decrease over time as the regions are catching up. A reduction 
in population also leads to declining revenues from the horizontal fiscal 
equalization scheme among the Länder. In particular the Eastern German 
Länder heavily rely on those transfers. They still account for a high share of 
their total revenues (for instance in Brandenburg roughly 40 percent). Fur-
thermore, the introduction of the so-called debt brake not allowing any 
longer debt financing of the Bund from 2016 and of the Länder from 2020 
will not provide the opportunity to finance existing infrastructures by defi-
cits. Since the costs per capita for providing public services increase expo-
nentially with decreasing population, Länder will to make the administration 
more effective and efficient. Territorial reforms, in most cases amalgamations 
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of municipalities, are considered as adequate approach to benefit from econ-
omies of scale and scope in this regard.  
The challenges from the demographics and the financial situation can be 
summarized as follows:  
The Eastern Länder in the short- and medium-term and the Länder in the western 
part of Germany with some delay in the longer term are facing the challenge: 
How to ensure more effective and efficient, citizen centered public services subject 
to constitutional requirements?  
2.  Heterogeneity in administrative structures  
and the fiscal relations of Länder and municipalities  
Looking from outside of Germany often the fact is neglected that there is a 
high degree of heterogeneity in administrative and territorial structures. If 
one compares some basic data on administrative structures of the Länder 
then a large variance becomes evident. This is caused by the patterns of Ger-
many’s federal structure. Each Land organizes its administration and its terri-
torial structures by itself. All Länder have own constitutions and jurisdictions. 
Moreover, Länder regulate the systems of financial relations among the mu-
nicipalities. Consequently, all Länder have established different systems of 
fiscal equalization schemes considering specific needs of their municipalities 
and territorial characteristics. Those schemes differ for instance as regards 
the level of equalization between fiscal capacity (i.e. tax income per capita) 
and the financial demands or needs of the municipalities. Each Land has 
adopted an own appropriate definition what a “conceptional” financial de-
mand of a municipality may be. Due to the nature of Länder as quasi-autono-
mous states, the reform of administrative and territorial structures and of the 
fiscal equalization schemes are permanent construction fields of Länder gov-
ernments.  
The differences between the Länder can be taken from the table 1 show-
ing the administrative structures for the 13 area states. Two issues are worth-
mentioning. The first are differences in the administrative divisions. Whereas 
all Länder have counties and non-county cities as administrative division we 
find differences in the administrative levels above and below. So some Länder 
have organized the territory in administrative districts. The second difference 
is whether there are municipal alliances which perform administrative tasks 
of the alliance member municipalities. The member municipalities do not 
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have own professional local administrations, but have assigned to some ex-
tent3 their function to the municipal alliance. Three specific types of munici-
pal alliances throughout the Länder can be differentiated: Amt, Verbandsge-
meinde and Verwaltungsgemeinschaft.4 
 
Tab. 23.1: Administrative structures by Länder as of 2011  
 
Source:  Federal Statistical Office 
A second difference between administrative structures between the Länder 
will become clear if one looks at indicators such as the average population 
and the average size of municipalities (figure 23.1). Whereas the average 
population of a municipality in Rhineland-Palatinate has slightly more than 
1.700 inhabitants, an average municipality in Northrhine-Westphalia has a 
population of 45.000 (figure 23.1 left). As regards the counties (see figure 
                                               
3  Depending on the model. 
4   For a discussion on the models of municipal alliances see Kuhlmann, S.; Richter, P.; 
Schwab, C. and Zeitz, D. (2012): Kommunal und Verwaltungsreform: Optionen zur 
Neugestaltung der Gemeindeebene in Brandenburg.  
Total
Non-county 
cities
Counties Total Municipalities
Alliance 
member 
municipalities
4 44 9 35 1101 190 911 270
7 96 25 71 2056 1069 987 313
- 18 4 14 419 148 271 53
3 26 5 21 426 426 - -
- 8 2 6 805 40 765 78
- 46 8 38 1010 288 722 131
5 53 22 31 396 396 - -
- 36 12 24 2306 48 2258 163
- 6 - 6 52 52 - -
3 13 3 10 468 232 236 94
- 14 3 11 220 103 117 19
- 15 4 11 1116 83 1033 87
- 23 6 17 913 125 788 116
Saxony-Anhalt (ST)
Schleswig-Holstein (SH)
Thuringia (TH)
Lover Saxony (NI)
Nordrhine-Westphalia (NW)
Rhineland-Palatinate (RP)
Saarland (SL)
Saxony (SN)
Baden-Württemberg (BW)
Bavaria (BY)
Brandenburg (BB)
Hesse (HE)
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MV)
Area States
Administrat
ive districts
Counties Municipalities
Municipal 
alliances
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23.1 right part) it can be observed that the average size of a county in Meck-
lenburg-West Pomerania (3811 km²) after the reform of 2011 is almost ten 
times the size of the average county in Saarland (428 km²). 
 
Fig. 23.1: Average population and size of municipalities and counties 
by Länder 
 
 
Source:  Federal Statistical Office; own calculations 
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What the data in the table 23.1 and figure 23.1 do not provide is how these 
structures have developed over time. There are some important differences 
to highlight. The territorial structures and the number of municipalities in 
Western Länder remained stable since the last “wave” of territorial reforms 
which dates back to the 1970ies. Since then two Länder, Lower Saxony and 
Rhineland-Palatinate, abolished the division of the territory in Regierungsbe-
zirke (administrative districts). The tasks of Regierungsbezirke were partly 
shifted down to counties or non-county cities or have been assigned to newly 
set up state offices or state agencies. We have also seen functional reforms 
in some Western Länder such as Baden-Württemberg and Northrhine-West-
phalia, which assigned some tasks (e.g. office of environmental issues) carried 
out by specific particular state agencies to Regierungsbezirke. In summary, 
the focus of administrative reforms in the Western Länder in the last 20 years 
was more focused on functions and the assignments of tasks rather than on 
territorial reforms. In the Eastern Länder since reunification we have seen 
both types of reforms. During the last years we see there already the second 
wave of territorial reforms, after the first took place in the middle of 1990ies.5 
In the Eastern Länder there have been a considerable number of amalgama-
tions at the municipal level, but also the number of counties has been reduced 
significantly. In Saxony-Anhalt the number of municipalities through amal-
gamations decreased from 1364 to only 220, i.e. by 80 percent in only 20 
years. In Saxony the number of municipalities today is 468 compared to 1626 
in the early 1990ies.  
3.  Examples of Recent Reforms 
Two recent examples of territorial reforms shall be studied in more detail in 
the next sections.  
3.1   Reform of counties in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 
In 2011 a reform of counties took place in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania is located in the northeastern part of Germany 
at the Baltic See. It is one of the Länder that have suffered the most from 
migration within Germany and it is the Land which will depopulate the most 
                                               
5  Examples of territorial changes on the county level in the eastern Länder are Branden-
burg 1993, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 1994 and 2011, Saxony 1994, 1996 and 
2008, Saxony-Anhalt 1994 and 2007 and Thuringia 1994. 
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in future. The population decreased from 1.9 million to 1.6 million since reu-
nification. The reform of 2011 focused only on the level of counties and non-
county cities. The level of municipalities was not regarded in this reform. The 
territorial structures even after the reform therefore remains divided into 
small sections with a high share of municipalities with less than 500 inhabit-
ants. Those municipalities remain below the minimum population threshold 
a municipality should at least according to local constitution in Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania.6 Against initial plans the territorial reform was not accom-
panied by a functional reform that would have reassigned administrative 
tasks and functions among the administrative levels.  
Following the last reform of counties in 1994 the new administrative 
structures of 2011 foresees 6 instead 12 counties und 2 instead 6 non-county 
cities. The new formed counties in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (3811 km²) 
have an average size that is the double of the Land with the second largest 
counties (Brandenburg).The average population of counties will be above 
200.000 inhabitants also in the year 2020 according to population projec-
tions. This is considered the required number of inhabitants in order to en-
sure an effective and efficient administration at county level. In unchanged 
territorial structures the average population of the counties would have de-
clined to 86.000 inhabitants. A major reason for the reform was the financial 
situation of non-county cities and counties which run large public deficits.  
The boundaries of the new counties resulted from the boundaries of the 
previously existing counties that were merged. Only in one case the territory 
of a former county was split and its territorial parts were integrated in two 
different new counties. Whereas the cities of Rostock and Schwerin retained 
non-county cities, four out of the six non-county cities also became part of a 
county and were granted the status of “large city in the county”. For the latter 
cities this means a downgrade of their former status. However, the four cities 
became the administration center of the county. Moreover, the cities still per-
form functions such as the ones of the building inspection office and monu-
ment conservation that are in principle tasks of the county, but are of partic-
ular importance for urban development. Tasks of planning, decision-making, 
execution and control concerning the entire area of the county are performed 
by the county administration. A particular problem in implementation of the 
reform is the transfer of assets of a non-county city to the county because in 
exchange of the asset transfer compensation has to be negotiated and 
granted. In practice this concerns school buildings, refuse collection services 
                                               
6  Kommunalverfassung Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, § 1 Abs. 3.  
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and local public transport. Further practical problems are related to the trans-
fer of staff from the former jurisdictions to the new ones and to the costs 
resulting from the reform as removals and from renting enlarged office prem-
ises in some cities.  
Interesting to note is that the non-county cities which were integrated in 
counties have a status similar to a non-county city in the local financial equal-
ization scheme. This potentially leads to higher transfer payments to those 
cities as the assumed financial needs are larger by definition. The cities that 
were seating the county administration in the previous territorial structures 
receive consolidation grants as compensation.  
The citizens were involved in the reform as they decided on the new coun-
ties’ names in referendum at 4 September 2012. The involvements’ aim was 
to support a debate among citizens about the counties and to achieve a 
higher degree of citizen’s identification with the new counties.  
The territorial reform was accompanied by intense discussions on the is-
sue whether sparsely populated counties which cover a large territory do not 
represent an impediment against voluntary political participation of citizens. 
So the voluntary political engagement of citizens for instance as selected 
members of the county council could suffer from long road distances to go in 
order to participate in council meetings. Another question related to the is-
sue how the presence of the public administration can be sustained in the 
periphery of the county. In practice this concerns the road distance still rea-
sonable for citizens to arrive at her/his local administration office and also 
the question what alternatives could be found to permanent local adminis-
trative office (for instance mobile citizen offices, development of IT infra-
structures).  
At this point of reform implementation it remains still open whether the 
reform and the new structures of counties in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 
will be sustainable in the longer term.  
3.2  The Discussion of Territorial and Functional Reform in Brandenburg 
The second example to study is the Land of Brandenburg. Currently there is 
not yet a reform taking place (the last reform dates back to 2003) but there 
is an on-going debate on future territorial structures and on the assignment 
of functions, the opportunities to strengthen local self-administration und 
participation of citizens. Since March 2011 a Commission introduced by the 
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Landtag of Brandenburg has been elaborating concise suggestions for re-
form.7  
In the core of debate stands thereby the level of municipalities and mu-
nicipal alliances, not the level of counties as in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. 
The case of Brandenburg is different in particular in terms of demographic 
change. Since reunification Brandenburg has not lost population as other 
Eastern Länder. However, there are very heterogeneous developments within 
the Land of Brandenburg. In the areas of the Berlin-Brandenburg Metropoli-
tan area – Berlin is completely surrounded by territories of Brandenburg – we 
have seen an increase in population over the last 20 year while there are 
strong decreases in rural areas of Brandenburg.  
In Brandenburg we find the Amt introduced in 1992 as the model of mu-
nicipal alliances. In other Länder, alternative models exist such as the Ver-
bandsgemeinde or Verwaltungsgemeinschaften. An Amt in Brandenburg 
consists of up to eight alliance member municipalities. At the same level 
stand the amtsfreie Gemeinden which are larger municipalities that have an 
own administration and are not an alliance member municipality. The Amt is 
not an additional level of local self-government but is a municipal alliance 
that pursues the purpose of preserving and strengthening self-administration 
of its alliance member municipalities. If the member municipalities did not 
share the costs of a joint administration they would be too small and would 
not have sufficient financial capacity to perform its functions. The Amt in 
contrast to the model of the Verbandsgemeinde does not have a council 
elected by citizens who live in an alliance member municipalities and there-
fore does not have a immediate democratic legitimized institution.  
In the reform of territorial structures of 2003 it was determined that an 
Amt or amtsfreie Gemeinde should have at least 5.000 inhabitants in order 
to secure the financing of an effective and efficient public administration. In 
light of demographic changes as of today 14 of 53 Ämter have a number of 
inhabitants below this threshold, in 2030 it can be expected that 28 Ämter 
will have less than 5.000 inhabitants.8 In comparison with the thresholds set 
for municipal alliances in other Länder, the threshold of 5.000 inhabitants 
seems low as they are usually in a range of 10.000 – 12.000 inhabitants. How-
ever in Brandenburg we find already today areas that have extremely sparsely 
                                               
7  Enquete-Kommission „Kommunal- und Landesverwaltung – bürgernah, effektiv und 
zukunftsfest – Brandenburg“ (EK 5/2) eingesetzt am 15. März 2011.  
8  Landesamt für Bauen und Verkehr (LBV) Brandenburg (2012): Bevölkerungsvoraus-
schätzung 2011 bis 2030. Ämter und amtsfreie Gemeinden des Landes Brandenburg. 
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populated. In the amtsfreie Gemeinde Groß Pankow only 16 persons live per 
square kilometer.  
In Brandenburg a high number of the administrative budgets of Ämter and 
smaller amtsfreie Gemeinden are in the red. In future this situation is ex-
pected to deteriorate further as particularly rural areas will be hit hard by de-
clines in population. For these reasons Brandenburg is looking for more ef-
fective and efficient territorial structures than today and a structure of tasks 
and responsibilities among administrative divisions in order to realize econ-
omies of scale and scope to the largest extent possible. The objective of the 
new administrative and territorial structures is to raise the degree of capacity 
utilization of existing infrastructures but also to keep a close-to-citizen and 
citizen centered public administration.  
The question in Brandenburg is which model of municipalities’ alliances is 
best to meet those requirements:  
One option discussed is the reorganization of Ämter in ordinary munici-
palities. In such a model the alliance member municipalities would lose their 
status as municipality and would be merged with other ones to form a new 
municipality. They would be become districts of the new formed municipality. 
The councils of the up to eight alliance member municipalities in the Amt 
would be replaced by the council of the new formed municipality. This reform 
option may have advantages arising from savings that result from the abol-
ishment of the individual political councils but may have the disadvantage of 
giving up political self-administration from the perspective of the merged al-
liance member municipalities. It may be more difficult to enforce political in-
terests that are district related in a larger council. In the new formed struc-
tures it also may be more difficult to achieve political compromises in the 
council if the interests of the former alliance member municipalities had di-
verse and heterogeneous interests.  
The second option policy makers in Brandenburg discuss is the introduc-
tion of the model of the Verbandsgemeinde. In this model the alliance mem-
ber municipalities are kept as legally and political independent territorial 
units. At the same time the Verbandsgemeinde itself is a self-administration 
territorial unit from legal viewpoint. In contrast to the Amt the Verbandsge-
meinde has an elected representation of citizens. The Verbandsgemeinde 
therefore has a higher level of democratic legitimization than the Amt. How-
ever, with an increasing number of alliance member municipalities the bur-
den from coordinating and decision making significantly increases. Rhine-
land-Palatinate where the largest Verbandsgemeinde has more than 50 alli-
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ance member municipalities serves as negative example. One should there-
fore consider a maximum number of alliance member municipalities in order 
to reduce burdens from political coordination.  
A third alternative discussed are mergers of existing Ämter. The idea is 
that Ämter with a larger population could be sufficiently effective and effi-
cient that they could also perform functions that are in most Länder per-
formed at the county level. Consequently, additional tasks could be delegated 
from counties to Ämter. The problem in this respect is that a larger extent of 
tasks performed by the Amt requires a democratic controlled supervision. 
The performance of tasks would otherwise not be adequately democratically 
legitimized. The model of the Amt that has a council only consisting of the 
mayors of its alliance member municipalities would have some limits in this 
respect.  
All three models of alliance member municipalities have in common that 
there is a discussion on the minimum population a municipalities and the al-
liance member municipalities should at least have in order to ensure an ef-
fective and efficient public administration. However, the determination of a 
minimum number of inhabitants crucially depends on the administrative 
tasks to be performed at this level.  
The future will show whether Brandenburg decides for one of the options 
outlined above. 
4.  Summary 
Currently we can observe discussions on the implementation of territorial re-
forms in a number of Länder. Territorial reforms are often accompanied by 
reforms in the assignment of functions. We can see territorial reforms in par-
ticular in those Länder which have faced a decline in population due to mi-
gration and which are therefore particularly hit by demographic change and 
decreasing financial resources at the same time.  
The types of territorial reforms differ between Länder. This is not only true 
for the choice of the reform model but also relates to the issue how Länder 
implement the reforms. The trend, however, is heading in the direction of 
larger, both in terms of population and area, administrative units. To this end 
most Länder have set financial incentives for amalgamations and mergers of 
municipalities on a voluntary base, they have introduced so-called wedding 
gifts for municipality mergers. 
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While the topic of sustainable territorial structures was for the time being 
on the agenda of the Eastern Länder, it is arriving also the Western German 
area states in light of demographic change. Also there, a number of Länder 
discuss different reform options, in Rhineland-Palatinate a reform of munici-
pal alliances (Model of Verbandsgemeinden) is currently underway. 
Even though there are reform efforts in order to retain an effective and 
efficient public administration in times of demographic changes, we do not 
know much about the success of the implemented reforms. One can refer to 
an evaluation gap in this area. Questions such as whether the reforms led to 
the expected outcomes or resulted in savings over time cannot be clearly an-
swered and are left for further research. Empirical evidence of 13 different 
models in 13 area states in Germany suggests that finding a clear answer to 
the question of optimal territorial structures is not trivial. Also the two exam-
ples have shown that the search for solutions is still ongoing. A good reform 
design should, this is can be leant from reform experiences, take into consid-
eration a multidimensional approach that incorporates territorial structures 
but also the assignment of tasks and the financial relations. In order to find 
an adequate reform design, the involvement of stakeholders such as citizens 
can be a factor to make a reform work.   
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Functional and Territorial Reform in Rhineland-Palatinate - Recent 
Issues and Lessons learned 
Gunnar SCHWARTING1 
I.  Introduction 
On September 28th 2010 two very important reform laws passed the parlia-
ment of Rhineland-Palatinate. The first concerned the rearrangement of tasks 
and duties mainly between state and local level (“functional reform”). The 
second contained steps towards a territorial reform. The two types of reform 
are shown in Figure 24.1. 
 
Fig. 24.1: Types of Reform 
 
 
Source:  Own illustration 
                                               
1  This article expresses only the personal views of the author. He thanks for very helpful 
comments Jesse P. Lehrke from the German Research Institute for Public Administra-
tion Speyer. 
Type
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276 
 
Functional reforms can take place within one level or between different lev-
els. Examples of functional reforms within one level are the bundling of duties 
in one single administration or, on the other hand, their unbundling, though 
the latter is quite rare. However, usually functional reforms are supposed to 
be top-down, i.e. from the state to mostly the county level. Sometimes a shift 
of tasks from the counties to the municipalities can be observed as well. Im-
portantly, the transfer of tasks calls for sufficient administrative capacity to 
exist on the receiving end. 
Territorial reforms can even be made without changing the boundaries of 
local authorities through establishing institutions for closer cooperation. This 
is the case if one (or more) inter-local bodies are charged with the provision 
of specific public services. Thereby, a new authority is created. Inter-local co-
operation is long known concept.2 In most cases however, it is developed vol-
untarily. 
Yet for most scholars territorial reforms are connected with amalgama-
tions. This process can be done by looking at all local authorities (in Germany 
even the counties3) - but a partial approach is possible too. Examples of this 
are found in the new Länder where the boundaries of the counties were 
changed (in some cases even twice) in recent years. The territorial reform in 
Rhineland-Palatinate follows a partial approach in another sense. It includes 
the municipalities while leaving aside the county-level (see red circle in Fig-
ure 1). Territorial reforms can be forced by law but voluntary amalgamation 
has also occurred several times. Rhineland-Palatinate intended to follow both 
paths. 
In most Western Länder of Germany the last fundamental reform includ-
ing functional and territorial aspects took place in the early seventies of the 
last century. Further functional reforms followed and many isolated reforms 
could be observed both on the state and the local level. 
Considering the state level there were three important developments in 
Rhineland-Palatinate: 
• the outsourcing of the construction office and the road authority to public 
enterprises; 
• the spatial concentration of state administrations for specific purposes, 
e.g. the forest offices; 
• some changes in the budget, e.g. the development of a pension fund. 
                                               
2  See the article on inter-local cooperation below. 
3  If the county level is mentioned this includes the county-free cities too. 
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Local administrations – not only in Rhineland-Palatinate – have been influ-
enced by the paradigm of New Public Management (NPM) since the 1990’s. 
Following the principles of NPM new organizational structures as well as a 
more flexible budgets resulted. Moreover, customer-oriented service provi-
sion became common in public offices over time. The latest reform was the 
introduction of accrual accounting into local bookkeeping, a framework fun-
damentally new for the local budgeting process. 
II.  Framework of the Reform 
The need for a new fundamental reform4 was obvious. During the discussion 
on the 4th development program 2008-2018 for Rhineland-Palatinate future 
challenges mainly arising from demographic change played a prominent role. 
At the beginning of the reform process the former minister of the interior, 
Karl-Peter Bruch,5 therefore drew attention to the following points that call 
for a new structure of local authorities: 
• demographic change will occur throughout the Land, though, of course 
with different intensities,6  
• that the fiscal crisis of the public sector will see high and fast increasing 
short-term debt in many local authorities,7  
• the changes in public services and public service provision, and 
• the possibilities provided by new information and communication tech-
niques 
Other goals to be reached were a better quality of local public services, pro-
vision of public services through ways and means (“close to the people”) and 
                                               
4   For an overview see M. Wallerath, Steuerung des Wandels durch kommunale Gebiets- 
und Funktionalreformen – Zur aktuellen Kommunal- und Verwaltungsreform in 
Rheinland-Pfalz, DÖV 64 (2011), p. 289ff. This paper refers mainly to the literature 
about the reform process in Rhineland-Palatinate. 
5  S. K.P. Bruch, Die Kommunal- und Verwaltungsreform in Rheinland-Pfalz, in: K. Beck/J. 
Ziekow, Mehr Bürgerbeteiligung wagen, Wiesbaden 2011, S. 137f. 
6  The county of Bitburg-Prüm for instance will lose about 5% of its population until 
2020 while the county of Mainz-Bingen still will grow by 3,2% in the same period. But 
in both counties the share of people aged more than 65 will raise between 2020 and 
2035 by nearly 50%. 
7  The mean short-term debt (for current purposes) per capita has now (mid-2011) 
reached 1.400 Euro; it exceeds long-term investment related debt. 
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improved possibilities for citizen participation in public affairs.8 These con-
siderations correspond to similar reform agendas in other Länder. 9  
In addition the development of the new reform must be seen in light of 
spatial, social and economic structures that have developed over the last four 
decades, i.e. since the last territorial reforms: 
• New traffic routes that allow for more dispersed settlement of people and 
that have led in turn to growing commuter flows; 
• Working conditions have changed rapidly (e.g. flexible work schedules, 
home office);  
• The improvement of traffic connections have opened up new economic 
opportunities in some regions;10 
• The importance of the industrial sector has declined; some sectors such as 
the shoe industry have disappeared completely;11  
• The service sector has become dominant; within this sector tourism has 
become increasingly important, which calls for specific and new infra-
structure;  
• The migration mainly of younger people and families to the suburbs that 
has been ongoing for a long time has led to a lot of spillover-effects that 
are not (fully) compensated for by fees or grants (“Suburban-Central City 
Exploitation”);  
                                               
8  The reform process was accompanied by two scientific expertises: M. Junkernhein-
rich/J. Ziekow, Begleitende Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung zu den Entwürfen des Ersten 
und Zweiten Landesgesetzes zur Kommunal- und Verwaltungsreform in Rheinland-
Pfalz 2010, and J.J. Hesse, Gutachterliche Stellungnahme zur Kommunal- und Verwal-
tungsreform in Rheinland-Pfalz 2010.  Both studies can be found at 
www.isim.rlp.de/staedte-und-gemeinden/kommunal-und-verwaltungsreform/ge-
bietsreform/  
9  See for Brandenburg S. Kuhlmann/P. Richter/Ch. Schwab/D. Zeitz, Kommunal- und 
Verwaltungsreform: Optionen zur Neugestaltung der Gemeindeebene in Branden-
burg, Speyerer Forschungsberichte 270 (2012), p. 5f. 
10  One good example is Montabaur, a small town beneath the railway track for the high-
speed train between Frankfurt and Cologne. Montabaur got a railway station; as a re-
sult commuters could reach either Francfort or Cologne in half an hour. 
11  A good description of development in a shrinking city in Rhineland-Palatinate is given 
by J. Bauer, Stadtentwicklung – Stadtumbau  vor dem Hintergrund der demographi-
schen Entwicklung in Pirmasens, in: Deutsch-Französisches Institut/Wüstenrot-Stif-
tung, Demographie und Stadtentwicklung: Beispiele aus Deutschland und Frankreich, 
Ludwigsburg 2006, p. 205ff. 
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• In addition: the now widely accepted ideas of sustainable growth call for a 
cautious and thought out of land, therefore suburban sprawl has become 
highly criticized;  
• Many problems and challenges cannot be met within the boundaries of a 
small municipality; thus bigger entities or more cooperation between mu-
nicipalities are needed.  
• Last but not least, due to the rising complexity of public service provision 
local administrations require a well-skilled labor force and are a facing 
shrinking work-force. 
At this point I should mention the fundamental (and still common) paradigms 
of spatial planning in Germany: The principle of equivalent living conditions 
as mentioned in Article 72 of the German Constitution. This does not mean 
equality in every aspect; but the sum of all elements of living conditions 
should not differ too much. The second paradigm is the theory of Central 
Places.12  
Following the principle of equivalent living conditions has (often) led to 
widespread inter- and intra-regional transfers (“giving money by the watering 
can”). However, faced with demographic change and the fiscal crisis in all 
public budgets it has become increasingly difficult to ensure equivalent living 
conditions through financial means. 
III.  Optimum size of Local Authorities 
The conditions for reforms are quite different between the German Länder. 
Rhineland-Palatinate – a middle sized Land with a population of 4 million – is 
slightly different from other Länder. Even after the territorial reform of the 
seventies it has the highest number of municipalities in relation to its popu-
lation. There are more than 2.300 municipalities – among them more than 
1.000 with a population of less than 500 and only 33 with a population of 
more than 10.000. So in Rhineland-Palatinate the local sector is very small-
sized – even the counties have on average less than 50% of the population of 
an average of an average North Rhine-Westphalian county.  
One of the fundamental theoretical problems of territorial reforms yet to 
be solved is the optimum size of a municipality.13 Economies of scale have to 
                                               
12  The alternative would be a concentration on growth poles or metropolitan areas com-
bined with the assumption that their development will spread into the hinterland. 
13  See Kuhlmann et al. (Fn.   ), p. 55ff. 
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be considered, though so do diseconomies of large scale.14 A simple assump-
tion is that the costs of public service-production follow a u-shaped curve. 
But economics is not everything. For a lot of public duties (e.g. water supply) 
physical conditions such as the topography determine the best scale of the 
service; other duties must be seen through the eyes of the customers – e.g. 
touristic regions which do not correspond to administrative boundaries. The 
Rhine Valley might be a good example with many counties having parts of 
their area on the borders of the river and parts in its hinterland. The conse-
quence is (often) the formation of organizations spanning or overlapping sev-
eral counties resulting in a lot of coordination-problems and occasionally also 
some transaction costs.15  
In another study Martin Junkernheinrich highlights the following aspects 
for determining a good (not an optimum) size for local authorities:16  
• Efficiency (low production and transaction costs) 
• Taking into account the preferences of citizens 
• Mapping of functions and space (“principle of perfect mapping”) 
• Adequate performance with respect to social, economic and demographic 
aspects 
• Sufficient compensation of disparities with respect to resources and po-
tentials 
In a political sense optimum size is the best balance between the (political 
and administrative) capacity to handle local problems and the distance be-
tween citizens and the political or professional actors. Therefore, in some 
Länder very small municipalities are linked together in associations of munic-
ipalities with their own professional staff while big cities are divided into sev-
eral (more or less autonomous) parts. Already at the beginning of the reform 
process in Rhineland-Palatinate it was clear that the existence of even the 
very small municipalities should be untouched.17 There could be voluntary 
                                               
14  See e.g. the considerations of B. Tarkan, Die kommunale Gebietsreform auf der Ebene 
der Landkreise in Rheinland-Pfalz, Kaiserslautern 2009, p. 95. 
15  Some considerations can be found in B. Tarkan (fn 6), p. 127ff. 
16  M. Junkernheinrich et al., Neuabgrenzung leistungsfähiger Gemeindegebiete 2011, 
p. 36, to be found at www.isim.rlp.de/staedte-und-gemeinden/kommunal-und-ver-
waltungsreform/gebietsreform/ 
17  For a critical view see H. Wollmann, Das aktuelle rheinland-pfälzische Reformprojekt 
im Kontext und Vergleich der Kommunalreformen in Deutschland, in: K. Beck/J. Zie-
kow, Mehr Bürgerbeteiligung wagen, Wiesbaden 2011, p. 184. 
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mergers between such municipalities of course but the fundamental struc-
ture should remain. As the Minister of the Interior said: “…municipalities 
guarantee fast decisions close to the citizen. In the municipalities there is 
very large voluntary engagement.”18  This expresses the firm conviction not 
only of the minister himself but of all leading politicians in Rhineland-Palati-
nate. 
As Figure 2 suggests there is no consensus about the minimum size of 
local authorities in the Länder – let alone some defined optimum (figure 2). 
 
Fig. 24.2: Recommended Minimum Size of Local Authorities 
Land Inhabitants 
Saxony-Anhalt 10.000 
Rhineland-Palatinate 10.00019 
Lower Saxony 7.000 
Brandenburg 5.000 
 
Although there is no clear evidence about an optimum size, the government 
of Rhineland-Palatinate did fix a minimum size for the associations of munic-
ipalities. The lower limit is set at a population of 10.000 to 12.000. This is a 
little bit less than recommended by the experts.20  
IV.  Functional Reform in Rhineland-Palatinate 
 – systematic or piecemeal? 
For functional reforms there should first be a critical analysis of tasks and 
duties to determinate which ones could be eliminated, changed or trans-
ferred to the local level. If a transfer to the local level is decided upon then 
the second step must be an analysis of the administrative capacities of the 
different local authorities. Thus, functional and territorial reforms are linked 
quite closely together. If the functional reform takes place in the first step 
                                               
18  K.P.Bruch (fn 1), p. 142, own translation. 
19  12.000 for Associations of Municipalities. 
20  See M. Junkernheinrich/J. Ziekow (Fn.   ), p. 2. 
282 
 
then the given administrative capacities define how many duties can be 
shifted to which level of local authorities. To get an idea of the consequences 
a reform has some pilot studies should be of use.  
The second reform law in Rhineland-Palatinate which embodied the func-
tional reform did not follow this very simple path. The first draft of the law 
contained 33 duties to be transferred to the local level many of them from 
the Ministry of the Interiors’ sphere of responsibility. The number seemed too 
low so the ministries were requested to add more duties to the list. In the end 
a total of 64 duties was reached. But the composition of the so called “64-
list” seemed to be an arbitrary selection. Moreover: In some cases the activi-
ties to be transferred were those which were quite unpopular in the minis-
tries or corresponding state offices.  
On top of this, sometimes the principle of efficiency was heavily violated, 
as when an activity done by one person in a state office was transferred to 36 
counties and county-free cities. Fortunately the 36 counties and county-free 
cities agreed that one administration should fulfil the task for all others and 
so, in effect, there was no change. However, the transfer of duties from the 
state to the local level did raise the need to levy charges for the service from 
the other local authorities within the conunty. 
Because of the small size of local authorities in Rhineland-Palatinate, the 
destination of the transfers was mainly the county level. The administrative 
capacities of the municipalities were (and will remain) mostly too small to 
take over many new duties. The (possible) complementary process of transfer 
of duties from the counties to the municipalities did not take place. So the 
counties can be said to be the winners in this race. For example, while in other 
Länder like North-Rhine-Westphalia the (much bigger) communities are re-
sponsible for such services as secondary schooling, this was and still is a duty 
of the county level in Rhineland-Palatinate. 
V.  Territorial Reform – first voluntary then forced? 
The territorial reform was limited not only by the existence-guarantee given 
to the small municipalities. In addition, the borders of the counties – and con-
sequently – of the county-free cities were not to be touched. Thus, the reform 
was focused on the level of the associations of municipalities and the smaller 
towns. The government sought mainly to encourage the merger of two such 
associations or of a town with its neighboring association. The first case of 
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this type was the merger of the town of Cochem with its neighboring associ-
ation resulting in a new association of municipalities with Cochem as one of 
them. To date four more voluntary amalgamations have followed.21 Based on 
this low number, it cannot be said that this is a big success of this way to 
reform administrative structures. 
The exclusion of counties and county-free cities has been heavily criti-
cized by the experts who assessed the reform.22 The creation of better struc-
tures for counties and county-free cities will be hindered when the associa-
tions of municipalities get their new shape. Sometimes the merger of two 
municipalities failed only because they are in different counties. Another def-
icit of this partial approach is the missing solution for the core city-suburb 
problems. The possibility to lower these problems, the incorporation of 
neighboring municipalities, seems to be blocked for a long time. So the terri-
torial reform in Rhineland-Palatinate goes only half of the way required if it 
is to address the issues that inspired the reform in the first place. 
The law defines two phases of the reform. In the first phase voluntary mer-
gers are possible – the partners are not set by the law and instead municipal-
ities can choose (if possible) between their various neighbors. Of course they 
had to respect the boundaries of counties. This phase is supported by the 
government with financial aid (“wedding incentives”: grants, debt-relief, sub-
sidies for merging costs etc.). The voluntary phase ended according to the law 
in 2012, for every merger an own law was decreed. Later forced mergers 
should follow as the law suggested.  
But if this had been done as rigorous as stated by the law political prob-
lems were expected, as some municipalities have recently seen initiatives and 
ballots on the issue. In all cases the citizens voted for independence and re-
jected forced mergers. The votes given in the local ballots show that many 
citizens were not content with proposed mergers despite the participatory 
results during the reform process itself. Evidently, as the discussion reached 
their home and became real, local sensitivities prevailed.  
Yet the possibility for forced mergers remained because the law was left 
unchanged. But at the time this chapter was last updated, the time schedule 
for the territorial reform has been revised – fusions should be decided upon 
now but need not be completed until 2019. This hesitation might be a result 
                                               
21  See the enumeration of the Ministry on the site: www.isim.rlp.de/staedte-und-ge-
meinden/kommunal-un-verwaltungsreform/gebietsreform/ (read 8.6.2013). 
22  See M. Wallerath (fn 2), p. 291. 
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of the political situation. No one denied the need for reform, but unfortu-
nately there was no cross-party consensus about the type of reform. The op-
position rejected the reform because of its inconsistency. While the earlier 
reform of the seventies was supported by both the then leading parties, the 
Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, this was not the case this 
time around. From time to time, the opposition called for a halt in the reform 
process to reconsider the basic principles, but the government wanted to 
bring the reform to an end before the next election in 2016. The delay of the 
reform (which should be completed in 2014 originally) cannot be interpreted 
as real solution to the impasse.   
VI.  Reform process – Citizens could participate 
One aspect of the reform process in Rhineland-Palatinate is unique and dif-
fers from many other similar projects; namely that it includes strong partici-
patory elements (Figure 3).23 It is one of the first approaches to involve citi-
zens in a complex issue like functional and territorial reform. 
 
  
                                               
23  For a short description see U. Sarcinelli, Bürgerbeteiligung im Rahmen der Kommunal- 
und Verwaltungsreform (KVR), Ergebnisse der wissenschaftlichen Begleitforschung, 
in: K. Beck/J. Ziekow (Hrsg.), Mehr Bürgerbeteiligung wagen, Wiesbaden 2011, p. 
149ff. 
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Fig. 24.3: Time Lapse of the Reform Process 
 
Source:  Own illustration 
 
At the beginning, information was shared and discussions were held with the 
political representatives of all local authorities regardless of whether or not 
they were directly affected. The second step was the inclusion of citizens. In 
April and May 2008, five regional forums were organized in which 800 people 
took part. Then, in June 2008 six four-day workshops were held with 25 par-
ticipants each (“Planungszelle”). The topics of their discussions were:24  
• Duties of modern local authorities and administrations 
• Sustainable territorial structures 
                                               
24  See www.buergerkongresse.rlp.de/die-buergerbeteiligung/die-planungszellen.de 
(read 8.6.2013) 
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• Service provision close to the citizens and new forms of inter-local coop-
eration 
The participation ended with a representative survey by telephone interviews 
with 10.000 citizens; in addition citizens could give their comments via the 
internet.25 Some of the main results of the survey were 
• The majority (63%) supported the reform process;26  
• 35% accepted territorial changes for their home municipality while 24% 
rejected; 
• Only 36% were interested in participating in the reform process them-
selves. 
One interesting result of this participatory way– which was not expected by 
everyone – was that citizens were not out of their depths even when con-
fronted with a complex theme such as administrative reform. 
Therefore the goals of the reform resulting in the two already mentioned 
laws were influenced by the opinions of the citizens. They made a lot of de-
tailed proposals especially concerning the quality of local public services but 
they also rejected radical reforms. This result was not very surprising but the 
government felt vindicated that it was on the right path. 
VII.   Outlook 
At the moment the reform does not give many answers on how to meet the 
challenges of the future. Many pressing questions are open: 
- How should services be provided for an ageing society? Are mobile offices 
a good answer? 
- How can private services such as medical care, grocery stores and so on, 
be guaranteed? 
- How can local public services be financed in the future with a (possibly) 
declining tax base? 
- How can local public administrations conserve and improve their profes-
sional quality? 
                                               
25  The results were published by  Polis-Sinus,  Kommunal- und Verwaltungsreform – Aus-
wertung der online-Befragung, München 2009. 
26  For the results see Polis-Sinus, Repräsentativbefragung im Rahmen der Bürgerbeteili-
gung zur Kommunal- und Verwaltungsreform, München 2009, pp. 41, 36 and 32. 
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- How can suburban sprawl be reduced and inner-cities (as well as inner-
municipalities) be strengthened? 
- How can cooperation – if mergers are not possible or not wanted – be 
strengthened? 
Moreover, there is quite substantial migration into some cities, mostly along 
the river Rhine. The need to find solutions for the challenges these cities face 
(housing, traffic, schools etc.) is urgent. This would seem to call for the inclu-
sion of the cities in the reform process, but – as discussed – this is not the 
case. 
Instead the Government announced a follow-up phase for the counties 
and the cities.27 Regarding the counties the main question might be their re-
duction from the current 24 to perhaps 12 or even less. However, one con-
straint is a recent decision of the High Court of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
In this Land, the government wanted to form very big counties. The High 
Court found that the single representative of the county council would not 
be able to be well-informed enough about such a big entity. For the govern-
ment of Rhineland-Palatinate this was one of the arguments used to justify 
the original exclusion of the county-level. 
The intended next phase for the cities is much more difficult. If their sur-
rounding municipalities have merged into bigger entities then there seems 
to be no possibility to extend the city borders. In addition, what might happen 
– as was the case in Hessen – is the incorporation of the smaller county-free 
cities (7 cities) into the neighboring county with the resulting loss of their 
former status. What then would be the outlook for the remaining 5 county-
free cities must be questioned. 
Thus, the Association of Cities Rhineland-Palatinate has proposed what it 
sees as a better solution – the formation of a city-county around a given city. 
The municipalities in this area will not lose their autonomy but a lot of local 
services could be delivered by the core city. This might lead to economies of 
scale and might reduce city-suburban conflicts. Broadly speaking this model 
is a bit similar to the “communautés urbaines” in France. 
But perhaps something completely different will happen: After the ongo-
ing reform maybe no second step of reform will follow. Instead there might 
be many incremental steps much as was seen in the last decades. This trend 
could be observed even during the ongoing reform. Despite all the compre-
                                               
27  See K.P.Bruch (fn 3), p. 146f. 
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hensive considerations about a good and sustainable administrative struc-
ture for Rhineland-Palatinate in the future, and despite the process of admin-
istrative and territorial reform, the Land changed the system of secondary 
schools fundamentally, with responsibility for all secondary schools trans-
ferred to the counties. It is not unlikely that similar things will happen in the 
future. 
What are the main lessons learned from the ongoing reform process in 
Rhineland-Palatinate? 
- A fundamental ex-ante analysis is needed. 
- Alternatives should be considered. 
- A partial reform is not recommended. 
- The challenges of the future need sustainable solutions. 
- Even a fundamental reform can be informed by participation of citizens.  
Unfortunately, it seems too late to give the reform in Rhineland-Palatinate 
another, better direction. The now completed new structures might endure 
long a time, perhaps another 40 years.  
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Benchmarking and Comparisons of Performance  
of Local Governments in Germany  
– Approaches, Advantages and Side Effects  1 
Tim JÄKEL 
1.  Introduction 
“Imagine a world without statistics. 
Government would fumble in the dark […]  
and electorates would struggle to hold their political leaders to ac-
count”  
(The Economist Feb 25th – March 2nd, p. 12 “Don’t lie to me Ar-
gentina”) 
 
“It’s a competitive world; 
everything counts in large amounts” 
(Depeche Mode: Everything counts. Construction Time Again, 
1983) 
 
The measurement of government performance is as old as modern bureau-
cratic government itself (Williams 2003; Heinrich 2007). This trend acceler-
ated in the late 1980s when benchmarking was imported as a management 
tool from the private sector in order to enhance efficiency in the public sec-
tor. The measurement of performance and its comparison became a popular 
aspect of the modernization of public administration. Since then the wave of 
                                               
1  A previous versions of this article has been presented at the Conference “Converging 
and Conflicting Trends in the Public Administration of the US, Europe, and Germany”, 
Speyer, July 19-20, 2012. I would like to thank Margrit Seckelmann, Elena Semenova, 
Sergio Fernandez, David Moynihan, Daniel L. Smith, and Jesse Paul Lehrke for their 
very helpful comments and suggestions. 
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New Public Management has abated. We are now aware not only of the vir-
tues but also the flaws which come along with the extensive measurement 
and comparison of performance in the public sector (de Bruijn 2002). None-
theless, local practitioners and politicians are in need of reliable information 
about the efficiency and the quality of the services provided by their munici-
palities, especially in the current era of austerity. 
Benchmarking is used to measure and to compare the performance of a 
given local government against that of its peers, generally by using policy-
related indicators. Take as an example the costs for the disposal of a ton of 
household waste (in any currency), which is typically used as proxy for the 
cost-efficiency of local waste management. Or take for instance the average 
waiting time at your local town-hall if you want to register, for instance, as a 
new resident. This can be used as an indicator for the quality of service deliv-
ery. However, normally performance indicators seem to be more about cost 
and outputs than about quality and impacts, simply because cost-related data 
are much easy to gather than information on the quality and impact of ad-
ministrative actions.  
Benchmarking is not necessarily equal to inspections, and it is also differ-
ent from performance management, although they share some similarities: 
In the first instance you have to measure performance, in whatever terms. 
What makes benchmarking so special is that you compare the performance 
of one local unit against that of its peers. Yet you do not have to do that 
through an inspection (though you can, of course, if you like). 
The way performance is compared and benchmarked among local govern-
ments varies widely across the OECD-world (Kuhlmann/Jäkel 2013). While a 
number of empirical studies around the world deal with the use of data per-
formance measures in state agencies and different layers of government, 
there has been only limited research on the factors behind the engagement 
in voluntary benchmarking activities. It is commonly held that there are two 
main benefits of doing so: the first being the prevention of under-perfor-
mance, and the second being improvement of performance. Benchmarking 
can make you aware of potential risks, which in turn will help you to make the 
right decisions (risk-assessments, or risk-management). A second major vir-
tue is that the members of a benchmarking-club, i.e. local practitioners and 
decision-makers, share knowledge about innovative solution which enables 
them to learn from each other (see Behn 2007). 
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2.  Compulsory performance benchmarking 
It's is helpful to distinguish between statutory local inspections and perfor-
mance assessments and voluntary benchmarking activities of local authori-
ties. The former plays a minor role in Germany due to federalism and a strong 
tradition of local self-government. In only in two (out of 16) German states, 
namely North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse, does the court of audit assess 
and compare the performance of all local entities on a compulsory basis to 
ensure that money is spent properly and a high quality of local public services 
is achieved. The court of audit in the state of Hesse introduced these bench-
marking schemes already in 1994; in North-Rhine-Westphalia the audit office 
started its work in 2003. Local authorities are subject to a policy-related com-
parative performance assessment every 3 to 5 years; major cities also see an 
annual review of their finances. The indicators that are used to measure and 
rank performance are defined by the state agency and the court of audit re-
spectively. In North Rhine-Westphalia, by far the largest German state by 
population, current values of performance indicators are compared against a 
given benchmark. In both states statutory performances assessments come 
at the rather moderate cost of about 4 million Euro per year. While in Hesse 
the state government bears the complete costs, local authorities in North 
Rhine-Westphalia have to pay audit fees. 
Statutory performance assessments are usually associated with a number 
of major flaws: They possibly lead to unintended behavior by the reviewed 
party that contradicts the initial purpose of improvement. Local actors may 
focus their attention and policy-actions on the performance indicators they 
know the reviewers will look at. This might come at the expense of local pref-
erences, which may differ from those of the state level. Another unintended 
side-effect is the shifting of focus to relatively trivial issues in order to gain a 
good ranking. In particular this will occur when league tables and values of 
performance indicators are linked to financial and administrative sanctions. 
While shifting of preferences is a rather subtle process, window dressing and 
cream skimming and cheating are offensive reactions to unpopular control 
from above, widely known as "teaching to the test" in the context of stand-
ardized educational tests. Local authorities usually state that compulsory re-
view of their performance increases red tape and results in opportunity costs, 
further squeezing their time and staff which would be better used providing 
public services. Furthermore, the review often does not tell them anything 
new, as local decision-makers are usually already aware of their problems but 
often lack the fiscal or administrative means to fix them. 
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The empirical evidence from Germany is mixed. Neither window dressing 
nor cheating is a problem, as courts of audit lack formal rights to impose fiscal 
or administrative sanctions for underperformance. Furthermore, there is no 
urgent need for local authorities to play with the numbers, as the audit office 
in North Rhine-Westphalia is rather cautious when it comes to the reporting 
of the results. Only top-performers are named on its website, while the lower 
sections of the league tables are hid. This is a strategy intended to avoid pub-
lic shaming and demoralizing local actors. This can be evidence that, although 
compulsory, local performance benchmarking might follow a mixture of hier-
archic and coordinated mode of governance. The court of audit in Hesse is 
much more direct in the wording of its findings and ensures a high level of 
transparency to the broad public. Summary reports and rankings of all assess-
ments are published annually. 
The audit agencies typically refer to saving potentials which can be iden-
tified from comparable performance information, potentials which can be re-
alized through actions in the right situation. The audit agency of North Rhine-
Westphalia refers to the example of a local government in which a savings 
potential of roughly 900,000 Euro could be realized, a conclusion based on 
its benchmarking results and subsequent consultations. In other cities the 
audits uncovered saving potentials in terms of human resources, resulting in 
the local executives publicly proclaiming the realization of these saving as an 
objective. Data acquired from these benchmarking activities thus may give 
political decision-makers evidence-based legitimization for budgetary cuts 
vis-à-vis the citizens and the local administration.  
Yet the major problem is to turn performance information gathered by 
centralized comparative performance assessments into innovations in local 
policies that can be adopted on a broad scale. State agencies which are in 
charge of the performance assessments point to numerous examples where 
a review has led to improvements, especially in cost-efficiency. Nonetheless, 
a majority of mayors in North Rhine-Westphalia still rejects the notion that 
compulsory reviews will change decision-making and operating principles 
routines in their municipalities, this according to a survey from Ebinger and 
Bogumil (2012). 
Some 800 municipalities covering 24 million residents are facing statu-
tory benchmarking exercises in the states of North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Hesse. Taking into account that Germany has more than 11,000 municipali-
ties (with about 80 million inhabitants), compulsory exercises turn out to be 
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the smaller part of the benchmarking landscape in Germany. Instead, in Ger-
many voluntary performance comparisons through the self-management of 
local authorities dominate. 
3.  Voluntary benchmarking exercises 
There has been a wide range of voluntary benchmarking exercises at the local 
level of government since the mid-1990s. Over this time period the Associa-
tion for Local Government Management (KGSt) has hosted more than 200 
voluntary benchmarking circles, each with dozens of participants from local 
authorities, involving nearly all local government tasks. In 2010, there were 
about 720 local government bodies organized into 75 benchmarking circles 
(Kuhlmann/Jäkel 2013).  
Self-management by local authorities has its pros and cons. The use of the 
resulting performance information is totally up to the participating local au-
thorities with no threat of formal sanctions being imposed by higher levels of 
government. As a result, according to an internal survey of KGSt, a vibrant 
exchange of local experiences takes place. At other times, the implementa-
tion of a voluntary benchmarking system might be a way to ward off compul-
sory audits by state authorities and inspectors. However, because these vol-
untary comparisons are often not made publicly available, citizens struggle 
to hold their local decision-makers to account. 
Another problem locally self-managed benchmarking exercises have to 
cope with is low coverage among medium and small-sized municipalities. In 
contrast to the centralized activities discussed above it is up to individual mu-
nicipalities to decide whether or not to join a benchmarking club. Unfortu-
nately, potential transaction and opportunity costs in the short-term often 
outweigh, in the minds of municipal leaders, the mid- and long-term benefits 
from benchmarking activities. Furthermore, the financial health of a munici-
pality strongly affects the likelihood of it taking part in voluntary benchmark-
ing exercises (see below). 
4. Public debt and the use of benchmarking: An econometric analysis 
Theoretical considerations 
Taking a broad perspective, it is quite clear that the use of performance infor-
mation has several benefits for local politicians and bureaucrats. Yet in a 
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world of blame games (Hood 2010) and electoral competition, the same local 
politicians and bureaucrats also have good reasons to be cautious about pre-
senting and comparing performance information. Thus the general question 
is why some local governments participate in voluntary benchmarking pro-
jects while others do not.  
To answer this question through an empirical analysis I use data from a 
survey conducted by Joerg Bogumil, Sabine Kuhlmann and Stephan Grohs in 
2005 (Bogumil et al. 2008; Kuhlmann/Bogumil/Grohs 2008). The survey’s 
purpose was to evaluate the implementation of administrative reforms in 
Germany at the local level of government. The survey included a question on 
whether and to what extent the local authority participated in local perfor-
mance benchmarking circles or competitions with other local governments. I 
restrict my analysis to the group of unitary (single-tier) authorities (73 re-
sponses, see Table 25.1)2  
 
Tab. 25.1:  German unitary authorities: The use of performance com-
parison 
Survey question “Is 
your local authority in-
volved in inter-commu-
nal benchmarking or 
competitions?” 
Freq. N Frequency % 
Cum. Frequency 
% 
Yes, regularly 20 27.4 % 27.4 % 
Yes, occasionally 38 52.1 % 79.5 % 
Yes, rarely/no/in the 
past, but not anymore 
15 20.55 % 100.0 % 
Total 73 100% - 
Source:  Bogumil et al. (2008). 
                                               
2  There are three main types of local authorities in Germany: (a) municipalities, (b) 
counties, which comprise of a number of municipalities; and (c) larger cities (single-
tier local authorities). The main purpose of counties is to provide those public services 
that small municipalities are not able to provide by themselves. Larger cities do not 
belong to a county, which means that they perform the public tasks of both munici-
palities and counties. In 2005 there were 115 unitary (single-tier) local authorities in 
Germany, some 300 counties and more than 11,000 small and mid-sized municipali-
ties. 
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Public Debt 
The first variable of interest is the municipalities’ levels of fiscal performance, 
which is measured as debt per capita (average in 2000-2004). Theoretical ex-
pectations from the “debt per capita” variable are ambiguous. In a local au-
thority with sound public finances the top-level management may use a per-
formance comparison to promote its fiscal performance. The purpose is to 
show that – compared to other municipalities – local decision makers are do-
ing a great job. In this case the purpose is to gain output legitimacy, which is 
equivalent to gaining electoral support for the next local election. However, 
also municipalities in a bad fiscal situation could be expected to have a strong 
demand for relative performance information. Instead of advertising their 
performance, their aim is to learn from other local authorities and improve 
their fiscal performance as well as to identify saving potentials.  
Johansson and Siverbo (2009) examined the causes that lie behind the use 
of relative performance evaluations (RPE), an instrument similar to bench-
marking, in Swedish local governments. They find that a budget deficit in-
creases the likelihood of adopting RPE; the probability of observing RPE uti-
lization is thus higher in municipalities that are fiscally stressed. 
In addition to debt, local unemployment rates (UNEMP) and the number 
of welfare recipients (WELFARE) are used as proxies for socio-economic 
stress in a given municipality. 
Number of public employees 
As a control variable we include the number of public employees. In a local 
authority with a large number of employees, the problem of moral hazard will 
increase strongly. The availability of a large number of administrative staff 
leads to proper division of labor and, simultaneously, to problems typical of 
any principal-agent relationships. For this reason we expect the number of 
public employees to have a positive effect on the extent to which perfor-
mance comparison is used by a local authority. Since the relative number of 
employees differs widely even among unitary authorities, logarithmic values 
are used in the equation. 
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Ideology of the incumbent mayor 
Whether a local authority uses performance comparison or not might also 
depend on the political ideology of the incumbent mayor. Johannson and 
Siverbo (2009) find that a left-wing majority in a given Swedish municipal 
council decreases the likelihood that relative performance evaluation (RPE) 
will be adopted. Benchmarking – as part of the New Public Management doc-
trine – was imported from the private sector to enhance efficiency in the pub-
lic sector. The idea was to spur competition among (local) jurisdictions. Thus 
it could be argued that parties supporting economic liberalism – and mayors 
belonging to these parties – are more likely to use benchmarking, as they also 
support the idea of applying managerial mechanisms to the public sector. In 
contrast, left-wing parties in government may oppose management instru-
ments that are inspired by private sector strategic management.  
An Econometric Model 
To estimate the effects of different potential explanatory variables on an or-
dinal scaled variable I specify an ordered (logistic) regression model (or pro-
portional odds model)(Long/Freese 2006: 183-222):  
y* = x‘ß + ε. 
The dependent variable indicates the extent to which performance compari-
son is used: 
Yi=1  if a municipality does not or rarely compare(s) its own perfor-
mance with other municipalities (or did so in the past) 
Yi=2  if a municipality compares its own performance with other munic-
ipalities occasionally 
Yi=3  if a municipality compares its own performance with other munic-
ipalities regularly. 
Instead of y*, alternative response categories yi = m are observed, with m = 
{1, 2, 3}. The probability of an observed outcome y = m (m = 1, 2, 3) for a set 
of explanatory variables (x) equals the probability that the latent variable (y*) 
falls between the corresponding cut points / thresholds (τ):  
Pr(y = m | x) = Pr(τm-1 ≤ y* < τm | x). 
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The standard formula for the predicted probability in the proportional odds 
model is 
Pr(y = m | x) = F(τ1 – xß) – F(τm-1 - xß), 
where F is the cumulative distribution function. Six different models repre-
senting different sets of explanatory variables were estimated. The variables 
debt per capita (logarithmic values) and number of public employees (loga-
rithmic values) are included in all six models. In model 3 and 4 dummy indices 
are included: The first dummy, represented as SOCIAL, is assigned the value 
of 1 if the incumbent mayor is a member of the social democratic party and 
zero if otherwise (model 3). This variable is expected to have a negative rela-
tionship with the outcome. A second variable, named LIBERAL, also captures 
underlying ideology and takes the value of 1 if the incumbent mayor is a 
member of the Free Democratic Party, a liberal party, and zero if otherwise 
(model 4). The variable unemployment rate is included in models 3, 4 and 6. 
 
Tab. 25.2:  Explanatory variables 
PARTICIP 
1 = non-use / rare use 
2 = occasional use 
3 = frequent use  
(see Tab. 25.1) 
DEBTLOG 
= debt per capita in Euro, mean values 2000-2004 (logarithmic in 
equation) 
UNEMP = unemployment rate, mean values 2001-2004 
WELFARE 
= number of welfare recipients per 1,000 inhabitants, mean val-
ues 2001-2004 
STAFFLOG  
= number of public employees, mean values 2000-2004 (loga-
rithmic in equation) 
SOCIAL 
= dummy variable, equals 1 for incumbent mayor being a mem-
ber of the social democratic party, 0 otherwise 
LIBERAL 
= dummy variable, equals 1 for incumbent mayor being a mem-
ber of the Free Democratic Party, 0 otherwise 
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Tab. 25.3: Summary statistics explanatory variables 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard  
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
[DEBT] 72 1337.79 538.75 61.46 2811.42 
DEBTLOG 72 3.08 0.24 1.79 3.45 
UNEMP 73 11.56 4 6.15 21.38 
WELFARE 73 46.89 18.33 19.49 121.2 
[STAFF] 72 4435.82 4139.2 748 22500.2 
STAFFLOG 72 3.52 0.32 2.87 4.35 
SOCIAL 73 0.52 0.5 0 1 
LIBERAL 73 0.04 0.2 0 1 
 
 
Tab. 25.4:  Correlation matrix explanatory variables 
 DEBTLOG UNEMP WELFARE STAFFLOG 
DEBTLOG 1.000    
UNEMP -0.096 1.000   
WELFARE 0.182 0.32 1.000  
STAFFLOG 0.316 -0.113 0.295 1.000 
 
Empirical results 
The coefficients of the variable debt per capita (logarithmic values) have the 
expected negative sign in all estimated models. The estimations suggest a 
linear negative relationship between the level of fiscal stress and the willing-
ness to use performance comparison. 
Also as expected, the variable number of public employees has a positive 
sign. It indicates that larger municipalities are more likely to use benchmark-
ing regularly. However, the coefficients do not differ significantly from zero. 
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It is noteworthy that the variable unemployment rate has a significant 
positive impact on the willingness to use performance comparison. In con-
trast, while the variable number of welfare recipients per 1,000 inhabitants 
has a positive sign, it is not significant at 10 per cent level. 
 
Tab. 25.5:  Estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explanatory varia-
ble 
Dependent variable PARTICIP 
DEBTLOG 
-3.574** -
3.519** 
-
3.462** 
-
3.381** 
-3.868** -
3.507** 
(-2.46) (-2.46) (-2.34) (-2.33) (-2.56) (-2.37) 
STAFFLOG 
0.565 0.719 0.660 0.793 0.473 0.670 
(0.73) (0.92) (0.85) (1.01) (0.60) (0.86) 
SOCIAL 
-0.061  -0.119    
(-0.13)  (-0.25)    
LIBERAL 
 1.837  1.690   
 (1.43)  (1.34)   
UNEMP 
  0.119* 0.113*  0.118* 
  (1.87) (1.79)  (1.85) 
WELFARE 
    0.012  
    (0.77)  
Cut point 1 
-
10.554** 
-
9.764** 
-8.586* -7.814* -
11.226** 
-8.636* 
(-2.34) (-2.25) (-1.90) (-1.75) (-2.50) (-1.91) 
Cut point 2 
-7.996* -7.154* -5.940 -5.119 -8.655** -5.992 
(-1.87) (-1.68) (-1.33) (-1.66) (-1.96) (-1.34) 
Number of obser-
vations 
72 72 72 72 72 72 
Log likelihood -68.844 -67.707 -67.030 -66.053 -68.555 -67.061 
chi2 8.565 10.839 12.194 14.147 9.142 12.130 
AIC 147.688 145.414 146.059 144.106 147.111 144.123 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.001. Absolute values of the estimated t-statistics are 
given in parentheses. AIC = Akaike's information criterion. 
 
The dummy for a Social Democratic mayor has positive effect, while the 
dummy for a liberal mayor has the opposite. While both these findings con-
form to the theoretical expectations, their coefficients are not significant. 
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Estimation results from model 63 were selected to illustrate how pre-
dicted probabilities are affected by the level of financial liabilities per capita. 
After estimating model 6 the predicted probabilities of the outcomes y = 1, y 
= 2 and y= 3 are computed. The values of the explanatory variables number 
of public employees (logarithmic values) and local unemployment rate are set 
to their mean values, while the values of the explanatory variable debt per 
capita (logarithmic values) are allowed to range from 3.45 (the variable's 
maximum, equal to about 2,800 Euro) and 0 (the variable’s minimum is 1.79).  
Fig. 25.1:  Predicted and cumulative probabilities for non-use, occa-
sional use and frequent use of performance benchmarking 
 
                                               
3  Ordered logistic regressions are based on the assumption that the coefficients that 
describe the relation between category 1 and category 2 are similar to those of the 
relation between category 2 and category 3. This assumption is called the propor-
tional odds or parallel regression assumption (PRA). To test the PRA you can run a so-
called Brant-test, which is a user-written command for the software STATA. The Brant-
test estimates different models and/or sets of coefficients, the number of categories 
of the dependent variable minus 1. In both tests a significant result indicates a viola-
tion of the PRA, if the result is not significant PRA is not violated. Brant test statistic 
for models 1, 3 and 5 provides evidence that the PRA has been violated. 
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301 
Figure 25.1 plots the probabilities of individual outcomes as well as the 
cumulative probabilities. As the sign of the regression parameter ß is nega-
tive, an increase in the debt per capita (logarithmic values) necessarily de-
creases the probability of being in the highest category of the dependent var-
iable (yi = 3; frequent use of performance comparison) (Cameron/Trivedi 
2010: 527). 
5.  Conclusion 
Local decision-makers are facing numerous challenges, from economic stag-
nation to demographic chance to environmental issues. Yet in the current era 
of austerity sound public finances are among the most pressing of issues. 
There are already plenty of good arguments for why policy-makers should 
head in the direction of budget consolidation; this article provides yet an-
other one. The empirical results indicate that a high level of fiscal stress, 
measured as ‘debt per capita' (logarithmic values), is an obstacle to the use of 
voluntary performance comparison measures in German single-tier local gov-
ernment. Evidently, unitary authorities with a high level of public debt (per 
capita) are giving more weight to the potential short-term, namely transac-
tion and opportunity, costs and the potential loss of reputation than to the 
potential long-term benefits of comparing your performance against that of 
your peers. 
The implication is that local actors should reduce their amount of financial 
liabilities in order to broaden their ability to take part in voluntary bench-
marking exercises. Thereby they could realize the potential benefits of such 
exercises, most notably identifying best practices in order to draw lessons for 
one’s own organization (‘learning from the best’), possibly including also ex-
plaining any performance gaps.  
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Shared Services by Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Germany: 
Chances and Obstacles - Some Fundamental Considerations - 
Gunnar SCHWARTING∗ 
I. 
Inter-municipal cooperation as defined by the Council of Europe “… involves 
two or more municipalities and institutionalizes their common structural and 
operational features. Co-operation between them … is thus given a formal 
basis and, in in functional and social terms, covers two or more communities. 
In European terms we are talking about co-operation between the authorities 
closest to the community, often municipalities, with a view to joint manage-
ment of matters regarded as of general interest to all the participants.”1  
In Germany there is a long tradition of cooperation between local author-
ities. It is mainly limited to specific scopes of tasks such as waste or sewage 
collection and treatment, or the supply of drinking water, tourism, or public 
transport.2 These services have physical attributes that make them ideal for 
cooperation across the borders of single municipalities. Yet, the possibilities 
to cooperate are still not fully maximized, especially in the field of „back-of-
fice services“.3 Many local authorities fear a loss of political influence or of 
steering capacity if they transfer some of their own responsibilities to an-
other institution, be it another municipality or a joint body created for a spe-
cific purpose. 
However, inter-municipal cooperation has received new attention from 
politicians as well as from scholars over recent years. The cooperation-model 
seems to be one possible way to increase the efficiency of public services 
                                               
∗  The author wants to thank Jesse P. Lehrke for some helpful comments and the im-
provement of the translation. 
1  Council of Europe, Good practices in inter-municipal co-operation in Europe, 2007, 
p. 1. https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1376549&Site=COE (Accessed 27.6.2013). 
2  See Council of Europe (Fn. 1), p. 8 . 
3  See f.ex. G. Schütz/P. Pfisterer, Shared Services: Rahmenbedingungen und Anwen-
dungsfelder des Shared Services Modells, in: G. Schütz (ed.), Shared Services: Koope-
rative kommunale Aufgabenerfüllung, Wiesbaden 2012. 
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while reducing their costs. It is fair to say that the term „inter-municipal co-
operation“ is currently experiencing a renaissance. This discussion is being 
driven by the rapid changes local public enterprises have recently undergone. 
The opening of the energy market led them to bundle activities together, e.g. 
purchasing power on the electricity stock market. Savings banks lost their 
traditional guarantees by the cities and counties and were forced to look for 
ways to cut their costs without reducing the service for the customer. A com-
mon solution was cooperation in the IT-sector.4 Yet these examples are only 
the top of the iceberg that this sector has seen in the past few years. 
There are many initiatives to support inter-municipal cooperation in Ger-
many, including:  
• An early approach initiated by the Bertelsmann-Stiftung together with the 
German Association for Towns and Municipalities (Deutscher Städte- und 
Gemeindebund);5   
• the state of Bavaria published a short guide to arrange cooperation mod-
els; 6  
• the state of North-Rhine Westphalia started a cooperation-project with 4 
middle-sized municipalities;7  
• the state of Hessen gives (small) financial support for inter-municipal co-
operation projects;8  
• the state of Thuringia founded a Centre for inter-municipal cooperation;9  
                                               
4  See G. Schwarting, Verwaltung 2025 – Versuch einer Reflexion, in: T. Trappe (ed.), 
Ausgewählte Probleme der Verwaltungsethik, Frankfurt 2013, p. 169. 
5  Bertelsmann Stiftung in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Deutschen Städte- und Gemeinde-
bund, Kommunale Dienstleistungspartnerschaften – mit Shared Services zu einer ef-
fektiveren Verwaltung, Gütersloh 2007. 
6  Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, Interkommunale Zusammenarbeit – Ein 
Erfolgsmodell mit Zukunftsperspektive, München 2012. 
7  Geschäftsprozessoptimierung durch Shared Services der Kommunen, Abschlussbe-
richt 2009,  http://www.deckert-mc.de/fileadmin/pdf/B1614B01_Ergebnisbe-
richt.pdf (Accessed 16.6.2013). 
8  See Claus Spandau, Kommunale Shared Services aus regionaler Perspektive, in G. 
Schütz (ed.), Shared Services (Fn. 3), p. 38ff. 
9  See http://www.serviceagentur-demografie.de/aktuell/projekte/interkommunale-
kooperation.html (Accessed 24.6.2013). 
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• the Association of Towns and Municipalities North-Rhine Westphalia 
(Städte- und Gemeindebund Nordrhein-Westfalen) published a handbook 
on cooperation;10  
• the Centre for Local Government Management (Kommunale Gemein-
schaftstelle) published several reports on inter-municipal cooperation;11 
and 
• furthermore, a lot of field reports have become available.12 
This article reviews cooperation between neighboring local authorities in 
Germany. Spatially dispersed cooperation such as (city) networks is excluded. 
Trans-frontier cooperation13 with its specific legal attributes as well as verti-
cal cooperation between different tiers of government is not elaborated upon 
either. Additionally, the scope of the study is the action of the cooperation 
partners – not the operational work of the cooperation body itself. 
Furthermore: The concept of Shared Services is broader than cooperation 
between municipalities. Shared Services can include different levels of gov-
ernment,14 private partners and/or citizens.15 The latter case is known as co-
production.16 These aspects will not be covered in this article. The following 
concentrates on the horizontal form of cooperation only.  
                                               
10  Städte- und Gemeindebund Nordrhein-Westfalen/B.J. Schneider (eds.), Handbuch In-
terkommunale Zusammenarbeit, 2. Aufl. Siegburg 2012. 
11  Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle Köln: Bündelung von Verwaltungsdienstleistungen. 
Grundlagen und Erfolgsfaktoren (KGSt-Materialien 3/2011) und KGSt®-Handbuch 
Interkommunale Zusammenarbeit (2010). 
12  A very profound report is given by the four cities of Nuremberg, Erlangen, Fürth and 
Schwabach about actual and possible fields of cooperation. Ergebnisse des Projekts IZ 
und Neu-Konzeption, Februar 2012 [http://www.nachbarschaftskonferenz.de/ 
images/stories/stadtrat_15022012_sachverhalt_top8.pdf (Accessed 16.6.2013)]. 
13   See for a more detailed discussion Council of Europe (Fn. 1), pp. 27ff. 
14   See the „Job-Centres“ in Germany, a joint body formed by the Federation and single 
counties or cities. 
15  See G. Schütz/P. Pfisterer, Inhalte der Shared Services-Konzeption, in: G. Schütz (ed.), 
Shared Services (Fn. 3), p. 13, figure 1. 
16  See Elke Loeffler et al. (eds.), Making health and social care personal and local: Moving 
from Mass Production to Co-Production, Governance, Birmingham 2012. 
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II. 
The rationale for cooperation between local authorities can be manifold. In 
most cases, it is not one single factor that leads to the joint supply of services, 
but several: 
1. The efficiency of public service provision can be increased by capturing 
economies of scale and reducing idle capacities;17  
2. The rising complexity of many local services and tasks calls for specializa-
tion and knowledge bundling. This is impossible in small local administra-
tions where the single employees have to handle different operations sim-
ultaneously (multi-functional workplaces); 
3. Demographic change in many places leading to a slowly shrinking labor 
supply; the public sector, especially local authorities may soon be faced 
with workforce shortages; moreover, the population size of many munici-
palities will go down requiring a reorganization of public services; 
4. Some services call for a high standard of performance which cannot be 
met at acceptable costs by a single local authority. For instance, the safety 
standards of IT-processes have increased rapidly. Only big IT-centers can 
bear the costs required to guarantee the required safety; 
5. The habits of citizens do not end at the boundaries of the single local au-
thority: Commuters work and live in different places and many public es-
tablishments such as theatres, museums or even swimming pools have a 
catchment area much larger than the city itself;18 
6. The development of e-government opens new possibilities for coopera-
tion because spatial-temporal distances between workplaces disappear;19  
7. Last but not least, cooperation is an alternative to the merger of commu-
nities or the delegation of tasks to a higher level, e.g. the county. 
                                               
17 For example. a fire brigade can protect a certain number of buildings and roads; this 
may cover the area of  two neighbouring municipalities. For a further discussion see 
Council of Europe (Fn. 1), pp. 17ff. 
18  This is the well-known case of „spillover-effects“. 
19  A good example is the establishment of points of single contact following the Di-
rective on services in the Internal Market 2006/123/EC, 12th December 2006. At this 
point the service provider can get all information he needs about the market in the 
specific state; moreover, the point of single contact is not restricted to information. 
The service provider can get its required permissions from this “bundling institution”. 
See also the reference to Italy in Council of Europe (Fn. 1), p. 18. 
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But, another consideration needs to be introduced. Some cooperation is not 
done voluntarily between two or more municipalities but is instead forced by 
law.20 In the 1970’s and 1980’s the state of North-Rhine Westphalia estab-
lished regional IT-centers and every local authority had to join this special 
purpose association. Another example are the two associations in Rhineland-
Palatinate responsible for the procurement of public transport by train. How-
ever, forced cooperation is not an issue of this paper which focused on vol-
untary cooperation only. 
The international legal basis for inter-municipal cooperation can be found 
in the European Charter of Local Self-Government: 
Article 10 
Local authorities’ right to associate 
1. Local authorities to be entitled, in exercising their powers, to co-operate and, 
within the framework of the law, to form consortia with other local authorities in 
order to carry out tasks of common interest. 
… 
In Germany inter-municipal cooperation is based on article 28 of the German 
Constitution and the corresponding articles of the State Constitutions.21 
Moreover, every State has a specific law defining the framework of inter-mu-
nicipal cooperation. Article 1 of the cooperation-law in Rhineland-Palatinate 
states22 that municipalities 
− are allowed to cooperate with each other, 
− can choose among different forms of cooperation as set by public law and 
− have the possibility to establish private enterprises with other local au-
thorities. 
Additionally informal cooperation can take place too. The possible forms of 
cooperation are shown in Figure 26.1. 
                                               
20  Some countries with a strong position for the Central Government in initiating co-
operation are mentioned in Council of Europe (Fn. 1), p. 12. 
21  See the Declaration of the Government and the Associations of Local Authorities in 
Niedersachsen, signed 25th February 2008: http://www.nlt.de/pics/me-
dien/1_1204037158/Erklaerung_Endfassung.pdf (Accessed 23.6.2013). 
22  Landesgesetz über die kommunale Zusammenarbeit Rheinland-Pfalz vom 22. Dezem-
ber 1982. 
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Fig. 26.1:   Forms of Inter-Municipal Cooperation (IMC) 
 Legal Basis Tasks Duration 
Working  
Committee 
Public Law consultation not defined 
Treaty Public Law single purpose 
to be defined  
by treaty 
Association 
Public Law/ 
Statute 
single purpose23 long-term 
Public Law Insti-
tution 
Public Law multi-purpose long-term 
Public Enterprise 
Private Law/ 
Statute 
multi-purpose long-term 
Round Table etc. informal consultation not defined 
 
Informal cooperation has gained much attention over the last decades. As 
one study put it “… nowadays, in a number of Western European countries 
light associations, networks and contracts are often replacing previous solu-
tions based on structured patterns of IMC …”24 “In France, … there are inter-
municipal arrangements (ententes), agreements (conventions) and confer-
ences.”25 Similar round-tables, ad hoc groups, and regularly held mayoral con-
ferences are quite common in Germany. Their main purpose is to adjust de-
velopment plans, events or investment intentions within the region; but in-
formal cooperation can also be used to bundle and articulate common con-
cerns to higher levels of government. Moreover, meetings of mayors and 
other representatives from municipalities can help to build up regional iden-
tity and/or regional responsibility.  
Informal meetings are open to other stakeholders in the region too and 
anybody can join and leave a cooperative endeavor at any time. This leads to 
a low level of commitment. Generally speaking, round-tables etc. are a means 
for consultation and not for decision making. However sometimes, regional 
                                               
23  Rhineland-Palatinate also allows for multi-purpose associations. 
24  G. Citroni/ A. Lippi/ S. Profeti, Remapping the State: Inter-Municipal Cooperation 
through Corporatisation and Public-Private Governance Structures, Local Govern-
ment Studies Vol. 39 2013, p. 211. 
25  Council of Europe (Fn. 1), p. 11. 
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meetings can be the core for more intensive cooperation. The formation of 
the city-network of Nuremberg-Erlangen-Fürth-Schwabach is a good exam-
ple. A further step might be the formal institutionalization of a metropolitan 
region, but one which retains autonomous local authorities.26  
However, the great majority of inter-municipal cooperation is done in a 
formal context. The choice of the suitable form depends on numerous differ-
ent factors such as 
• supervision by a higher level of administration, 
• the flexibility to change tasks and members, 
• accounting rules, 
• the responsibility of actors, and/or 
• the possibility to delegate mandated powers. 
Of course, if private stakeholders join then the cooperation must take a form 
within private law. “Most countries have opted for a mixed model of inter-
municipal co-operation involving both, public-law and private-law bodies, the 
former chosen for their democratic legitimacy and reliability of resources, the 
latter for their flexibility.”27 But these are not the only considerations to be 
made. Practical questions should be solved before signing a treaty or deciding 
over a statute. Some cooperation fails because critical issues were not dis-
cussed comprehensively upfront. The partners should agree on  
− the majority voting rules within the cooperative body, 
− the management of the new organization, 
− the responsibility to select the managers, 
− the financing rules (per capita contributions or demand charges), 
and 
− the service organization with respect to the municipal partners. 
                                               
26  See for the cooperation within the Metropolitan Region Rhine-Neckar Ch. Brock-
mann/S. Köstler, Shared Services in der Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar, in: G. Schütz 
(ed.), Shared Services (Fn. 3), p. 55ff. 
27  Council of Europe (Fn. 1), p. 7. However, the same report shows that some countries 
in Europe have gone over completely to private-law entities (p. 23). 
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III. 
Even if Shared Service Centers for “back-office” services are at the center of 
current discussions,28 inter-municipal cooperation is still most prevalent in 
more traditional fields. Unfortunately the official statistics in Germany in-
clude no data on inter-municipal cooperation. Only the total number of asso-
ciations under public law is published by the statistical office. They amounted 
to 1,095 in 2009.29 No official information is available about the fields of op-
eration and equally little knowledge exists about inter-municipal cooperation 
through private enterprises. 
Hence, other sources must be used. In 2004, a study by Kienbaum Con-
sultants gave an overview of the main sectors of inter-municipal cooperation. 
These were  
− regional marketing and tourism, 
− water supply and sewage treatment, 
− information technologies, 
− promotion of economic and labour market development, and 
− spatial planning and development.30  
This is the latest comprehensive statistical information available. 
For Italy, a new study gives some insights into inter-municipal cooperation 
through private companies. Even though the study covers only 6 regions, the 
importance of this form of cooperation is obvious: The authors report that 
78% of the municipalities are involved in inter-municipal cooperation 
through corporatization. The average number of municipalities holding 
                                               
28 The pilot project in North-Rhine Westphalia had five sub-projects: Procurement, Public 
Real Estate, Building Yard, Bookkeeping and Outstanding Payment Requests, and 
Staff Management. 
29 N. Heil/P. Mödinger, Ausgewählte Struktur- und Bilanzmerkmale öffentlicher Fonds, 
Einrichtungen und Unternehmen, Wirtschaft und Statistik 4/2012, p. 344. 
30  The results are taken from Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Interkommunale Zusammenar-
beit – Handreichung für die Kommunalpolitik, Bonn November 2008, p. 27, 
www.library.fes.de/pdf-files/akademie/kommunal/05825.pdf (Accessed 23.6.2013). 
The survey covered 350 local authorities with more than 10.000 inhabitants. 
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shares in these companies is 9.1, often with provinces and regional territories 
as additional shareholders.31  
 
Fig. 26.2:  Fields of inter-municipal cooperation in Germany, 2004 
 
Source: see Fn 31 
IV. 
The advantages of and the requirements for inter-municipal cooperation are 
described by many scholars. For four towns in North-Rhine Westphalia32 a fi-
nancial benefit of 1.5 million Euros per year was reported.33 However, the use 
of the instrument is still far from realizing its full potential: “… in many parts 
of the fulfilment of public tasks in the public administration there is a wide 
gap between the possible gains in efficiency by strategic direction and the 
actual realization.”34 There must be crucial factors behind the successful de-
velopment of inter-municipal cooperation that go beyond mere consultation. 
These are shown in Figure 26.3. 
                                               
31  See Table 1 and 2 in G. Citroni et al. (Fn. 24), p. 219f. 
32 See Geschäftsprozessoptimierung (Fn 7). 
33  Geschäftsprozessoptimierung (Fn. 7), p. 34. 
34  G. Schütz/P.Pfisterer, Inhalte (Fn. 18), p. 12. Own translation.  
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Fig. 26.3:  Crucial Factors for the success of inter-municipal coopera-
tion35 
Needed Factors Risks 
Benefits Loss of identity 
Goals Pre-step to mergers 
Openness Competition between partners 
Project management Administrative culture 
Resource planning Too many partners involved 
Management of conflicts 
Uncertainties about the legal 
framework 
Leadership  
Short-term results  
Evaluation  
Promoters  
Involvement of political actors  
Information of citizens/Transparency  
Change management  
 
Before the cooperation body is fully operational it is necessary to weigh the 
expected benefits against the transition costs. Naturally, the net benefit must 
be positive for all partners. The partners should agree on the same goals for 
the cooperation and they should be open to the current as well as potential 
partners. Openness also means the willingness to change their own processes 
and to accept new, innovative solutions. Therefore, detailed project manage-
ment is necessary. One must keep in mind that inter-municipal cooperation 
is not an ad-hoc decision but a long-term project. Thus, all the well-known 
instruments of project management should be applied. 
To develop cooperative endeavors, resources – both financial and human 
– are needed. Part of the staff has to plan and prepare the project by identi-
fying the necessary changes. As the adoption of new or the merging of exist-
ing IT-programs has a cost, the transition period should be as short as possi-
ble. Also, bringing together different people from different administrations 
                                               
35  Based on Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Fn. 31), p. 77ff. 
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all whom are accustomed to their existing work-flows can lead to misunder-
standings. Hence, project management must be supplemented by conflict 
management, which leads to another management aspect. The transition 
from the old to the new situation will not happen automatically – change 
management is needed. 
Inter-municipal cooperation is successful if it has high-ranking promoters, 
preferably the mayors themselves. But promotion is not everything; these in-
dividuals must also show leadership and “keep things on track”, even in diffi-
cult situations, and must help to overcome sudden obstacles. Additionally, 
inter-municipal cooperation is not an arrangement between administrations 
only. Political actors must be informed early on as in the it is they that have 
to decide if cooperation takes place. Of course, also citizens are affected by 
some – although not all – fields of cooperation. If this is the case then they 
should be informed too and perhaps their participation will be necessary as 
well. 
Nothing promotes the acceptance of and support for a project like its suc-
cess. Therefore, a project should have some very short-term positive effects 
to encourage the acceptance that the changes require to realize further and 
full success. However, early successes are naturally not an alternative to a full 
evaluation after a certain period of time. Such evaluation should also be the 
basis for the further improvement of the cooperation.  
If this evaluation has negative results, a problem arises. The partners have 
given away their capacities and knowledge to the cooperation body and to 
get the tasks back into their own administration, further transition costs 
arise. Thus, the project should have answers to problems that arise in the 
event of its failure (“worst-case-scenario”) and how to rebuild “lost” struc-
tures. 
Furthermore, some risks or obstacles have to be considered. If a local au-
thority gives away any task, this constitutes a (albeit small) loss of responsi-
bility and identity. The newly created inter-municipal body is another step in 
the principal-agent cascade, making the distance between the original prin-
cipal – the citizen – and the operating organization even greater.36 Moreover: 
                                               
36  See on the cascade-model, for example,. G. Schwarting, Public Corporate Governance 
Codes: Necessary but successful too?, Halduskultuur – Administrative Culture 14, 
2013, p. 149. 
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“… the members representing the municipalities are not directly elected and 
procedures to ensure democratic local participation are few and little used.”37  
Naturally, all partners are involved in the decisions of the cooperation 
body. However, they do not act autonomously but in cooperation with oth-
ers. One of the crucial questions in the North-Rhine Westphalian project38 
was the organization of the winter road services (“where will snow removal 
been done first?”). Another problem arises from the different administrative 
cultures that are supposed to now work together. Even among municipalities 
such differences can appear, with one administration following, for example, 
the traditional hierarchical model and another using the principles of New 
Public Management. 
As territorial reforms are currently being discussed in some states, coop-
eration is often seen (and feared) as a kind of pre-merger.39 It is necessary to 
convince stakeholders that cooperation is just the opposite – successful co-
operation can be an alternative that helps to avoid mergers. A second obser-
vation is that promoters of cooperation often neglect potential competition 
between the partners. A good example is tourism. Joint marketing might be 
helpful to position a region in the market; but every municipality expects that 
it will benefit the most. The number of partners can be a problem too. If the 
number of partners exceeds a critical number, then the costs of getting re-
sults might rise exponentially and sometimes no consensus can be reached 
on taking a given action. 
Lastly, there are two very European problems. First, there has been a long 
discussion of whether inter-municipal cooperation has to obey the rules of 
public procurement. If this would be the case, the forming of cooperation 
bodies would be more complicated and take longer. Second, it is not clear if 
the services provided by the joint body to the municipalities are subject to 
value-added taxation.  
                                               
37  Council of Europe (Fn. 1), p. 8. In Public Transport there are some examples of advisory 
boards formed by the customers. 
38  Geschäftsprozessoptimierung (Fn 7). 
39  For the policy of reducing the number of municipalities see Council of Europe (Fn. 1), 
pp. 15ff. 
315 
V. 
“Intermunicipal co-operation is generally based on local authorities’ wishes 
in all countries. This is a common fundamental principle; local authorities 
generally take part on terms which they themselves set in the statutes gov-
erning intermunicipal cooperation, which cover such matters as winding up 
or withdrawal from the entity. The municipalities are represented in the in-
termunicipal body … often according to their population size and sometimes 
according to the size of their financial contribution. In general it is possible 
for municipalities or local entities to refuse co-operation, if only through non-
participation, or to reject a project.”40  
As this short article suggests, inter-municipal cooperation serves as an in-
strument to improve the efficiency and quality of public service provision. It 
can help to overcome inadequate municipal structures without mergers or 
the delegation of tasks to a higher administrative level. However, inter-mu-
nicipal cooperation is not a panacea for very local problems, especially fiscal 
ones. “Secondly, in all European Countries IMC strategies and patterns of co-
operation are not selected once and for all, rather, they change across time 
depending on the juncture of several factors, both endogenous and external 
to the domestic institutional system: shifts in the composition, scope, insti-
tutionalization and flexibility of IMC settings can be in fact the effect of na-
tional reforms of local governments, or a response to new European require-
ments and guidelines for the delivery of specific services, or again the result 
of specific local needs, or a mix of the three.”41 
An example of a new paradigm in inter-municipal cooperation might be 
the slowly growing share of joint bodies under private law. In Italy a clear 
preference for the forming of inter-municipal companies can be seen: “The 
success of corporatization with respect to other varieties of IMC mainly rests 
on its bottom up/voluntary nature and on its greater flexibility as far as the 
composition, scope and organizational features of cooperation are concerned 
… In addition corporatization looks more appealing than contracting-out and 
public-private partnership (PPP) pure and simple, on the one hand because it 
allows municipalities to maintain political control over the providers, and on 
the other because it guarantees a framework for cooperation which is more 
stable than ad hoc PPP agreements.”42 
                                               
40  Council of Europe (Fn. 1), p. 30. 
41  G. Citroni et al. (Fn. 24), p. 211. 
42  G. Citroni et al. (Fn. 24), p. 230. 
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Annex taken from “Local Governments and Public Service Reform Initia-
tive/United Nations Development Program/Council of Europe, Toolkit Man-
ual – Inter-Municipal Cooperation 2010”43  
 
„THE CHARACTERISTICS OF IMC 
• IMC is about two or – more typically – several municipalities working 
together. 
• By cooperating, partner municipalities agree to work together at 
some cost to produce new benefits for each of them that would be un-
available through isolated and unilateral action. 
• The joint effort may concern one or several domains falling within the 
legal competence of the municipalities.  The law can specify that cer-
tain competences given to municipalities cannot be transferred to 
IMC (e.g. State competences delegated to the Mayor). 
• Cooperation has a cost for each partner municipality: it needs effort, 
financial contributions and sharing resources (staff, land, machines, 
buildings, etc). 
• IMC is the result of a deliberate decision and not just the mechanical 
implementation of a legal provision.  Agreement is voluntary, rather 
than imposed by the law, although the law may sometimes strongly 
encourage or even oblige municipalities to look for co-operative solu-
tions. 
• “New gains for the partner municipalities may have different charac-
teristics, such as: creating the capacity to provide services which can-
not be delivered by a small municipality, saving on costs of service de-
livery, improving service quality, better coordination in development 
planning, more efficient and visible development policy. 
• Cooperation is not incidental; it has a certain duration and is most of-
ten a permanent arrangement with an undefined expiry date. 
• There is no permanent transfer of local tasks or competencies; munic-
ipalities keep indirect control over the decisions and services that re-
sult from cooperation.” 
                                               
43  Local Governments and Public Service Reform Initiative/United Nations Develop-
ment Programme/Council of Europe, Toolkit Manual – Inter-Municipal Cooperation 
2010, p. 8. 
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Implementation of Citizen Prticipation in the planning Process of 
Infrastructure Projects – from Participation of concerned Citizens 
to participatory Governance 
Jan ZIEKOW 
The question of which role the citizen should play in the decision-making pro-
cess of the government and government service delivery, beyond voting in 
elections, is a core topics of discussion in public administration regardless of 
the respective political system of the specific state. The terms applied are as 
numerous as the contexts from which they come and the content of their 
substance. Among them the terms participatory governance, collaborative 
governance and social accountability1 are presently especially pervasive, yet 
this list could be easily completed by many other examples.  
1.  Participatory governance as the government’s task 
First of all, the question of who is responsible for the establishment and im-
plementation of citizen participation is of major significance: Are the citizens 
themselves responsible for raising their voices and contributing to public de-
velopment? Or does the government have the duty to at least make sure its 
citizens are granted the opportunity to participate? 
The German model of the “Gewährleistungsstaat” (ensuring state) leads 
to the fundamental conclusion that the content of the common good cannot 
be maintained only by the unilateral actions of the government; rather it 
needs to be supported by the cooperation of both government and private 
actors.2 The “Gewährleistungsstaat” is basically designed to distribute the 
roles for the fulfillment of public duties.3 The idea of shared responsibility 
results from the insight that the state has a responsibility to shoulder its task 
in cooperation with society. Therefore in Germany we can speak of a partner-
ship between state and citizens with common responsibilities.4 Yet the model 
                                               
1  Cf. Ziekow 2011b: 1 ff.; Ziekow/Longo 2013: 3 ff. 
2  Ziekow 2009a 
3  Pitschas 1990: 237 f.; Saladin 1984: 161; Ziekow 1997: 386 ff.; Ziekow 2009b. 
4  Pitschas 1990: 237 f. 
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of shared responsibility entails two aspects: on one hand a division of work 
between government, semi-government and private actors for the fulfillment 
of public interest tasks, on the other hand the organization of cooperation 
arenas to realize this work division.5 Consequently, shared responsibility does 
not mean a single allocation of tasks to be completed, rather it has to be dy-
namically adapted to the needs of the differently-faceted rationales.6 
Regarding "citizen-participation", there are two core aspects that can be 
derived from the concept of the “Gewährleistungsstaat”: Firstly, the citizen 
has a fundamental responsibility for the realization of the public welfare; 
therefore citizen engagement is not a gratification dependent on the state's 
disposition (goodwill), but a fundamental right and, simultaneously, a funda-
mental duty of the citizen. Secondly, it is the task of the government to coor-
dinate the contributions of government institutions and the actions of citi-
zens. The state can only exercise its legitimatory responsibilities to ensure 
public goods if it constructs supplementary arenas to maintain its legitimacy. 
Any deficits in responsibility of state institutions must be compensated for 
by enlarging the frame of responsible actors. The need to maintain the pro-
spective legitimacy of state institutions requires the inclusion of lateral legit-
imation patterns under the final responsibility of the state. This government 
task constitutes a core element of participatory governance. 
2.  The problems of citizen participation in developing infrastructure 
and industry projects 
One aspect out of the numerous complex tasks of participatory governance 
that is playing a major role in Germany lately is citizen participation in the 
authorization process of infrastructure and industry projects and their chang-
ing role herein. The trigger for this development comes down to one particu-
lar project. Whilst the political discussion about the enhanced involvement of 
citizens goes back a long time, and was discussed especially intensively in the 
late 70s and 80s of the last century, the current impulse was driven by the 
reconstruction of the Stuttgart main railway station (into a through station). 
The authorization of this project, known under the name of "Stuttgart 21", 
was already applied for by Deutsche Bahn almost 20 years ago. As with all 
                                               
5  Hoffmann-Riem 2000: 52; Trute 1999: 13. 
6  Trute 1999: 13 f. 
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large transport projects, extensive administrative procedures, the so-called 
"Planstellungsverfahren" (planning proposal process), have to be carried out 
also for the reconstruction of a big railway station. 
In such a process the responsible authority hast to set forth not only the 
pros but also the cons of the project applied for, and then analyze and decide 
if, and if yes, how the project can be constructed.7 In this procedure all other 
authorities that are responsible for the expert aspects, e.g. experts in water 
protection. must be consulted. Further, the local communities affected by the 
project as well as environmental protection associations can submit their 
opinions. Additionally, all documents concerning the project have to be pub-
licly displayed for a certain amount of time and, additionally, be published on 
the internet. Thus, every citizen whose own interest is affected by the project 
can raise objections. Citizens thus can submit the argument that, for example, 
their interest to not be subject to the traffic noise caused by the trains is at 
stake and has to be considered adequately. The objections of the citizens then 
have to be orally discussed in a hearing ("Erörterungstermin"). Here, the citi-
zens have the opportunity to explain again what is important to them and 
and respond to questions by the project initiator and responsible authority 
concerning the citizens affected interests.8 
This complex procedure for the participation of those concerned was car-
ried out also in Stuttgart. At the end of the procedure the authority came to 
the conclusion that the railway station could be constructed and decreed its 
respective decision. There were then some appeals before the Courts against 
this decision, thus altogether it was quiet for a long time before the construc-
tion actually started. At that time heavy resistance broke out against the re-
construction of the railway station. This led to the nomination of a former 
Federal Minister as a mediator and, after the voting out of the current state 
(regional) government, to the holding of a plebiscite on the project financing. 
Eventually, the plebiscites approved the reconstruction of the railway station, 
which is now underway.9 
Apart from the plebiscite, there was nothing special about these pro-
cesses, as there have long been citizen protests against projects such as air-
ports, railway stations, roads or power plants. Whether referred to as media-
tion or arbitration or something else, these procedures to solve such conflicts 
                                               
7  In detail:  Ziekow 2004: 2007 ff. 
8  Ziekow 2012: D 34 ff. 
9  Further to the Stuttgart 21 conflict cf. Brettschneider 2013. 
320 
 
were often carried out.10 What made the characteristics of the protests in 
Stuttgart significantly different was the fact that citizens were fighting only 
in parts for their own interests. There were other reasons for protest centered 
around different values and general common concerns such as historic build-
ing preservation, transport concepts, the use of public funds, and (esthetical) 
urban planning. Obviously these aspects were not given enough considera-
tion during the planning proposal process. 
The reasons for this failure are rooted in the (German) culture of admin-
istration. In a state governed in keeping with the rule of law, different opin-
ions are almost in every case perceived as legal conflicts. These do not deal 
with preferences or different perceptions of technical-scientific issues (facts), 
but solely verify if the administration stuck to the legal framework.11 To 
bridge the conflicts of interest at least for some of the cases, these conflicts 
are converted to legal forms of decision-making by means of “legally pro-
tected interest”.12 This results from the fact that interests are often only per-
ceived in those cases in which they are formulated as an individual law from 
the very beginning, even if this is not adequate. Because of this fact, it is not 
uncommon that the actual interests, which are not converted to “legally pro-
tected interests”, are not recognized as being such. 
To an even greater extent this applies to the identification of value con-
flicts and the way of coping with them.13 The existence of value conflicts is 
not reflected in administrative procedures. In so far as value decisions have 
to be taken, on the political level, they are taken at the moment of decreeing 
the applicable regulations. Even in cases where it is actually not a conflict on 
the value level, it often occurs that the actual interest of the respective party 
is estimated as not important enough or is deemed as unacceptable. In such 
cases, very often common interests are used as a tool to assert individual in-
terest or the issue is even transferred to the value level to justify it as a value 
conflict and thereby build up political pressure and to demand a greater say.   
Consequently, this way of acting leads to structural “speechlessness” be-
tween administration and citizens. Communication processes can be put in 
                                               
10  Cf. for the example of Frankfort Airport Geis 2005; Gohl/Meister 2012. For the exam-
ple of the pumped storage plant Atdorf Ewen/Gabriel/Ziekow 2013. 
11  Further to the different administrative cultures cf. Jann 2000; König 2007. 
12  Further to this model cf. Henke 1968. 
13  Further to the importance of classifying different types of conflicts for citizen partic-
ipation cf. Ewen/Gabriel/Ziekow 2013: 31 ff. 
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practice by the administration only as provided for by law. Obviously, an au-
thority shall not be prevented from informing the citizen and talking to 
him/her and, of course, this is done in daily administrative practice. Yet in 
order to avoid committing procedural errors the administration has to clearly 
point out the limits to that communication. 
In consequence, the administration’s competence and will to present mat-
ters of public interest adequately and fairly is contested by citizens. Yet in-
stead, the authorities are not uncommonly attributed the role of the “at-
tacker”, especially when major infrastructure projects are being realized. It 
may be that they are regarded as “sitting in the same boat” with the developer 
of the project or that they are deemed to have ignored matters of individual 
or common interests. This results in a problem for the authority when it must 
hold a debate between multiple parties in which it also needs to “defend” it-
self.  
3.  From participation of the affected to participatory governance  
From the problems described it has to be concluded that, to date, the ap-
proach of the German administrative system to hearing the affected citizens, 
i.e. involving those citizens who assert that their own rights are affected, does 
not go far enough. 
Rather, it is necessary to make use of an approach that is based on the 
model of participation and that does not cover only the relevant actors under 
the criterion of their legally allocated function but on their actual roles. Per-
haps in theory there might be the “typical” administration, the “typical” citi-
zen and the typical “project developer”, but the reality is much more multi-
faceted. Within an administrative process for the authorization of large infra-
structural projects not only one authority is involved, but many different 
ones, and in many cases even authorities from different administrative levels 
(federal government, “Länder” governments, and municipalities). The same 
heterogeneous image is reflected by the citizens. Here you will find, on one 
hand, the affected citizens who are against the project because their own 
rights are affected. On the other hand, there are persons who try to prevent 
the project from being realized because of its overall aspects. But there are 
also advocates of the project who often have little chance to be heard and 
there are civil society organizations who want to emphasize only certain as-
pects of the project. And finally, there is a wide range of different project de-
velopers, from enterprises whose shares are held completely or predomi-
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nantly by the government and large international strictly profit-oriented cor-
porations to medium size private sector enterprises that are anchored in a 
certain region and therefore have to give due consideration to their actions.14 
The core element of the needed approach is the personal common inter-
est in participating that brings all these actors together in one overall system 
of participatory governance: The citizens who want to give their concerns a 
voice, the project developers who want to explain their project and get the 
chance to overcome any possible resistances, and the public administration 
who is interested in avoiding opposing fronts and administrative procedures 
with (larger) political dimensions. 
Now, what is the objective of implementing such participatory govern-
ance? The central aim is to increase the transparency of the authorization 
process where large projects are concerned and simultaneously avoid con-
flicts. This results in the relief of the actual planning or authorization proce-
dure by decreasing the number of disputes arising in judicial or administra-
tive proceedings.15 Another expectation linked with the policy of early in-
volvement of the public can be described by the term “creation of ac-
ceptance”.16 What participation cannot guarantee is what politicians desire 
most, and that is result acceptance. Opponents of a project will not convert 
into advocates simply by the means of participation. Procedural acceptance 
means that all persons and institutions involved in the project can point out 
their concerns which will then followed by a thorough and open discussion. 
Thereby the authorization procedure as a whole will be perceived as fair, even 
if it does not lead to the preferred outcome of the individual. The solution of 
conflicts should not be used to define success here. Sometimes such solution 
is possible, but not always. Therefore we should only talk about conflict miti-
gation – the conflict intensity or extensity will be kept at a lower level as it 
would have been at without participation. Additionally, by providing early 
suggestions a participatory procedure can improve the quality of the applica-
tion for the future project.17 
                                               
14   Further to the heterogeneity of actors cf. Ziekow 2012: D 68 ff. 
15  Draft of a law for the improvement of public participation and the standardization of 
planning procedures, Deutscher Bundestag – Drucksache 17/9666 S. 15. 
16  Draft of a law for the improvement of public participation and the standardization of 
planning procedures, Deutscher Bundestag – Drucksache 17/9666 S. 15. 
17  Schmitz 2012: 1458. Further to the purposes of public participation cf. Ziekow 2012: 
D 14 ff. 
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Compared to this, the disadvantages resulting from broadening participa-
tion governance are less significant. The feared increase of inefficiency in ad-
ministrative procedures due to citizen participation has not manifested itself. 
The results of the empirical analysis of several thousands of administrative 
procedures that have been conducted by order of Baden-Württemberg prove 
that public participation has only minor significance as a factor in time de-
lays.18 It might be that it is more time and money consuming to compensate 
for deficiencies in communication by the continuous ad hoc implementation 
of communication chains during the procedure or even more when the pro-
cedure has been finalized. 
To date, several factors have been identified as key elements of participa-
tory governance, these being: 
• Enlargement of the number of participating citizens: The limitation of these 
participatory procedures to only those citizens whose individual rights are 
affected should be given up. It should be replaced by the wide general par-
ticipation of the public in which everybody - affected or not, in favor or 
against the project - can participate. 
• Information: a model of citizen participation where only the project devel-
oper and the authorities know how the project shall function, while the 
citizens barely comprehend what it is actually about, does not make sense. 
Project developers and authorities therefore have the duty to provide in-
formation and answer questions. 
• The right time: The experience with participatory procedures in Germany 
has shown that citizens are always disappointed and annoyed if they have 
the impression their participation only serves as an “alibi” and that all im-
portant decisions were actually made long ago. One example for such an 
important pre-decision is the location of the project: It is not uncommon 
that there are several possibilities for the location of an infrastructure pro-
ject. The project developer then examines which location is the most fa-
vorable from their point of view and submits an application for the author-
ization of the project. However, it might be the case that from the citizens’ 
point of view another location would have been much better and that they 
would not have opposed the same project being constructed at another 
location.  Very often, however, they are only actively involved after this 
decision has already been taken.  
                                               
18  Ziekow/Oertel/Windoffer 2005: 121 ff., 211 ff. 
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• Continuation: As the example of the Stuttgart main railway station has re-
cently shown, in order to realize participatory governance it is not suffi-
cient to apply citizen participation at any time (during the procedure) and 
to thereafter leave citizens out of it. If it takes several years between the 
first level of citizen involvement and the next level of participation or the 
decision about the application, the dialogue will come to a full stop. This 
should be avoided by introducing a so-called integrated participation pro-
cedure. The integrated participation procedure follows directly from the 
aforementioned early citizen participation and ensures the progression of 
the administrative procedure accompanied by simultaneous citizen par-
ticipation, even during the construction phase. This does not mean that 
new meetings have to be held constantly; an internet forum or a round 
table held at certain time intervals would do very nicely. 
For a legalistic system, i.e. an administration exhibiting strict adherence to 
the law like the German one, the typical first step would be to regulate issues 
by law that have not been previously regulated. In June 2013, such a regula-
tion was implemented under Article 25 (3) of the Federal Law on Administra-
tive Proceedings (VwVfG). Per this provision all major projects are now sub-
ject to so-called early citizen participation. This early citizen participation will 
be conducted even before the project developer has submitted their applica-
tion. This prevents the authorities from using the, previously quite common, 
(legal) defense that they cannot make space for citizen participation as they 
are not responsible before the application has been submitted. Thus, Article 
25 (3) VwVfG no longer allows the authorities to refer to a non-existing re-
sponsibility due to the non-existing submission of the application; they can 
no longer escape from providing for early civic participation before holding 
the application in their hands. This provision explicitly confers the responsi-
bility to provide such participatory opportunities prior to the beginning of the 
authorization procedure.  
However, the possibility of self-conducted early citizen participation by 
the authority is not mentioned in the provision. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that the legislation wants to stress mainly the responsibility of the 
developer to offer early citizen participation. This reflects the role perception 
of the authorities dealing with authorizations. According to this perception 
they see themselves as neutral institutions responsible for the performance 
of government procedures and are unwilling to be made jointly liable for the 
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announcement of a private project.19 An early citizen participation is there-
fore only implemented by the authorizing authority if the aims pursued as per 
article 25 (3) VwVfG would be massively missed. This will particularly be the 
case where a remarkable conflict potential is already apparent but the project 
developer is unwilling or unable to offer early citizen participation that com-
plies with the goals of the provision.  
The way in which early citizen participation is conducted is in principle at 
the discretion of the project developer. However, Article 25(3) VwVfG sets 
minimum binding standards for the details of early citizen participation. Ac-
cording to these, the project developer has to inform the public about certain 
contents and to give citizens the chance to express their views on them. A 
central element consists of a critical discussion of the project with the af-
fected public. The term “discussion” signals an oral discourse. Only such di-
rect exchange of views provides the opportunity to set out the respective in-
terests and come to a common agreement in order to avoid later disputes, 
thus meeting the objective foreseen by early citizen participation. Using, for 
example, only electronic communication will not achieve the desired result. 
4.  Conclusion 
In conclusion I would like to take up a question which in Germany is asked 
again and again:  Isn’t it very expensive to implement such a complex partic-
ipatory governance? Is this the right way forward, especially given the recent 
financial crisis? Certainly at the beginning these new approaches will raise 
implementation costs, but these will decrease significantly during and after 
the process of establishing the respective routines of participatory govern-
ance. Of more importance, though, is the German experience that an early 
resolution of disputes in the long term will be much cheaper for the admin-
istration (as well as for enterprises) than public disputes and long lasting 
court battles, not to mention the benefits for the political system generated 
through the acceptance by the citizens. 
In this context I would like to counter one misconception: At least in the 
German case we can reject the view that the increased use of participatory 
governance is an expression of a systemic crisis that urgently needs to recur 
to extra–parliamentary patterns of legitimation in order to avoid a collapse. 
                                               
19  Further to the dangers of this role assignment see Ziekow 2012: D 71 f. 
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In light of the broad consensus regarding the enlargement of citizen partici-
pation during the process of project planning and its authorization, its expan-
sion has more to do with the sovereignty of a “mature democracy” and an 
impulse to consider its own revitalization: “democracy is a continuum and not 
a binary condition of either democratic or not”.20 From such a perspective the 
inclusion of elements of citizen participation is a tool to complement the par-
liamentary representative system and plays the prospective role of a system 
stabilizing component. 
 
  
                                               
20  Charles 2010: 157. 
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Consequences of the Economic and Financial Crisis  
for Public Administrations in Germany 
Gisela FÄRBER 
1.  Introduction 
The economic and financial crisis that began in 2008 and that saw the most 
severe economic disturbances for most industrial and newly industrializing 
countries since World War II was surprisingly quickly overcome in Germany. 
Despite the hope that the other European countries fighting against the crisis 
by means of Keynesian economics would recover in a similar way, this was 
not to be. In particular, in the South European countries and Ireland the bank-
ing crisis required billions of Euros to prevent the financial institutions from 
collapsing, which led in turn to the Euro debt crisis, which continues to this 
day. 
When observing the stabilizing activities of the different levels of govern-
ment in Germany and the resulting development of budgetary revenues and 
expenditures, the question arises as to whether the effects of the crisis on 
public budgets in Germany can be measured and evaluated with regard to 
intergovernmental relations. Of particular interest is whether the three levels 
were hit in different ways and whether horizontally there were varying impli-
cations that can be connected to the crisis. As the crisis caused budgets to 
run into deficits due to lost tax revenues and increased expenditures for pro-
grams combatting recession, the budget deficits and the interest payments 
that accrued onto of the existing public debt will be used as main indicators 
for a quantitative analysis. They give a better picture of the costs of the crisis 
for public administrations than the deficits themselves because they take into 
consideration how the Bund, the Länder, and the local authorities – the latter 
also compared within their level of government – differ with regard to in-
creased tax revenues and rebalancing their budgets. Budgetary burdens 
counted as interest payments relative to tax revenues in 2020, when not only 
the Federation1 but also all states must have balanced budgets, serve as the 
measure for the burdens of the German crisis running from 2008 to 2010.  
                                               
1  The debt of the Bund is limited to at most 0.35% of GDP from 2016. 
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This contribution measures the budgetary effects that the initial crisis had 
for German governments and tries to identify those of the Euro debt crisis as 
well. A further part of the paper deals with the question of whether structural 
reforms protect countries against hazardous speculations in the financial 
markets and whether Germany needs further reforms to ensure its stable 
economic development in the future. 
2.  Dimensions and causes of the recent financial,  
economic and Euro debt crisis  
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 is considered as the 
formal starting point of the financial and economic crisis, even though the 
problems within the financial markets had been developing for some time. 
The so-called subprime crisis was a direct result of real asset bubbles in the 
USA, in UK, Spain, and other countries, but needs to be considered in the 
context of the deregulation of the financial markets in the 1990’s and result-
ing development of new financial ‘products at that time. The policy of ex-
tremely low interest rates of the US Federal Reserve Bank in order to promote 
economic growth and employment - with the side-effect of reducing the 
enormous deficit in the US federal budget under the Clinton presidency – 
helped the bubbles to grow. In addition, the dominant American rating agen-
cies failed in their task to control the risks of financial products and institu-
tions.  
The crisis in the financial sector transformed into a strong recession after 
the banks were no longer able to offer credit and the enterprise sector began 
to cut jobs. All the governments of the affected countries helped their stum-
bling banks, rediscovered Keynesian policies, and undertook stabilizing pro-
grams financed by debt. As a result budget deficits and thus the public debt 
to GDP rations grew worldwide (see figure 28.1 and 28.2). In 2009, only four 
EU countries were able to keep to the 3% debt limit agreed upon for Euro-
zone countries. 
After years of deficits only in 2006 did Germany attain a budget surplus 
exceeding the 3%-limit, after which it also, reduced the total public debt-GDP 
ratio due to an increasing surplus in 2007. However, in 2008 the crisis re-
versed this trend and led to a deficit of 3.6%, while in 2009 the deficit 
amounted to almost 5%. Fortunately an unexpected economic recovery re-
duced the excess of expenditures against revenues to less than 1% of GDP in 
2010. In 2012, the German public sector again had a budget surplus. How-
ever, in other European countries – particularly in Southern European Euro   
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Fig. 28.1: Budgetary balances in relation to GDP, selected European 
Union member states 2005 to 2013 
 
Source: European Statistical Office 
 
countries and Ireland - the crisis continued and grew even worse when the 
governments could only refund their credits for old debt and fund new 
budget deficits at higher, even unsustainable interest rates, while the banking 
sector still was failing to deliver finance to the enterprise sector due to their 
continued existential problems.2   
With regard to the total public debt to GDP ratio Germany is just below the 
EU average. The ratio is decreasing again while it is still growing in all coun-
tries hit by the Euro debt crisis. According to the new European fiscal compact 
regulations, Germany has to reduce this ratio over the next few years to be-
low 60%; therefore, continued consolidation is still needed. Stable economic 
development and high growth rates will help the public debt indicator to de-
cline, but strong fiscal discipline at all levels of governments is desirable, per-
haps even necessary.  
  
                                               
2  See Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: 
Stabile Architektur für Europa – Handlungsbedarf im Inland, Jahresgutachten 
2012/13, Wiesbaden 2012, pp. 31. 
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Fig. 28.2: Public debt in relation to GDP of EU member states as of the 
end of 2012 
 
Source: European Statistical Office 
 
3.  Financial effects of the crisis on the Bund,  
the Länder, and local authorities in Germany  
Germany is a federal country and the budgets of the three levels of govern-
ment and – in a horizontal perspective - of the regions and states were hit in 
different ways by the crisis. One reason for the differences is the uneven im-
pact of the crisis due to the geographical variations in economic structure 
and sectoral characteristics, while a second – somewhat related – reason 
were diverging measures taken in response to the crisis and differing degrees 
of participation in the federal programs designed to stabilize regional and lo-
cal demand.   
3.1  The financial and economic crisis of 2008-10 
Table 28.1 shows the regional rates of growth from 2008 to 2011. In 2008, 
when the crisis started, the growth rates still remained positive but diverged 
strongly by region. In 2009, only Berlin registered a positive growth rate; all 
9,
8 1
8,
5
21
,7
37
,9
38
,2
40
,5
40
,6 45
,4
46
,2 52
,4
53
,6
54
,4
55
,5
55
,6
71
,3
71
,3 74
,0 79
,8
81
,0 85
,2
86
,0
86
,6
88
,7
90
,2 9
9,
8
11
7,
4
12
4,
1
12
7,
0
15
6,
9
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
ES
T
BG LU
X
RU SW LI
T LT DK C
Z SK FL SL
O KR P
L
M
A N
L A
HU
N
GE
R EU SP C
Y
U
K FR BE IR
E P I
GR
335 
other regional economies shrank on average by 4%. The biggest decline was 
seen in the Saarland (-9.7%) and Bremen (-8.5%), while three East German 
states suffered only an average decrease.  
 
Tab. 28.1: Regional growth rates of GDP 2008-11 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 total 2008-11 
BW 1,1% -7,1% 7,7% 5,2% 6,37% 
By 0,8% -2,0% 5,5% 5,2% 9,69% 
He 1,2% -5,4% 3,3% 3,6% 2,49% 
Nds 2,9% -4,2% 6,1% 4,1% 8,76% 
NW 2,4% -4,1% 4,4% 3,1% 5,78% 
RPL 1,6% -2,5% 5,5% 3,8% 8,44% 
Saar 1,3% -9,7% 5,9% 5,8% 2,44% 
SH 3,3% -2,8% 2,4% 3,9% 6,81% 
HB 1,4% -8,5% 7,1% 2,3% 1,62% 
HH 3,0% -4,1% 3,9% 1,5% 4,13% 
Be 4,9% 0,7% 3,4% 2,2% 11,56% 
Bb 3,3% -2,2% 5,4% 3,3% 9,97% 
MV 2,6% -1,5% 3,2% 2,3% 6,74% 
Sn 1,0% -2,9% 4,0% 3,2% 5,22% 
SAT 1,3% -4,4% 5,4% 1,5% 3,67% 
Th 0,9% -4,0% 5,8% 3,9% 6,61% 
GER 1,9% -4,0% 5,1% 3,9% 6,76% 
Source: National Accounts of the Länder 
The recovery in 2010 and 2011 was stronger in those states that had experi-
enced the sharpest decline in the preceding years. In total, however, the de-
cline in 2009 was so sharp for some states that the accumulated growth rate 
for 2008-11 are close to zero. Bremen and Saarland – both former steel pro-
ducing locations that have been undergoing structural change for decades – 
as well as the banking center of Hessen, and Saxony-Anhalt in Eastern Ger-
many have the lowest growth rates across the entire crisis and recovery pe-
riod, while Berlin, Brandenburg, and Bavaria experienced economic growth of 
about 10%. 
The negative growth rates contributed directly to shrinking tax revenues 
in 2009 and again in 2010. Although the fiscal equalization scheme, which 
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mainly is an equalization of tax capacities, adjusted the growth differences 
among the states, the disparities in the losses are still remarkable (fig. 28.3). 
In several states which saw strong economic effects from the crisis (BW, He, 
Saar) the decline of local tax revenues was even stronger than those of the 
central state.  
 
Fig. 28.3: Change of tax revenues after fiscal equalization 2009 and 
2010 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, own calculations 
 
Much more diverging was participation of the jurisdictions in expenditure 
programs (see figure 28.4). While the Federation used, on the one hand, ex-
penditure programs to combat the crisis, including among them many 
matched grants, and the social security insurances for the stabilization of de-
mand and the labor market (the reduced hours compensation in particular 
was very successful), several states actually reduced their expenditures dur-
ing the crisis in order to continue their consolidation policies. Some other 
states (By, BW, NW, Sn) had to spend high amounts of money in order to res-
cue their state-owned banks. However, local governments, which were the 
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addressees of several federal programs establishing additional measures for 
maintaining local infrastructure, increased their expenditures more than 
their states. 
 
Fig. 28.4: Change of total expenditures, 2009 and 2010 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, own calculations 
 
Shrinking tax revenues and increasing expenditure led to sharply growing 
deficits for the majority of the German jurisdictions (see table 28.2). The 
highest deficits of all levels of government was seen in the federal budget, 
with a value of about 860 Euros per inhabitant. At the state level, only Saxony 
and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania attained surpluses in 2009, with minor 
deficits in 2010, and did not follow anti-cyclical budgetary policies. The East 
German municipalities – except Brandenburg – also realized budgetary sur-
pluses in both these years when the crisis severely influenced all public sector 
budgets. Those states that – together with their local communities - had se-
verely unbalanced budgets before the crisis experienced the highest deficits 
of all jurisdictions, 1,927 Euros per inhabitant in Bremen and almost 1,164 
Euros in Saarland. 
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Tab. 28.2: Budget balances 2008 -10 
  Land Local governments Land + local governments 
  2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
BW 104.7 -125.1 -79.0 163.9 -237.0 -64.0 268.6 -362.1 -143.0 
By -2.7 -645.8 -105.8 144.7 -12.8 -27.2 141.9 -658.6 -133.1 
He -275.0 -444.4 -316.5 -65.1 -138.5 -437.0 -340.1 -582.9 -753.5 
Nds -88.9 -184.5 -237.1 79.4 -108.4 -75.1 -9.5 -292.9 -312.3 
NW -69.5 -271.8 -360.9 35.6 -103.6 -133.4 -34.0 -375.5 -494.3 
RP -353.2 -403.6 -480.2 -62.5 -212.5 -172.7 -415.8 -616.1 -652.9 
Saar -548.9 -969.3 -944.3 1.9 -184.3 -219.7 -547.0 -1153.6 -1163.9 
SH -173.4 -357.9 -469.7 -135.7 -166.8 -113.7 -309.1 -524.7 -583.5 
HB -859.6 -1383.2 -1927.0       -859.6 -1383.2 -1927.0 
HH -176.8 -564.1 -69.9       -176.8 -564.1 -469.9 
Be 208.4 -426.3 -411.1       208.4 -426.3 -411.1 
Bb 58.4 -203.8 -196.6 203.9 44.9 -43.1 262.3 -158.9 -239.7 
MV 185.8 253.4 -106.9 133.4 49.5 23.7 319.1 302.9 -83.2 
Sn 289.6 46.0 -42.6 220.6 66.1 50.8 510.2 112.0 8.2 
SAT 2.9 -109.4 -305.0 145.1 51.1 23.9 148.0 -58.3 -281.1 
Th 110.1 -94.4 -262.8 121.4 7.5 -8.9 231.5 -86.8 -271.7 
Länder -39.6 -315.4 -272.9 74.4 -87.6 -94.4 34.7 -402.9 -367.3 
Bund             -214.9 -682.5 -613.0 
Social in-
surances 
      +79.0 -179.3 +35.2 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, own calculations 
 
The budgetary consequences of the deficits arising from the crisis can be cal-
culated by taking the subsequent resulting increased interest payments into 
account. While the Federation increased taxes in 2010 in order to reduce its 
deficit, states and aggregated local governments operate under the assump-
tion that they only can attain balanced budgets by reducing expenditures or 
increasing them by less than the revenues grow. The model calculated3 as-
sumes a long-term growth rate of 3% for GDP and tax revenues, with expend-
                                               
3  See in detail Färber, Gisela: Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis in a Federation: Ev-
idence from Germany; FÖV Discussion Paper No. 69, Speyer 2012. 
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itures increasing by only 1% annually until the budget is balanced and an in-
terest rate of 4% from 2014 onward. As a baseline for the calculations the 
data of the 2010 budgets were used. The total public debt in 2020 and the 
increase of total debt from 2008 (the year before the crisis) are then used to 
judge the budgetary effects of the crisis (see figure 28.5).  
  
Fig. 28.5: Total public debt of the Federation (Bund) and States and 
municipalities aggregated, 2008 and 2020 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, own calculations 
 
Another indicator of the effects of the crisis is the “affordable” expenditures 
without interest payments of state and local governments in 2020, by which 
time the budgets must be balanced.4 Figure 28.6 demonstrates that the 
highly indebted states will see a sharply loss in their ability to finance above 
average expenditures for their citizens as a result of the new debt taken on 
during the crisis, while the states with lower debt and interest burdens 
                                               
4  For more on this concept see Blanchard, O.J. et al.: The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy: 
New Answers to an Old Question; in: OECD Economic Studies 15/1990 und Wissen-
schaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen: Nachhaltigkeit in der Fi-
nanzpolitik – Konzepte für eine langfristige Orientierung öffentliche Haushalte, 
Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen, Heft 71, Bonn 2001. 
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quickly will - or have already - come back to a normal path of expenditure 
growth. 
 
Fig. 28.6: Primary expenditures (without interest payments) of state 
and local governments per inhabitant coverable by total 
public revenues until 2020 – measured as per cent of aver-
age 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office, own calculations 
 
The model demonstrates that the long-term budgetary effects of the crisis 
clearly diverge among the German governments and depend on the size of 
the deficits during the crisis. However, the accumulated deficit before the 
crisis has a stronger effect on the total costs of the crisis than the additional 
debt taken on during the crisis, which is quite plausible if one considers that 
the displacement effect of the interest payments is much bigger then and the 
scope for an anti-cyclical fiscal policy is, therefore, much smaller. The states 
with the highest deficits could not afford the budget deficits they ran during 
the crisis, neither will they be able to afford the resulting interest payments 
In future. Their citizens will pay for the deficits by experiencing the highest 
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losses of public services, mostly at the lowest level of all governments5 (see 
figure 28.6).  
Another important insight of the model is that the costs of the crisis do 
not change the weight of the three federal tiers in relative debt. Although the 
Federation experienced the highest financial burdens, these were compen-
sated for by increased taxes rates and the introduction of new taxes (e.g., on 
nuclear plants and on flights).  
3.2  The crisis of public debt in the Eurozone  
While the German economy experienced a quick recovery in 2010, many 
other countries were hit by speculations in the capital markets against their 
high public debt in a way that had never happened before. Instead of a return 
to positive growth rates the public deficits increased even further because 
the interest rates were driven to level not seen since before World War II. The 
budgetary burden from the interest payments prevented these countries 
from reducing their public debt and led, in turn, to sharply increasing debt-
to-GDP ratios. The Euro itself was under pressure in the capital markets and 
was threatened with the total loss of its credibility.  
Those Euro countries with a more healthy economy experienced shrinking 
interest rates for their public debt. The Euro countries therefore split the cap-
ital market and thus asked for measures to reestablish stable expectations 
that all countries would be able to service their debt. The European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) was established by the Euro countries, later to be re-
placed by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Both sought to provide 
low interest loans to countries experiencing turbulence and to ensure that 
they would be able to pay back the credits coming due for payment. Mean-
while the European Central Bank started to intervene as well and established 
programs to acquire the  debt of the countries in crisis and to flood the Euro-
pean capital markets with liquidity to ensure low interest rates.  
In order to stabilize the capital markets the countries that receive mone-
tary assistance from these special funds are required to undertake structural 
reforms of their labor markets and their social policies as well as to cut back 
their budget deficits. The European Fiscal Compact was introduced in 2012, 
establishing stricter rules for public budgets by adopting the German ‘debt 
                                               
5  For the city state of Bremen it should be kept in mind that the city states are allowed 
135% of financial needs per inhabitant.  
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brake’, which requires balanced budgets except in periods of recession or nat-
ural disaster. For Germany the consequence was that the overall public sector 
needs to deliver the balanced budget not only from 2020, but from 2012/13. 
All governments are under strict European supervision regarding their budg-
etary planning and also reporting about the development of revenues and 
expenditures during the fiscal year.  
For the German government sector, these measures led to divergent 
budgetary effects: The Federation had and still has to cover the contributions 
for the capital of the EFSF and  ESM. The Federation had to negotiate with 
the Länder for the balancing of the state and local budgets earlier than 2020 
and now has to take over certain expenditures, mainly from the local level, as 
well as to guarantee that any eventual monetary sanctions in case of irregular 
deficits are covered from the federal budget.6 
 
Tab. 28.3: Public debt (including liquidity credits) and interest pay-
ments of the German government tiers, 2008 -2012 
  Federation Länder Local governments* 
  public debt 
interest 
payments 
public debt 
interest 
payment 
public debt 
interest 
payments 
2008 985,750  40,760 483,268 21,057 108,864 5,005 
2009 1,053,814 38,848 526,745 20,295 113,810 4,250 
2010 1,287,460 38,390 600,110 21,533 123,569 4,013 
2011 1,279,583 50,115 615,399 21,231 129,643 4,532 
2012 1,287,517 42,542 644,929 22,086 135,178 4,253 
Source: Federal Statistical Office  
 
The asymmetric reactions of the capital markets with regard to interest 
rates for public debt of Euro countries has had a paradoxical effect for Ger-
man budgets: As investors were willing to abandon profitable rates in favor 
of the security of loans, Germany was able to refinance public loans under 
the conditions of shrinking interest rates and in doing so reduced the average 
                                               
6  See Stefan Pilz: Ein fiskalpolitischer Pakt als Brücke in die Stabilitätsunion? In: 
Wirtschaftsdienst 7/2012, pp. 457.  
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interest rates for all types of public debt. Due to the solidarity concept of the 
German financial constitution this development held also for states and mu-
nicipalities, with all levels of government seeing decreasing interest pay-
ments despite the still increasing public debt in 2011 and 2012. For 2013, a 
further reduction of interest expenditures is expected. Based on the volume 
of debt, the Federation will profit most from this development and thereby 
will have a certain amount of compensation for the additional expenditures 
it has taken on. 
The crisis contains, however, also a risk for the future public budgets in 
Germany: The Federation’s finances will be threatened in the event that a 
country cannot pay back the ESM loans. Will Germany then suffer the loss of 
its financial credibility too? What happens in the event that the European 
Central Bank is not able to recollect the enormous liquidity it is now spread-
ing across Europe and inflation rates therefore start to increase? How will 
increasing inflation influence the prices the public sector has to pay for public 
service production? Are the German jurisdictions prepared to again pay in-
creasing interest rates for their debt without falling back into budget deficits? 
Certain, and too numerous, states and municipalities are not using the ad-
vantageous situation of low interest rates and are instead again increasing 
tax revenues to restructure their budgets.  
4.  Capability of reform to protect against risks from public debt? 
The experience of the European debt crisis - with numerous countries coming 
under tremendous pressure from the capital markets (Greece, Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, and Italy) while other countries like Germany conserved its AAA 
rating despite high public debt ratios - leads to the question of whether a 
highly performing, (comparably) efficiently working public administration 
can protect a state from dangerous financial speculations against it. Further-
more, the capability of the public sector to adapt and reform is obviously a 
key location-variant factor that during the crisis gave some states better 
chances to ‘survive’ disturbances and external shocks and regain a stable eco-
nomic growth path. 
A special challenge facing governments during and following from the fi-
nancial and Euro crisis is directly related to setting limits on the risks of 
‘greedy’ capitalism, such as those that contributed to the subprime crisis and 
the manipulations of interest and exchange rates by big banking houses. Here 
governments have the duty to establish and execute the principles of “good 
regulation” in markets which tend to fail. Governments and administrations 
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also need to supervise compliance with the regulations and to set effective 
sanctions for their violation. 
A second perspective on crisis prevention considers the importance of po-
litically painful so-called “structural reforms”, particularly of the labor and 
service markets, of the pension and social security systems, and of tax admin-
istrations. These regulations determine international economic competitive-
ness and seem to be crucial for the trust of the financial markets and thereby 
for the stable development and credit-worthiness of a national economy. In 
this area all countries that were severely affected by the Euro crisis have a 
below international average performance, while the more stable countries 
had undertaken reforms in the years preceding the crisis.  
A third factor for stability could result from intergovernmental financial 
relations that guarantee stable public sector financing in vertically across the 
tiers of governments and horizontally among the jurisdictions of a certain 
level of government. Given that public debt is not homogeneously distributed 
across the whole government sector in any country but instead shows high 
divergences, particularly at the decentralized tiers, the credible solidarity of 
upper tiers and the other jurisdictions of the same tier in case of a debt over-
load of one or a few governments might signal to the financial markets that 
the overall credit standing of the public sector in total remains good. The 
long-term legal stability of the established rules in this field might therefore 
be a precondition for the national stability of the financial markets and for 
the whole economy, which not only protects the overindebted governments 
but also the borrowing conditions for the others. 
It should, however, not be neglected that Germany still has many fields in 
which reforms are necessary if it is to secure its international competitiveness 
and financial stability. Among these are solutions for the rapidly growing, 
largely un-covered pension system and the aging of the civil service. Inter-
governmental relations are currently under renegotiations and need to solve 
the ‘vertical’ problems of the underfunded state and local levels. Electronic 
government projects are suffering from a lack of technical and economic in-
ter-departmental and intergovernmental coordination, which not only is in-
efficient in itself, but also leads to inefficient and underperforming admin-
istration which burdens citizens and enterprises.  
Finally, the German national governance structures are under pressure 
from the proposals, and even some decisions already taken, for the further 
centralization of competences to the European level. The crisis has given 
more powers to Europe without clear evidence that the EU will find better 
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solutions than the hypothetic sum of the national solutions. The further cen-
tralization of social insurances jeopardizes not only additional transfers from 
the rich member states to the poorer ones, but also creates incentives for the 
misuse of social transfer payments and inefficient migration. A shift of com-
petences to the European level is mistrusted and it is widely believed that it 
would bring about more bureaucracies and administrative burdens. There-
fore, a further centralization should always be connected with a re-decentral-
ization of other competences – like the economically uneven regulation of 
the agricultural markets - which no longer are appropriately addressed at the 
supranational level. 
5.  Summary and conclusion 
The presented calculation of the costs of the 2008-2010 crisis demonstrates 
that burdens for all levels of government in Germany exist and will persist. 
Although the expenditures and losses of tax revenues related to the crisis 
itself and the fight against the crisis are unevenly spread among the tiers, a 
shift of burdens that could lead to a transfer of revenues was not and will not 
be considered. However, in a horizontal perspective, the decentralized public 
budgets have seen sharply divergent outcomes from the crisis. Particularly 
those states and municipalities that entered the crisis with an overload of 
debt have come out of the crisis with more debt than ever and will have real 
problems to conform with the new ‘debt brake’ requiring balanced budgets 
as of 2020.  
The burden of from the Euro debt crisis has fallen mainly on the budget of 
the Federation. All jurisdictions, however, profited from the secularly low in-
terest rates for the ‘stable’ Euro countries. Yet not all of them have used these 
favourable conditions to rehabilitate their budgets. As long as the financial 
markets are not definitively appeased, and until the Euro crisis countries re-
turn to stable growth, considerable budgetary risks remain for all German 
governments, as does the risk of inflation (for purchase prices, nominal inter-
est rates, and civil service wages). In this case, diverging capital market rat-
ings could lead to increasing risk surcharges and higher interest rates for all 
governments without balanced public budgets. Therefore, the financial plan-
ning systems needs to be developed further into a system of financial risk 
management.  
The biggest risk, however, is the general economic development. As long 
as the economies of the countries in crisis are still shrinking sharply Germany 
cannot be sure it will not suffer from falling demand for its exports. Moreover, 
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the stability of the other countries in the world market is influenced by the 
amount of export-led German economic growth as well. Yet many countries 
outside of Europe also lack the structural reforms that were identified in this 
contribution as being crucial for stable economic development. Given these 
facts, all countries should consider the past crisis and future ones as oppor-
tunities for structural administrative reforms.  
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China's urban-rural integration Strategies under the Financial Crisis 
and Optimization of administrative Hierarchy 
WANG Yukai  
China's urban-rural economic and social integration is a major strategic goal 
of its modernization process. This goal will not be changed even if the finan-
cial crisis occurs, and the year 2020 is anticipated to witness the basic reali-
zation of it. Thus, there is a list of questions to be discussed. Firstly, how to 
establish this goal? Secondly, what is the inherent link between China’s strat-
egy for economic development in the future? Thirdly, what is the biggest ob-
stacle to China in implementing urban-rural integration in the next decade? 
Fourthly, what kind of administrative hierarchy is needed for China to ensure 
the realization of this goal?  
1.  The basic requirement of urban-rural integration: establishment 
of the goal 
According to the author's understanding, urban-rural integration cannot be 
interpreted as the urbanization of a rural area, nor as the general sense of 
urbanization. Actually, it means the process of integration of urban and rural 
areas in a state and society at a certain stage of economic and social devel-
opment. This process will last long and the integration will not happen at 
once. There is a view that the best period for urban-rural integration is when 
the urbanization rate is about 50%. As we know, the rate of China in 2010 
has achieved 47.5%, an indication of the best time for the integration.   
If this were the case, this paper believes that urban-rural integration 
should include three basic elements from the perspective of system. Firstly, 
it should systematically ensure that various elements of urban and rural areas 
flow free and are not limited. Secondly, as the policy goal of the government, 
it should be a unified policy for both areas rather than two policies- one for 
urban area and the other for rural area. Thirdly, under the same policy goal, a 
unified institutional arrangement and design should be adopted in both ar-
eas.   
Based on the above understanding, urban-rural integration should include 
three goals. Firstly, in terms of politics, we should make traditional farmers 
and citizens have equal social status and common political rights. Secondly, 
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in terms of economy, we should make productivity developed at the same 
level through promoting urban-rural integration, especially rural productiv-
ity. Thirdly, in terms of public service, we should make both urban and rural 
resident enjoy almost the same living standard and quality. 
In general, there are three trends for realizing urban-rural integration. 
Firstly, we should break the system and policy restrictions on separated ad-
ministration of urban and rural areas. Secondly, we should unify the planning, 
construction and management of urban and rural areas. Thirdly, we should 
achieve the harmonious, coordinated and sustainable development of urban 
and rural economy and society. The above is the framework of the analysis on 
urban-rural integration, including the meaning, goals, and ways to achieve it. 
2.  Economic development at country-level of urban-rural integration:  
an important growth pole 
As the world's largest emerging economy, China will undoubtedly witness its 
booming economic development in the future. But after the financial crisis, 
China may show a significant shift in strategy patterns of its economic devel-
opment. 
When China implemented its reform and opening up policy, world econ-
omy began to show a trend of integration. Attracted by China’s low-price re-
sources and the inexhaustible supply of cheap labor force, the tide of inter-
national capital flew into China, injecting great vitality to local economy. But 
in fact, this tide is a result of the strategic adjustment of economic structure 
of Western countries. An important aspect of this adjustment is to shift fac-
tories with large consumption of resources and serious environmental pollu-
tion to developing countries. Thus, China has to accept those outdated pro-
duction facilities from western countries while it obtains international capi-
tal. This is because China has almost no choice but to accelerate the pace of 
development with the help of international capital and solve a series of prob-
lems, including food and clothing. In this sense, China passively makes its way 
to economic development guided by the low-cost export strategy. Imple-
menting this strategy step by step with southeast coast regions leading the 
opening up is an inevitable choice for China to develop into an export-ori-
ented economy. On the one hand, economic globalization and large amount 
of cheap labor have brought China huge development dividends so that its 
processing industry performs noticeably well in the world. On the other hand, 
this dividend has also cost China a lot in resource and environment and in 
over 200 million migrant workers without social security. High investment, 
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consumption and pollution, the three problems China has experienced during 
its 30 years of economic development, lead to the growth rate of 9.7% in 
exchange. The problem that China's economic development is not sustaina-
ble is exposed in the financial crisis.  
Firstly, from the perspective of international community, China, as an eco-
nomic power, will not develop its manufacturing at a fairly low added level in 
the future. Instead, China must find its place in the high-end industrial chain, 
which is a inevitable choice for it to grow stronger. Secondly, changes in con-
sumer behavior in developed countries and trade frictions have also forced 
China to adjust its low-cost export strategy. Based on the above analysis, this 
paper believes that China should transform the strategy it has long insisted 
on, that is, to develop its inland with with the leading role of southeast coast 
areas. The goal of this transformation is to implement a strategy called “com-
bining point and plane”, which aims to develop economy in an all-round way 
from a certain place to the whole region.   
The so-called “point” refers to the regional economic circles made up by 
several big and medium-sized cities during 30 years of reform and opening 
up. These circle is the first growth pole in China’s future economic develop-
ment. Their dominant position will lead the future direction of China's eco-
nomic development and establish China's position in the world economy. 
They include the Yangtze River Delta economic circle, the Pearl River Delta 
economic circle, the Bohai Rim economic circle covering Beijing and Tianjin, 
Haixi Economic circle, the Beibu Gulf economic circle, Chengdu-Chongqing 
Economic circle, Wuhan-Changsha Economic circle in central region, Guan-
zhong economic zone, the northeast economic zone, etc.. The so-called 
"plane" refers to the economies consisting of more than 2,300 counties and 
county-level cities in China, which can become a new economic growth pole 
in the future by empowering developed counties and strengthening their 
economy. It can be envisaged that once the important role of counties in 
China’s economic and social development is established in the future, with 
the support of construction and investment of infrastructure, high-quality ed-
ucational and medical resources, and the establishment and improvement of 
social security system so as to lay a solid foundation for urbanization, county 
economy will definitely boost China’s economic growth.  
The “combining point and plane” strategy for China’s future economic 
growth will probably restructure the industrialization, urbanization and inte-
gration of urban and rural areas in China, by which we can realize three main 
goals.  
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Firstly, we should fundamentally transform the export-oriented economic 
development model passively established at the beginning of reform and 
opening up into a domestic demand-driven model with active expansion of 
export.  
Secondly, we should achieve industrial upgrading, and find a place in the 
high-end of world chain.  
Thirdly, we should crack the dual social structure by a fundamental change 
in the economic growth pattern so as to achieve sustainable development. 
The three main goals are in line with the one regarding a reform of eco-
nomic growth pattern recently put forward by the central government, that 
is, to transform China’s future economic growth from driven by investment 
and exports to by consumption, investment and exports, and from led mainly 
by secondary industry to jointly by primary, secondary and tertiary industries. 
This goal is also consistent with policies of adjustment in income distribution 
structure, urban and rural structure (to speed up urbanization), regional 
structure and spatial structure of land development and industrial structure 
(to accelerate strategic emerging industries and services). The strategic 
transformation of China's economy will certainly have profound impact on its 
future modernization. 
3.  The biggest obstacle to achieve urban-rural integration strategy: 
system 
Based on the above ideas and analysis, we should find out the major obstacle 
for us to achieve urban-rural integration after three decades of reform and 
development. Before analyzing the obstacle, this paper will provide three 
judgments. Firstly, China has made enormous achievements in three decades 
of reform and opening up and witnessed the rapid industrialization and ur-
banization, but it is unable to and does not achieve urban-rural integration. 
Basically, It has separate development in two aspects- one is industrialization, 
the other is urbanization. Secondly, three decades of reform and opening up 
has greatly improved living standards of Chinese people, including that of 
farmers, and brought the number of impoverished people down from 250 
million to 17 million. But it does not narrow the gap between urban and rural 
areas which even continues to expand with figures showing that the urban-
rural income gap has changed from 2.22:1 in 1978 to 3.33:1 in 2008. Thirdly, 
significant changes that urban and rural areas have undergone and great 
achievements China has made in urbanization and other aspects have not 
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shaken the foundation of separated administration of urban and rural areas 
and even brought out abnormal urbanization, that is, excessive metropolita-
nization. Take Beijing for example, currently its permanent resident popula-
tion is 19.61 million, if coupled with floating population, the figure shoots up 
to 22 million people. Some experts, however, believe that resources and en-
vironment in Beijing is only able to support 18 million people. 
There are many reasons for why the reform has brought great achieve-
ments, but does not realize urban-rural integration, three of which can ex-
plain this issue from the perspective of system. Firstly, public policies formu-
lated by the government has always been subject to separated administration 
of urban and rural areas. Thus, there is not a unified policy goal and arrange-
ment. Yesterday at a panel discussion, I said that almost every year after the 
reform and opening up, documents related agriculture were issued against 
the background of separated administration of urban and rural areas, which 
does not help to solve current problems. Secondly, China implemented the 
policy of “putting county under the control of municipal government” in 
1982, which has strengthened separated administration of urban and rural 
areas in a sense. This policy originally aimed at giving play to the leading role 
of central cities in regional economic development. This paper believes that 
it is good at first, but in fact it is perhaps deviated from the goal in the future. 
Readers may have different views. Based on the statistics, 275 out of 330 
prefectures implemented the aforementioned policy in 2002, covering one 
billion people, and more prefectures have carried out this policy in recent 
years. However, some municipal governments block capital projects, contain 
economic development and occupy resources of counties. Thirdly, township 
governance structure does not adapt to and to some extent have adversely 
affected the development process of urban-rural integration. 
4.  To accelerate adjustment of vertical power structure of prefecture: 
the establishment of institutional framework of urban-rural integration  
Problems related to systems have arose during the process of urban-rural in-
tegration, like a single strategic planning of urban and rural areas, and unified 
systems covering planning, household registration, employment and public 
services. Thus, how to adjust the administrative hierarchy has become a very 
important issue. 
According to the central government, the adjustment of administrative 
hierarchy should be coupled with the strategy of empowering developed 
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counties and strengthening their economy so as to reduce management lev-
els and empower local governments. Accelerating the reform of putting coun-
ties directly under the control of provincial governments is a significant step 
in implementing vertical management. There are two main models of this re-
form in China, Hainan Model and Zhejiang Model. Hainan provincial govern-
ment has never implemented the policy of “putting county under the control 
of municipal government” from 1988, when Hainan province was just built. 
In 2008, it continued to streamline administration and delegate power, em-
powering municipal and county governments to deal with 100-plus matters. 
In Zhejiang Province, financial power is held by the provincial government 
while administrative power by municipal governments. Reforms like Zhejiang 
Model mainly aim to expand the power of county governments in economic 
management, which is different from the situation in social management and 
public services. This paper believes that Zhejiang Model is still the best choice 
for other regions. But with the deepening of reform, it can be projected that 
more regions would choose Hainan Model during the Twelfth Five-year Plan 
period, not only financial power but also administrative power of county gov-
ernments are directly under the control of provincial government. Besides, 
the rapidly developing modernization, highway and E-government have pro-
vided guarantees for implementing the policy of putting county under the 
control of municipal government, increasing the number of entities directly 
governed by provincial government, and expanding management range.  
According to this paper, the administrative hierarchy should be based on 
local conditions and can coexist with other management structure. For in-
stance, after implementing the policy of putting counties directly under the 
control of provincial government, economically developed regions in the east 
can consider to cancel and integrate some township governments into agen-
cies so as to flatten management structure. In middle and western regions, 
township governments can be maintained with financial affairs of towns han-
dled by counties so as to avoid increasing burden on people because of their 
existence and to assume public services within their financial capacity. We 
can make effort to move forward this reform from six aspects.  
Firstly, we should strive to develop county economy and make counties be-
come the leading force in implementing urban-rural integration strategy. Cur-
rently there are almost 2200 counties and county-level cities in China, and 
2800 in total if coupled with prefectures. As a whole, counties assume most 
public services and social management, but their economic strength is still 
relatively weak as a result of lacking investment in public infrastructure and 
of unreasonable distribution of medical and educational resources. From the 
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perspective of development, only when county economy enjoys considerable 
growth and become an important growth pole of national economy in the 
future can it lay a solid foundation for modernization and accelerate the pro-
cess of China's urban-rural integration. Conversely, if the great economic de-
velopment of thousands of counties and tens of thousands of towns cannot 
be achieved, it will not lead to the realization of modernization or urban-rural 
integration. Thus, we should put county economic development in a promi-
nent position. 
Secondly, we should promote the transfer of power from provincial and mu-
nicipal governments to county governments. Counties are important carriers for 
industrialization and urbanization, but much power is held by provincial and 
municipal governments so that county governments do not have enough fi-
nancial power to handle administrative affairs, social and public manage-
ment. We should promote provincial governments to empower county gov-
ernments by the reform of governing counties by provincial governments so 
as to balance financial power and authority.  
Thirdly, we should further separate duties and powers of central, provincial, 
municipal and county governments. We should define responsibilities in social 
management and basic public services that governments at different levels 
shall take, and set up  transfer payment systems respectively at central and 
provincial level. It is of vital importance to establish a standard provincial 
transfer payment system after county finance is included into provincial fi-
nance since each province has almost 100 counties with uneven develop-
ment. By doing so can we implement the policy of empowering developed 
counties and strengthening their economy which is fair to all counties rather 
than making developed one stronger while developing one weaker. 
Fourthly, we should make a bit of adjustment in the provincial and county 
administrative divisions, increasing the number of municipalities. We can make 
a bit of adjustment in large provinces or some unreasonable administrative 
divisions. But such adjustment may not lead to the increase of organizational 
system at the provincial level. Instead, only by setting cities like Dalian, Qing-
dao, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shenzhen as municipalities can we increase the 
number of provincial units. According to area and population of each region 
in China, this paper believes that we should at least have 40 provinces and 
municipalities in total in the future.  
When adjusting the provincial administrative divisions, it is also necessary for 
us to upgrade administration of key counties on the basis of strict demon-
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stration and scientific calculations, or to promote Party secretaries and gov-
ernors at county level to prefecture level or sub-prefecture level, and heads 
at township level to department level. By doing so can we stabilize grass-
roots management teams and mobilize the initiatives of cadres. 
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Promoting Equivalence of Public Services with Fiscal Equity - 
Practice of Germany and Its Inspiration to China 
ZHANG Yonghui  
After the unification of East and West Germany in 1990s, the country was 
facing huge differences between two places in ideology, standard of living, 
development mode etc. However, after hard work for nearly two decades, 
Germany now has become one of the federal countries with the highest 
equalization level: the index of fiscal equity of West and East Germany de-
creased from 50 points of difference to 6 points1, which successfully nar-
rowed down the difference of regional financial disparity and achieved bal-
anced economic development among regions, effectively promoted public 
service level in underdeveloped areas, and thus strongly maintained national 
unity and social harmony and stability. Among all, the fiscal equity mecha-
nism that requires the achievement of fiscal balance for equivalence of public 
service ability is a significant factor. Today under the circumstances that our 
country made great efforts in achieving basic equivalence of public services, 
the practice of Germany undoubtedly will provide beneficial inspiration for 
us, and will give us reference for further completion of reform.  
I.  Public fiscal system of Germany that aims at equivalence  
of public service ability 
Germany is a federal country. Politically, it is a country with combination of 
decentralization and moderate centralization; administratively, three levels 
of government - federation, states and local (cities, counties, villages) take 
their own responsibilities. Government at any level has independent budget, 
and is responsible for congress at its level; economically, it is in the system of 
social market economy.  
Basic Law of Germany clearly presented the requirement of "consistency 
of principal of civil rights to subsistence". The country should provide general 
equivalent living conditions nationwide, and all states should provide resi-
dents with public services at basically identical level. In order to achieve the 
goal, the country must make sure that the financial strength of each state is 
                                               
1  Fan Jida: Distinctive German Fiscal Decentralization, Study Times, 13 September 2010. 
356 
 
similar, i.e. basic equivalence of financial resources. In this case, it can be as-
sured that the difference of ability of providing public service in each state is 
not too wide. However, due to the differences of natural conditions, geo-
graphical locations and historical origins among states, there are actually 
huge gaps of financial resources among them, and in different areas, the gap 
of tax payment per capita can reach to more than 10 times. Thus, in order to 
achieve the goal of equivalence of public services, Germany established a se-
ries of effective and special measures and systems2 concentrating on transfer 
payment system of fiscal balance.  
Germany adopts the tax sharing system of "fiscal centralization and tax 
sharing". Fiscal equity system is a fiscal system with the function of adminis-
trative decentralization management and fiscal and taxation regulation that 
formed under the background of social market economy -- a compound mode 
of latitudinal transfer payment and longitudinal transfer payment combina-
tion: on the basis of dividing governance and expenditure range of all levels 
clearly and giving certain tax jurisdiction to government of all levels, it 
achieves balanced combination of latitudinal and longitudinal capital source 
and longitudinal and latitudinal balance of financial resources layout by lati-
tudinal and longitudinal fiscal equity, in order to ensure providing basically 
balanced public service nationwide.  
i.  Fiscal system of unification of financial control and governance 
Constitution of Germany, i.e. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
has regulations for the division of governance of governments at all levels in 
principal. Meanwhile, it clarifies expenditure liability and tax allocation sys-
tem of governments at all levels, which forms the three-level (federation, 
state and local) the revenue-sharing system. 
Governance division aspect. In principal, if national interest is involved, 
affairs that can only be achieved with nationwide unified action belong to 
central government; local government shall be responsible for affairs that are 
closely related to development of local economy and society; as to special 
affairs, governments above Level-2 shall take shared responsibility. To be 
more specific, the governance scope of federal government mainly include 
national defense, foreign affairs, customs and frontier defense, federal trans-
portation and mails as well as civil affairs and financial management etc. of 
                                               
2   See also Ma Haitao and others: Problem Studies of Basic Equivalence of Public Ser-
vices in China; in: Economic Science Press. 2011 Edition. 
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federal level. The governance scope of state government mainly include civil 
affairs and tax management, police, education affairs, culture affairs, medical 
treatment and health, social security etc. of state level. The governance scope 
of local government is mainly providing public products and services with 
strong regional features, including public affairs, construction and mainte-
nance of public infrastructure service facilities in the district etc.  
Financial control division aspect. Tax is the main source of fiscal revenue 
of all levels in Germany, which takes about 3/4. It is that foundation of in-
come distribution in the 3-level fiscal system of Federal Republic of Germany. 
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany sets tax division of govern-
ments at all levels. According to the requirement of tax sharing system, taxes 
with large amount and stable resource are divided into shared tax, and the 
rest are exclusive tax. Germany carries out the mode of coexistence of shared 
tax and exclusive tax with shared tax being the dominant type. Basic Law 
clearly specifies the tax allocation of governments at all levels. It allows fed-
eral law to make small adjustment, while great adjustment can only be made 
via the amendments of Basic Law. Thus, the tax allocation ratio is relatively 
fixed.  
Accordingly, federal, state and local governments shall take responsibili-
ties of fiscal expenditure to fulfil their own duties in principal, i.e. expenditure 
for federal governance duties shall be arranged by federal government, ex-
penditure for state or local governance duties shall be arranged by state or 
local governments. This reflects the unification between government duties 
(governance) and fiscal expenditure (financial control) of governments of dif-
ferent levels.  
ii.  Fiscal Balance Transfer Payment Mechanism 
Basic Law claims that the allocation of financial resources shall ensure federal 
government and state governments can exercise all duties that they are re-
sponsible for independently. For this purpose, states with lower revenue per 
capita acquire balance from VAT income of all states.  
Fiscal Equity Law specifies the concrete measures: using longitudinal (up-
per and lower governments) and latitudinal (inter-states and cities in the 
same states) equity these two methods to adjust re-allocation of revenue. 
This is the special, wholesome and effective fiscal equity mechanism of Ger-
many.  
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Longitudinal fiscal balance includes two levels: fiscal balance of the Fed-
eral to the States and fiscal balance of the States to local governments within 
their jurisdiction.  
1. Financial transfer payment from federal to state governments. The follow-
ings are a few major methods: one is adjustment of shared ratio of VAT. In 
Germany, shared tax is the main resource of revenue, which is allocated 
to federal, state and local governments according to different types of tax 
and certain proportion. Thus, central finance can take the VAT part as spe-
cial balanced fund and return a part of it to states by per capita. Basic Law 
specifies that federal should take certain proportion from its own VAT 
share to support financially weak and payment imbalanced states, which 
aims to help financially weak states reaching 92% of national average 
standard. Another is special appropriation. As to important investment 
projects that within the scope of state and local governance, federal gov-
ernment shall give certain complement to improve regional economic 
structure, or local urban construction; providing appropriation and com-
plement for some heavy payments for states and assignments relegated 
from federal to states can help balancing the difference among regions.  
 
2. Financial transfer payment from states to local governments in their gov-
ernance. In order to bring fiscal revenue and expenditure level of all local 
governments closely, all states have built up fiscal equity mechanism for 
local governments in their governance as well, but federal has not set uni-
fied rules for concrete practice. Generally, it includes two types: general 
fiscal appropriation, which takes 70% of state to local fiscal appropriation. 
Local governments are the main undertakers of social public affairs of fed-
eral and state governments and local social public affairs, thus state gov-
ernments shall ensure the expenditure for public affairs of local govern-
ments financially. This part of appropriation has no restriction of concrete 
usage, which means it is at local governments' disposal. There are several 
forms: appropriation calculated by local taxation capacity index and de-
mand index; subsidy appropriation for administrative expenditure; special 
appropriation for especially difficult places. Another type is special appro-
priation from province to local and the amount is usually 30% of state to 
local fiscal transfer payment. The appropriation is specialized in state gov-
ernments appointed public service projects, mainly includes kindergar-
tens, elementary, middle schools and higher education, road construction, 
public transportation, culture and entertainment, sports facilities, water 
resource and "Three Waste" treatment, pension, social relief, etc.  
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Latitudinal balance is mainly carrying out interstate* financial transfer 
payment. Rich (financially strong) states transfer parts of fiscal revenue to 
poor (financially weak) states, so that financial revenue and expenditure of 
all states can be approximately balanced. Interstate financial transfer needs 
the approval of federal senators. After federal calculates taxation capacity 
and standard tax demand of all states with rigorous and complex formulated 
approach, the strength of financial resources and level of transfer payment of 
all states can be confirmed. At last, it will be confirmed whether the state has 
balance obligation or qualification.  
States with balance obligation will "support" states with balance qualifi-
cation with fiscal revenue according to calculated proportion. Thus, even the 
financial resources of poor states can increase to 95% of average national 
financial capacity. By means of "borrowing from the rich", public services abil-
ity of all states is generally equivalent, which is useful for the equivalence to 
some extent. At last, federal government carries out transfer payment by sup-
plement appropriation for some especially difficult states to keep balance; 
there are all sorts of preferential policies for underdeveloped areas3.  
By means of crisscross transfer payment mechanism, Germany achieves 
latitudinal and longitudinal balance of financial resources distributions, pro-
motes comparatively equivalence of financial capability of all states, and ba-
sically achieves equivalence of public services nationwide. 
II.  Analysis of fiscal equity problems that influence basic equivalence  
of public services of our country 
Basic equivalence of public services has been generally achieved in devel-
oped countries. In contrast, basic equivalence of public services has only 
started in China. Since basic equivalence of public services has fundamental 
security of subsistence and development of citizens, it became the obligated 
duty of a country (government). Therefore, it goes without saying that how 
important the role of government finance plays. From the practice of Ger-
many, we can see that fiscal equity is very crucial to equivalence of public 
services capacity. As to reality, fiscal disequilibrium is extremely obvious in 
our country: the huge gap in public services among regions, urban and rural 
                                               
3  Experience and Inspiration of Supply and Supervision of German Public Services. Infor-
mation Network of Economic System Reform www.sdpc.gov.cn 
*  No further explanation because interstate financial transfer payment takes small pro-
portion in the whole system and only few states implement. – Author’s note. 
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areas and people presents huge difference of financial resources acquisition 
among them.  
There are historical as well as realistic reasons for the difference. One is 
long existed urban-rural dual structure. The existence of dual structure not 
only generally led to huge difference in resources access and welfare distri-
bution between urban and rural areas in decades after the establishment of 
New China, but also became the main reason that floating population (mi-
grant workers) is difficult to fit in the city where they work due to the house-
hold registration system after the reform and opening-up.  
Judging from the requirements of public fiscal system, there are at least 
two severe problems for now: 
One is mismatching and disunion of central and local governance and fi-
nancial control in the fiscal system. Reform of tax sharing system in 1994 
corrected the malpractice of prevalence of local protectionism under “all-
round responsibility” fiscal system and the capacity of the central macro-reg-
ulation being strongly challenged, which greatly increase the proportion of 
central government in financial allocation. Under the tax sharing system, cen-
tral-local relationship showed the feature of co-existence of "political one-
ness" and "economic federalism"4. Though local acquired certain independ-
ence in this arrangement, generally speaking, in the central-local relationship, 
the weight of central rights is strengthened, while the burden of local obliga-
tion is increased. In other words, reform of tax sharing system enhanced the 
fiscal extractive capacity of central government while delegated public ser-
vice responsibility of central government, which means the center of finance 
moved upwards and the center of governance moved downwards. In condi-
tions with limited resource, local governments have to take measures to dig 
up more fiscal revenue in order to fulfill regulated responsible governance. 
While in China, there are five levels of administrative units: central, province, 
prefecture-level city, county and village. According to the logic of chain trans-
ferred responsibilities, it is necessary that the further it goes down, the heav-
ier the responsibilities are, but the less the resource (fiscal revenue) is. As 
such, the disunion of financial control and governance is more obvious, which 
has been confirmed by numerous researches.  
                                               
4  Yang Guangbin: Decentralization reform of China – Analysis of Following the Main 
Line of Central-Local Relationship. Ideas and Interests in the Political Reform of China. 
Yang Guangbin, Kou Jianwen/chief editor, China Renmin University Press, Jan 2012 
Edition. 
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Another is that the rebalance function of finance is not obvious in the ar-
rangement of financial transfer payment mechanism. Financial transfer pay-
ment of our country was established on the basis of tax sharing system in 
1994, which is still a nonstandard and transitional arrangement of system 
mechanism. Its content mainly includes three methods: tax return, financial 
transfer payment and special transfer payment. From the result, tax return 
adopts radix method, which is beneficial for arousing the enthusiasm of high 
fiscal revenue areas, but solidifies the problem of financial disparity formed 
under the financial contract system. It can easily lead to the Matthew Effect 
that "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer". According to this return 
standard, developed areas get more tax return, while underdeveloped areas 
get less. As a result, it enlarges regional allocation difference of financial re-
sources, and the balance function of transfer payment is weakened. However, 
transfer payment of financial resources is targeted to supplement financial 
transfer for poorer provinces. Without mature and scientific calculation and 
assessment of fiscal revenue and expenditure, the transfer can hardly balance 
financial capacity in different regions and achieve equivalence of public ser-
vices. According to international experience, special transfer payment has 
clear direction of usage, takes effect fast and is easy to supervise in terms of 
implementing given policies and goals of central government, playing central 
finance's role in macroeconomic regulation and control, leading reasonable 
adjustment of resources of locals, promoting development of local economy, 
etc. However, due to unclear governance division of governments at all levels 
and insufficiency of reasonable and normative calculation standard,  "running 
around for funds" has become an important job duty for many local govern-
ments in China. It severely affects the function of financial transfer payment 
in promoting the capacity of basic public services standard in relatively less 
developed areas and hinders the achievement of basic equivalence of public 
services.  
III.  Promoting basic equivalence of public services of our country  
by means of fiscal equity  
General Secretary Hu Jintao pointed out in the Report of the 17th National 
Congress of CPC: we need to strengthen the matching system of central and 
local financial resources and governance, improve fiscal system under prov-
ince, enhance public services ability of basic-level governments, which 
pointed out the direction of our further endeavors. As mentioned above, by 
means of fiscal equity, Germany achieved basic balance of offering ability of 
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public services standard among places with different locations and economic 
development standard via financial transfer payment with longitudinal and 
latitudinal adjustment, which provides good foundation for the sustainable 
development of the harmonious and stable Germany. This should be a bene-
ficial reference for a country that is carrying out basic equivalence of public 
services project like us.  
Considering the huge difference of development phase, fundamental re-
alities, system and mechanism of Germany, whereas our country is going 
through the process of economic and social transfer, and governmental func-
tion is in the transition of transformation and reconstruction, the fiscal eq-
uity-oriented promotion of basic equivalence of public services can only be a 
gradually process that completes in development and appears its own fea-
tures. However, during the process, at least the followings need continuous 
exploration and improvement: 
First is exploring the reform of current binary household registration sys-
tem and gradually weakening and eventually annulling the function of house-
hold registration factor in terms of basic public services. Without reform of 
binary system, the allocation of financial resources can never be balanced. As 
historical existence, binary household registration system has played an im-
portant role. However, it has become a kind of discriminative institutional 
factor that affects numerous groups of enjoying their deserved public finan-
cial services provide by the country nowadays, and it further hinders the de-
velopment of urbanization progress and the merging process of national 
economy and society.  
Second is the exploration of division of duty and authority of govern-
ments at all levels. Unclear division of duties not only affects the implemen-
tation of duties, but also has huge influence on the establishment of reason-
able systems of financial resources distribution of duty implementation. 
From the practice of Germany, the constitution of Germany and laws has 
clear definition in terms of governance scope and duties among federal, state 
and local governments. Moreover, there are laws to abide by with regard to 
the level of governance and duties, and even methods of implementation. 
Government at each level has clear division of work and perspicuous rights 
and liabilities, thus providing solid foundation for the establishment and ef-
fective running of grated tax for different levels financial system. While the 
reality of our country is the co-existence of unreasonable division of duties 
of central and overall local governments and mismatching of allocation of fi-
nancial resources and responsibilities, and the allocation of responsibilities 
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and equipment of financial resources of governments at all levels under pro-
vincial seem to share the same problems. As a matter of fact, it is s a generally 
problem in terms of the establishment of public fiscal system of our country.  
Third is the exploration of scientific and reasonable financial transfer 
mechanism led by central finance. Leading by central finance is the develop-
ment trend and common feature of modern public finance. It helps to develop 
and strengthen central's innate advantage in macroeconomic regulation and 
control and coordinate the increasingly complicated and heavy duty of eco-
nomic and social affairs. In the meantime, it enables central government to 
cover coordination and development fees for re-allocation (i.e. financial 
transfer payment) in different regions, thus to narrow the developmental gap 
among regions. Overall, current financial transfer payment obviously has 
transitional feature. Led by fiscal balance, we need to work out all sorts of 
financial transfer payment method by scientific research and reasonable de-
sign. Considering current interest of all local governments, the fact that local 
governments will still be a significant driving force of economic development 
and the trend of governmental function transformation in a long time, we 
need to make moderate adjustment of current financial transfer method. To 
be more specific, we need to: cut down the proportion of tax return moder-
ately; confirm relatively accurate amount of financial transfer payment on the 
basis of relatively accurate measurement of providing standard requirements 
of basic public services of all regions and local financial revenue and expendi-
ture; establish and design relatively complete mechanism of previous confir-
mation, fund payment and subsequent supervision for special transfer pay-
ment, in order to avoid malpractice such as "running around for funds".  
Fourth is to gradually establish relatively comprehensive financial super-
vision system. Germany has comprehensive supervision system for the use 
of fiscal funds, which includes legislative and judicial supervision, financial 
sector supervision, social public supervision and social intermediary agency 
supervision, accounting firm for instance. As users of financial funds, the ex-
ecution must follow the approved budget. Drawing up and implementation 
of financial budget must be clear and explicit, including time, projects and 
methods. On the contrary, the current fiscal system of our country is exten-
sive. No matter in financial budget, financial performance or fiscal audit, we 
have the transitional features of non-transparency and lack of standardiza-
tion. As to the practice, financial budget and other information that govern-
ments at all levels started to publish in recent years generally has the prob-
lems of being too extensive, lacking of declaration and detail items remaining 
private, which lead to weak supervision from the public. We should complete 
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the operation of government finance, regulate the establishment, execution, 
audit, publicity and other procedures of government finance budget by 
means of systematism, and establish and perfect comprehensive financial su-
pervision system including NPC, CPPCC, audit, social public etc.  
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Situation and Thoughts in Province-County Direct Governance 
LIU Yong  
Between May 15 to 22 2012, along with a research group of the Administra-
tive Divisions and Geographical Names Department of the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs Division, I went to Taizhou, Yangzhou (Jiangdu), and Zhenjiang of the 
Jiangsu Province; and the City of Yiwu of Jinhua, Zhejiang, and the town of 
Xucun of Haining, Jiaxing, Zhejiang, and other areas, to learn about the pilots 
of “counties directly governed by provinces” on the “direct control of the 
county”. During the one week field research, study and discussion, I got a lot 
of first-hand materials, heard many valuable comments and suggestions, and 
was greatly inspired. Now I will report the information relevant to the re-
search. 
I.  The implementation of the system of “counties directly governed  
by provinces” has effectively promoted the development  
of county economy 
The counties visited by the research generally reflected that the implementa-
tion of the “counties directly governed by provinces” system has reduced ad-
ministrative levels and costs, advanced the construction and development of 
the urban system within counties, and effectively promoted the rapid, 
healthy and stable development of county economy and society.  
1. The promotion of the rapid growth of county economy. The pilot in the 
Jiangdu city showed that since the beginning of the pilot of “counties directly 
governed by provinces” in 2002, along with the implementation of the policy 
of “expanding power and strengthening counties”, the financial settlement, 
project approval etc had been directly governed by the province, which had 
greatly improved the independent development of the county’s economy, in-
creased the opportunities of obtaining projects and the success rate of appli-
cations, and accelerated the economic development of Jiangdu. From 2002 
to 2008, the annual growth rate of the economy of Jiangdu averaged about 
15%, well above the growth rate before the pilot. By 2008, its GDP reached 
33.5 billion RMB. Even under the influence of the world financial crisis, in the 
first four month of 2009, the growth rate of the economy of Jiangdu still 
reached 13.4%. Since 1993, a fiscal system of “county governed by province” 
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has been implemented in the Yiwu city. In addition, since 2002, the provincial 
and prefectural government has delegated the authority related to 697 eco-
nomic and social events to Yiwu, significantly enhancing the ability of Yiwu 
to accelerate economic and social development. Since the expansion of its 
power, the growth rate of the economy of Yiwu had remained above 15 per-
cent, and the growth rate of its government revenue remained above 30%. In 
2008, its GDP and government revenue reached 49.3 billion RMB and 6.9 
billion RMB respectively. 
2. The advancing of the construction and development of the urban system 
within counties. The conclusion of the Yiwu city was that since the expansion 
of its power, the capability of urban construction of Yiwu had been signifi-
cantly enhanced, and the construction of the urban system continued to ac-
celerate, promoting the development of urbanization and the rapid expan-
sion of the urban area. By 2008, the built-up area of downtown Yiwu had 
reached 78 square kilometers, the size of a metropolis, which was almost dou-
ble what it was in 2002 (38 square kilometers) and quadruple what it was in 
1997(15 square kilometers); its urbanization rate had reached 78%, entering 
the stage of high degree urbanization development. The built-up areas of var-
ious townships had expanded to different degrees, and population and indus-
try continued to concentrate in urban areas and administrative towns, accel-
erating the formation and development of the urban system; urban infra-
structure continued to be extended to the countryside, and central treatment 
of the rural and urban waste and sewage had been fully implemented, pro-
moting the integration of urban and rural development. 
3. The improving of administrative efficiency. According to the experience of 
the Yiwu city, the reform of expanding the power had reduced administrative 
levels, strengthened the sense of responsibility of the county-level govern-
ment, simplified the approval procedures, reduced administrative costs, and 
improved government efficiency. Compared with the situation before the ex-
pansion of power, the average time spent on applying for projects has been 
reduced by 4 to 5 working days; the delegation of the authority to hold civil 
service exams and exams related to professional titles by the prefecture-level 
city had saved more than 1.5 million RMB in costs within two years; the del-
egation of the authority for the registration of changes related to vehicles 
down from the prefecture-level traffic police department could save 5 million 
RMB in a single year. 
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II.  The implementation of the system of “counties directly governed  
by provinces” is still problematic and faced with obstacles 
At the beginning of reform and opening up, in order to give full play of the 
central and leading role of cities in the promotion of regional economic de-
velopment, and reduce the number of local governments within the same 
area, China began the full implementation of the merge of prefectures and 
cities, the merge of cities and counties, and the administrative division sys-
tem of “cities governing the counties”, gradually forming the pattern of 
changing a prefecture to a city and setting up a city covering a county as a 
whole. Years of practice has proved that this division system has both pros 
and cons, but the drawbacks are more prominent, namely: under our national 
conditions of a large population and a serious shortage of resources, the ex-
isting prefecture-level cities simply cannot meet the requirements for a high 
degree of industrialization and urbanization; the lack of a proper level of con-
nections between the rural and urban area hinders the formation of a com-
plete architecture of the urban system, and the formation of the reasonable 
spatial distribution pattern of regional economy---“big dispersion and small 
concentration”; the development gap between regions and the gap between 
urban and rural areas in particular, continues to widen, hindering the coordi-
nation of regional economy and the harmonious development of society; etc. 
However, since the system of “cities governing the counties” has been estab-
lished and a pattern certain vested interests has been formed, compelling 
reasons, considerable commitment, and considerable time and effort are re-
quired to break this pattern. Generally speaking, the full implementation of 
the system of “counties directly governed by provinces” across China is still 
problematic and faced with obstacles, including mainly the following aspects. 
1. There are obvious differences between the views of prefecture-level cities 
and counties (cities) on the system of “counties directly governed by prov-
inces”. During the research, we found that the attitudes and understanding 
of the system of “counties directly governed by provinces” of the govern-
ments of prefecture-level cities and counties (cities) were completely differ-
ent. In general, most prefecture-level city governments held a negative atti-
tude about the system. They did not think that they had been grabbing the 
interests of counties (cities); instead, they had been working hard to promote 
the development of counties (cities). For example, the Taizhou City was of 
the opinion that the system of “Counties directly governed by provinces” was 
theoretically possible, which would help to reduce the administrative levels, 
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reduce administrative costs, and improve administrative efficiency, but prac-
tice proved that the current pilot of the system of “counties directly governed 
by provinces” did not work, because actually administration levels had not 
been reduced (the authority of governing important and lucrative issues has 
been delegated to the counties, while the authority of governing difficult and 
unprofitable issues remains at the prefecture-level cities). This actually in-
creased the administrative costs, complicated administrative procedures, and 
increased the difficulty of administration. The Taizhou City also believed that 
they did not the concentrate the fiscal resources of counties (cities) in the 
city; instead they had spent a lot of fiscal resources for the development of 
counties (cities). 
However, counties (cities) governments generally actively supported the 
implementation of the system of “counties directly governed by provinces”, 
but due to the different levels of economic development of various counties 
(cities), there were slight differences between their specific reasons for sup-
porting the system or their specific attitude toward the system. Economically 
developed counties (cities) were very supportive the adoption of the system 
of “counties directly governed by provinces”, so they can get a lot of oppor-
tunities and space for development; economically backward counties (cities) 
also want the direct governing of the province, in order to have direct access 
to greater provincial support; as for economically moderately developed 
counties (cities), the situation was more complicated. If the economic 
strength of the prefecture-level city was moderate, or even no better than 
that of their own, such counties (cities) certainly hoped that they became in-
dependent and were directly governed by the province. However, if the econ-
omy of the prefecture-level city they were from was relative strong and the 
economy of the province was relatively weak, in order to get more support 
from the prefecture-level city, they would be willing to temporarily remain in 
the system of “cities governing the counties”. There are only a few such coun-
ties (cities), like the Zengcheng City in Guangzhou. 
2. The full implementation of the system of “counties directly governed by 
provinces” will result in excessive administrative workloads for the provincial 
government, hindering the effective administration of the region by the pro-
vincial government. Take the Jiangsu Province as an example. The province is 
currently composed of a total of 13 prefecture-level cities, and 52 counties 
(cities). If all those components are directly governed by the province, the 
Jiangsu Province would have to directly govern “13+52” lower-level adminis-
trative divisions. The practice of various countries shows that number of di-
rectly governed subordinate administrative divisions should not exceed 40 to 
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50, otherwise the effects of direct governance would be affected. There are 
even more subordinate administrative divisions of prefecture-level cities and 
counties (cities) in other province, generally between 80 to 100 ones. There-
fore, the full implementation of the system of “counties directly governed by 
provinces” would require the adjustment of the size of the provincial-level 
administrative regions accordingly. 
3. The delegation of authority is not enough, impeding the full realization of 
the potentials of the system of “counties directly governed by provinces”. 
Currently, the pilot of the system of “counties directly governed by prov-
inces” is still in its infancy and the delegation of authority is still relatively 
limited, making it difficult to give full play to the potentials of the system. 
According to the information provided by several pilot counties (cities), the 
current inadequacy of the delegation of authority is mainly reflected in the 
following aspects: First, some administrative authority involving critical re-
sources for the economic and social development of counties (cities) has not 
been delegated, such as urban planning and the size of land use, so that the 
development of counties (cities) is still under considerable administrative 
constraints. Second, there are still too many intermediate links in the process 
of project approval. For example, every year, more than 10 billion RMB is in-
vested on infrastructure development in the Yiwu city, but the effects of 
those investments are impeded because the county-level authority of Yiwu 
for administrative approval is limited. Projects exceeding a certain amount of 
money and a certain size of land use have to be submitted to the higher level 
for approval, leading to more intermediate links and long cycles. Third, the 
delegation of authority related to many issues is insufficient and the expan-
sion of power to some more fundamental areas has not begun. Due to such 
factors as economic interests, hierarchy etc, it is difficult to actually imple-
ment the expansion of power in some areas. For example, the Yiwu city has 
managed to obtain the administrative authority for some foreign affairs to 
develop export-oriented economy, but failed to truly exercise the authority 
for various reasons. In terms of the expansion of power to more fundamental 
areas, the progress is limited. At present, the pilots for the expansion of 
power are mainly related to some of the authority of economic and social 
management, and the authority in more fundamental areas, such as adminis-
trative reform, organization and personnel, and institutional management 
basically has not been delegated. However, the delegation of such fundamen-
tal authority is increasingly important for the economic and social develop-
ment of counties. For example, in terms of institutional management, since 
the counties (cities) do not have the authority to setting up institutions, the 
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government of Yiwu could only be organized in accordance with the local reg-
istered population of 700 thousand and the county-level administrative divi-
sion. However, the current resident population of Yiwu has reached two mil-
lion people, which puts tremendous pressure on the normal administration 
of many agencies of the government. 
III.  A few ideas for perfect relevant policies to further promote the 
system of “counties directly governed by provinces” 
1. Taking different measures step by step in different circumstances. The sys-
tem of “counties directly governed by provinces” is directly related to the in-
terests of prefecture-level cities and counties (cities) under its jurisdiction, so 
it should be promoted by taking into full consideration of the wishes of those 
governments and taking different measures step by step in different circum-
stances according to the levels of economic development of various regions 
and the specific relations between prefecture-level cities and counties(cities) 
based on the principle of promoting the industrialization and urbanization 
process in China, promoting the integration of urban and rural development, 
promoting the coordinated development of large, medium and small cities 
and small towns. Specifically, in economically developed regions, the direct 
governing of the counties should be encouraged to strive for greater oppor-
tunities and space for development, but not forced upon those counties (cit-
ies) that are willing to stay within the jurisdiction of the prefecture-level city; 
in economically backward regions, i.e. regions of the so-called “a heavy carts 
drawn by a small horse”, the direct governing of the counties should be 
strongly encouraged to obtain more assistance; as for economically moder-
ately developed regions, the counties(cities) should be allowed to make free 
choice according to their own situation. 
2. Establishing an administrative division system in which cities and counties 
are equal entities, improve regional cooperation organizations, and rational-
ize the relationship between prefecture-level cities and counties. An admin-
istrative division system of an appropriate degree of separate governance for 
urban and rural areas should be established according to international prac-
tice. The administrative levels of various kinds of cities should be phasing out 
and instead categorizing those cities into large, medium, and small ones ac-
cording to their population. The staffing of the administrative agencies 
should be determined according to the population of the city, but the admin-
istrative levels of administrative personnel in all cities should be equivalent. 
Except for direct-controlled municipalities, all other cities of various types 
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should implement the equivalent system of administrative division as that of 
counties (including the future the “Town becoming City”). Accordingly, vari-
ous regional cooperation organizations of a relatively loose structure should 
be established, such as city circles among a city and surrounding counties 
that allow the surrounding counties to have freedom of participation and the 
city to determine the scope of its hinterland according to its own level of eco-
nomic development and influence; regional cooperation organizations of ur-
ban clusters can be established between various cities according to their rel-
ative proximity, connections and division of industries to realize the coordi-
nated development of regional economy; Of course, stretches of urban clus-
ters with a larger range can be formed by combining the urban clusters.  
3. Further promoting the delegation of authority and the expansion of power, 
striving to invigorate the regional economy at all levels, and promoting the 
coordinated development of urban and rural economy. The fundamental aim 
of “counties directly governed by provinces” and the delegation of authority 
are to increase the number of players in the market economy, meet the re-
quirement of China’s industrialization and urbanization for geographical lo-
cations and reasonable space layout, so as to achieve comprehensive, coordi-
nated and sustainable development of China’s regional economies. The sys-
tem of “counties directly governed by provinces” let counties (cities) become 
new independent player in the market economy, and the delegation of au-
thority created the space for the new players of county (city) economy to dis-
play their capabilities. In the future, in order to further promote the rapid de-
velopment of county economy, the delegation of authority should be further 
enhanced, with the focus on the following areas: First, in places where the 
level of cities and counties is equivalent, the same authority should accord-
ingly be given to all cities and counties, such as the authority of urban plan-
ning and land use planning etc; as for those cities that still retain a number of 
counties (cities) within their jurisdiction, some more powers can be properly 
given to them. Second, the authority of the county-level governments in 
terms of personnel, fiscal resources and administration should be aligned. Ac-
cordance with the principle of “full delegation of all the powers that can be 
delegated”, it is proposed that the provincial governments delegate the pow-
ers of their various departments as much as possible to the cities and coun-
ties. And it is also proposed that the ministries and commissions of the cen-
tral government delegate some powers based on local needs as possible or 
delegate some powers through the delegation of provincial governments. 
Third, the reform of the county-level institutions and the strength of person-
nel should be deepened. Without raising the administrative levels, efforts 
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should be made to realize the determination of the institutional structure and 
the strength of personnel of the county-level government according to the 
resident population of a county, in order to ensure that the institutional 
structure and the strength of personnel of the government continue to meet 
the requirements of local economic and social development. 
Finally, it should be noted that, when dealing with the relations between 
various levels of government, the relations between the rights and responsi-
bilities of local governments and agencies under direct leadership. The local 
governments should not inappropriately demand the return of the powers of 
the agencies under direct leadership for their own interests. The correct ap-
proach is to clearly require that the agencies under direct leadership should 
not unreasonably push their responsibilities to a local government without 
such functions following the principle of the unity of administrative powers 
and fiscal powers, and the unity of responsibility and rights, in order to form 
a good system of division of functions among various levels of government 
and promote the further reform of the administrative institutions in China. 
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